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It is claimed that the National Intelligence Model (NIM) consolidated intelligence-led 
policing principles in investigative practice and decision making in British policing.  
Subsequently, encouraged by the Home Office, the NIM was adopted by a number of 
other public services with an investigative capability.  However, that transfer took place 
without a sufficiently rigorous evaluation of the model’s value to the police service and 
without any meaningful analysis of its relevance to the investigative functions of other 
public sector agencies.  This research examined the adoption of the NIM by three public 
sector bodies:  The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), The Identity and 
Passport Service (IPS) and the Driving Standards Agency (DSA).  It drew on archival 
materials, associated literature and the analysis of semi-structured interviews with the 
personnel of these and associated agencies.  Research respondents also assessed a 
simplified version of the NIM that was designed to remove many of the original 
model’s inconsistencies and ambiguities. 
 
The research identified that the reviewed public services are not compliant with the 
NIM minimum standards and that the model has not delivered any meaningful 
improvement in the consistency of process, investigative efficiency, improved 
partnership working, or in fraud reduction in those agencies.  The NIM failed because of 
perceived complexity, the language of the model and supplementary guidance; its 
exclusive ‘fit’ with the police; and a suspicion by the agencies’ personnel that its 
adoption was intended as a performance management and governance tool.  Moreover, 
the revised version of the NIM’s minimum standards did not improve comprehension or 
conformity, or resolve the model’s perceived police bias.  It was concluded that the 
model is not fit for purpose for the agencies studied and that an alternative model that is 
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A brief explanation of terms used within this paper. 
 
Assets 
Within the context of the NIM, these include: knowledge, systems, sources and 
(competent) people to provide the platform and intelligence capability to sustain the 
NIM business process. 
 
Code of Practice 
The ACPO (2005) Code of Practice on the National Intelligence Model, issued in 
January 2005 by the Home Secretary under the Police Reform Act 2002, provides a 
statutory basis for the introduction of NIM minimum standards and its basic principles. 
Chief Officers must have regard to the code and ensure that their forces adopt the 
practices of NIM and implement the required minimum standards. Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is responsible for inspecting the application of 
NIM in all police forces and for ensuring that these Minimum standards are met.  The 
NIM minimum standards consist of 11 individual elements, in total there are 135 
standards and can be viewed in Annex 1. 
 
Control Strategy 
The purpose of the control strategy is to prioritise the work of the Borough Command 
Unit (police area, such as a borough or division) according to an agreed, manageable 
range of issues against which resources can be allocated for the forthcoming six months 
(ACPO/Centrex, 2006: 44).  Once the Strategic T&CG has agreed the crime and 
disorder problems for the control strategy, the group must also agree and recommend 
the strategic priorities for prevention, intelligence and enforcement within each area. 
 
Information Sharing 
According to the NIM Code of Practice (ACPO/Centrex, 2005: 12), the model improves 
the opportunities to share intelligence across forces and agencies, and between local and 
national levels of policing. The NIM has not only been adopted by police forces but also 
by other agencies such as the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), United 
Kingdom Immigration Services (UKIS) and by Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships (CDRP). It reduces barriers to effectiveness by producing standardised 





In its simplest definition, intelligence is described as “Information designed for action” 
(Sims, 1993; Taylor and Tidy, 2000).  An alternative description of the ‘task of 
intelligence’ is “…. to provide facts and inference to support first strategy and policy 
making, second local strategic crime and disorder decisions and third to form the basis 
of effective tactical and operational activity” (Grieve, 2004: 31).  Generally considered 
to be processed data or information – most commonly the ‘processing’ will be 




The intelligence cycle includes the collection, evaluation, analysis and 
dissemination/actioning of criminal intelligence at the relevant levels in police and other 




Intelligence-led investigation has been described as a ‘business model’ and a 
‘managerial philosophy’ where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an 
objective, decision making framework that facilitates crime reduction (Ratcliffe, 2009: 
89).   
 
Intelligence Priorities (as set by the Strategic Tasking and Co-ordinating Group) 
The intelligence priorities within the control strategy should describe the strategic 
direction that needs to be taken to enable the intelligence requirement to be fulfilled. 
 
Intelligence Requirement 
The Intelligence Requirement is a list of facts required, or questions that need answering 
about a problem.  The purpose is to gain more information about crime and disorder 
problems.  The purpose of the intelligence requirement is to direct staff to focus on key 
areas, but it should not prevent them from collecting information on a wide range of 
issues (ACPO/Centrex, 2006: 50). 
xiii 
NIM compliance 
The NIM was given statutory footing by the Police Reform Act 2002 when the 
government required the police to comply with the published minimum standards of the 
model; it is against these standards that inspection is undertaken and the ‘level of 
compliance is determined’ (HMIC, 2008: 7).  To be ‘fully compliant’ all standards must 
be met and adhered to. 
 
Operational Review 
Commissioned by the Tasking and Co-ordination Group, this may include a Results 
Analysis to identify ‘lessons learnt’ for retention in the organisational memory. 
 
Problem Profiles 
Problem profiles are ‘commissioned’ and must be authorised by the TT&CG  
(ACPO/Centrex, 2006: 70); their purpose is to: identify and understand the scope and 
context of the problem; enable operational management to make resource decisions; 
guide investigations and shape plans; highlight prevention, intelligence and enforcement 
opportunities; provide information for partnership; maintain supervision; assist in 
subject selection and identification (suspects or victims); ensure legislative requirements 
are fulfilled; and focus intelligence gathering.  Flood (2004: 51) stated that ‘problem 
profiles’ lead to target profiles and “assets are lined up to enable investigation and 
disruption of those criminals and criminal groups chiefly responsible for the criminality 
described in the problem profile”. 
 
Referral 
Referral is a common expression in non-police public services relating to a suspicious 
report or activity that triggers ‘referral’ to the security department or investigations unit, 
e.g. a tendered benefit application or identity document that is irregular. 
 
Strategic Assessment 
The strategic assessment drives the business of the Strategic Tasking & Co-Ordination 
Group and gives an accurate overview of the current and long term issues affecting the 
organisation (ACPO/Centrex, 2005: 64-65).  The chief architect of the model described 
the strategic assessment as it “…enables the strategic tasking and co-ordination to set 
priorities” (Flood, 2004: 51) 
xiv 
 
Strategic Tasking and Co-ordination Group (ST&CG) 
The ST&CG sets the ‘control strategy’ – the “priorities for intelligence-led enforcement 
and prevention” (Flood, 2004: 51) and the ‘intelligence requirement’ is required to 
deliver the strategic priorities for prevention, intelligence and enforcement.  The 
decisions made by the ST&CG provide the context in which the TT&CG works 
(ACPO/Centrex 2006: 12). 
 
Tactical Assessment 
Tactical assessments – drive the business of the TT&CG. The assessment identifies the 
shorter-term issues in a police force, BCU or region in accordance with the control 




The Tactical Menu comprises four elements: targeting offenders (in accordance with the 
Control Strategy); the management of hot spots (spatial concentrations of criminality); 
the investigation of series criminality or incidents; and the application of preventative 
measures (NCIS, 2000: 14). 
 
Target profiles 
The ‘target profiles’ are commissioned by the Tasking and Co-ordinating Groups to 
secure a greater understanding of either a person (suspect or victim) or group of people, 
in line with the control strategy priorities or high risk issues. 
 
Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group (T&TCG) 
The TT&CG is responsible for considering and determining the requirements at a 
tactical [and operational] level (ACPO/Centrex, 2006: 12), effectively authorising the 
problems and subject profiles recommended.  According to Flood (2004), tactical 
tasking and co-ordination enables “… problem profiles are commissioned to illuminate 
opportunities for tactical response” (Flood, ibid:  51).  The role of the Tactical Tasking 
& Co-ordination Group (TT&CG) is to commission and apply the tactical menu to the 
control strategy; respond to new needs (reactive); and to check that agreed plans are on 
course (NCIS, 2000: 14).   
xv 
Tasking & Co-ordinating 
“At the heart of business management in the NIM is a tasking and co-ordination process 
….. operating at both strategic and tactical levels” (Flood, 2004: 48).  The tasking and 
co-ordination process is the means by which considerations, decisions and directions, 
relating to intelligence products, are communicated to influence the activity of 
intelligence and investigative personnel.  There are two groups, the Strategic Tasking 
and Co-ordination Group (ST&CG) whose main purpose is to set the control strategy, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Foundation of this research 
This study reviews the adoption of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) by non-police 
public services with an investigative capability, to establish their level of compliance with: 
the model; the associated Code of Practice; and the minimum standards.  In addition, from 
the perspective of operational staff, it endeavours to determine whether the application of 
the model delivers benefit in promoting a standardised form of intelligence-led 
investigation; facilitates ‘effective partnership and collaborative working’ (DWP, 2006; 
IPS, 2007); and its perceived impact on fraud.  Critical to this study, and according to the 
NIM Code of Practice: “The National Intelligence Model is not confined to, or restricted 
for specialist usage. It is relevant to all areas of law enforcement; crime and its 
investigation, disorder and community safety.” (Home Office, 2002; para. 3.1.3).  As such, 
the model has been adopted by a number of public service agencies to support and guide 
the process of their investigation services.  Compliance or conformity is determined by 
adherence to the NIM minimum standards that “sets out the criteria by which the model 
should be applied” (ACPO, 2005: 101) 
 
The NIM continues to be closely associated with UK police forces as a mandatory 
ingredient of police management to provide a common system of intelligence-led 
investigation  It is intended to encourage partnership and to support operational policing 
through intelligence-led decision making (ACPO, 2005; Parliament.uk, 2010).  The NIM 
was designed within the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) in 1999 and 
represents a synthesis of a number of intelligence-led initiatives that have been subject to 
trial and development within police services from the 1970s, and ‘due regard to the code’ 
and adoption of NIM practices is now a compulsory for the police within the United 
Kingdom (Ratcliffe, 2008).  The origins and development of intelligence-led policing 
(ILP) and the NIM are reviewed in Chapter 2 of this study.  However, ILP has not been the 
only development, in recent years and there has been a growing consensus that the police 
systems of the Western industrial societies have experienced profound change (Jones and 
Newburn, 2009: 733), particularly in crime control and investigation. In the UK this was 
further stimulated by the Baumber Report (ACPO, 1975), which proposed the employment 
of intelligence to direct policing; the introduction of analysis; and mandatory operational 
briefings (John & Maguire, 2007: 200).  Nor have these changes exclusively focused upon 
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intelligence-led investigation (Ratcliffe, 2008) and include organisational management 
(Chatterton et al, 1996; Johnston, 1996) and the impact of new technology (Marx, 1988).  
However, the compulsory imposition of the NIM and its Code of Practice on the police, 
having been subject to legislation, codified - under section 39A of the Police Act 1996, as 
inserted by Section 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002, required compliance that is subject to 
audit and inspection.  The legislation states that “Chief officers must have regard to the 
code and ensure that their forces adopt the practices of NIM and implement the required 
minimum standards” (ACPO, 2005: 8).  Specific only to police services, the legislative 
requirements do not extend to non-police public services and their compliance will rely 
upon voluntary adherence to the model and the minimum standards. 
 
This study has not focused on police compliance to the minimum standards, nor on the 
impact or efficacy that the NIM may have delivered to their tasking and investigation 
processes and procedures.  Rather, it examines the creation and development of the NIM, 
as public policy; the possibility of policy transfer influencing its evolved profile (from the 
Kent Policing Model); and its adoption and implementation into the broader investigative 
community (Hill, 2009).  With regards to policy, examined in detail in Chapter 4, the 
research intends to examine the level of conformity by non-police agencies and whether 
the current level of adherence to the NIM will provide an appropriate and robust model to 
deliver a nationally consistent intelligence-led investigative process and practice.   
 
Setting the scene 
This study examines the National Intelligence Model (NIM) to establish whether, as a 
business model, or ‘business process in action’ (NPIA, 2009), it is accessible and 
appropriate to non-police public services, with an investigative capability.  In the public 
service context, it seeks to identify whether the NIM encourages intelligence-led 
investigation; facilitates improved partnership and collaborative working; and supports 
reduction in fraud.  The foundation of this enquiry is based upon earlier research (Osborn, 
2008), consultancy and literature review, and examines the model’s relevance to 
organisations beyond the police, initially identifying and reviewing areas of non-
compliance to the NIM processes and asset requirements as outlined in the guidance and 
minimum standards (ACPO/Centrex, 2005).  In response to this review and consultation, it 
proposes that revised, simplified and complementary processes of intelligence-led 
investigation are considered for adoption by non-police public services.  
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The research has employed interview responses of public service criminal investigation 
and intelligence staff and reviewed the investigation and tasking processes of three 
different centralised non-police public services.  In descending order of staff size and 
budget the public services under review were the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP); the Identity & Passport Service (IPS); and the Driving Standards Agency (DSA).  
It has also included a limited number of interviews and process reviews with investigative 
staff of the Driving Vehicle Licence Authority (DVLA) and the Criminal Records Bureau 
(CRB).  The full rationale for this selection, together with their departmental profiles is 
provided in Chapter 3.  In addition, personnel from both the Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS) and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) were consulted to gauge the 
‘police perspective’ and to provide a comparison between a police and non-police agency 
(SOCA) that shared a common business purpose.   
 
Since 2001, on retiring from the Metropolitan Police, I have been professionally engaged 
with the police, SOCA and other public services, predominantly as a consultant and trainer. 
Through exposure and professional collaboration with managers, investigators and 
intelligence staff in public service, a number of revised and generally improvised versions 
of the NIM have been identified.  Public service organisational investigative systems have 
similarities with the published version of the NIM, but it was evident that a consolidated 
and common intelligence-led investigation process between the police and agency 
investigators does not exist.  This experience has provided me with valuable insight and 
some appreciation of the apparent struggle public service investigation managers and staff 
continue to experience in reconciling the demands of the model with their own 
organisational structures and procedures.  It was the evident anomalies of investigative 
practice, tasking and co-ordinating between these agencies that stimulated this research. 
 
Problem Statement 
This research establishes the suitability of the NIM as a process, for non-police public 
service investigation.  The reasons have been identified and an alternative revised, 
simplified and complementary principles of intelligence-led investigation process and 
guidance have been proposed for consideration. 
 
Earlier research (Osborn, 2008) and consultancy experience within UK public service over 
the last decade (see Appendix 2) have identified an apparent will, and business imperative, 
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to forge meaningful partnerships with the police and the broader investigative community.  
The potential benefits of intelligence sharing and complementary investigative practices 
was, and continues to be, acknowledged by senior managers within public services, 
supporting cost reduction and improved investigative products and governance.  By 2006, 
a substantial number of agencies, regulators and Non-Government Organisations had 
embraced and ‘signed up’ to the NIM with an expressed enthusiasm and expectation that it 
would reduce the fraud risk, and deliver benefits to investigative processes and products.  
However, a limited review (Osborn, ibid) of tasking and coordination as an indicator of 
NIM conformity within the DWP. IPS, the security services; and the DSA, identified a low 
level of conformity to the key requirements of NIM.  This research indicated a number of 
potential causes contributing towards non-compliance that included limited investment in 
the required (NIM) assets to support the model; expressed suspicion that the model was a 
thinly disguised ‘performance tool’ with limited and selective adoption of process.  These 
contributors were exacerbated by a limited understanding of the model and the compliance 
criteria by investigators and managers.  It was evident that, to the public service 
investigator, the NIM appeared to be relatively complex and that, with each new 
publication of supplementary guidance, it became more sophisticated, elusive and biased 
towards police application.  It was suggested by an Investigation Manager (RS22) that the 
terminology is exclusive and that outside of the police, direct parallels and interpretation of 
the terms require a creative flexibility; particularly when attempting to reconcile extant 
organisational policy, investigative protocols, systems and procedures with the 
requirements of the model.  In recognition of these concerns there have been some 
published attempts to simplify aspects of the model for police to reduce the bureaucracy 
demanded for strict compliance (Morgan-Jones, 2009: 12-15).    
 
It was evident from early interviews that the NIM was popular with some senior managers 
within ACPO, the police (NCIS, 2000b), the Home Office and a number of senior 
managers within public services.  This appeared to be based on the belief that the NIM, as 
a refined ILP rational model, would prove effective in improving investigation, 
collaborative working and performance. However this popularity was not universally 
shared throughout the public service.  This research will endeavour to establish whether the 
adoption of the NIM has provided benefit to non-police agencies, although the 
effectiveness of the model remains difficult to measure (Maguire, 2004: 5).  Ratcliffe 
(2008: 273) closely associates the NIM with intelligence-led policing, arguing that: “In the 
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UK, it is almost impossible to discuss the concept of intelligence-led policing without 
making reference to the National Intelligence Model (NIM)”.  Acknowledging this close 
association between the NIM and ILP, at the outset of the NIM development Reiner (2000: 
123) argued that the success or otherwise of ILP strategies was ‘hard to measure’ as “a 
crucial difficulty in evaluating policing innovations is the absence of reliable and valid 
measures of police performance.”  This is supported by Tilley (2008: 147) who 
acknowledges that ILP enjoys a ‘high level of surface plausibility’, but qualifies this by 
suggesting that hard statistical evidence of the overall benefits with regard to routine 
offending is hard to find.   
 
In the absence of standardisation and where variations of the model, even between police 
authorities subject to external inspection, are evident, meaningful performance measures 
and comparative analysis can be frustrated (Vass & Simmonds, 2001).  The apparent 
complexity of process (examined in Chapter 4 and 5) and the evident inconsistency in the 
NIM implementation (resulting in numerous versions within the UK police and public 
services) potentially exacerbates accurate measure.  Exclusively referring to the police, 
Burgess, et al (2002: 17) commented “the evaluation of the impact of performance 
monitoring schemes, the level of complexity of policy activity makes it a particular issue in 
this context. Such complexities also suggest that a simple set of performance measures will 
not be sufficient”.  In this respect, statistical evidence as a product of reliable quantitative 
comparative analysis may prove elusive and the research may have to rely upon the 
testimony of operational personnel and managers to provide a measure of ‘benefit’ derived 
from adoption of the NIM by public services. 
 
Rationale 
This Professional Doctorate has encouraged personal reflection on my professional 
experience; feedback in consultancy; and continuing work with public services.  This 
exposure, together with primary research undertaken over the last decade, has indicated 
that key elements and activities of the NIM are often resisted or ‘adapted’ to accommodate 
the core services of the hosting organisation including the prevailing investigative 
protocols and procedures, e.g. identity and issuing passports, or the paying of benefits 
(DWP, 2010a: 2010b).  This non-compliance and apparent operational resistance has 
stimulated and informed this study.  Within the police and public service management, 
there remains a broad acknowledgement that the NIM potentially offers the opportunity 
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and promise of a more unified, standardised and collaborative response to ‘crime control’ 
(Parliament.uk, 2010).  However, this perspective is not apparently shared by all public 
investigators, as the investigation of ‘crime’ is almost exclusively dominated by fraud and 
not ‘volume crime’, community safety, public order, nor the diversity of criminal activities 
dealt with by the police.  As such, this research reviewed whether the NIM and the criteria 
outlined in the minimum standards, supported or confounded agency compliance and their 
suitability for investigators and security managers within public services outside of 
mainstream policing.   
 
Aims and objectives 
The aim and objectives of this research is provided at Appendix 1, and are shown in 
summary below. 
 
1. Assess the relevance and accessibility of the NIM, as a business model to non-
police public services. 
2. Establish the level of compliance with the NIM, Code of Practice and minimum 
standards by public service investigative teams. 
3. Identify the specific areas of non-compliance and assess its impact on intelligence-
led investigation, decision making and partnership. 
4. Identify and evaluate the causes for non-compliance with regards to the model’s 
asset requirements, process and procedural change and cultural resistance. 
5. Assess whether a revised edition of the NIM minimum standards will improve the 
comprehension and understanding of the public service investigation teams. 
6. Propose any potential remedies to non-compliance with the NIM. 
 
Structure 
The following chapter (2) introduces the origins and development of intelligence-led 
policing and the NIM.  Chapter 3 provides an explanation of the research design; the 
ethical issues in carrying out this research; and the challenges encountered.  Chapter 4 
summarises the literature review, including relevant earlier research, to provide the 
intelligence origins of the NIM; and its validity as a business model; whilst Chapter 5 
provides a summary of the findings of the primary research concluding with a summary 
and interpretation of the results and relevance to this study.  Chapter 6 draws upon the 
findings and examines the conflicting perspectives - proposing a revised and simplified 
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model and guidance that may reconcile the different core businesses and investigative 
processes of public services. The concluding chapter (7) provides a concise summary and 
review of this study identifying difficulties and compliance problems associated with the 
NIM experienced by public services.   
 
Summary 
This research describes the public service implementation of the NIM; specifically from 
the perspective of the non-police agency operational ‘users’.  It reviews aspects of 
conformity with the model and the minimum standards to establish whether, adopted in its 
current form, there is any real, or perceived, benefit to the reduction of fraud, either 
through improved intelligence led investigation, decision making or productive 
partnership.   
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Chapter 2: Origins, foundation and development of the NIM 
Introduction 
The NIM, launched in 1999, was commissioned by ACPO (Christopher, 2003: 154) and 
was formulated within NCIS.  It was co-authored by Messrs Flood and Gaspar, primarily 
inspired by ILP, and developed from the Kent Policing Model (KPM).  The NIM resulted 
from an ‘accelerating push’ to professionalise police practice which was, in Kent Police, 
championed by their Chief Officer David Phillips and then promoted, firstly by ACPO to 
the Home Office and then as a central government ‘law and order agenda’.  As a precursor 
to the introduction of the NIM, the 1990s witnessed police forces adopting and progressing 
proactive methods of crime management in response to the National Audit Commission’s 
(1993) report ‘Helping with Enquiries –Tackling Crime Effectively’.  This resulted in 
increased intelligence application by police including the creation of the Directorate of 
Intelligence (SO11) within the MPS (John Grieve Centre, 2010) together with the launch 
of the Systems for Investigation and Detection (SID) project in 1991 (Grieve, 2004: 33).  
This broadly synchronised with intelligence-led policing (ILP) experiments in Kent (John 
& Maguire, 2007: 210) resulting in the introduction of the KPM in 1993.  A number of 
notable commentators suggest that the full arrival of ILP coincided with the establishment 
of the NIM (Savage, 2007; Rowe, 2008) and this is supported by Ratcliffe (2008, 4) who 
argues that “the concept of ILP is enshrined in legislation that demanded all forces adopt 
the NIM in 2004”.  This proposes that the NIM is a direct evolutionary product and 
conceptual reflection of ILP, albeit for non-police public service consumption, this is more 
commonly referred to as ‘intelligence-led investigation’.   
 
Predominantly the model and minimum standards reinforce key areas of policing activity 
and business as illustrated by the inclusion of ‘core business areas’ of policing such as 
‘disorder’ and ‘community problems’ (ACPO, 2005: 103).  These terms, together with 
allied police terminology and complexity “at some levels of the model” (Flood, 2004: 51) 
within the ‘Guidance’, indicate that the model, as originally conceived, was not designed 
or intended for adoption by non-police agencies.  The NIM ‘Guidance’ provides no 
qualification or exemption for public services, stating that it is necessary to apply the 
criteria within the minimum standards (ACPO, 2005, 2.2.1: 101) including the acquisition 
of key assets and implementation of the processes to support intelligence-led investigation 
and decision making.  Arguably, selective adoption, available to non-police agencies, may 
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deliver some benefits, however failure or inability to meet the ‘minimum standard’ criteria 
will frustrate standardisation and, potentially, decrease the advantages of intelligence-led 
investigation implicit in the model.  I would therefore argue that cosmetic or superficial 
adoption will confound the aspiration for: national standardisation; improved investigation 
and decision making; and commonality of process, necessary to facilitate collaborative 
working and partnership. 
 
This chapter will review the NIM as a developed intelligence-led business model and a 
reincarnate and modified version of the Kent Policing Model, representing an evolved 
product of ILP; designed by NCIS, sponsored by ACPO; and adopted by the Home Office 
for national implementation.  To preserve chronology, I will initially review the origins of 
ILP within the UK.  An additional inclusion is a brief description of the Intelligence Cycle 
(Baumber Report: ACPO, 1975) as it provides a common thread through the three 
interrelated processes expounded by intelligence-led policing, the KPM and the NIM.  
Having established a foundation of ILP as a process, this will be followed with an 
examination of the stimulus and development of the KPM.  This is followed by a 
contextual review of its progeny - the NIM including a description of ‘compliance’ for the 
police and ‘conformity’ from the public service perspective.  This is supplemented with a 
brief review of the core decision making ingredient of the model ‘tasking and co-
ordinating’; and the ‘intelligence strategy’ that was included within the KPM.  The final 
element of this chapter provides a review of the NIM as a potential tool of partnership. 
 
Intelligence-led policing (ILP) 
The concept of gathering and exploiting intelligence as an aid to investigation is not new 
and will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4.  Even within the police, early detectives 
and investigators were aware of the value of intelligence, often derived from crime logs 
and informants, but it was the slim ranks of the early CID who maintained an almost 
exclusive preserve of ‘intelligence application’ described by Maguire (2003: 365) as 
“possessing the monopoly of expertise” in this arena.  However, this elite group did not 
practice any systematic recording or processes in the collection and application of 
intelligence (PRO MEPO 2/4967, 1936; cited in James, 2011: 45).  Although since the 
1920s a card index system of ‘local thieves’ had been maintained in (MPS) CID offices 
(Grieve, 2004: 27).  The process of intelligence development, synthesis and inference were 
generally not institutionally employed in mainstream (and uniform) policing.  Intelligence-
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led policing was a devised paradigm of the 1970s that appeared to strike popular resonance 
with police managers and, over time and through refinement, delivered operational benefits 
(Ratcliffe, 2008).  John & Maguire (2007: 200) suggested that the Baumber Report 
(ACPO, 1975) initiated the concept (now familiar in modern policing) that intelligence 
gathering and analysis should be employed to generate a fuller picture of crime and 
disorder and it was necessary to brief officers with relevant information.  It is appropriate 
therefore that this research commences with ILP credited to the Baumber review and 
report. 
 
Before the Baumber Report (ACPO 1975), the expression of ‘criminal intelligence’ lacked 
a documented common vision, strategic aim or working definition within the UK police 
community. (Ratcliffe, 2008).  That is not to suggest complete institutional torpor as in the 
1960s the MPS C5(2) Intelligence Section developed its own surveillance unit and with the 
London and Provincial Liaison Section (C9) evolved into C11 (Grieve, 2004: 28) – 
focusing on the collection and development of criminal intelligence.  However, on 
commencing his inquiry, Baumber’s first self-imposed task, was to consider whether the 
police needed an intelligence system at all (James 2010: 98).  My experience of police 
training in the 1970s, supported this consideration as it was relatively devoid of any 
reference to intelligence gathering or application, being dominated by the recognition of 
offences and the reporting of crime with only limited guidance being provided for 
investigation.  Flood (2004) argues that preceding Baumber’s Report (ibid) most forces 
were preoccupied with investigating reported crime “intelligence activity in most police 
forces had exclusively short term operational objectives.  Moreover, the absence of any 
means to formalise intelligence requirements meant that a premium was often attached to 
the volume … rather than its quality or relevance … there existed no coherent doctrine of 
intelligence” (Flood, 2004: 40). 
 
In an attempt to remedy what he referred to as “a haphazard and controversial subject”, 
Baumber recommended minimum standards for the collection and management of 
intelligence (ACPO, 1975: 26).  The Report also recommended more systematic 
application of criminal intelligence for all of the police service and a clear differentiation 
was made between ‘information’ and useable ‘intelligence’.  Baumber proposed that the 
interpretations of criminal intelligence be consolidated and revised to include data 
evaluation, analysis, contextualisation and association to provide optimum value 
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(Sheptycki, 2004), although providing no differentiation between ‘modes of intelligence’, 
i.e. crime, criminal, community and contextual.  He further proposed a process for the 
development of intelligence in the ‘intelligence cycle’ (see Figure 2.1) and should be 
credited with being the first senior police manager to substantially expand the definition 
and application of information and intelligence.  Despite its 35 year provenance, Baumber 
continues to be regularly cited (John & Maguire, 2007; Keane & Kleiven, 2009) as the 
stimulator of ILP and to provide a definition of criminal intelligence: “criminal intelligence 
can be said to be the end product of a process often complex, sometimes physical, and 
always intellectual, derived from information that has been collated, analysed and 
evaluated in order to prevent crime or secure the apprehension of offenders” (ACPO, 
1975, para.32).   
 
Post-Baumber and the Intelligence Cycle 
Baumber’s recommendations, although providing the foundation for contemporary ILP, 
resulted in very limited progress even though Sir Robert Mark had claimed to be the first 
Chief Officer to implement ILP strategies (within the Metropolitan Police).  However, he 
argued that his response was a reaction to the paucity of resources to perpetuate traditional 
policing methods: “the refusal of successive governments to allow police adequate 
resources to fulfil their primary function of prevention” (Mark, 1978: 293).  Even this 
implementation was limited, resulting in “a comparatively small number of handpicked 
men and women to specialise in intelligence gathering and surveillance” (Mark, 1978: 
294).  If this was the case and the 1970s witnessed the formal introduction of ILP, its 
development and application was not immediately adopted throughout the UK; appearing 
to have been initially interpreted as an informed tool to improve ‘directed patrolling’ 
(Home Office, 1988).  Few of Baumber’s recommendations, or those from the subsequent 
Pearce Report (ACPO, 1978), on Criminal Intelligence Offices, had been acknowledged or 
implemented (Grieve, 2004) and this was confirmed when over a decade later, in 1986, 
ACPO commissioned a further study to be undertaken by Ratcliffe, then Assistant Chief 
Constable of Cambridgeshire (ACPO, 1986).   
 
According to Ratcliffe (ibid), designated staff appeared under-trained and the few 
Intelligence Units that existed appeared ill-equipped and without clear focus and purpose.  
He reported and emphasised the need to co-ordinate intelligence gathering and the 
improved application of intelligence products to, direct operational activity and guide 
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resource allocation, thus stimulating ILP.  However, Grieve (2004) argued that Ratcliffe 
was no more successful than Baumber in effecting meaningful change and significant 
impetus to ILP throughout the police.  Following Ratcliffe, several authors and authorities 
have sought to progress the concept of ‘intelligence first’ and to provide a single nationally 
adopted systems (Maguire and Norris, 1992) and probably the most celebrated of these was 
the Kent Police Model (KPM) which commenced in 1993 (Flood, 2004; Phillips, 2008) 
and is reviewed on page 14.  
 
Baumber’s introduction of the concept of the Intelligence Cycle (see Figure 2.1 below) 
provided a framework for ILP (ACPO 2008: 11), but the description in this ‘Guide to 
Intelligence-led Policing’ remains slightly controversial.  IntelligenceAnalysis.net (2010) 
disputes the terms ‘direction’, ‘collation’ and ‘evaluation’ and, proposed an alternative 
cyclical process, arguing that collection, grading, analysis, evaluation, dissemination, 
direction and back to collection, more accurately reflects an analyst’s perspective.  
Therefore, the latest ‘version’ of the Intelligence Cycle is not without its critics and 
continues to court some controversy, but it is a reasonably sound and simple process.  Its 
profile is familiar to trained public service investigators and managers, e.g. Accredited 
Counter Fraud Specialists and Managers (ACFS/ACFM), as it is a core part of their 
training.  It has relevance within this introduction as an illustrative mechanism to support 
the intelligence-led investigation process and will be referred to again, and exploited, as a 
familiar intelligence tool in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 2.1: The Intelligence Cycle (ACPO, 2008: 11) 
 
 
Key to Figure 2.1: 
Direction:   sets the objective and scope of the task 
Collection:   gathers information relevant to the task 
Collation:   organises material in a logical and useable form 
Evaluation:  considers both the validity and reliability of the 
information harvested 
Analysis:   of the information to develop inferences; identify 
information gaps; and making recommendations 
relevant to the task. 
Dissemination:  effectively communicate outcomes of analysis based 
upon the initial task 
 
In its evolving guise, ILP has been described as a ‘business model’ and a ‘managerial 
philosophy’ where data analysis and crime intelligence were pivotal to an objective, 
decision making framework that facilitates crime reduction (Ratcliffe, 2009: 89).  For 
clarity and general appeal (not being specific to policing), deLint (2006: 1) offers an 


























oriented and targeted approach to crime control, focusing upon the identification, analysis 
and management of persisting and developing problems or risks”.  It appears clear that 
when first proposed, ILP was an ‘operational tactic’ (Ratcliffe, 2008: 6), intended to reduce 
crime through proactive policing - targeted by criminal intelligence.  ‘Proactivity’ was 
defined by HMIC (1997) as “targeting of specific criminally-active individuals and 
monitoring of activities to obtain evidence for successful prosecution, strategic initiatives 
against particular categories of crime, crime prevention categories and initiatives”.  
Innovative in comparison with traditional reactive policing methods, the intention was to 
expand the collection, analysis and use of intelligence to tackle routine volume crime.  
However as described, its adoption and evolution into a practical and working national 
practice and model employed by all police officers and investigative staff, remained slow 
(Grieve, 2004) and Flood (2004: 40) concurred by stating that “neither of the reports, 
however, led to a dramatic improvement in either intelligence processes or capacity”.  It 
was also apparent that, initially police managers remained sceptical and resistant to 
departing from traditional methods (Reiner, 2000), potentially questioning whether ‘ILP 
works’ (Ratcliffe, 2008).  This resistance may have been more cultural than intellectual 
(Lingamneni, 1979; Manning, 1992 and 1997; Hart, 1996; Chan, 1997) and will be 
reviewed further in Chapter 4.  However, managerial confidence in ILP may have 
remained equivocal because, as Reiner (2000:123) has commented, their remained 
difficulties associated with accurately measuring the ‘success’ of ILP.  However, in the 
1990s the popular press, broadcasters and politicians were regularly adversely commenting 
on the apparent inability of police to use intelligence effectively; identifying disappointing 
international comparison; and highlighting commissioned studies revealing inadequacies in 
police intelligence systems (Gill, 2000; Cope, 2003, 2004 and 2008; Innes, Field & Cope, 
2003, and 2005; Skeptycki, 2004; and Phillips, 2008).  This increased pressure and 
publicity together with an ‘explosion in criminality’ (Ratcliffe, 2008: 2) potentially, 
provided impetus to adopt overt ILP practices.   
 
The development of the Kent Police Model (KPM) 
Regardless of motive or mode, towards the end of the millennium the police and political 
climate appeared set for ‘Zeitgeist Singularity’ and the embryo, if not the heart and soul, of 
the NIM was spawned in the Kent Policing Model (KPM) described as “an intelligence-led 
proactive problem solving approach to policing with crime reduction as its primary 
objective” (HMIC, 1995: 1).  David Phillips, the Chief Constable of Kent Police, ably 
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assisted by Brian Flood, introduced the KPM in 1993 as a deviation to traditional policing 
methods and to employ a “holistic system of intelligence-led policing” (ILP: Maguire, 
2008: 455).  Phillips stated that the collection and analysis of information on offenders and 
their associates could inform target enforcement that would prevent criminal behaviour 
through disruption (Tilley, 2008: 147).  The KPM has been described as the “most 
extensive and influential proactive intelligence-led policing initiative demonstrated across 
the mainland UK” (Tilley, 2008: 113).  However, its success requires some qualification, 
not least that the Kent model did not incorporated a strategic element, and the model, 
almost exclusively, focused upon four crime elements: robbery, autocrime, burglary and 
drugs (interview with ACPO member cited in James, 2011: 124). In addition, Amey et al 
(1996: 33) proposed that the model could not affect general levels of crime.  However, 
even with these limitations, the localised implementation of the KPM was ambitious as 
Flood believed that previously attempted transitions towards ILP had failed due to a 
combination of cultural resistance to change and scarce tactical resources - necessary to 
respond to the intelligence products (James, 2011: 113-114).   
 
The KPM demanded a “significant level of structural reorganisation to produce integrated 
systems” (Maguire & John, 1995 cited in Maguire, 2008).  Phillips and Flood maintained 
constant pressure to achieve adoption of the KPM, manifesting an almost messianic 
commitment to orchestrate ‘submission’, conversion to, and implementation of the model.  
Initially, the police intelligence systems were not configured to support intelligence 
sharing, nor to supporting problem solving activities (Flood, Felton and McCann, 1998: 1-
2) requiring organisational and procedural change to ensure sustained commitment to the 
employment intelligence as a “genuine and necessary discipline for policing” (Phillips, 
2006: 4).  Nevertheless, the KPM was piloted for a 12 month period in Thanet (population 
circa 120,000) in 1993 and, following implementation, recorded reductions (Amey et al, 
1996) in the four key areas of reported crime (auto crime, burglary, drugs and robbery).   
 
Subsequent independent research (Amey et al, 1996) tended to prove inconclusive as to the 
precise contributory factors impacting on the decrease in recorded crime, although ‘victim 
satisfaction’ had increased and police staff appeared to welcome the changes.  Flood also 
conducted his own research (cited in James, 2011: 121), broadening his population as the 
model expanded across the force.  The general results continued to be positive; in that the 
management information and performance indicators demonstrated that some recorded 
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crime levels were decreasing, albeit inconsistently across the county.  Flood’s (internal and 
unpublished) research revealed that the critical success factors were difficult to identify, 
particularly as the BCUs employed their own interpretation of the model (HMIC, 1995: 5) 
and varied tactics in response to crime reduction and prevention.  Nevertheless, Phillips 
became convinced that the KPM, effectively blending intelligence-led’ and problem-
orientated policing, could be developed as a national policing model (Phillips, 2008) and 
he was supported in this by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies suggesting that 
the model “has a significance which extends well beyond Kent to the police service 
nationally” (HMIC, 1995: 7).  Encouraged by the results from Kent; endorsement by 
HMIC; and the subsequent adoption by ACPO, in 1998, NCIS offered Brian Flood a 
position in its Corporate Development Unit.  It was there, working with the Deputy 
Director General of NCIS, Roger Gaspar, that the KPM was re-engineered and re-branded 
for general release as the National Intelligence Model; resulting in the ‘Blue Book’, an 
introduction and effective ‘manual of guidance’ to the NIM, circulated to all forces in 
England and Wales in 1999. 
 
NIM 
The National Intelligence Model (NIM) 
The NIM, as a Home Office endorsed model, was first piloted in England and Wales in 
2000.  Its purpose was to produce an ideal intelligence model: “for the whole business of 
policing that would enable police commanders to understand and anticipate risks and 
threats across the public safety domain” (Flood and Gaspar, 2009: 54).  As a direct result 
of this ‘piloted introduction’ and trial, in November 2002, the NIM was included in the 
first National Policing Plan (NPP) for 2003-2006 by the Home Secretary, David Blunkett.  
The NPP incompletely described the NIM as “underpinning intelligence-led policing at 
force, cross boundary and national levels” (Home Office, 2002: para. 3.21); effectively 
omitting Level 1.  The NPP continued by stating that the model had “demonstrated ability 
to improve collection, analysis and the management of police intelligence and the 
management of police deployment” (Home Office, 2002: para. 3.21), and requiring all 43 
police authorities to adopt the practices of the model and have “regard for the code” by 
April 2004 (Home Office, 2002; ACPO, 2005: 8).   
 
The NIM was “a direct descendant of intelligence-led policing…” and its purpose was “to 
promote standardised intelligence-led proactivity” (Flood, 2004: 41).  In addition through 
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broad adoption it was intended to: facilitate compatibility between different organisations 
engaged in criminal investigation; provide clarity of responsibilities (for chief officers and 
police authorities); and “to ensure observance of the principles, standards of 
implementation, results in a systematic programme of continuous development, practice 
and capability” (ACPO; Centrex, 2005: 100).  The substantial document, ‘Guidance on the 
National Intelligence Model’ (ACPO, 2005) provides a rationale and a lengthy description 
of the NIM; the compliance requirements are described in the Code of Practice that 
provided the minimum standards.  Both the Code of Practice and the ‘Guidance’ were 
granted statutory recognition and required compulsory adoption of NIM practices by the 
police, codified - under section 39A of the Police Act 1996, as inserted by Section 2 of the 
Police Reform Act 2002 (Section 1.2 of the Code of Practice, p. 2). 
 
The NIM is an ILP model, an augmentation  and development of the KPM (supplementing 
a ‘strategic element’ and broadening its impact on general crime and policing) designed by 
police; and developed by NCIS.  The model incorporates elements of earlier police 
initiatives such as ‘problem oriented policing’ (Goldstein, 1990); ‘community policing’ 
(Kelling & Wilson, 1982) ‘crime reduction and neighbourhood policing’; and aspects of 
COMPSTAT including and ‘Quality of Life Policing’ (Bratton, 1998; Griffiths, 1997; 
Hyunseok et al, 2010).  ‘COMPSTAT’ relates to an alternative intelligence model, 
incorporating a strategic assessment, initially employed by the New York City Police and 
is explained in detail in Chapter 4.  The presentation of the original (NCIS) model may 
defy simple description and during research, the significant majority of respondents had 
difficulty in articulating the model’s profile, its core processes or the requirements of its 
minimum standards.  It is argued that the perceived complexity of the model as presented 
within the “Guidance” (ACPO; Centrex, 2005) is a potential weakness (as Newburn et al, 
2007: 210 have noted), its purpose was to support, and potentially replace, a variety of 
intelligence-led investigation processes to a broader audience, thus providing a framework 
to standardise investigative practice.  The simplest graphical representation of the NIM, 
and the illustration that introduced the model shown below (see Figure 2.2), is supported 
by this explanation: “… a diagrammatic representation of the NIM business process.  This 
process map graphically illustrates the NIM relationship with the intelligence cycle.  The 
ACPO NIM minimum standards have been built using this process map to provide 
structure and focus upon key elements of the model. The model’s strength is in its 










Products     
(8)
Tactical 
Resolution    
(10)
Operational 
















T&CG     
(9)
The National Intelligence Model Business Process
 
 
The NIM has been variously described as a “business management model” (Christopher, 
2003); an “intelligence-led business model” (Grampian Police, 2010); an “intelligence-led 
policing model” (Scottish Police College; SPSA, 2010); and a “business process in action” 
(National Police Improvement Agency; NPIA, 2009).  According to the NPIA (2009), the 
model takes an intelligence-led, problem solving approach to crime and disorder.  The 
NIM has also been portrayed as ‘the major vehicle through which intelligence-led policing 
is being delivered in the UK’ (Tilley, 2008: 147); a ‘national intelligence-led investigation 
model’ (Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005: 39) and, according to ACPO, “the core business 
model for policing…” (ACPO, 2005: 9).  Furthermore, guidance on the NIM (ACPO, 
2005: 12) states that “NIM promotes a co-operative approach to policing and many of the 
solutions to problems will require the participation of other agencies and bodies”. It was 
intended to ‘standardise policing practice’ (Newburn, Williamson & Wright, 2007: 210) 
and, through published ‘minimum standards’, to ensure common employment of 
intelligence-led policing as a particular paradigm.  As such, compliance or conformity with 
the NIM minimum standards is necessary to provide an essential structure and framework 
Figure 2.2: The National Intelligence Model Business Process (ACPO, 2004: 4) 
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to ensure a common system to accumulate, analyse and employ intelligence products to aid 
decision making (associated with tasking and co-ordinating).  However, the issue of 
‘compliance’, covered in the next paragraph, generates a fundamental research question, 
without full compliance can the potential benefit of the NIM be secured, or even assessed? 
 
Compliance with the NIM 
From the police perspective, ‘compliance’ requires adherence to the model and the 
minimum standards ensuring there is a systematic adoption of intelligence-led 
investigation and policing, whilst organising operational policing over three geographical 
levels (designated 1, 2 and 3).  In essence, level 1 deals with local issues; level 2 with 
regional issues; and level 3 with national issues, often engaging various agencies such as 
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), and the SOCA (Herdale & Stelfox, 2008: 172-3).  
The Police Reform Act 2002 require that “chief officers ensure that there are procedures 
in place throughout their force to monitor compliance with this code of practice and the 
National Intelligence Model Minimum Standards document of April 2003 (and with any 
successor document as directed by the Association of Chief Police Officers). Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of Constabulary will inspect and report on those procedures” (NCPE, 2006: 12).  
The ‘Guidance’ provides the required practical detail regarding assets and procedures to 
ensure compliance with the Code of Practice on the NIM (NPIA, 2010).   
For non-police public agencies, there is no legal requirement to adopt the NIM, the Code 
of Practice or the minimum standards and, unlike the police, they are not subject to 
inspection.  However, I would argue that ‘adoption’ of the model by a non-police agency 
(generally described as ‘compliance’) must embrace the core assets and intelligence-led 
processes and procedures outlined in the ‘Guidance’ to ensure a relative fit and 
standardisation with other users (ACPO, 2005: 60).  From earlier research (Osborn, 2008) 
and professional experience, compliance has a more liberal interpretation within the public 
services, as an example, the Gambling Commission (2010) claim: “we are compliant with 
the National Intelligence Model (NIM) which is a nationally recognised intelligence led 
business model used by law enforcement agencies”. They then provide the following 
description of their compliance: “information is collected by the Intelligence Department 
from a number of sources. This information is then collated, evaluated, analysed and 
developed in order to find links, associations and trends, and can be used to build a picture 
which is used to inform the decision making process of senior management”.  Similarly, 
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the Security Industry Authority (2010) claim in publication: “we use the National 
Intelligence Model to identify non-compliance and target our resources appropriately”.  
However, neither of the two organisations in this example, comply with, or conform to the 
NIM minimum standards (ACPO, 2005) in that they do not have the following: a definable 
intelligence strategy or requirement; a coherent control strategy; a forensic policy; nor a 
tasking and co-ordination group policy or system (ACPO, 2005: s.5: 113).  In addition, 
neither of these agencies appear to host a limited access IT system “to communicate and 
then monitor the action and responses resulting from tasking and co-ordination decisions” 
(ACPO/Centrex, 2005: 114).  As a supplement, this specific requirement was reviewed by 
both the DWP and the IPS, but it was determined that cost implications precluded further 
IT investment and that the extant case management system (CMS) was “sufficient for the 
supervision of investigators” (DWP, 2006: 9).  For clarity, the following paragraphs will 
review and describe two of these elements, ‘tasking and co-ordination’ and the 
‘intelligence strategy and requirement’. 
 
The NIM: Tasking and Co-ordination 
Tasking and co-ordination is “the heart of the business process” (Flood, 2004: 48; ACPO, 
2005: 103) and a fundamental part of the NIM.  For further detail, although not necessarily 
greater comprehension, I would refer the reader to the ‘Practice Advice on Tasking and 
Co-ordination’ (ACPO/Centrex, 2006).  Tasking and co-ordinating is the NIM element 
that employs intelligence products in decision making as a critical element of the business 
process within NIM.  Most visibly this takes the form of Strategic’ and Tactical Tasking 
and Co-ordination Group meetings.  The original NCIS document on the NIM develops the 
concept of prioritising intelligence work in decision making and states: “…the strategic 
tasking and co-ordination group works from a single key intelligence product, the strategic 
assessment, on the basis of which it sets the ‘control strategy’, an integral part of which is 
the setting of operational intelligence priorities, or an ‘intelligence requirement’.  This 
directs the work of intelligence staff in the provision of intelligence to operational teams as 
well as continuing to provide strategic intelligence.” (NCIS, 200a: 13)  In addition, and 
with specific regards to the ‘process’ of tasking and co-ordinating, the Metropolitan Police 
Service provided the following guidance: 
 
“The Strategic Tasking and Co-ordinating Group (Strategic T&CG) sits twice 
yearly at each level and, informed by the Strategic Assessment, sets the Control 
Strategy for its area of command; it also approves an Intelligence Requirement 
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that provides direction to all police staff regarding the collection of 
intelligence.  The Tactical Tasking and Co-ordinating Group (Tactical T&CG) 
sits at least fortnightly at Borough Command Unit (BCU) and force levels, and 
3-monthly at a regional level.  Informed by the Tactical Assessment and the 
resources available, it prioritises the proposed tactical activity for the BCU, 
force or region for the next period and ensures that it is aligned to the 
priorities identified within the Control Strategy.  The Tactical T&CG also 
commissions the remaining two Intelligence Products: the Problem Profile and 
the Target Profile, as and when required, and prioritises the tactical activity to 
be taken against each.” (MPA/MPS, 2005: 6).  
 
Therefore ‘Tasking and Co-ordination Groups’ (TC&G), for agencies adopting the NIM, 
are the ‘decision makers’ – determining areas of intelligence collection; operational focus; 
and the direction and allocation of resources in response to a range of intelligence 
products. Their effectiveness will, inevitably, be dependent upon the quality of the 
intelligence (Herdale and Stelfox, 2008).  For public services, the Strategic Tasking & Co-
ordination Group (ST&CG) should include a collection of senior agency and operational 
managers, supported by a crime analyst, ideally sitting twice yearly to review the ‘current 
state’ in the form of a ‘strategic assessment’.  The purpose of the ST&CG is to set and 
amend the ‘control strategy’; sanction the ‘intelligence requirement’; and set the 
‘prioritisation of resources’  (ACPO, 2005: 76), effectively providing direction for 
investigative staff on the collection of intelligence; and a ‘control strategy’ that delivers 
priorities for the next 6 months.  The Tactical Tasking & Co-ordination Group (TT&CG) 
should be a collection of operational managers, and possibly investigators and intelligence 
officers, supported by an analyst, who sit fortnightly.  They are informed by the ‘tactical 
assessment’ and review current investigative activity (monitoring); determine operational 
activity (tasking) ensuring that this is aligned to the control strategy (in line with the set 
strategic priorities of the organisation or division).  They can determine whether to respond 
either reactively (in response to identified criminality) or proactively (more aligned to 
crime prevention).   
 
The core business processes of the NIM, fuelled by intelligence products, critically rely 
upon the products of the strategic’ and the tactical tasking and coordinating groups 
comprising the key decision makers.  These two groups are the means by which police and 
law enforcement managers ensure the exploitation of intelligence gathering products to 
apply the various elements of the National Intelligence Model to their area of responsibility 
(Stelfox, 2008).  According to Newburn, Williamson & Wright, (2007) the Tasking and 
Co-ordination Groups, drive NIM at each level comprising, of resource managers with the 
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authority to collate and direct appropriate resources.  Indicative of the importance and 
primacy of the tasking and co-ordination process the ‘Practice Advice on Tasking and 
Coordination’ (ACPO, 2006: 8) proposes that half (66 of the 135) of the NIM minimum 
standards relate to it.  
 
In summary, tasking and co-ordination is undertaken by two groups within a NIM-
adopting organisation the ST&CG and the TT&CG.  The NIM minimum standards do 
permit local determination of the chairing of the T&CG meetings however, it also provides 
general guidance on the roles and police ranks for chairs of both the tasking and co-
ordination group meetings.  To meet the criteria, agencies must ensure that the individuals 
appointed to chair such groups have ‘executive authority’ empowering them to make 
resource decisions (ACPO/Centrex, 2005: 126).  In addition, the role of the chair should be 
supported and complemented by an ‘Actions Manager’ in the role of an ‘enforcer’ – 
arranging the execution of agreed actions (this role may also carry the role of briefing 
manager); monitoring progress; and feeding back results.  The purpose of tasking and co-
ordination is therefore to determine and communicate decisions and directions based on the 
‘development of intelligence products’, (ACPO, 2007: 13).   
 
The guidance requires that operational tasking directions are based upon the products of 
intelligence gathering and analysis and, for police, that there are five types of meeting 
identified that should impact on the work and activities of both intelligence and 
investigative staff.  The pinnacle of the decision pyramid (see Figure 2.3 on page 24) is the 
ST&CG, which sets the ‘control strategy’ to prioritise work for the department, region or 
organisation according to an ‘agreed, manageable range of issues’ against which resource 
allocations can be made for the next 6-12 months. It also sets the intelligence requirement 
that directs and focuses activity to gather, evaluate and collate information/intelligence 
regarding crime (and disorder) problems.  Directly beneath this group sits the TT&CG 
required to prioritise issues highlighted in the tactical assessment; review the intelligence 
requirement; and to allocate operational and support resources having determined the best 
methods of dealing with ‘prioritised crime’ (and non-crime) problems..  There are three 
associated, and generally subordinate meetings to respond to the ST&CG & TT&CG 
decisions and these are the: Intelligence Unit Meetings, (IUMs); Daily Management 
Meetings, (DMMs) and Neighbourhood Co-ordination Meetings, (NCMs) – all of which 
are required to monitor operational and tactical ‘progress’ and ensure that the directions 
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from the ST&CG and TT&CG are observed.  From the non-police perspective, these 
meetings, e.g. IUM, DMM and NCM are likely to have very limited relevance for 
intelligence units (where they exist) and to investigators who focus on an extremely narrow 



























Figure 2.3: The tasking and co-ordinating groups identified in the NIM 
 
In practical terms, the responsibility for management and delivery of the information and 
intelligence used by both tasking and co-ordination groups is conducted by crime 
(tactical)’ and intelligence (strategic) analysts, based within intelligence units.  Crime 
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24 
impetus since the introduction of the NIM.  A review of the analyst’s role, partly arising 
through some managers’ misinterpretation of what the function entailed, identified that the 
role is slowly developing away from simply generating the visual representation of data 
and intelligence using crime pattern analysis and mapping technology, with analyst’s now 
providing advice on resourcing and prioritisation to senior police managers (John and 
Maguire, 2004).   
 
However, without a good understanding, support and direction from senior managers, 
analysts are frequently used to simply provide management information and to create 
graphical representations of areas; with the opportunities for creative interpretation of 
problems and potential responses being minimised (Osborn, 2008).  This reality contradicts 
Cope’s (2003: 340), drawing upon Gill (2000), who views crime analysis as involving “the 
synthesis of police and other relevant data to identify and interpret patterns and trends in 
crime, to inform the police and judicial practice”.  However, Cope (2004: 201), in 
reviewing the integration of borough crime analysis within two police forces, did identify 
cultural and understanding gaps between police and analysts and this research suggests that 




A strategic assessment and consequent ‘intelligence requirement’ or strategy, described by 
John & Maguire (2002: 212) as “informed by analysis of problems … and by priorities 
imposed … by internal and external bodies”, is required to conform with Element 1 of the 
(NIM) minimum standards, (see Annex 1: 183).  This was not a feature of the KPM and 
was not encountered in non-police public services in previous research (Osborn, 2008) or 
professional exposure.  The term ‘intelligence requirement’ is undefined by the NPIA 
(2009) and the ‘Guidance’ describes it as “a dynamic document” that focuses on 
‘priorities’ and “other key threats identified in the strategic assessment” (ACPO, 2005: 
65).  From the police perspective it appears to mean “the gap between what is known and 
what is not” (Gwent Police, 2010: 10) and, potentially, requires a dedicated intelligence 
gathering resource, such as Operation Intelligence Units, that are not universal to public 
service investigative communities.   
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A broader definition of an intelligence requirement is drawn from the Intelligence 
Services: “… need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence.  A 
requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command’s knowledge or understanding of 
the operational environment or threat …” (FAS, 2010: 4-15).  Public services may benefit 
from an ‘intelligence requirement’ provided they have undertaken a strategic assessment 
and identified priorities; and this would potentially deliver benefit in partnership activities, 
particularly in determining shared objectives and goals.  However, even within mainstream 
policing there appears to be variation, for example, North Yorkshire Police have attempted 
to describe the aim of the ‘intelligence strategy’ as “to guide development of focused and 
coordinated NIM centred, intelligence-led policing” (NYPA, 2007: 4), which may not 
prove particularly helpful to a public service investigative manager.  Neither would further 
review, as what does not appear in the North Yorkshire Police documentation is an actual 
‘intelligence requirement’.  The theme of ‘intelligence requirement’ and ‘intelligence 
strategy’ (ACPO, 2005: 113) will be returned to under ‘policy transfer’ in Chapter 4. 
 
NIM as a model to encourage productive partnership 
The concept of ‘partnership’ for the police can be traced to two key documents, the first 
was Home Office Circular 8/84 (1984) that introduced the concept of the multi-agency 
approach to crime and was supplemented with the government launch of the ‘Safer Cities 
Programme’ (Phillips & Cochrane, 1988).  The second document was the Morgan Report 
(Home Office, 1991) that, according to Walklate (2002), constituted the moment when the 
partnership approach to crime prevention became the underlying principles of policing 
policy.  The benefits of collaborative working are proven from an operational resource 
perspective, potentially providing more personnel, shared expertise; and a greater volume 
of data and information.  However, the investigative and intelligence resources within 
public services are, proportionately, very limited compared to the police and SOCA; 
severely reducing the capacity for collaborative operations.  A further difficulty is that 
public service agencies are almost exclusively concerned (and governed through 
established performance indicators) with the investigation of criminal offences relating to 
identity and entitlement – those dominated by fraud.   
 
Despite the apparent acknowledgement, within the broader public service, that partnership 
may deliver dividends to operational investigation (DCA, 2006; DCFS, 2009), earlier 
research (Osborn, 2008) identified scepticism from public service investigation and 
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intelligence staff regarding the dividends of joint working.  A potential reason is that the 
majority of public service agencies do not have prosecuting authority and are often reliant 
upon the police or SOCA to ‘promote’ fraud offences for prosecution (although 
exceptionally, DWP and HMRC can progress independent prosecutions).  This reliance 
and expectation is not always fulfilled.  From personal experience, I am aware that for 
police and SOCA officers investigating and identifying ‘serious crime’, that any sundry 
fraud offences relating to benefit or passports disclosed may well be viewed as ‘minor’ 
and, in consequence, not recommended for prosecution to the Crown Prosecution Service.  
This factor may frustrate ‘working partnerships’ and a willingness on behalf of  public 
service investigators  to engage in collaborative work, as it requires both ‘shared 
investigative methodology’ (Fraud Review, 2006: 154-6) and, ideally, ‘increased police 
responsiveness to fraud reports’ (Levi, Burrows, Fleming & Hopkins, 2007: 94).  The 
Fraud Review (2006: 128) noted in its interim report that fraud is not a national policing 
priority and that, with the sole exception of the City of London Police, ‘fraud squad’ 
numbers have been reducing – over 29% from 1998 (589) to 2006 (416) and thus 
providing less operational capacity, and potential willingness, to convert fraud 
investigations into prosecutions.  This diminishing resource and commitment creates 
particular difficulties for public services without independent prosecution authority, 
essentially relying upon operational police ‘goodwill’ and support to meet their 
investigation performance targets.  Unfortunately, the NIM is not perceived as a remedy 
for this situation as it imposes no requirement on the police (as the primary sponsors for 
prosecution to the Crown Prosecution Service) to recommend, with equal vigour, all 
identified offences resulting from collaborative investigation and partnership.  
 
In this respect at least, the potential dividends from investigative partnership, although 
recognised by government (CDA, 1998); the police (GMPA, 2010; MPA, 2010; 
Strathclyde, 2009); and the National Fraud Authority (NFA, 2010b; 2011a; 2011b), are not 
unanimously shared by all public service investigative personnel.  In fact, the term 
‘partnership’, which has, almost, become a ‘mantra’ in contemporary policing circles, 
continues, in some cases, to experience a luke-warm reception by public service 
investigators and managers (Gilling, 2006).  The NIM, as a potential facilitator of 
partnership, has not impacted upon the, parochial, perception of some agency investigators 
who believe that their organisations tend to be side-lined (particularly by the police and 
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SOCA) during joint working and this can be manifested by disengagement, personal 
jealousies and even professional rivalries.   
 
Within the minimum standards for the NIM (ACPO/Centrex, 2005) partnership does not 
appear to be a significant consideration in the proposed activity (it is mentioned only four 
times in the 135 standards).  However, it is acknowledged within the “Practice Advice 
Introduction to Intelligence-led Policing” (ACPO, 2007: 6) that NIM “is a business model 
used by the Police Service, and increasingly by other partners”, but this document 
provides no supporting evidence, detail or qualification as to the level of partner 
compliance, or its effectiveness.  Preliminary research for this study determined that these 
claims, regarding the actual level of adoption and compliance, demanded further enquiry.  
There are a significant number of non-police investigators operating within the UK, the 
majority employed by public authorities and government agencies who are regularly 
engaged in serious criminal investigations, predominantly fraud.  An example is the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). The DWP employs 1800 investigative staff 
engaged in dealing with benefit fraud investigations and has adopted, at least in name, the 
National Intelligence Model (DWP, 2010b).  However, joint working can take a number of 
forms and provide a pressing reason for partnership, when considering an ‘intelligence-led 
model’ and its insatiable appetite for data and information – “an intelligence led, problem 
solving approach to crime and disorder” (NPIA, 2009).  The sourcing, acquisition and 
refinement of data and information delivers the fuel for investigation, decision making, 
problem solving and tasking and co-ordination and is reviewed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
The last 30 years have witnessed a proliferation of electronically ‘stored information’ 
within public services.  This information provides an invaluable intelligence source for 
investigating crime, including fraud – and, for public services and commerce, providing a 
rich harvest of personal data, potentially delivering corroborative or contesting evidence to 
establish legitimacy of identity and entitlement.  As an illustration, the approximate 
magnitude of this intelligence repository can be gauged by Table 2.1 below and, although 
not entirely dwarfing the Police National Computer (PNC), their records have a far broader 













Number of records 
DCI DWP 
 
UK; all people allocated a NINO 
since 1948, when the scheme was 
set up. 
82 million (including 13.5 
million records for people 
who are dead) 
NHSCR GRO(E&W) England, Wales & Isle of Man; all 
people registered with an NHS GP 
when the system was created in 
1991 plus people born since, or 
registered with a GP for the first 
time after 1991. 
66.8 million (including 6 
million records for people 
who are dead) 
NHSCR 
Scotland 
GRO(S) Scotland 6 million (includes deaths 
since 1992) 
Vital Events GRO(S) Scotland (Computerised 
searchable index, with digital 
images of all records capable of 
viewing by Government 
Departments via GSI).   
All births, deaths and 
marriages recorded in 
Scotland since 1855.   
UKPS UKPS UK; people who currently hold a 
UK passport, or have held or 
applied for one. 
Database 55 million (includes 
12 million with digitised 




DVLA Great Britain; all people who have 
gained a driving licence since 
1970 and most who have ever 
held one 
44 million records (includes 
unknown number for people 







UK; people who will be 18+ in the 
coming year, who are eligible to 
vote and who register. The 
register is actually an amalgam of 
480 local databases, rather than a 
single entity. 
44 million records (includes 
small number – c.11,000 – of 
UK residents living  
overseas) 
 
(Cabinet Office 2006; 85)  
 
Although substantial advantages in investigation and intelligence-led decision making may 
be evident with partnership and data sharing, it is neither easy to exchange, nor 
commonplace between investigating agencies.  Public service data bases are maintained in 
strict organisational silos; access is restricted and not available for trawling or review (and 
those restrictions may apply internally, e.g. DWP without documented and specific 
investigative objective).  Without formal memoranda of understanding (MoU) or service 
level agreements (SLA) most agencies are highly reticent about releasing personal data and 
the substantial majority of data cannot be searched or directly accessed outside of any 
particular agency.  An indication of the difficulty to lever personal data from public 
services was again indicated last year by a further appeal made by the National Fraud 
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Authority “public sector organisations should endeavour to meet lawful and proportionate 
requests” (NFA, 2010a: 9). 
 
The resistance to ‘intelligence sharing’ in partnership appears to relate to organisational 
proscriptions resulting from unnecessary anxieties surrounding the Data Commissioner and 
the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).  However, although  the DPA does not inhibit the 
disclosure of data when investigating crime - section 29(3) permits this - it often appears to 
discourage criminal investigative access to personal data held by other agencies.  This is 
particularly the case when attempting to work in partnership with the NHS (due to the 
sensitivity of their data) and HMRC for traditional and cultural reasons.  I was informed in 
2004 by a senior manager within HMRC that ‘the DPA trumps investigative access’, I 
interpreted this statement as an indication that the organisational concerns and anxieties 
regarding ‘disclosing personal data’, manifested in proscribed policy (IPS, 2008; DWP, 
2009), precluded the advantages of accessing criminal intelligence and evidence.  
However, the potential difficulties of partnership between central public services and the 
police, as encouraged by the NIM, may not be typical and, since 1998, there have been 
statutory partnerships between the police and the Local Authorities (legislative support for 
joint working and intelligence sharing is provided for crime and disorder local partnerships 
by s. 116 Crime & Disorder Act, 1998).  These are reviewed below to see if the proposal 
that adoption of the NIM can feasibly “… promote partnership working” (NPIA, 2009) or 
whether this may be too ambitious an objective for an intelligence-led business model. 
 
Statutory Partnerships 
Although not a direct feature of this research, statutory partnerships are worthy of inclusion 
in this introduction as they provide a mandatory example of joint working between the 
police and a public service agency, viz. Local Authorities.  In addition, the Guidance 
(ACPO, 2005: 103) states that “The NIM is a tool that Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships should use to develop and deliver the strategic priorities…”. The Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 (CDA) was significant for establishing a ‘statutory partnership’ 
between the police and a civilian authority within the UK.  This legislative intervention by 
central government imposed responsibility for reducing crime and disorder in local 
authority areas in England and Wales on the police and local authorities (Hughes, 2008: 
56).  The Act has led to the incorporation of 376 Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships (CDRP).  These partnerships are required to carry out and publish crime and 
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disorder audits, strategies and targets; consult with the local community; publish 3-year 
crime and disorder reduction strategies; identify targets and performance indicators; report 
annually on progress (Gilling, 2006).  In addition, the CDA delivered to the local 
authorities and the police new powers and duties to develop multi-agency and community-
based strategic partnerships to reduce crime and disorder in their locality.  
 
The Crime and Disorder Act was apparently inspired by neo-liberal thinking; the Home 
Secretary commenting during the Bill’s second reading that it ‘represents a triumph of 
community politics over detached metropolitan elites’ (Straw, 1997).  A review of the 
CDA’s stated objectives to strengthen the visibility, responsibilities, membership and role 
of local partnerships, partially undertaken in response to some expressed concerns 
regarding their effectiveness, was undertaken by the Home Office (2006).  This failed to 
demonstrate any clearly evidenced ‘success’ Hughes (2006: 57) and summarised by stating 
‘CDRPs have not been able prove their success in performance management terms’.  From 
the review it was apparent that neither the NIM, nor ‘statutory partnership’, acted as an 
effective catalyst to facilitate joint working and productive collaboration between local 
authorities and the police.  Even with a ‘shared agenda’; complementary targets; and with 
the guidance of the NIM, at least on the police side, productive partnership appears elusive 
and difficult.  
 
The identified tensions between the police and CDRP members have tended to result in 
relatively narrow crime reduction strategies, rather than a ‘community safety’ agenda; 
driven by centrally dictated performance targets.  In some instances ‘statutory partnership’ 
has not only failed to deliver, they may even have acted as a distraction to both police and 
local authorities (Home Office, 2006). James’ (2011: 253) research into the application of 
the NIM in mainstream policing found that whilst NIMs processes were fundamentally 
sound, in practice they were not applied and, despite a significant NIM-related activity, 
partnership participation was extremely limited.  
 
Nevertheless, it would be unsafe to interpret the Home Office (2006) findings as indicating 
that crime reduction partnerships cannot work.  There are some local, and relatively recent, 
examples where some multi-agency approaches are effective: the police acting in 
partnership with HMRC, Borders and Immigration Agency (BIA), the Security Services; 
and SOCA has delivered some excellent results.  In addition, the ‘Greater Manchester 
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Against Crime Partnership Business Model’ (GMAC PBM) has demonstrated that data 
sharing and concerted collaborative working can effectively reduce crime and improve 
public safety (GMAC, 2010).  The GMAC PBM is described as a business process model 
for partnership (multi-agency) working, which employs an ‘interpretation of the National 
Intelligence Model’ (John et al, 2006: 1-2).  The GMAC PBM integrates a multi-agency 
approach to crime reduction while attempting to retain a formal, and productive, structure 
for action similar to the NIM (Ratcliffe, 2008: 150).  However, even this success must be 
qualified as there is no direct evidence that it was the NIM that provided the catalyst or 
framework for successful partnership or collaborative working in that context. 
 
Summary 
The historical concept of gathering and exploiting intelligence, as an aid to investigation, 
was initially examined, reviewing Baumber’s (ACPO, 1975) recommendations and the 
subsequent reports and stimuli to ILP, notably from Pearce (ACPO, 1978) and Ratcliffe 
(ACPO, 1986).  It provided a description of the Intelligence Cycle and the evolution of ILP 
as a business model and managerial philosophy (Ratcliffe, 2008: 6).  From these origins, 
the development of the KPM and its introduction in 1993 were described.  It identified the 
focus on four crime types: robbery, autocrime, burglary and drugs and the absence, within 
its profile, of a strategic element.  It included a short review on the results of the KPM 
delivered (Amey, et al, 1996) including the positive endorsements it received for broader 
application (HMIC, 1995: 7).  
 
A review of the NIM; qualifications for compliance and conformity; tasking and co-
ordination, and the intelligence requirement was examined to provide an explanation of 
process embodied within the model and context for this study.  It was evident that the 
architects and sponsors of the National Intelligence Model intended it to contribute to the 
reduction of general crime and fit contemporary policing structures whose core functions 
relate to general law and order and community safety.  However, the test of the NIM as a 
potentially productive rational business model must rely heavily on the level of compliance 
and conformity by any adopting organisation or agency.  Full adherence to the criteria 
outlined in the ‘Guide’ may be deliberately avoided, e.g. failing or refusing to resource the 
necessary ‘assets’ required, or unintentional or alternatively due to misunderstanding of the 
minimum requirements.  In addition, the demands of the model on investigative practices 
may potentially create a tension between an agency’s primary function and the extant, and 
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more traditional, mechanisms of investigation and governance – a model that ‘fits’ the 
police, may not suit a different public service agency.  The intelligence-led decision 
making and problem solving theme of the NIM is captured within the ‘tasking and co-
ordination’ process. The terminology and requirements for tasking and co-ordination were 
reviewed and some simplification and summary has been attempted, although this retains 
an indication of the interpretative demands and challenges placed upon agency staff, if 
unfamiliar with police terminology. 
 
The final part of this chapter reviewed the theme of partnership and provided an 
examination of the assertion by the NPIA that adoption of the model will “… promote 
partnership working” (NPIA, 2009).  Earlier research (Osborn, 2008) suggested that the 
NIM was not considered a ‘partner-friendly model’ by a limited sample of public service 
investigators.  However, for two of the agencies under review, the DWP and the IPS the 
primary reasons for adoption focused on embedding intelligence-led investigation into 
their processes and increased partnership (Kitchen, 2005; DWP, 2006; IPS 2006).  
Although not an essential requirement for partnership, it is evident that compliance with 
the model and providing a consistent investigative and decision making methodology 
would deliver some benefits and this is encouraged in the ‘Guidance’ stating that the NIM 
is a model that “is not confined to, or restricted for specialist usage” (ACPO, 2005: 3.1.3).  
In addition to potential resource benefits of collaborative working, the opportunity for 
‘data sharing’ was also reviewed and an illustrative table (2.1) was included to indicate the 
magnitude, breadth and potential value in intelligence-led investigation, of data held in 
major national databases within the public service. 
 
The NIM was intended to have a relatively broad appeal – for adoption and application 
beyond the police service (Home Office, 2002; europarchives, 2009).  The model has been 
adopted by a number of non-police public organisations and agencies with a criminal 
investigative capability, essentially to promote intelligence-led investigation and to enable 
partnership and collaborative working (Kitchen, 2005).  However, the core business areas 
the NIM identifies (NCIS CD-ROM 1999: Fig. 1.1) are broad and encompass disorder and 
community problems as well as crime.  The outcomes defined by the NIM adopt similarly 
broad terminology as in ‘community safety’, ‘reduced crime’, ‘arrested/disrupted 
criminals’, ‘managed hotspots’ and ‘potentially dangerous offenders’ (John & Maguire, 
2007: 211).  The former elements have evident importance to society; general policing; and 
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local authorities with statutory partnership responsibility.  In addition, it is proposed that 
business outcomes could be achieved through a variety of ‘policing methods’ including: 
‘intelligence, reactive operations, proactive operations and patrol resources’.  However, 
potentially these will have limited appeal or relevance to central public services e.g. 
Identity and Passport Service, Department for Work and Pensions, and Driving Standards 
Agency and may impact upon the levels of compliance to the model.  A review and 
description of the methodology employed in determining the operational relevance; 
conformity; and potential benefit of the NIM within the three agencies mentioned above is 
provided in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a description of the considerations and rationale of the methodology 
employed for this research.  The first part of this chapter deals with the potential 
contribution from previous research and the motivation for the study followed by the 
parameters of the investigation.  It includes a description of the principal non-police public 
services included within the body of the research; the design; data collection; and primary 
research.  This is supported with details of the research sample, ethical issues and describes 
the application of conceptual content analysis employed in refining the raw data.  The final 
part of this chapter provides a rationale and justification of the research method. 
 
Contribution to knowledge 
An initial review and limited survey (Osborn, 2008), indicated that, with the exception of 
local authorities, little specific research had been published on the qualitative adoption of 
the NIM by non-police public services with an investigative capability.  My preliminary 
findings, whilst formulating the research proposal and drawing upon recent consultancy 
experience, suggested that there was limited conformity with the NIM minimum standards 
or to the key ethos of the model relating to intelligence-led decision making within public 
services.  These findings refuted the claims of conformity to the model by a number of 
public services, e.g. IPS, DWP, Child Support Agency (CSA) and Criminal Records 
Bureau (CRB).  A similar level of non-compliance was not evident in the police, albeit 
research has identified a substantial number of variations of implementation between 
constabularies (James, 2011).  An allied agency, the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA), sharing a core business purpose with the police, has also adopted a revised 
version of the NIM.  As an example, it currently does not employ qualified criminal 
analysts to provide refined intelligence products for tasking and co-ordinating (RS03 and 
RS08).  From my exposure to public services it was evident that the adoption of the 
published version of the NIM was relatively superficial.  It appears that, without adopting 
the core processes, implicit for full compliance, within the guidance and minimum 
standards (ACPO, 2005), these agencies were unlikely to derive benefit from improved 
intelligence-led decision making.  In addition, agencies continued to have difficulties in 
assembling, resourcing and funding the required ‘assets’ outlined in the NIM Guidance 
(Home Office, 2005) to support intelligence-led investigation. 
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I would argue that the continued selective and, in some cases, cosmetic adoption of the 
NIM throughout the UK intelligence and investigative community will inhibit the drive 
towards uniformity, joint working and, potentially, frustrate intelligence sharing and 
meaningful partnership. This is in conflict with the following ACPO statement:- “NIM 
improves the opportunities to share intelligence across local and national levels of 
policing. It reduces barriers to effectiveness by producing standardised processes and 
language and creates a co-operative working environment.” (ACPO Centrex, 2005: 12).  
The perpetuation and potential expansion of further public services practising different 
interpretations, versions and profiles of the NIM will exacerbate the standardisation of 
intelligence-led investigation and resource-based decision making at both a tactical and 
strategic level.  In this research and previous consultation, I have identified a number of 
difficulties that public services investigators experience with the NIM that may frustrate 
broader adoption and compliance, resulting in potentially conflicting processes and 
inadequate tasking and co-ordinating.  In addition, the minimum standards accompanying 
the model are perceived as complex and the language and terminology employed appear to 
contribute to the public service investigator’s view that the NIM has exclusivity to the 
police and similar criminal justice agencies (Osborn, 2008). Accompanying the difficulties 
in comprehension are chronic shortages of ‘NIM assets’ - the resources required for 
compliance. The findings have highlighted aspects of the model, and the minimum 
standards that may contribute to nonconformity by public services and, potentially, 
inhibiting closer parity and partnership with police practices. 
 
Parameters, design, data collection and primary research 
This research sought to establish whether the NIM is fundamentally accessible to, and 
suitable for, non-police public services.  It engaged with operational investigative staff to 
identify whether the model supports the reduction of risk and vulnerability to fraud, and 
whether it provides a productive intelligence-led investigation model, facilitating 
partnership and joint working.  It is argued that successful implementation of the NIM and 
performance (MPS, 2009; Durham Police, 2011) relies upon its adoption by operational 
staff – investigators, intelligence officers and their line supervisors.  It is through their 
adherence to the model; compliance with the minimum standards; and adoption of 
intelligence-led processes, that conformity can be determined.  Such conformity will 
provide a measure of the standardisation and commonality required to deliver the potential 
benefits associated with intelligence led decision making, investigation and effective 
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partnership.  For this reason, the research findings will draw upon contemporary semi-
structured interview responses; my earlier research undertaken as part of this Professional 
Doctorate; and professional experience in risk management consultancy over the last 
decade within the UK public services.  The research was limited to non-police public 
services without a statutory requirement to work in partnership with the police, excluding 
the 376 Local Authorities operating in the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships.  It 
also excluded commercial organisations with investigative capability, e.g. the financial 
sector.  The significant majority of the research was undertaken with investigative staff 
within three organisations: the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP); the Identity and 
Passport Service (IPS); and the Driving Standards Agency (DSA).  These agencies were all 
identified within the Identity Fraud Study (Cabinet Office, 2002: 74-76) and are relatively 
representative, providing a reasonable spread, of different types of public service with 
investigative personnel (in size, budget and service).   
 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
The DWP is one of the largest government agencies (exceeded only, in staff terms, by the 
National Health Service) paying over £145 billion to more than 20 million customers each 
year, and administering over 30 different benefits, grants and allowances (DWP, 2010a: 
12).  It delivers a service as an amalgam of the Employment Service: resourcing Job 
Centres; the Benefits Agency administrating payments of state benefits; and the Pension 
Service paying state pensions both in the UK and overseas.  Their ‘client group’ could 
generally be summarised as: the disabled, lone parents, pensioners and the unemployed.  In 
the last decade it has employed between 1800 - 3000 investigative personnel; currently the 
number is approximately 1800 (DWP, 2010a: 22), continuing to be the largest single non-
police public service employer of investigative staff.  The DWP have traditionally been 
highly sensitive regarding their fraud vulnerability and have historically drawn criticism 
for marginalising the levels of risk and loss (Cabinet Office, 2002; 74) and more recently 
for exaggerating the same figures (McManus, 2010; Tunley, 2011).  The DWP are featured 
in this research as a major public service, in terms of staff complement, social impact and 
financial responsibility.  A further reason for its selection is that I have a good 
understanding of the DWP counter fraud systems, policies and procedures having trained 
and operationally engaged with their investigation/intelligence staff.  I have worked as a 
lead consultant on its Change Team and designed and delivered a range of accredited 
investigation courses including: Criminal Intelligence Analysis; Accredited Counter Fraud 
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Specialist (ACFS); Accredited Counter Fraud Managers (ACFM) and the accredited 
Protection in Security (PinS) Programme. 
 
Identity and Passport Service (IPS) 
The IPS is an executive agency of the Home Office that came into existence on 1
st
 April 
2006 being formerly known as the UK Passport Service.  At its busiest periods, the IPS 
employs a little over 4,000 staff (seasonally varied) across the UK in 7 regional offices; 56 
interview offices; the GRO in Southport; and the ‘centre’ based in London.  Each region 
has an investigative team and this is supplemented by two Operational Intelligence Units 
(London and Glasgow) and a number of specialist units including the Major Investigation 
Team (Glasgow) amounting to approximately 90 investigative staff (McCluskey, 2011).  
The principal function of the IPS is to provide passport services for British nationals, in 
addition it has responsibility for the General Registry Office (GRO); the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS); and until 10
th
 May 2010, the identity card initiative.  In 2008-09 
the IPS received 5.35m passport applications; issued 10,000 identity cards; and delivered 
1.92m certificates (primarily relating to births, deaths, marriages and civil contracts).  The 
IPS counter-fraud activities resulted in the investigation of 7,344 potentially fraudulent 
passport applications, representing a shortfall against a target of 9,407 (based on a 
projection from sampling exercises).  Passport fee receipts fund all passport related 
activity; GRO services are paid for by a combination of fees collected and Home Office 
funding (IPS Annual Report, 2009-10).  The IPS has featured in this research as a mid-
range public service, in terms of staff complement and budget.  In addition, I have 
considerable understanding of its counter fraud policies, procedures and 
investigation/intelligence staff having undertaken a full review and revision of the security 
and investigation policy and procedures in 2008.  I have worked as a lead consultant on its 
Major Investigation Team and Operational Intelligence Unit Projects and designed and 
delivered a range of accredited investigation courses including: Accredited Counter Fraud 
Specialist (ACFS); Accredited Counter Fraud Managers (ACFM); Investigative Managers 
Course; and both Operational and Strategic Criminal Intelligence Analysis. 
 
Driving Standards Agency (DSA) 
The Driving Standards Agency (DSA) is one of the executive agencies and a member of 
the Motoring and Freight Services (MFS) group, within the Department for Transport. It is 
a comparatively compact public service, operating on a budget of £184m, mainly funded 
through fees and revenue from other road safety initiatives.  The DSA Headquarters is 
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located in Nottingham, with administrative centres in Cardiff and Newcastle.  Driving tests 
are administered from over 400 driving test centres and 140 theory test centres and during 
2009-10 the DSA conducted 1.8m practical driving tests.  In the same year the DSA 
concluded 416 criminal investigations concerning 1,491 individuals suspected of being 
involved in impersonation/identity fraud; it concluded 394 cases involving illegal driving 
instruction; and together with police support arrested 311 individuals (56 successfully 
prosecuted).   
In March 2010 (DSA, 2010), the DSA employed 2,568 staff of which approximately 20 
were engaged in, and associated with, investigative and intelligence gathering duties.  The 
DSA features in this sample despite the paucity of staff engaged in investigation as it 
provides a reasonably typical example of a number of smaller executive agencies with 
substantial regulatory responsibility.  Impersonation fraud, relating to driving tests (both 
theory and practical), have increased with the introduction of a more challenging driving 
licence ‘pass criteria’.  This, together with the investigations relating to unregistered 
driving instructors, ensures that the limited team of approximately 20 professional 
investigators all carry heavy workloads.  Nevertheless, in November 2009 the DSA were 
awarded ‘The National Identity Crime Single Point of Contact Award’ in recognition of 
their contribution to the national ‘fight against identity crime’.  Another ‘selection 
qualification’ for the DSA is that I have considerable understanding of its counter fraud 
policies, procedures and investigation/intelligence staff.  I have worked as a consultant and 
trainer with the Operational Intelligence Unit Project (Cardiff); designed and delivered a 
range of accredited investigation courses including: Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist 
(ACFS) and the Accredited Counter Fraud Managers (ACFM) programmes to its 
investigative management and personnel. 
 
Research design 
As the researcher it was necessary to acknowledge my objective limitations as a former 
consultant and trainer within the organisations under review.  Gurbich (2004: 4) supports 
the premise that the researcher cannot be separated from their “background, life experience 
and memories”.  I acknowledge that these frames of reference may filter and potentially 
distort my impressions of the action, behaviour and responses of others.  This may be 
particularly the case as a Professional Doctorate student, when attempting to empirically 
test assumptions drawn from professional exposure and experience.  Lee (2002) had 
reviewed the impact of the researchers’ life experience on both research methodology and 
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(to a lesser extent) the evaluation and assessment of empirical products commenting on the 
difficulty of suppressing and avoiding self-reflectivity.  It was apparent that the 
researcher’s ambition to be objective and rational can be frustrated by the ‘modern self’; 
formally ‘socialised’ and ‘normalised’.  Added to this potential ‘experimenter bias’, 
Heisenberg (1949:3) postulated that the very action of ‘observation’ (and to a lesser extent 
‘measurement’) of an object “can cause uncontrollable changes in the system being 
observed”.  As a researcher I acknowledged that I may encounter “unavoidable frustration 
and potentially inhibition in the search for answers, truth and reason” (Kant, 1781/1901), 
attempting to put aside assumption and preconception from previous exposure to the public 
services under review.  Davies (2007: 9) suggested that discovering answers to questions is 
“the purpose of research…the application of scientific procedures”.  He appears to refute 
the limitation of Lee (ibid) imposing a universal real world framework, thus enabling 
science to exist, although he does recognise both ‘experimenter’ and ‘experimental bias’.  
Having a comprehensive understanding of the processes and investigation culture under 
review I was aware of the potential to unintentionally bias or prejudice the research.  
Acknowledging that these factors can potentially amplify the risk (Bell, 1999; Yates, 
2004), for the period of this research I have deliberately not engaged in any professional 
operational activity with the agencies under review. Nevertheless, Locke’s proposition 
(cited in Lowe, 1995) that our intellect relies, exclusively, on our senses may suggest that, 
unwillingly, I may have been deceiving myself through a ‘research fallacy’ simply seeking 
to affirm an idealistic perception and employing sense data that is ontologically privileged.  
Coleman (1999) supports a realist epistemological approach; essentially based on a critique 
of positivism (but not a rejection of it).  He embraces the views of Davies (2007); whilst 
apparently attempting to tread a compromising path between the modernist and the 
classical view.  Coleman (1999) suggests that realist studies employ (and potentially 
exploit) science for ‘discovery’ and to study and describe hidden mechanisms and 
structures of reality, albeit these may be beyond our immediate experience but within our 
sensual perception.  He explains that observational data are the manifestation of “the 
workings of hidden reality and, facts are acknowledged and explained by the revelation of 
casual links from ‘structural mechanisms” (Coleman, 1999: 11).   
 
Sobh (2006) argues that epistemology is the relationship between reality, ontology, and the 
researcher, whilst Hamlyn (1995: 242) suggests that its epistemology deals with 'the nature 
of knowledge, its possibility, scope and general basis'.  By employing an epistemological 
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approach I am seeking an effective way of understanding and explaining how we know 
what we know.  It deals with the “the nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope and 
general basis” (Hamlyn 1995: 53); “and is concerned with providing a philosophical 
grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure that 
they are both adequate and legitimate” (Maynard, 1994: 28).  Bahari (2010: 18) states that 
the qualitative methods, adopted in this research, are typified by narratives, ethnographies 
and case studies.  This is supporting proposals that these are characterised by the 
development of a theory as a result of empirical data (Saunders, et al 2007: 17).  In 
addition, Bryman (2004: 266) states that qualitative research normally emphasises words 
rather than qualifications in the collection and analyses of data.  By adopting an inductive 
approach it was necessary to gather information from participants and to process and 
develop the information into themes; broader patterns, theories or generalisations.  Finally, 
these findings are compared with personal experience and existing literature related to the 
topic; according to Rocco et al. (2003) this inductive logic or qualitative method is 
generally associated with understanding a particular phenomenon in a social context.  
From an epistemological point of view, the objective truth can be “exposed because 
understandings and values are objectified in the people being studied” (de Quiros, Aranda-
Mena, Edward & Calder, 2007: 2-3); extending this position meaning is not so much 
discovered, but constructed – there being no ‘objective truth’ to be discovered.  The 
philosophical or worldview considerations have been acknowledged, and I have qualified 
the research design to complement this form of pragmatic investigation and social research 
(Grady, 1998). 
 
In summary, I acknowledge the limitations to this operational research (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2003) and I have endeavoured to counter a number of the associated risks, by 
adopting a ‘systematic approach’ and employing a transparent “investigation and ethical 
process”, trusting that this supports my enquiry and that the research findings are based 
upon a logical relationship and not just ‘supposition’ or belief (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 
2002: 38). In this respect, I have acknowledged that it would have been unsafe for this 
research to have been exclusively reliant upon my professional consultancy experience 
with the public services.  This experience can ‘inform’ my primary research findings by 
supporting context placement and narrative interpretation, but in isolation, it cannot form 
the basis of argument or proposition.  In accordance with the advice of Stake (1995: 240), I 
have aspired to objectivity, giving proper regard to validity and reliability being provided 
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with this salutary reminder that ‘criteria of representation ultimately are decided by the 
researcher’.  I have adopted an interpretive approach to this research, acknowledging my 
intimate relationship with the subject under review together with the “situational 
constraints shaping this process” (Rowlands, 2005: 81).  Therefore this interpretive 
research does not seek to predefine variables, nor does it set out to test hypothesis, rather it 
aims to produce an “understanding of the social context the phenomenon and the process 
whereby the phenomenon influences and is influenced by the social context” 




This research has drawn upon current published and archival data relating to the National 
Intelligence Model; the foundational sources being dominated by Home Office, Centrex, 
NPIA and ACPO.  To supplement this, and to provide a general history to the origins and 
foundations of the NIM, I have reviewed both biographical and autobiographical sources 
of key players in its development (Mark, 1978; Flood, 2004; Grieve, 2004; and Phillips, 
2008).  In addition, and as part of a sequential and cumulative collection of studies, I have 
plundered my own research from the four years Professional Doctorate Programme and 
empirical findings from my work as an Investigative Consultant and Change Manager with 
the public services since 2001.   
 
Primary Research 
Initially, I determined to employ mixed method research; employing both an electronically 
circulated survey and supplementing the findings with a limited number of semi-structured 
interviews.  However, despite a reasonable return (17%) in the survey’s pilot, results from 
an initial ‘live trawl’ harvested an empirically unacceptable response.  A review of the 
completed surveys, together with the emerging findings from the structured interviews, 
revealed potential indicators for the low return.  Fundamentally, the majority of public 
service investigative staff appeared unfamiliar with the requirements and purpose of the 
NIM minimum standards and this incomprehension may have contributed to the poor 
return.  Initially, faced with disappointing survey results, I reviewed the methodology, 
avoiding the temptation to simplify the questions for a potentially naïve audience, as this 
would have frustrated the focus of the research.  Saunders, et al (2001) suggests that the 
researcher may suffer from poor return rates and further describes the limitations of 
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questionnaires with regards to responses, potentially, failing to describe the underlying 
reasons for ‘outcome’.  I therefore determined to expand the research sample for interview 
– employing, in its simplest form, a ‘guided conversation’ (Kvale, 1996; Atkinson et al, 
2001), with a specific aim and a blend of both inductive and deductive methodology 
(Perry, 1998).   
 
Sample, ethics and content analysis 
As a direct consequence of the low response to survey, I increased the subject database of 
those willing to be engaged in semi-structured interview from 24 to 49 (2 transcripts were 
not employed at the subject’s request).  Qualitative semi-structured interviews were 
employed as the key method for primary research (see Appendix 4), partially to 
compensate for discontinuing the survey and in the expectation that the qualitative nature 
of the data would improve.  The qualitative interview is argued by Sewell (2009) as being 
the most useful social research tool for understanding the meaning and impact on a 
programme or process to its participants.  The interview is capable of identifying variations 
to implementation (and partial or non-adaption), application and conformity; and of 
exploring individual differences between people’s understanding and experiences.  Bell 
(1999) suggests that the main advantage of the interview is its adaptability providing the 
field researcher with an opportunity to develop the research themes based upon the 
answers and cues provided by the respondents.  It avoids the limitations imposed by the 
‘fixed’ nature of a questionnaire and provides an opportunity for ‘follow-up’; to probe 
responses, ‘dig deeper’ or seek clarification (Bell, 1999).  In addition, interviews can 
provide the researcher with a more comprehensive understanding of features beyond 
simple ‘process’ or ‘application’, potentially introducing the critical background, 
environment, attitudes and motivations (Gilbert 2001). 
 
Perry (1998: 791) reported that a doctoral thesis would require an overall sample of 
between 35 to 50 interviews to obtain meaningful results and this acted as a guide in 
determining the final research population of 47 interviewees.  As can be seen from Table 
3.1 below, these were broadly and proportionately distributed between public services in 
accordance to the size of their investigative community with the DWP contributing 36% of 
the interviewees; the IPS: 23% and the DSA: 13%.   In addition, the sample size was 
sufficient to demonstrate that further data collection, through structured interview, was 
unlikely to reveal substantially new data, viz. within the themes and content analysis 
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categories established (Douglas, 2003; Goulding, 2002; Locke 2001).  I deliberately 
applied convenience sampling to the significant majority of interview subjects who are 
currently actively engaged as investigation staff operating in non-police public services.  
This form of sampling is justified by Morse (1994: 228) who recommends that respondents 
are selected from those “who have the knowledge and experience the researcher requires, 
have the ability to reflect, to articulate, the time to be interviewed and is willing to 
participate in the study”.  I employed an interview schedule (Appendix 4), that was 
itemised, to support evaluation and analysis, and supplemented this with a scripted 
introduction for face-to-face interviews. This was in accord with Kumar’s (2005) 
recommendations that differentiate between the structured schedule as a qualitative 
research tool, and the interview itself which is recognised a method of data collection.  
This provided some advantage in that it delivered ‘[relatively] uniform responses which 
assures the comparability of data’ (Kumar, 2005: 126).   
 
I had determined to provide agreeable subjects with an original copy of the NIM minimum 
standards and a revised and simplified set for review and comment.  In respect of eliciting 
and interrogating feedback, the interview delivered a more adaptable research tool than the 
questionnaire, facilitating both ‘follow up’ and probing supplementary questions, whilst 
permitting an opportunity for clarification of a response denied to the research when using 
a remote survey.  I employed ‘qualitative interviewing’ in thematically semi-structured 
format; combining both open and closed questions.  Responses were faithfully and 
contemporaneously recorded; to facilitate content analysis and amplify its products in an 
attempt to capture both emotion and attitude.  This approach permitted the participant to 
describe what was meaningful or important to them in their own words – not being 
restricted by predetermined categories.   
 
The semi-structured nature of the face-to-face interviews provided a good degree of 
control, reliability and speed (Smith, 2003); the interview structure maintaining a 
deliberate direction over the process and, arguably, with a consistent format, provided 
reliable data gathering.  Prior to interviews all of the subjects were contacted, their consent, 
to engage in the research, was confirmed and they were offered a pre-interview opportunity 
to review the original NIM minimum standards (Annex 1) and an ‘unaccredited and 
revised edition’, reduced to 40 sections (Appendix 3).  It was emphasised to subjects that 
to decline reviewing either the ‘original’ or ‘revised’ minimum standards would not 
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exempt them from being interviewed. The majority of the respondents 40 (85%) of the 
subjects agreed to review the pre-interview data, RS01–RS25 and RS33-RS47, and this 
was provided electronically 14 days before the scheduled interview.  A summary of 
interview subjects is shown in Table 3.1 with an indication of the proportionate 
contributions to the target population.  The subjects who were not provided with pre-
interview standards, viz. staff from CRB, DSA, DVLA and DWP, are shown in 
parenthesis. 
 
The sample provided a broad division of 40% managers and 60% of 
investigators/intelligence officers.  Respondents were selected on the basis of their 
knowledge, experience and role and I applied purposive sampling to ensure a range of 
subjects, drawn from both the intelligence and operational investigative community.  The 
majority of respondents were known from previous consultancy and training programmes 
within the public services.  The disproportionate representation of managers (40%), when 
applied to the workplace, was deliberate and manipulated over the course of the research.  
This was in response to the investigators and intelligence officer’s apparent limited 
familiarity, with organisational policy, partnership and collaborating working, revealed in 
earlier in the research (Osborn, 2008). 
 
















CRB 2       (1) 1 
DSA 13   1 (1)  1 2+(1) 6 
DVLA 4   (1)    (1) 2 
DWP 36  1 4 1 2 1 6+(2) 17 
IPS 23  1 2 1  2 5 11 
Police 9 2 2      4 
SOCA 13   2   2 2 6 
          
Total 100 2 4 10 3 2 4 19 47 
 
 
CRB: Criminal Records Bureau;    DSA: Driving Standards Agency;     
DVLA: Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency; DWP: Department for Work & Pensions;     
IPS: Identity and Passport Service;    SOCA: Serious Organised Crime Agency 
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The professional profile of the interview subjects is shown below, together with the 
identification code that is employed for citations within this report.  The respondents 
shown in Table 3.2 accepted the invitation to review and comment on original NIM 
minimum standards (Annex 1) and the unaccredited revised NIM minimum standards 
(Appendix 3) prior to interview. 
 
Table 3.2: Subjects who reviewed the NIM MS and Revised MS 
RS01 ACPO member (Police) RS18 Investigation Manager IPS 
RS02 ACPO member (Police) RS19 Investigator IPS 
RS03 Investigation Manager SOCA RS20 Investigator IPS 
RS04 Investigation Manager SOCA RS21 Senior Manager IPS 
RS05 Investigator SOCA RS22 Investigation Manager DWP 
RS06 Investigator SOCA RS23 Intelligence Officer DWP 
RS07 BITSU Intelligence Officer SOCA RS24 Senior Manager DWP 
RS08 BITSU Intelligence Officer SOCA RS25 Investigator DWP 
RS09 Investigation Manager DWP RS33 Investigation Manager DWP 
RS10 Intelligence Manager DWP RS34 Investigation Manager DSA 
RS11 Investigator DWP RS35 Intelligence Manager IPS 
RS12 Investigator DWP RS39 Investigator SOCA 
RS13 Crime Analyst DWP RS40 Investigator SOCA 
RS14 Crime Analyst (retired 2010) DWP RS41 Investigator DWP 
RS15 Investigator IPS RS45 Investigator DWP 
RS16 Investigator IPS RS46 Investigator DSA 
RS17 Investigation Manager IPS RS47 Investigator (retired 2009) IPS 
 
 
Table 3.3 below provides details of investigative staff and managers who were 





Table 3.3: Subjects who did not review the NIM MS and revised MS 
RS26 Investigator DVLA RS30 Investigator DWP 
RS27 Investigator CRB RS31 Intelligence Manager DSA 
RS28 Investigator DWP RS32 Investigation Manager DVLA 
RS29 Investigator DSA   
 
The following respondents shown in Table 3.4 declined interview or, at the schedule 
appointment, were unavailable for full interview, but were willing to provide a written 
response to the questions and review the proposed revised NIM minimum standards (MS). 
 
Table 3.4: Subjects who reviewed the NIM MS and revised MS providing written   
responses 
RS36 Investigator DSA RS42 Investigator DWP 
RS37 Investigator DWP RS43 Senior Manager (retired) Police 
RS38 Investigator IPS RS44 Senior Manager (retired) Police 
 
When consent was given, interviews were recorded, faithfully transcribed and securely 
stored in an encrypted format.  On three occasions, subjects requested that the interviews 
were not electronically recorded, but consented to my ‘note taking’.  To support the 
frequency and pace of the interview, these notes did not form a contemporaneous record, 
although I employed short hand notes to support a summary of the interview.  Following 
the initial transcription of the recorded interviews, I employed a denaturalised approach, 
removing any idiosyncrasies of speech.  Oliver, Serovich and Mason (2005: 1273) argue 
that transcription is a ‘pivotal aspect of the enquiry’ and the transcription processes have 
been described in terms of a continuum.  At one end lies ‘naturalism’ in which everything 
in the interview is transcribed with as much detail as possible – reflecting a verbatim 
record of speech (Shagloff, 1997 cited in Oliver, et al, 2005) and acknowledging that the 
spoken responses provided an individual’s actual construct of reality.  At the other end lies 
‘denaturalisation’, the transcript suggesting that within the speech ‘are meanings and 
perceptions that construct our reality’ (Cameron 2001 cited in Oliver et al, 2005:1274). 
 
The thematically semi-structured interview framework covered the following aspects of the 
research: compliance with the NIM; perceived impact on risk or vulnerability to fraud; 
impact on partnership and ‘joint working’ (a more familiar expression than partnership to 
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non-police public services); whether the NIM is a productive business model; whether the 
NIM improves efficiency or effectiveness of investigation; and (to those respondents who 
had agreed to review them: RS01 - RS25 and RS33 - RS47) seeking critique on the revised 
NIM minimum standards.  The questions were initially framed and then trialed; as a result 
of feedback, they were edited and converted to a semi-structured interview protocol (see 
Appendix 4).  
 
Ethical Issues 
This research was carried out with the approval of the University of Portsmouth Ethics 
Committee and in strict adherence to the consent provided to the terms and conditions 
outlined in the Research Proposal (approved in 2009). The study was designed and 
undertaken consistently and fairly to preserve the honesty, integrity and quality of the 
findings.  All participation was voluntary and the research was undertaken openly, without 
deception and all subjects were free to withdraw at any time.  It was evident from earlier 
research (Osborn, 2008) that subjects had expressed a heightened sensitivity to this 
research theme and I considered it necessary to maintain a high level of anonymity to 
encourage openness and honesty in response.  Furthermore, the majority of subjects 
continue to be employed within their respective agencies and may have experienced a 
sense of vulnerability should their responses be made public and interpreted as critical.  
Strict confidentiality was therefore assured to all respondents and this has been preserved 
throughout this study by the exclusive employment of nominal codes with limited 
descriptive data, i.e. role and organisation to identify respondents. All personal data and 
transcription has been encrypted and stored onto a MicroSoft Access database, on a stand-
alone personal computer (without server or internet access).  Following transcription, all 
electronic audio recordings, research diaries and schedule records relating to a subject’s 
code were securely deleted; and the original manuscripts and notes were destroyed.  In two 
examples, the role description (in Tables 3.2 - 4) has been amended and generalised to 
frustrate identification, due to specialised nature of the subject’s role.  
 
Prior to any request for interview, subjects were provided with an information sheet and 
invited to complete a consent form, these consent records were converted to electronic 
copies, encrypted and stored onto as separate IT system.  Transcribed interview records 
were available to interviewees and on three occasions were requested and provided to the 
subjects in secure electronic files.  Two subjects requested the withdrawal of their 
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interview transcript from this research, effectively reducing the research sample from 49 to 
47.  In accordance with their requests the transcripts; identities; and all associated data 
were deleted and no details have been employed in this report. 
 
Content Analysis 
Content analysis (CA) was employed to systematically examine the textual and transcribed 
material and is a technique that derives from the communicative services (Mayring, 2004).  
Qualitative and conceptual CA was used to ‘break down the text’ into a system of 
categories (Krippendorf, 1980).  Conceptual analysis begins with identifying research 
questions and then coding responses into manageable content categories – the process of 
coding is basically one of selective reduction – reducing the transcript to categories of a 
word, set of words or phrases indicative of the research theme (Colorado State University, 
2009).  Carney (1973) supports the use of CA in interview-based social research stating 
that ‘it gets the answers to the questions to which it is applied’.  In addition, CA can be 
inclusive as Mayring (2004) states “…qualitative content analysis does not seek to shut 
itself off from quantitative analytical procedures, but attempts to incorporate them into the 
analytical process in a justified way.”  A rudimentary coding (categorical analysis) system 
was applied with a research focused interpretation – ‘there are scarcely any fixed rules’ 
(Flick, 2002: 185).  The choice of CA was guided by Berelson (1971: 74) as ‘a research 
technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of manifest content of 
communication’.  As such I employed it as a research tool, focusing on the actual content 
and internal features of textual media.  It provided a comparative and descriptive format 
through the identification of certain words or phrases, themes, characters or sentences and 
can quantitatively present them in an objective manner.  Although CA has been trialed on 
serial audio recordings, in this research it was exclusively applied to interview 
transcriptions, text summaries and written responses.  The structured interview transcripts 
were subjected to conceptual CA (Palmquist, 2004); the respondents’ interview transcripts 
being manually coded into manageable context categories employing the prescribed form 
of ‘selective reduction’.  Alternative CA processes and software was reviewed, but not 
employed – the industry leader being ‘NUDIST when working with data management 
facilities (Proralis Research, 2008).  
 
The CA was undertaken as part of the overall analysis evaluation, not intended as a ‘stand-
alone’ process (Boyzatzis, 1998) and complementary to the review and evaluation of 
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identified policy, process and procedure within each public service organisation.  It was 
relatively time consuming and, inevitably, the validity of the product may be questioned 
due to possible subjectivity, through selective questioning and intervention, categorisation 
and interpretation.  I acknowledged this refining risk and the cautionary statement of De 
Dreu & West (2001: 163) “whether using literature review; card sorting or computer 
aided analysis, but all can emphasise the subjective nature of the sorting activity”.  One 
method I employed to support the reduction of researcher bias was to employ a process of 
verification: using a ‘second rater’ to apply the categories that I, as the ‘first rater’, had 
generated.  A common criteria is to use 80% agreement that categories are generally 
replicable (Krippendorf, 1980), having applied the ‘two-rating system’ to this research, I 
have sought to increase empirical validity (and reliability) whilst acknowledging the 
reservations of Flick (2002: 218) who states “the problems of how to assess qualitative 
research have not yet been solved”. 
 
Rationale and justification 
The thematic semi-structured interview as a qualitative research tool was adopted in 
compliance with a pragmatic view that research must ‘add value’ and be unequivocally 
useful to both the researcher and audience of the findings (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  I was 
guided by the methodological ‘tenets’ (and tools) described by Denzin & Lincoln (2000a: 
14) who stated that the topics and concepts must be appropriate and relevant to the concept 
of the study. This is supported by Easterby-Smith et al (2002: 27) who argue that the 
methodology employed, ‘essentially a form of research philosophy’, will help to clarify 
research design; identify which design will work (and alternatively those that will not); and 
identify and even create designs outside of past experience.  I maintained a healthy 
scepticism towards prior work, endeavouring to conduct this study with a relatively 
impartial view; intending that the products and findings of the research must explain 
processes and relationships – resulting from the researcher’s study (‘immersion in the 
field’) and that this properly reflect the dynamics of the study (Locke, 2001).  I sought to 
generate enough data (and of sufficient quality) to illuminate patterns, concepts, categories, 
properties, associations and dimensions (Thompson, 2004).  In this respect an appropriate 
sample size was established (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003) achieving theoretical 
saturation (Glaser, 1992) and delivering data with a reasonably rigorous claim to true 
representation.  Theoretical saturation was recognised in that further data yielded no 
additional information; no relevant data emerged regarding a determined category; the CA 
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categories were appropriately developed in terms of properties and dimensions 
demonstrating variation and; the relationship amongst (and between) categories were 
established and validated (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 212).   
 
Summary 
From earlier research (Osborn, 2008) and exposure to the public services, the operational 
investigative teams did not appear to be adhering to the criteria requirements of NIM 
despite organisational claims of ‘adoption’ and ‘conformity’.  The potential benefits of the 
NIM, as an intelligence-led process, may not be accessible without conforming to the asset 
and procedural requirements (ACPO, 2005: 2.2.1: 101). This revised methodology was 
designed to identify, predominantly from investigative personnel, the level of conformity 
and where variations exist, the reasons.  It focused on three public services that have 
‘adopted’ the model representing different staff complements, budget and core businesses, 
the DWP, the IPS and the DSA to provide a broad spread of agencies.  The initial intention 
to employ survey and structured interview was modified following trial and the research 
population was expanded to accommodate the exclusive use of interview.  The qualitative 
semi-structured thematic interviews were ethically undertaken in line with the University 
of Portsmouth guidance and the findings were subject to content analysis employing 
selective reduction and categorical analysis as part of an overall evaluation process.  The 
findings were supplemented by a comprehensive review of published and archival 
information. 
 
Professional exposure, as a consultant (Appendix 2), to criminal investigations to a 
substantial number of public services over the last decade has provided me with a valuable 
insight into the policy, processes and the linguistic and operational culture of these 
organisations.  With a background as a detective officer, crime analyst and manager from 
the Specialist Operations branches of the Metropolitan Police I had a good understanding 
of investigative procedures, collaborative working and the demands of legislation to 
maintain evidential integrity.  With this experience, within the police and commerce, I was 
fortunate and privileged to work with a broad range of investigative staff and intelligence 
units within the public services listed below. 
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Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) 
Child Support Agency (CSA) 
Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) 
Department for Environment, Fisheries and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) formerly separate entities as the 
Employment Service, the Benefits Agency and Pension Service (now constituting 
JobCentre Plus, Pensions Service and the Risk Assurance Division) 
Driving Standards Agency (DSA) 
Driver and Vehicle Licence Agency (DVLA) 
Forensic Science Service (FSS) 
HM Revenue and Customs formerly the separate entities of the Inland Revenue and 
HM Customs & Excise (HMRC) 
Identity and Passport Service (IPS) formerly the United Kingdom Passport Service 
(UKPS) 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
National Health Service (NHS) 
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) formerly the National Crime Squad (NCS) 
and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) 
 
Although previous experience and exposure can be an asset, I was conscious that this could 
lead to subjective bias, including presumption in designing the methodology; reviewing the 
results; and interpreting the research findings.  To counter this risk a number of safeguards 
have been observed including the use of content analysis, ‘second rating’, and 
endeavouring to reach theoretical saturation, to ensure objectivity and reliability in the 
research process. 
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Chapter 4:  Background and related work 
Introduction  
Chapter 2 reviewed the origins of intelligence-led policing (ILP); the development of the 
Kent Police Model and the naissance of the NIM.  The model provides a national ILP-
based policy and a business process that dominantly positions the collation, analysis and 
application of intelligence as the central driver for criminal investigation and crime 
reduction (Home Office, 2004).  Having established the evolutionary path of the NIM, this 
chapter initially reviews the creation of this policy and the potential influences exerted on 
the NCIS designers through policy transfer or ‘lessons learned’ (Hill, 2009: 180).  This is 
followed by an examination of the description of the NIM, within the Guidance, as a 
business model.   
 
The NCIS ‘blue book’ (NCIS, 2000), effectively an introduction to the NIM, claimed that 
it ‘provided clarity and standards for intelligence work’ and enabled the review of 
‘intelligence systems and introduce more rigour in the management decision-making 
process’ (p. 2).  More recently, the NPIA (2010) stated that the model ‘takes an 
intelligence-led, problem solving approach to crime and disorder’ (NCIS 2000: 7).  These 
sources (the emphasis added) concur in identifying the core ingredient of the model as 
(criminal) intelligence, with the NPIA and NCIS including ‘decision making’ and ‘problem 
solving’ that was described in Chapter 2 under the auspices of tasking and co-ordination.   
 
To provide context, this chapter will examine the origins of intelligence and draw upon 
related work for a more focused review of criminal intelligence.  This is supplemented 
with a review of the NIM as an effective crime reduction model (Kirby & McPherson, 
2004; Maguire, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008 and Grampian Police, 2010) and, specifically for 
public services, its potential impact on fraud.  The final part of this chapter provides a 
review of the NIM implementation from the perspective of organisational change and the 
potential impact that this may have on public service conformity to the model. 
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The NIM as a national policy 
The entitlement of the NIM to be described as national policy cannot be definitive as Hill 
(2009; 15) states that “The definitional problems posed by the concept of policy suggest 
that it is difficult to treat it as a very specific and concrete phenomenon”.  However, for the 
purpose of this review, the model’s entitlement to that term is drawn from a number of 
sources, Jenkins (1978: 15 cited in Hill, 2009: 15) defines ‘policy’ as “a set of interrelated 
decisions … concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a 
specified situation …”.  This definition is supported from a business perspective of policy 
and is described as a, “… set of basic principles and associated guidelines, formulated and 
enforced by the governing body of an organisation, to direct and limit its actions in pursuit 
of long-term goals” (Businessdictionary, 2011).  This appears to provide a ‘fit’ with the 
NIM as ‘policy’, in that it relates to ‘intelligence-led decision making’ employing 
‘interrelated decisions’, i.e. analytical products; intelligence products; knowledge products; 
and system products (John & Maguire, 2004: 2).  The selected ‘goals’ have been 
articulated in a variety of forms, including force objectives; the reduction of crime and 
disorder (NPIA, 2010); and meeting ‘strategic goals’ (John & Maguire, 2004: 58).  The 
NPIA are unequivocal in their determination for the model: “NIM became policy of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 2000” (NPIA, 2009), which delivers the 
broad police perspective.  I would argue that its later adoption by the Home Office; 
elevation to legislative recognition (s. 2, Police Reform Act 2002); and the imposition for 
compulsory national adoption by police services, convert this ‘police (ACPO) policy’ to 
‘national policy’.  
 
Policy Transfer 
Designed within NCIS, the NIM was a refined product ostensibly based upon the precepts 
of ILP and embodied in the Kent Police Model and recommended to the Home Office for 
adoption.  As described in Chapter 2, the Kent model was introduced in 1993 as a “holistic 
system of ILP” (Maguire, 2008: 455) and it drew positive attention (HMIC, 1996 and 
1997), later described as “the most extensive and influential” ILP project demonstrated in 
England and Wales (Tilley, 2003: 313).  Re-engineered, rebranded and published in 1999, 
the NIM was strongly sponsored by Phillips, as a representative of ACPO, and 
recommended to the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, in September 2000.  However, the Kent 
Police Model was not alone in its claim for intelligence-led success at the close of the 
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millennium.  Circumstantial evidence to support policy transfer rests upon a number of 
factors, the NIM was a different model to the Kent Police Model in that it had 
“substantially broader scope and ambition” (James, 2011: 124).  As Amey et al identified 
(1996: 33), in its original form the Kent model, only focusing on four ‘crime types’ 
(robbery, autocrime, burglary and drugs), was not intended to impact upon general crime.  
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, unlike the Kent model, the NIM includes the 
requirement for ‘strategic assessment’.  This is described by John & Maguire (2002: 212) 
as “informed by analysis of problems … and by priorities imposed … by internal and 
external bodies”, arguably influenced by COMPSTAT that, of all the contemporary 
policies, it exclusively featured this element.   
 
In addition, there was potential for policy transfer during the NIM’s genesis within NCIS 
and the Home Office, from alternative policing initiatives such as Community Policing; 
central government performance policy; and the prevailing social environment.  There is 
no direct evidence that these factors impacted upon the model’s transition into national 
policy, and adoption by the Home Office.  However, modification of the Kent model was 
quite evident and may have provided the Home Office with a convenient and timely 
opportunity to progress both intelligence-led policing and greater performance 
accountability.  James  2011: 132 notes that  an ACPO member suggested that the NIM 
was an attractive proposition to the Home Office as it was a “rational model that offered a 
degree of accountability”; whilst Flood’s account confirms that “they [Home Office 
officials] were looking for some new initiative” .  
 
It was evident that the NIM had a limited gestation period in comparison with ILP, which 
could be reliably traced back to the Baumber Report of the mid 1970’s (ACPO, 1975) and 
that it was a modified product from a county policing initiative.  This review will include 
three possible contributors to policy transfer during the NCIS development of the NIM: 
‘COMPSTAT’, Community Policing and the New Public Management (NPM).  As an 
introduction, I have included a time line covering a three decade period from 1975 (Table 
4.1) to illustrate a schedule of events, initiatives and themes that potentially exerted 





Table 4.1 Time Line (1975-2006): Development and potential policy transfer to the NIM 
Year Initiative, Event 
or Theme 
Source Comment 
1975 Baumber Report: 




ACPO, 1975 The introduction of the concept of ILP and 
recommendations for the more systematic use and 
application of criminal intelligence for all of the police 
service and a clear differentiation was made between 
‘information’ and useable ‘intelligence’. 
1977 ILP introduced to 
the Metropolitan 
Police 
Mark, 1978 Limited implementation, resulting in “a comparatively 
small number of handpicked men and women to specialise 
in intelligence gathering and surveillance” (Mark, 1978: 
294) 
1978 Pearce Report: 
3
rd
 Report of the 
Working Party 





ACPO, 1978 The Pearce report drew a broad distinction, in terms of 
content, between criminal intelligence records and criminal 
records (Maguire & John, 1995). “For working purposes 
we therefore define criminal intelligence records as 
containing inferential and speculative matters about 
criminals and crime that do not form part of the criminal 
record.  It does not preclude the inclusion of some criminal 
record information such as summaries of convictions 
where it would be helpful, but we would expect this to be 
minimal and duplication is to be avoided so far as 





Problem oriented policing entails more than identifying 
and analysing community problems and developing more 
effective responses to them, “…in its broadest context it is 
a whole new way of thinking about policing that has 
implications for every aspect of the police organization its 
personnel and its operations  With an ever present concern 
about the end product of policing as its central theme it 
seeks to tie together the many elements involved in 
effecting change in the police … changes are coordinated 
and mutually supportive It connects with the current move 
to redefine relationships between the police and the 





















Rowe (2008: 154), argues that it was the Scarman Inquiry 
and subsequent report (1981) on the Brixton disorders that 
renewed and established the Community Policing agenda. 
Friedman’s (1996: 115) definition for Community Policing 
is a “policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more 
effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, 
improved quality of life, improved police services and 
police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on 
community resources that seeks to change crime causing 
conditions.  This assumes a need for greater accountability 
of police, greater public share in decision making, and 
greater concern for civil rights and liberties”. 









Marshall (1999: 2) suggests that there is no consensus on 
an exact meaning of the term and it refers to a number of 
concepts including ‘being tough on crime’; ‘strict non-
discretionary law enforcement’; and ‘police action against 
minor offences and disorder’.  Bratton (1997: 34) 
described it as ‘strategic re-engineering’ of the New York 
Police Department including strict crime control; 
decentralised policing with accountability; use of timely 
and accurate intelligence data, trust; and emphasis on 











Planning introduced into the MPS taking into account 
intelligence-led strategic assessments.  Co-ordinating and 
targeting introduced together with institutionalised 
management of CHIS; and the reorganising and 
restructuring of the intelligence process (Grieve, 2004: 28-
30). 
1986 Ratcliffe Report: 




ACPO, 1986 Designated staff appeared under-trained and the few 
Intelligence Units that existed appeared ill-equipped and 
without clear focus and purpose.  Ratcliffe reported and 
emphasised the need to co-ordinate intelligence gathering, 
better use and application of intelligence products, 
directing operational activity and guided resource 
allocation to stimulate ILP (ACPO, 1986) 




The Systems for Investigation and Detection project 
identifying commonality of procedures, staffing, roles and 
integrated levels of activity (Grieve, 2004: 33).  
Recognised as local best practice it introduced targeted 
proactive working, senior ownership of intelligence, 
communicated intelligence strategies, tasking and co-
ordination and partnership. 







Described as “an intelligence-led proactive problem 
solving approach to policing with crime reduction as its 
primary objective” (HMIC, 1995:1).  David Phillips, the 
Chief Constable of Kent Police, ably assisted by Brian 
Flood, introduced the KPM as a “significant deviation to 
traditional policing methods and to employ a holistic 
system of ILP” (Maguire, 2008: 455) 
1994 COMPSTAT 
introduced to the 
Transit police in 
new York, USA;. 
Bratton, 1998; 
Dussalt, 1999 
The originator of COMPSTAT (COMSTAT) was Maple 
and in interview (Dussault, 1999) he defined four 
fundamental principles: 
 
 Accurate, timely intelligence clearly 
communicated to all. 
 A rapid deployment that is concentrated, 
synchronized and focused. 
 Effective tactics and strategies. 
 Relentless follow-up and assessment.  
 
Referred to as ‘COMSTAT’ or ‘Charts of the Future’ by 
its originator Jack Maple it was introduced to the New 
York Police Department in 1994 by Police Chief Bratton 
1996 Performance 
review on Kent 
Police by HMIC 
HMIC, 1996 
and 1997 
Reported: the Kent Policing Model (KPM) has generated a 
greater appreciation amongst officers of the concept and 
ethos of crime reduction, and the component parts of the 
model appear to be more cohesive (HMIC, 1997: 2) 
 
The major benefits of the KPM include: 
 
 a control on demands for policing services by 
assessing calls from the public and by providing 
the most appropriate response; 
 the development and utilisation of criminal 
intelligence to ensure that resources are most 
effectively directed; and 
 the establishment and development of specialist 
teams to deal with intelligence, crime scenes, 
crime recording, victim care and interviewing 
(HMIC, 1996: 2.19: 8) 
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HMIC, 1997 Refers to The Audit Commission, working with ACPO, 
HMIC and others publishing two papers, emphasising the 
primary importance of intelligence led policing. (1.19: 5).  
Recommends: formal tasking criteria; National Informant 
Database; and measure performance in respect of the crime 
intelligence functions (6.6: 35). 





The initial publication on the NIM. 
 
2000 NIM comes to 





Sponsored by ACPO and suggesting a move away from 
reactive policing to ILP (James, 2011: 132). Phillips meets 
with the Home Secretary in September 2000 to discuss 
police reform. 
2001 National roll 





Following the publication of the NCIS ‘Blue Book’, police 
forces began to voluntarily adopt aspects of the NIM.  John 
& Maguire’s report followed a 21 month study of ‘early 
experiences’ of implementation on the NIM focused on the 
three ‘development sites’, but acknowledging that other 
forces had begun their implementation. 







Compulsory imposition of the NIM and its Code of 
Practice through legislation, codified - under section 39A 
of the Police Act 1996, as inserted by Section 2 of the 
Police Reform Act 2002.  Compliance is subject to audit 
and inspection by the HMIC. 
2003 The NIM is 








Introduced by the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, it 
included the requirement for all police services in England 
and Wales to implement the NIM, stating that “Chief 
officers must have regard to the code and ensure that their 
forces adopt the practices of NIM and implement the 
required minimum standards” 





*           *           
* 
DWP, IPS and 










This published manual constitutes 213 pages and provides 
a comprehensive description of the model, Code of 
Practice (pps. 99-109) and the minimum standards (pps. 
111-159) 
*                                         *                                          * 
The three public services under review ‘adopt’ the NIM to 
support their investigation and fraud reduction. 






In Scotland there is no legal backing to the implementation 
of the implementation of the NIM, however, ACPOS 
acknowledges the Code of Practice as written by ACPO 




Policy Transfer: COMPSTAT 
Potentially the strongest competing ‘intelligence-led model’ of topical interest to the police 
at the end of the last century was not ‘home-grown’, but a trans-Atlantic import 
‘COMPSTAT’ originated by Jack Maple in 1994 under the aegis of Bratton (Dussault, 
1999) and later introduced to the New York City Police.  Both the NIM and COMPSTAT 
are jointly described as “intelligence models to enable strategic management and the 
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timely direction of resources to crime” (Ministry of Justice, 2005).  Loveday (2005) 
reported that COMPSTAT received substantial popular interest and support in the UK 
generated through enthusiastic media reporting of its adoption and subsequent crime 
reduction in association with the ‘zero tolerance’ initiative by the New York City Police 
(NYCP).  Within the UK police service, a number of prominent senior police managers 
provided a qualified interest in the adoption of COMPSTAT (Hayes, 1998; Griffiths, 
1997), but the support was not unanimous, particularly when the full extent of 
accountability and sanction became evident.  Bratton (1998), the Commissioner of New 
York City Police, argued that, for the COMPSTAT element to be successful, it demanded 
internal accountability with Precinct (BCU equivalents) Commanders attending weekly 
organisational (Force equivalent) Crime Control Meetings to report their results.  These 
gatherings, colloquially known as ‘blood-lettings’, were executed in a ‘data [intelligence] 
saturated environment’ (Weisburd et al, 2001 and 2004) and similar to the NIM tasking 
and co-ordinating mechanism and processes.  The COMPSTAT process incorporated a 
‘zero tolerance’ ethos, delivered significant results extending beyond the community 
environment with dramatic, and independently corroborated, reductions in recorded crime.  
However, compliance and ‘delivery’ was ruthlessly imposed and monitored by Bratton 
who, over the 18 month period its trial and implementation, transferred over 30% of his 
Precinct Commanders and dismissed four of his five ‘superchiefs’ (Maple, 1999: 136).   
 
It appears possible, although circumstantial, that COMPSTAT exerted influence on the 
design of the NIM, if only through the addition of a ‘strategic element’.  However, it 
should be acknowledged that the SID project, launched in 1991 within the MPS, had also 
promoted the need for published communicated intelligence strategies and other attributes 
ultimately featuring in the NIM, viz. tasking and co-ordination (Grieve, 2004: 33).  The 
Kent Policing Model contained no ‘strategic element’ and this element was appended to 
the NIM whilst under development at NCIS.  On its arrival at the Home Office, the NIM 
caused some uncertainty as to where to place the model and it is likely that more familiar 
parallels in policing initiatives were sought, if only to place this ‘NCIS creation’ into 
perspective.  Initially, for review and development, it was deposited with the Organised 
Crime Portfolio and then moved to the Crime Reduction Directorate.  At one stage it was 
held by two separate departments and following discussions with ACPO it was again 
transferred, this time (Spring 2002) to the Policing Policy Unit (James, 2011: 132).  As 
previously mentioned, Ratcliffe (2008: 273) closely associates the NIM with intelligence-
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led policing, arguing that: “…almost impossible to discuss the concept of intelligence-led 
policing without making reference to the National Intelligence Model (NIM)”.  He pursues 
this point by stating that: ILP and the NIM is “… philosophically closest to problem-
oriented policing, and to a degree the accountability mechanism of CompStat”.   
 
I would argue that attributes of COMPSTAT influenced the design of the Kent Police 
Model and, being familiar to Phillips, ACPO and to NCIS, influenced the design of the 
NIM.  In addition, I would assert that the doctrines associated with COMPSTAT exerted 
some influence on the architects of the model and the developers within the Home Office, 
as both are intended to “deliver the tight and targeted management of resources based 
upon processed information and intelligence”. (Stelfox, 2007; Tilley, 2008).   
 
Policy transfer: Community Policing: 
Community policing is not a new concept and in some respects, it has the oldest 
provenance of its contemporary rivals, viz. Team Policing, Unit Beat Policing, Policing by 
Objective, Sector Policing, ILP, Problem Oriented Policing, Zero-Tolerance and 
COMPSTAT.  Emsley (2007: 235) suggested that although the concept of community 
policing was articulated towards the end of the twentieth century it is much older, “…the 
ideas and practices that are brought together within the concept have run through the 
history of policing”.  By the end of the 1970’s Community Policing was recovering as a 
workable concept with police managers (Mackenzie and Henry, 2009: 9) and was 
characterised as the ‘new orthodoxy’ (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994: 3).  The term appears to 
feature under a number of alternative banners, i.e. ‘neighbourhood policing’, ‘community 
partnership’ and ‘community engagement’ (Rix et al, 2009: 9) and this may be partially 
due to its lack of clear definition, or as a convenience.   
Despite its ‘history’, a clear definition of community policing remained elusive, according 
to Friedman in 1992, there was no definition available in literature.  Tilley (2003: 315) 
stated that following a comprehensive review “community policing is widely endorsed 
though at the same time widely seen to be close to meaningless’. Rowe (2008: 72) 
suggested that its definition may ‘often appear vague and more than a little aspirational’ 
and for contemporary policing, the closest to a definition were two sets of ten principles, 
the first provided by Alderson (1979) and the second, over a decade later, by Trojanowicz 
and Bucqueroux (1990).  Friedman (1992: 4) described these as: “Alderson’s ten principles 
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related to policing under conditions of freedom with emphasis on guaranteeing personal 
freedom and free passage while the principles offered by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 
have more to do with the implementation of the concept in a given police force”.  For the 
purpose of this research I have adopted Friedman’s (1996: 115) definition for community 
policing as a “policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime 
control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, improved police services and 
police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to 
change crime causing conditions”.   
The ethereal and potentially ambiguous meaning of the term has not precluded it from 
continuing to be widely used, although its generous application (referring to a broad range 
of police-public relationships and partnerships) may have contributed to its devaluation 
and, to some writers, making the term almost meaningless (Manning, 1984: 211; Bayley, 
1994: 104; Tilley, 2008: 376-377).  However, this view is not unanimous and Williamson 
(2005: 153) described Community Policing as the ‘preferred policing style’ and Brogan 
and Nijhar (2005: 1) state that it remains the ‘buzzword in Anglo-American policing for the 
last two decades’.  Furthermore, it continues to be the subject of current Home Office 
review (Rix et al, 2009; Mason 2009) and a popular topic with contemporary researchers 
and writers on police practice (Innes et al, 2009; Peak & Glensor, 2011). 
 
For this research it is the level of both popularity and familiarity that Community Policing 
experienced during the transitional design of the Kent Police Model to the NIM that 
provides its potential qualification as an ‘influencer’ through policy transfer.  The 
identifiable differences between the NIM and the Kent model suggest revision and 
modification to the KPM by the NCIS authors, potentially influenced by ACPO.  
Intelligence-led policing and the Kent model were exclusively the preserve of the police 
and, in themselves they did not allude to an intelligence-led investigation model for 
comprehensive adoption and application beyond the confines of law enforcement agencies.  
Neither ILP nor the Kent model precluded ‘joint working’ or partnership, but their profile, 
processes and products were potentially more insular and intended to deliver against the 
broad demands of policing.  Community Policing requires broader engagement (Rix et al, 
2009) than the Kent model extending to social initiatives such as ‘Neighbourhood Watch’ 
and, in the continuing drive for intelligence-led investigation and decision making, demand 
broader access to data and information.  This implicitly requires working collaboration 
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with society, public service communities and commerce to enable “more efficient and 
effective crime control ….through a proactive reliance on community resources” 
(Friedman, 1996: 115). 
 
Recognition that the police could not, in isolation, address increasing crime and disorder 
problems was clearly acknowledged by central government in The Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 (CDA).  This legislation established ‘statutory partnership’ between the police and 
civilian authorities.  The compulsory partnership engaged with the 376 local authorities 
and instigated the creation of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) and 
could be viewed as ‘Phase 1’ of greater community engagement and collaboration.  The 
CDRPs are required to carry out and publish crime and disorder audits, strategies and 
targets; consult with the local community required.  The CDA delivered new powers to the 
local authorities and the police and requirements to develop multi-agency and community-
based strategic partnerships to reduce crime and disorder in their locality with the implicit 
expectation that the NIM would support this joint working.  However, this did not demand 
compulsory engagement with the broader investigative community in other public services 
and commerce.  The revision of the Kent Policing Model and inclusion of the following 
statement within the NIM Code of Practice: “The National Intelligence Model is not 
confined to, or restricted for specialist usage. It is relevant to all areas of law enforcement; 
crime and its investigation, disorder and community safety.” (Home Office, 2002; para. 
3.1.3) could be viewed as ‘Phase 2’ of a government initiative to increase the consistency 
of intelligence-led investigative process across the national investigative community and 
thus facilitate greater collaborative working.  Although not conclusive as, policy transfer; 
“lesson drawing” (James & Lodge, 2003: 179) or the “migration of ideas as a driver of 
policy change” (Hill, 2009: 180), the NCIS design team formulating the NIM were familiar 
with the themes and practices of Community Policing albeit they operated in a service that 
focused on serious and organised crime.  The Kent Policing Model was designed and 
implemented for parochial (county) application and clearly featured a police-specific 
profile.  There is no suggestion that it was devoid of Community Policing considerations 
rather, I would argue, that this element was fortified in the design of the NIM, thereby 
addressing a perceived popularity for increased partnership within central government (The 
Scottish Government, 2010).  In comparison with the Kent model, the NIM was intended 
to attract a more general appeal; broader application; and compliance that required direct 
engagement with both society and the general investigative community.  In this respect the 
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‘Guidance’ (ACPO, 2005) was composed to include an abundance of references to 
‘community’: co-operation, engagement, information and partnership as can be seen from 
the references below – the emphasis has been added (the list is selective, not exhaustive). 
 
NIM promotes a cooperative approach to policing and many of the solutions to 
problems will require the participation of other agencies and bodies. It is 
further strengthened when used in conjunction with other partner agencies, 
e.g., joint tasking and co-ordination processes, and when it incorporates 
community information into the strategic assessment (p.12). 
Law enforcement relies on intelligence from local officers and the 
identification of problems through community engagement (p. 35). 
Community information can come to the police from members of the public 
and through partner agencies (p. 33) 
Community and partnership activities and meetings (p. 47) 
information management: indicates a problematic neighbourhood, tensions or 
problems within a community group or a signal crime (Section 6.3: 50)” 
Access to external sources of information through partnership arrangements 
can provide: community intelligence and community impact assessments (p. 
59) 
NIM tasking and co-ordination processes link with community partnership 
(Section 9: 74) 
The intelligence requirement may involve changes being made to community 
policing (p. 77) 
Neighbourhood policing uses NIM to manage activity (p. 83) 
effective working relations between the police, partner agencies and the 
community . (p. 89) 
 
Policy Transfer: New Public Management 
Levy (2010: 234) argued that the performance culture has been the “dominant paradigm in 
public administration for at least 20 years” and this would support the potential influence 
of New Public Management on the architects and developers of the NIM.  Added to this, 
the key sponsors of the NIM (Phillips and factions within ACPO) would have been aware 
that to achieve Home Office endorsement (and national adoption) a ‘performance 
management’ ingredient would provide an attractive incentive.  Again, policy transfer 
relies upon circumstantial evidence although Pidd, (2008: 58-59) argues that the NIM was 
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exploited as part of a consolidating drive, by the Home Office, to expand the New Public 
Management initiative within the police service.  Value for money, management by 
objective and the prioritised application of resources all typified the Conservative 
Government’s ‘Fiscal Management Initiative’ (FMI, 1982), which evolved into New 
Public Management, intending to encourage better financial and resource management by 
introducing commercial practices into the public services.  Savage (2007: 212-3) argues 
that the performance culture imposed upon the police, in response to FMI and New Public 
Management, can broadly be identified in three phases: economy and efficiency (1980s); 
effectiveness (1990s); and results and delivery (under the New Labour regime) and these 
epochs are adopted in this short review.   
 
Policy transfer: NPM - The 80s, ‘Economy and Efficiency’ 
The police were quickly included within the trawl of ‘targeted’ public services by the 
Home Office Circular 114 (1983), which encouraged the application of the New Public 
Management (Burrows & Lewis, 1988).  Although not compulsory, HO Circular 
(114/1983) was quickly adopted as “as a seminal text that influenced the thoughts and 
actions of police leaders” (ACPO, 2008: 23).  In some quarters it stimulated annual 
planning cycles; policing by objective; the “Three E’s” of efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy; and what Brooks (2010: 1) described as “the notion of what gets measured, gets 
done”.   
 
The police response, and an inevitable product of 114/83, was to focus activity onto 
specified local objectives.  However, Weatheritt’s (1993) research identified that the 
objectives were “often formulated on the basis of poor, irrelevant or incomplete 
information”.  This indicated that FMI/New Public Management, in the guise of the HO 
Circular 114/83 did not act as a spur for the increased efficiency and accountability.  
Rather it tended to promote traditional methods, appearing to act more as a retardant, 
diverting energy and resources away from the introduction of progressive, and potentially 
more effective, initiatives.  What HO Circular 114/83 failed to provide in the 1980’s was a 
structure, it was not modularised, directive or accompanied with standards as in the case of 
the NIM, it did not ‘translate the fundamental principles’ (Skogan, 2008: 26) and 
permitted discretionary implementation.  The bounty of 114/83 was police diversity of 
practice and Leishman et al (1995: 26) argued that the police service were almost unique in 
the public sector in its resistance to New Public Management.  This resistance coincided in 
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the late 1980s with a “concerted drive from central government … to introduce efficiency 
measures and heightened financial accountability into the public sector in pursuit of value 
for money” (Walsh, 1995: 178).   
 
Policy transfer: NPM - The 90s, ‘Effectiveness’: Audit and Inspection  
The 1990s witnessed police forces progressing and adopting more proactive methods of 
crime management, in some cases stimulated by the National Audit Commission’s (1993) 
report ‘Helping with Enquiries –Tackling Crime Effectively’.  This ultimately resulted in a 
number of experiments and initiatives including intelligence–led policing as in the Kent 
Policing Model (John & Maguire, 2007: 210), although Savage (2007) suggested that the 
full arrival of ILP coincided with the establishment of the NIM.  Innes & Sheptycki (2004: 
22) suggested that the increased demands placed upon policing to be more accountable and 
“cost effective”, motivated this shift away from traditional methods “… the new practices 
of ILP (and the NIM) have contributed to these shifts”.  However, standardisation and 
consistency between forces together with increased ‘efficiency and accountability’ still 
appeared elusive to the Home Office and HMIC (1997: 34-35 recommendations to 
improve intelligence work in the UK).  Scott (1998: 270) argued that the very expansion of 
a performance culture can drive police from the ‘hard-to-quantify areas’ such as 
community policing and crime prevention to simply concentrate on whatever they are 
being measured against.  Measurement took two forms, centrally imposed targets and an 
inspection regime. HMIC inspections had been relatively informal, “little concerned with 
testing scrutiny”; that was to change with the arrival of New Public Management, 
effectively shifting the inspection process from “ritual to one of enforcement”’ (Savage, 
2007: 96).  Added to this, the HMIC increased its power and impact in a number of ways, 
firstly by undertaking thematic inspections - in-depth scrutiny - as well as annual 
inspections (Reiner, 2000).  Secondly, by publishing all its reports – effectively ensuring 
that recalcitrants were ‘named and shamed’ as well as circulating good practice; and finally 
by re-stocking it ranks with qualified staff, including civilian experts in areas of finance 
and human resources.  Through these inspections and subsequent reports, the police were 
encouraged to review and identify processes and procedures to meet their policing 
objectives.   
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Policy transfer: NPM - The Police & Magistrates Court Act, 1994 and RIPA, 2000 
Selective legislation has imposed elements of performance management on the police, 
together with tighter controls by central government delivered through the Police & 
Magistrates Court Act 1994 (PMCA) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 
2000.  The PMCA effectively empowered the Home Secretary to introduce mandatory 
annual objectives and performance indicators (targets) on the police.  In response, forces 
were required to generate and publish annual policing plans that, effectively, held Chief 
Officers to account (Jones & Newburn, 1997; 2002, 129-146).  Initially, Jones, Newburn 
and Smith (1994) stated that the constitutional framework established by the PMCA only 
had a superficial and indirect effect on UK policing.  arguing that the due process model 
was “hopelessly inadequate” and that the revised regulations were “frequently ignored and 
could even be counterproductive” (Jones et al, 1994: 5).  Conversely, Newburn (2003: 94) 
suggested that the PMCA heralded “a new era of policing, emphasising crime control”, 
thus effectively laying the foundation for legislative adoption of the NIM within a broader 
policing context.  More recently, Reiner (2010) defended the PMCA as a first step in 
ensuring police accountability and one of the more successful NPM inspired practices.  
The level of meaningful and lasting change to police effectiveness and the direct impact of 
the PMCA on investigative practices or culture remain debatable.  The reason for some 
inertia within the police reported by Jones et al (1994: 5), at least within centralised units, 
may be supported by Skogan (2008: 27) who, citing his research with the US police, 
suggested that officers (particularly in elite units) were able to resist most changes that 
were attempted to be enforced by “avoidance strategies”.  
 
Whereas the PMCA had a direct impact upon the police and local authorities, the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (RIPA) had wider significance on the use of 
a broad range of powers for all government agencies and in particular the DWP (then the 
Benefits Agency).  The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was introduced by 
Parliament in 2000, setting out the reasons and authorities for the use of directed covert 
surveillance and covert human intelligence sources (CHIS).  The legislation created a 
regulatory framework to govern the way public authorities use these techniques.  The 
Home Office (2009) consultation paper stated: 
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…under RIPA, the most deeply intrusive techniques, such as intercepting 
communications or eavesdropping in private places, can only be used by a very 
limited set of public authorities. …they must first be satisfied that it would be 
necessary and proportionate to do so. … the impact of these techniques on the 
privacy of those under investigation, and on any other people who might be 
affected. Different techniques can only be used if they are authorised at 
appropriately senior levels; and the most deeply intrusive techniques are 
subject to prior independent approval. 
 
The Home Office (2009: 3) consultation paper suggested that for many years, public 
authorities, including the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, various regulatory 
bodies, and local authorities, had used a wide range of covert investigatory techniques to 
investigate suspects without alerting them to the fact that they are under investigation.  
Until 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force and the Government passed 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), public authorities could use most 
of these techniques free from statutory control.  Such agencies were not always required to 
consider the necessity or proportionality of using these techniques, nor were they required 
to justify the intrusion into the privacy of those under investigation.  The use of covert 
investigatory powers and practices by government agencies were largely unregulated, 
being only selectively subject to higher level authority; in many cases not prone to 
independent oversight; and with no independent complaints mechanism (Home Office, 
2009).. 
 
The legislation has courted some controversy, stimulating public criticism of the use of 
surveillance by some Local Authority enforcement officers and investigators and concerns 
regarding the potentially trivial nature of some of the ‘crimes’ being investigated.  Misuse 
of covert investigation powers by non-police authorities has prompted government 
reflection and public consultation about whether such authorities should remain invested 
with such powers (Harfield, 2009: 103).  These concerns led to a review of the legislation 
in 2009, leading to revised legislation - the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed 
Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2010.  In addition to defining 
the circumstances when these investigation methods may be used, the Act also directs how 
applications will be made and how, and by whom, they may be approved, reviewed, 
renewed, cancelled and retained. The Act must be considered in tandem with associated 
legislation including the Human Rights Act (HRA), and the Data Protection Act (DPA). 
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It provided restrictions on public services, limiting the engagement of powers under RIPA 
when performing ‘core functions’. For example, an agency may rely on the Act when 
conducting a criminal investigation as that would be considered a ‘core function’, whereas 
the disciplining of an employee would be considered a ‘non-core’ or ‘ordinary’ function.  
Examples of when public services may use RIPA and CHIS are as follows: 
 
Trading standards – action against loan sharks, rogue traders, consumer scams, 
deceptive advertising, counterfeit goods, unsafe toys and electrical goods; 
Enforcement of anti-social behaviour orders and legislation relating to unlawful 
child labour; 
Housing/planning – interventions to stop and make remedial action against 
unregulated and unsafe buildings, breaches of preservation orders, cases of landlord 
harassment; 
Benefits fraud – investigating ‘living together’ and ‘working whilst in receipt of 
benefit’ allegations and council tax evasion; and 
Environment protection – action to stop large-scale waste dumping, the sale of unfit 
food and illegal ‘raves’. 
 
Public authorities using techniques under RIPA are now subject to independent inspection. 
Finally, there is an independent tribunal, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, to consider 
any complaints relating to the way investigatory techniques regulated by RIPA have been 
used. It prescribed that Local Authorities’ use of these investigation methods were 
restricted in nature and should only be used for the prevention and detection of crime or the 
prevention of disorder. Local Authorities are not able to use intrusive surveillance 
(Thurrock, 2011).   
 
The examples do not replace the key principles of necessity and proportionality or the 
advice and guidance available from the relevant oversight Commissioners.  The RIPA 
(Communications Data) order came into force in 2004. It allows Local Authorities to 
acquire communications data, namely service data and subscriber details for limited 
purposes. This order was updated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Communications Data) Order 2010 (Thurrock, 2011: pps. 3, 4, 13). 
 
Policy transfer: NPM - motive for the NIM; New Labour 
Potentially, I would argue that the opportunity presented by the NIM, already popular with 
ACPO, offered the Home Office a highly attractive customised and structured mechanism 
to impose further ‘efficiency’; standardisation and accountability into the police.  It may 
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also have signalled a future advantage in that, if made compulsory through legislation, it 
would provide the government with an established inspection regime to ensure police 
compliance.  This occurred with the mandatorily introduction to the police through the 
Police Reform Act, 2002, providing additional stimulus for the New Public Management 
performance initiative, to ‘drive up’ performance through the consistent use of an 
‘approved’ business model.  This view is broadly supported by Savage (2007: 117) who 
argues that the NIM reflects New Public Management in at least two senses; it provides a 
“national standards framework” designed specifically to impact upon performance and, in 
description, “it is explicitly a business model”.  However, this should be qualified, the NIM 
only provides a framework for intelligence-led investigation and decision making, 
although the ‘Guidance’ broadens the claim to: “NIM is the core business model for 
policing” (ACPO 2005: 9) and infers that it is not limited in that “NIM is an intelligent 
means of conducting police business” (ACPO 2005: 11).  The Select Committee on Welsh 
Affairs clearly linked the model to performance stating that the NIM was: “a further tool 
for identifying targets and priorities in the local context is the National Intelligence 
Model” (Parliament.uk, 2005).  Perhaps the firmest ‘link’ of the NIM to performance is 
provided by the NPIA (2008):  
 
For many team leaders the structures that serve the National Intelligence 
Model (NIM) process such as Tactical Tasking & Coordination meetings …. 
may be the only formal opportunity to discuss performance, hold people to 
account and decide on follow-up action. These processes could therefore be 
considered as part of, or strongly related to, the performance management 
framework as they have an important role in the process of setting operational 
priorities, tasking resources and monitoring delivery through results analysis 
(NPIA, 2008: 18).   
 
Hough, (2006) also supports the NIM as a New Public Management initiative, arguing 
“some policing initiatives have compounded the effect of NPM” and that the NIM, as a set 
of “business processes”, has compounded the paradigm, “locking the police more tightly 
into crime fighting goals”. This latter assertion is borne out by Foster (2003: 212) who 
suggested that the “management culture within the police was similar to the boardroom”.  
In addition, the NIM has continued to expand its impact on policing activity through the 
publication of tighter guidance (see the list on page 168), potentially extending beyond the 
parameters of New Public Management and managerialisation (McLaughlin, 2007: 96).  In 
this respect, the imposition of NIM and an expansion of the performance culture have 
provided significant impact on police management activity. 
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NIM as a business model 
According to Alan Buck, the Chairman of the Superintendent’s Association Crime 
Advisory Committee, the NIM was originally intended, solely, for intelligence purposes 
(IntelligenceAnalysis.net, 2009).  However, this view may be flawed as the Home Office 
were apparently convinced that the NIM could operate as a business model.  As previously 
discussed, the model may have offered additional appeal by providing an opportunity to 
expand the performance culture within the police by supporting the elevation of the Kent 
ILP-based decision making process to a business model.  This was a view endorsed by 
interview with an ACPO officer (RS02) who suggested that the NIM, is exclusively an 
intelligence process – not a business model.  Although designed within NCIS and 
sponsored by ACPO, the Home Office may have perceived added advantages to imposing 
such a business model on the police as indicated by the following statement: 
 
It is important to note that the NIM is NOT just about crime and NOT just 
about intelligence – it is a model that can be used for most areas of policing …. 
The NIM is primarily a business model for use in allocating resources (Home 
Office, 2007). 
 
Furthermore, in the ‘Guidance on the National Intelligence Model’ (ACPO, 2005: 9) 
ACPO may have supported this broader application of the NIM beyond an ILP process tool 
stating that: “NIM is a business model for law enforcement” (p. 8) and “NIM is the core 
business model for policing …”.  In addition, the guide states: “NIM is like any other 
business model in that it requires products to have practical application” (p. 59).  Even 
contemporary writers support the notion “[the NIM] is in essence a business model” 
(Maguire, 2003: 38); whilst Ratcliffe (2008: 273) states: “While the National Intelligence 
Model is not entirely synonymous with intelligence-led policing, the NIM has been adopted 
as a business model”. 
 
A definitive description of a business model continues to be elusive (Shafer, Smith and 
Linder, 2004), and Debelak (2006: 3) argues that there is “… no single accepted definition 
of a business model has appeared”.  However certain ingredients appear to be necessary 
relating to the intended outcome of a business model and, selectively, these include: 
“deliver value to customers … provide for customer satisfaction” and “fund the business” 
(Debelak, 2006: 4).  In the final ingredient, the NIM may not meet the full criteria as a 
business model from a commercial perspective.  Morris et al (2005) suggest that, even at a 
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rudimentary level, it should be defined in terms of an “economic model, acknowledging 
both fiscal cost and benefit”.  This is further supported by: “the model includes the 
components and functions of the business, as well as the revenues it generates and the 
expenses it incurs” (Investopedia, 2010). This view is broadly supported in that ontologies 
for business models are intended to validate the underlying rationale of the business 
providing conceptualisation and formulation of the essential components into elements, 
relationships vocabulary and semantics (Osterwalder, 2004).  In addition, the critical 
ingredients or variables that should be included are: consumers, customers, allies 
(partners), suppliers, flows of product, information and money (Weille and Vitale, 2001: 
128).   
 
Two further alternative definitions of ‘business models’ worthy of consideration are: “a 
description of means and methods an organisation employs to earn the revenue projected 
in its plans” (Business Dictionary, 2007); and “a description of the operations of a 
business including the components of the business, the functions of the business, and the 
revenues, and expenses that the business generates” (Investorwords, 2006).  Both of these 
suggest that the business model must include a plurality of ‘means and methods’ or 
‘components and functions’ – potentially excluding the NIM, as a business model, with 
limited influence focusing on the intelligence handling, investigation and tasking process.  
The term business model is often used ‘from theory, meaning that the model’s components 
and their interrelations with the whole business can be relatively obscure’ (Hedman & 
Kalling, 2003).  As explained by Porter (2001: 65): “the term [business model] to describe 
key components of a given business for empirical use has been criticised for being unclear, 
superficial and not theoretically grounded”.  This suggests that, at the very least, the 
description of the NIM as a business model may be unsafe or misleading, but not 
necessarily incorrect.  From this initial review it appears that the NIM may be a business 
model indirectly ‘providing value to customers’ (Debelak, 2006) through improved 
intelligence-led decision making and resource allocation.  However in excluding fiscal cost 
and benefit considerations (Morris et al, 2005) an alternative title for the NIM, such as a 
‘business process’, may have been a more accurate description and it is defined and 
referred to as such in its own ‘Guidance’ (ACPO, 2005: 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, etc.).   
 
However, Zott, et al, (2010: 25) argue that the business model is a new unit of analysis, “a 
system level concept, centred on activities and focusing on value” and do not emphasise 
71 
the fiscal element.  Treece (2010) concurs stating that the contemporary viewing a 
“…business model as an activity system” and stating that as it “remains theoretically 
underdeveloped” (Treece, 2010: 12).  This would suggest that the common themes 
identified within these definitions of ‘business model’ definitions (Zott et al, 2010 and 
Treece, 2010) may engage with any single aspect of costs and revenue, or process.  As 
such, even as a description of a ‘process’, the NIM – without direct costing or overt fiscal 
accounting - could reliably be described as a business model.  
 
I would argue that the NIM would hold greater attraction to the broader investigation 
community if it was been described as an intelligence process and thus resisting too close 
an association with the commercial sector.  As Carson (2007: 408-9) reminds us, ‘price 
tags’ or ‘budgets’ often offends popular sensibilities regarding crime reduction, indeed the 
media often represent that the cost of policing (particularly of serious crime) as not a 
serious consideration. Even the Audit Commission although identifying substantial 
wastage in the Criminal Justice System, appears not to consider the cost of investigations 
(the substantial majority) that do not reach court.  However, the NIM to justify the term 
‘business model’ (or business process) should deliver benefit – simple consistency, as a 
sole product, cannot deliver justification if the benefit quotients or factors are not evident.   
 
There remains the unresolved question as to which agency or department determined and 
ascribed the epithet of ‘business model’ onto the NIM (was it NCIS, ACPO or the Home 
Office) and what was the motive – if any?   Perhaps Magretta (2002) has captured the 
reason in that she suggests the term ‘business model’ was one of the great ‘buzzwords’ of 
the Internet boom, routinely invoked “to glorify all manner of half-baked plans”.  She 
acknowledges that properly constructed and applied such a model can provide substantial 
benefit to an enterprise provided it “focuses attention on how all of the elements of a 
[business] system fit into a working whole” (Margretta, 2002: 6).  However, this is 
marginally countered by McPherson and Kirby (2004: 23) defending the term in their 
claim that: “The NIM is a business model that not only enables police forces to work 
together with a common level of understanding but also greatly assists a problem solving 
approach.”.  Furthermore, they suggest that the NIM provides a common language, 
standard systems and operating procedures and delivery encouraging ‘clear ownership and 
accountability’ (McPherson and Kirby, 2004).  These statements hold some validity with 
regards to NIM now being a nationally imposed process on the police and subject to a 
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single code of practice; but this does not guarantee ‘consistency’.  As for the “commonality 
of language” this research argues that this claim appears to be aspirational and idealistic, as 
any such ‘commonality’ should extend to all investigative partners (potential users), 
whereas the language employed within the model appears to be heavily weighted towards 
the requirements of volume crime and policing.   
 
The origins of intelligence 
The collection and employment of intelligence is not a new concept, neither has it been a 
specific preserve of the police and criminal investigators.  It has its roots in history and was 
employed, albeit in a non-standard and relatively rudimentary form, before the inception of 
criminal investigation departments and substantially predating the origins of the British 
police service.  Writers on the history of the collection and exploitation of intelligence cite 
examples such as Sun Tzu (6
th
 Century BCE) for military purposes (Grieves, 2004); 
Walsingham (c.1532 – 1590) for national security (Wilson, 2007); and Machiavelli (1469-
1527) for political ends (John and Maguire, 2007: 199).  To focus on just one, Francis 
Walsingham actively recruited informants, thus harvesting and collating intelligence to 
direct investigations regarding ‘state security’.  When writing to Cecil in 1568 he stated:   
“ … by weighing the current protestations of the credibility of the party it comes from [the 
informant], the nature of the matter is of the greatest importance” (Hutchinson, 2007: 36).  
It was evident that he was seeking to justify ‘value’ in intelligence by testing both its 
veracity and the integrity of the source– potentially the foundation of both the 4x4, and 
evolved 5x5x5, evaluation system (see Appendix 5).  However, the standardised use of 
criminal intelligence and crime intelligence (as opposed to intelligence predominantly for 





The first Prefect of Police, Lt General Reynie, appointed in 1667 and occupying this role 
for nearly thirty years, set up extensive monitoring and surveillance on the Parisian 
population, amassing a substantial network of informants and establishing an impressive 
archive of information and intelligence (Heuillet, 2001; University Francais, 2010).  This 
process was maintained and slowly evolved, being emulated within other European 
capitals, however France remained at the forefront of the active acquisition and use of 
criminal and ‘national security’ intelligence.  By the 1820s Vidocq, as head of the Paris 
Surete, adopted an intelligence model that included a sophisticated system of surveillance 
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and intelligence gathering on suspected criminals, ‘reactionaries’ and ‘anarchists’ (Morton, 
2005). These intelligence reports were proactively gathered and categorised using an 
elaborate card index system and intelligence files; this ‘hard copy database’, supported by 
a dedicated team of ‘Intelligence Officers’ facilitated systematic collation, evaluation and 
analysis.  There is surviving evidence to support that Surete investigators (agents) were 
tasked, directed and co-ordinated using good quality intelligence products (Heuillet, 2001). 
 
Within the UK, from the start of land-based policing in 1829, “gathering intelligence was 
considered important” (Grieve, 2004: 27) and with policing firmly established by the 
middle of the nineteenth century, organised and systematic intelligence gathering was 
perceived as the exclusive prerogative of detectives developing into the CID and specialist 
units (Morris, 2007). The Special Irish Squad, established to counter the Fenian (Irish 
Independence Movement) bombing campaigns in London, quickly adopted and embraced 
pro-active methods of intelligence gathering (Critchley, 1978, Ascoli, 1979).  However, the 
full dividends of intelligence-led policing and investigation was potentially inhibited and, 
to a certain extent, arrested by cultural protectionism and the absence of suitably 
sophisticated data bases (searchable archives); tending to rely upon card index systems and 
a ‘creaking’ paper-based General Registry (Emsley, 2002).  At divisional levels, the 
handling of intelligence was often the exclusive domain of the CID or a single uniformed 
police officer, the ‘Collator’ whose personality, competence and motivation dominated 
local intelligence collection, storage and dissemination (Mason, 2004; Rogers, 2004).  
There was clear evidence that substantial volumes of information and intelligence were 
gathered (albeit in relatively primitive systems), but appeared to be rarely used internally 
(Haggerty 1997: 5).  It was noted by Horvath, et al, (2001; 9) that investigation processes 
appeared to be relatively uninfluenced by developments in policing, including the changes 
in policing demands, the crime problem (with greater levels of volume crime) and 
technological advances.   
 
Intelligence systems within the police were relatively slowly adopted and complementary 
processes expanded only with further encouragement and direction being provided by the 
Home Office and ACPO (ACPO, 1978; 1986; 1996). Although criminal intelligence 
systems, procedures and processes developed within specialist units, they initially appeared 
to have limited impact on mainstream policing (Newburn, Williamson & Wright, 2007: 
200).  The term ‘intelligence-led policing’ (ILP) gradually expanded to embrace its modern 
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application (see Chapter 2) – using intelligence to direct general policing (beyond just 
specialist units and the CID) including aspects of preventing ‘parochial’ (local) crime, 
disorder and maintaining ‘community safety’ as in Uniform Beat Policing (Gregory, 1967).  
As previously described, two notable products of the intelligence developments resulted in 
the 1990s, the Systems for Investigation and Development project within the MPS (Grieve, 
2004: 33) and the ‘Kent Pro-active Policing’ drive in 1993 (Maguire & John, 1995) with 
the systematic production of intelligence routinely being used to inform and direct a range 
of policing activities at both strategic and tactical (operational) levels – including uniform 
deployment (Amey, Hale & Uglow, 1996).  A number of forces adopted similar models to 
the MPS project and Kent Police initiatives, employing intelligence products to task 
uniform and community-based policing (HMIC, 1997).  The evolution of this was the 
development of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) being an imposed requirement, as a 
mandatory business model, on all UK police forces (Home Office, 2002). 
 
Criminal intelligence 
It is noteworthy that Maguire & John (1995) in their Home Office Research Paper (No. 64) 
researching integrated approaches to intelligence, surveillance and informants cited 
Baumber’s definition (see p. 12) and did not attempt to contemporise the term.  Whitaker 
(1999: 67) argued that criminal intelligence is anything, which is the product of 
‘intelligence work’, resulting from the “systematic and purposeful acquisition, sorting, 
retrieval, analysis, interpretation and protection of information”.  More recently, criminal 
intelligence has been defined as: "information compiled, analysed and/or disseminated in 
an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity." (IACP, 2003: 4).  This 
definition recognises that criminal intelligence originates as information that has 
undergone a process for a specific purpose.  In this respect information is unlikely to be 
intelligence in the literal or practical sense until it has undergone a form of ‘process’ and a 
determination has been made as to its utility for operational, tactical or strategic law 
enforcement purposes.  However, Brown (2007: 340) provides a more concise 
interpretation for criminal intelligence stating that it is “information which is significant or 
potentially significant for an enquiry”.  This suggests that even raw data or information has 
the potential to be criminal intelligence and merely relies upon its potential ‘significance’ 
to an investigation.  In personal correspondence with Steve Brown he qualified his 
interpretation by stating that:  
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I accept I hold the minority view on this.  The 'designed for action' idea has 
become very well established and espoused by very many analysts. I was 
hosting a training session for an international law enforcement audience last 
month [February, 2011] and the trainers (all of them serving UK officers) used 
it, but it is an approach that I don't think fits well with reality. If you ask a front 
line police officer who is entering a piece of information on to a CRIMINT 
system, he will say he is reporting it because s/he thinks it is intelligence, not 




 June 2011). 
 
Useable intelligence generally consists of reasoned conclusions, suppositions, and 
informed judgments based on the collection and analysis of reasonably reliable information 
(IACP, 2003: 3).  Intelligence is, or should be, more than speculation but may not always 
constitute a certainty (or established fact).  Peterson (1994: 271) offered a complementary 
definition stating that “in most cases, criminal intelligence consists of evaluations of a wide 
variety of raw pieces of information that provide the basis for informed judgements and, as 
a whole, create enough information from which to draw reasonable inferences and 
conclusions.”  However, she limited the ‘source of information’ to ‘suspected persons 
involved in criminal activity or the data resulting from analysis of criminal data collected 
on persons known or suspected of being involved in criminal activity.’  By this limitation, 
she appears to have partially precluded two other recognised forms of intelligence (both 
relevant to the NIM); ‘community intelligence’ based upon data provided to police and 
investigators by ‘ordinary’ members of the public; and ‘contextual intelligence’ relating to 
wider social, economic and cultural factors (generally acquired through environmental 
scanning).   
 
The NIM and crime reduction 
The NIM, as a statutory requirement for police in England and Wales, is intended to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of investigation and the reduction of crime 
(ACPO, 2005).  It enjoys broader claims, in that it is intended to increase community 
safety, control disorder and control criminality (Grampian Police, 2010), but these may 
allude to its key function of reducing criminal activity through an intelligence-led 
approach.  It has firm supporters who suggest that there is a link between NIM and 
operational performance (Blair, 2003), but I would argue that contemporary research 
indicates this as ‘not proven’ (James, 2011).  However, it may provide standardisation of 
process provided there is ‘compliance’ or conformity with the minimum standards, which 
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requires substantial investment and, in the case of most public services, effective changes 
in policy, process and investigative procedure.  For performance, the key requirement of 
the majority of police intelligence strategies reviewed, state that compliance with, and 
endorsement of, the model is paramount (North Yorkshire Police, 2007; MPS, 2009; 
Durham Police, 2011).   
 
Another critical factor appears to be timely and proportionate reaction to tasking decisions, 
and this demands an adequate “tactically deployable capability” (ACPOS/Centrex, 2006); 
or more simply - ‘adequate resources’.  The Government Office for the North East (2010) 
confidently pronounces that “NIM ensures that activity to reduce crime, disorder, anti-
social behaviour and substance misuse is delivered” – this may be aspirational and no 
evidence is presented to support the statement.  As a development of ILP and Problem 
Oriented Policing (Goldstein, 1990) the NIM was originally articulated as a law 
enforcement strategy that sought to reduce crime (Ratcliffe, 2008).  The Select Committee 
on Welsh Affairs (2005) confidently reported that the NIM would “mean that we can now 
create strategies that will reduce crime and improve the quality of life in our community”.  
However, it remains debatable whether a single ‘model’, introduced to increase the 
efficiency of investigation and tasking decision making, does improve ‘quality of life’.  
There is substantial support from both sociologists and criminologists that the causes and 
rates of crime draw on a broad range of factors that include cultural, systemic, economic, 
educational and legal.  Academic studies continue to perpetuate a fundamental 
disagreement and discussion on the causes related to increasing crime.  For example, 
Stephenson (2006) and Currie et al (2002) rely upon a partial socialist philosophy that the 
main cause of crime is unemployment.  Alternatively, Boswell (2000), reviewing serious 
juvenile offenders, provides a more pluralist argument that it is ‘socialisation’, including 
being exposed to, or the victim of bullying related to, violence and sexual assault.  The 
influential findings of Rutter & Smith (1995) are radically different – dismissed by Cohen 
(1995) - according to their study the main causes of crime was post-war freedom and 
individualism.   
 
Regardless of the actual reasons for crime, whether individual factors or a ‘mix’, there 
remains considerable uncertainty as to whether the police (even when attempting to work 
in partnership) employing the NIM can have any significant impact on the general crime 
rate and the associated societal anxieties (Reiner, 2011).  Bratingham & Faust (1976: 285) 
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suggested that primary crime reduction is the responsibility of the general population; 
secondary crime reduction relates to social ‘interventions’; and the police only provide 
tertiary intervention through the criminal justice system.  These interventions have been 
modified over the years with Van Dijk & de Waard (1991: 484), and Tonry & Farrington 
(1995) offering similar, but alternative schemes, but these views differ with the broad 
pronouncements of media commentators and politicians.  Laycock (2008: 59-60) states that 
crime prevention is a generic term incorporating a range of techniques designed to stop 
crime from happening or reducing the probability of crime occurring.  She proposes that all 
crime reduction techniques fall loosely into only two categories: ‘social’ or ‘situational 
measures’ (or a combination of both).  Both of these categories require a substantial 
investment and active partnership by ‘other parties’, not just the police.  Yet the 
effectiveness of the police and public service investigators, as the perceived key agents of 
crime reduction, at least in the eyes of the public and the media, remain dominant.   
 
In isolation, even if the NIM could deliver improved intelligence-led investigations, 
decision making and deployment, Carson (2007: 408) suggests that the typical criminal 
investigation does not exist in the sense of a ‘most common example’ (ACPO, 2005), 
because the norm is ‘no enquiry’.  This research has not revealed any evidence to support 
that the NIM has increased the number of investigations or prosecutions within the public 
service.  Seeking analogous results with the police, broadly compliant with the NIM, 
reliable temporal comparisons were made more complex with the adoption of ‘counting 
rules’, with some indications that police statistics may be under-recording (Hough & 
Maxfield, 2007), possibly reflecting the introduction of performance targets.  These were 
further exacerbated with the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard in 
2002, requiring the police to adopt a ‘victim-led’ approach to crime recording.  And, 
regardless of the ‘national picture’ of crime, the UK continues to receive ‘negative press’, 
particularly relating to violent crime with headlines trumpeting ‘UK shamed as the crimes 
capital of Europe’ (Daily Express, 2010).  Comparatively, and employing 2008 figures, the 
UK recorded the highest number of domestic burglaries at 284,427 amongst our EU 
partners (this was inaccurately reported as the UK figure is actually 309,001) – nearly 
equalling the combined total of France and Italy (319,330) that featured respectively 
second and third on the ‘league table’ compiled by Eurostat (Tavares & Thomas, 2010).  
Violent crimes also featured and revealed that the UK recorded 1,094,066 offences, 
78 
unfavourably shadowing France with the second highest total, but with less than a third 
(331,778) of the UK figures. 
 
Fraud in the Public Service 
It appears likely that improved cross-agency intelligence-led investigation; data sharing 
and consistent working practices could provide significant benefits in the ‘fight against 
crime’ and, predominantly within the public service, ‘crime’ relates to fraud.  Fraud 
continues to rise and “pose a major risk” (Morgan, 2011: 31) to society and public 
services, this is particularly the case with regards to the delivery of social benefits 
(National Audit Office, 2006: 3).  With benefit payments accounting for the largest 
governmental ‘budget head’ in 2009/10, this is an obvious target for fraudsters.  The 
Centre for Policy Studies (2009) suggests that the current 50 benefits will require Treasury 
funding of £186bn.  However, the complexity of the benefit system delivers substantial 
governance difficulties and consequently increases vulnerability to fraud and error.  As an 
example the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) manuals on ‘how to apply benefit’ 
run to fourteen volumes and 8,960 pages; a separate four volumes and 1,200 pages are 
required by the local authorities, just to administer housing benefit.  Add to these the HM 
Revenue & Customs instructions, required to facilitate the payment of the, now notoriously 
administered, Tax Credit - requiring two further volumes and 260 pages of direction, 
qualification, assessment and instruction (Johnston, 2009).   
 
Fraud is a growing public and political issue, but one that has not necessarily been fully 
acknowledged by the public service agencies or by the Home Office.  By DWP estimates, 
the cost of investigating fraud in 2008 was £154m, which resulted in £22m recovery of 
fraudulently claimed benefits (recovery being less than 14% of the investigative process 
cost; and less than 0.012% of the benefit budget).  This raised concerns with the 
Committee of Public Accounts (2008: 3) questioning both the efficacy of the benefit 
administration system; the investigation process; and even the accuracy of the data.  In 
2006, public service fraud losses were conservatively estimated at £6.4 billion (2005-06), 
excluding income tax fraud and public sector fraud against the EU (Levi, et al, 2007) 
however, the current figure, more realistically, estimates fraud losses at between £18bn - 
£25bn (NFA, 2011b; Cabinet Office, 2011). In the DWP alone, the 2007 figures state that 
6,756 individuals were prosecuted for fraud and this figure is dwarfed (less than 3% of 
fraud referrals) when compared to claimants dealt with by administrative sanction or 
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investigations that are ‘filtered’ to be designated ‘error’ (DWP, 2010a: 28).  Confusingly, 
and regardless of a growing public concern over the increasing levels of fraud, in 2007, 
DWP senior managers decided to reduce their fraud investigative capacity by 40%.   
 
The Fraud Review (2006: 7) states: “fraud is massively underreported” it continues by 
proposing that “in the wider context of anti-fraud activity the police must develop effective 
partnership arrangements with a number of sectors and interests who operate in this area” 
(ibid: 63).  The Review contains nineteen references to the National Intelligence Model (or 
NIM) in the main text, and strongly supports the need to employ the model and 
intelligence-led policing (Ratcliffe, 2008) to support a strategic response to the expanding 
problem and cost generated by fraud.  The cost of fraud is not restricted to direct financial 
loss, identity fraud continues to rise with CIFAS (2010) reporting a ‘continuing surge in 
identity fraud’; based upon 2009 figures: 14% increase in identity fraud (up from 49,140 
cases to 56,063) and a 22% increase in ‘victims of impersonation’.  The IPS Annual Report 
(2009-2010) states that 7,344 frauds were ‘detected or deterred’ from passport application, 
albeit this was a shortfall on the target of 9,407.  However, these figures, although 
reasonably impressive at first sight, represent a small proportion of passports issued 
(‘detected and deterred’ represents about 0.1% of passports issued).  The IPS appears to 
resist any comprehensive accounting and may even be in ‘conscious denial’ over the 
‘identity fraud problem’; their ‘common sampling’ methodology (to evaluate fraud) is 
simplistic and only designed to evaluate ‘compliance with process’ (IPS, 2008).  
Inevitably, identification of fraudulent applications are low, although most investigative 
staff acknowledge that it is these very processes that remain relatively weak and 
vulnerable.  Uncomfortably for the IPS, there are occasional ‘leaks’ regarding their 
systems and processes through the media and parliamentary questions.  The BBC News 
(2007) reported in February that about 1,000 passports were currently ‘missing in the post’; 
the following month it reported that 10,000 passports were wrongly issued by the IPS 
every year.  This was supplemented in a Parliamentary Question (Ryan, 2007) that in 2006 
there were 290,996 passports reported lost or stolen; these ‘lost reports’ were routinely not 
investigated and duplicates issued.  The IPS admitted that it anticipated about 16,500 
fraudulent passports applications were received annually and that ‘10,000 were 
undetected’; an interesting admission and precision for the ‘unknown’.  The level of annual 
passports distributed remains reasonable constant with 6 million being issued by the IPS 
and about 400,000 by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Malloch-Brown, 2009).  
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Outside of the public services, the problem of identification fraud is considered to be 
significant and CIFAS have implied a reducing confidence by the financial sector who, 
traditionally have employed British Passports as the ‘gold standard’ and most reliable form 
of identity, particularly with ‘identity fraud continuing to rise’ (CIFAS, 2010). 
 
Similarly, the DSA are not immune to the threat of fraud as the decision on eligibility to 
hold a UK driving licence rests with them, being responsible for administering over three 
million practical driving’ and theory tests in 2010.  The last decade witnessed more 
demanding driving standards to qualify for a UK driving licence with the introduction of 
theory tests and basic maintenance requirements.  The Agency has experienced year-on-
year increases in driving candidate impersonation, employing a dedicated intelligence and 
investigation unit to undertake criminal investigations.  For the year 2010-11 the DSA 
investigated 1615 cases of impersonation and illegal driving instruction, resulting in 276 
cases being referred to police (DSA, 2011: 53).   
 
Organisational Change 
Through professional exposure, I can testify that the introduction of the NIM provoked 
considerable process change in resource management within the police.  It required 
additional ‘assets’, viz. knowledge, system, source and assets (see Annex 1) to adopt the 
model, together with the compliance requirements of the minimum standards that has 
precipitated procedural revision and adaptation.  It was intended to have a broad impact on 
decision making - providing direction and determining resource allocation.  As a 
development of intelligence-led investigation, the NIM was not an entire novelty, rather an 
extension of ILP, and as Wood and Shearing (2007: 55) suggested “intelligence-led 
policing [the NIM] does not re-imagine the police role so much as re-imagines how the 
police can be smarter”.  By ‘smarter’ this should, ideally, result in greater efficiency and 
effectiveness – aspirationally, translating itself into reduced crime and increased 
community safety.  Indeed, the strength of a ‘change force’ is determined by its ‘impact on 
the business performance of an organisation; a strong force for change can result either in 
a substantial decline, or improvement in performance’ (Strebel, 1997: 538) and, as 
previously discussed, the assertion that NIM enhances police performance is unproven and 
remains statistically elusive. 
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Osborn and Brown (2005: 184) suggest that there are four main impeti to innovation and 
change within the public service and that these can be categorised as: “research, ‘market 
demand’, ‘political imperative’ and ‘the need to be seen to perform’”; the latter stimulus 
sometimes referred to as ‘conspicuous production’.  Potentially, all of these featured in the 
decision to promote the NIM as a working synthesis of ILP and problem oriented policing 
(Goldstein, 1990).  At the close of the millennium there was continued media (transferrable 
into the public consciousness and therefore ‘market’) demand and a New Labour initiative 
provided a political imperative to promote better performance within the police.  Finally, 
ACPO embraced the model (strongly encouraged by David Phillips, the Chief Constable of 
Kent) – despite criticism from some quarters, including an NCIS executive’s complaint 
that the model was rather ‘over-engineered, too complex’ (cited in James, 2011: 126).   The 
adoption of the NIM appears to have generated ‘conspicuous production’ having resulted 
in reorganisation (OIUs), recruitment (intelligence staff) and regular assembly (tasking and 
co-ordinating), as well as triggering a consequent plethora of documentation (DWP, 2005) 
– and it continues to do so.  In addition, the NIM was perceived as a new idea for non-
police agencies, innovative and relatively unfamiliar to their operational investigative 
community.  It potentially failed effective diffusion due to a range of factors including 
cultural resistance, the absence of a formulated change plan and identified ‘champions.  
 
Diffusion of innovation 
At the time of its introduction into the DWP, IPS and DSA, the National Intelligence 
Model represented a considerable, and potentially complex, innovation to the public 
service investigative community.  This community, effectively comprising a relatively elite 
and discrete social system within the greater organisation, was typified by a separate 
autonomous culture, working outside of the mainstream business and ‘core processes’.  
From previous exposure and research (Osborn, 2008) it was identified that prior to the 
NIM adoption, the fraud investigation teams appeared to experience limited personnel 
‘churn’ and long-service investigators were a very common feature.  In comparison with 
the police, investigative practices were predominantly reactive and traditional with 
operational individual’s undertaking the range of intelligence gathering, development and 
analysis to support their own investigations.  Within this social framework, for the 
adoption of a novel idea diffusion is necessary to enable acceptance and embedded process 
and behavioural change.  Diffusion is a form of ‘social change, “…a process by which 
alteration occurs in the structure and functions of a social system” (Rogers, 2003: 6). 
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Essential to the process of diffusion is effective communication and the ease of the 
innovation’s accessibility and adoptability.  Communication is most effective when 
transmitted and reinforced by ‘opinion leaders’ and these are almost exclusively drawn 
from the social system or cultural group being subjected to the change.  These individuals 
may hold institutional power, e.g. designated supervisors, or be informal leaders holding 
status in the group that is awarded credibility through competence, experience, social 
accessibility and conformity to the social norms.  Their role can be critical in delivering the 
messages associated with change adoption, ensuring that the “innovation is communicated 
through certain channels, over time, among the members of a social system … a special 
type of communication in that the messages are concerned with new ideas” (Rogers, 2003: 
6).  However, the implementation did not identify, nurture and support ‘opinion leaders’ 
from within the investigative staff, nor did it seek to incentivise the transition, which could 
have increased the rate of adoption (Rogers, 1973). 
 
Ideally, in the homophilous social system of the agency investigator – one that features a 
strong and relatively insular culture – the diffusion of new ideas would be predictably 
difficult.  Such insularity and ‘strength in numbers’ can support traditional beliefs and 
practices particularly without identified champions for change (Kong, 2011).  Being 
separate from, and not sharing the common processes, associated with the core business 
this social group with elitist tendencies, is able to resist decisions that are authoritative or 
collective, essentially allowing each member of a social system to face their own 
innovation-decision” (Orr, 2003: 3). For such change to occur it requires knowledge 
acquisition; persuasion (forming a favourable or unfavourable impression of the 
innovation); decision (choice whether to adopt or reject); implementation; and 
confirmation (or reinforcement). 
 
The perceived complexity of the language used to describe the model and the minimum 
standards (Innes, & Sheptyki, 2004) reported by subjects in this, and earlier, research 
would impair knowledge acquisition. In the absence of identified champions, persuasion 
did not appear to be an identifiable strategy of the senior managers who adopted the NIM 
and then unsuccessfully attempted to implement it, by imposing the revised systems upon 
the operational staff.  From this research and previous findings (Osborn, 2008) the 
investigative personnel have formed an unfavourable impression of the NIM, suspicious of 
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its relevance, provenance and suitability to the non-police public service.  As such, the 
implementation has foundered and continues to be resisted.  I would argue that, potentially, 
the most damaging oversight by the senior managers was failing to recruit and support 
champions and opinion leaders within the operational staff.  Schon (1963: 84) argues that 
“the presence of an innovation champion contributes to the success of an innovation … the 
new idea either finds a champion or dies”. Champions and opinion leaders do not 
guarantee success, nor do they control attitudes as much as pre-existing norms; therefore 
change agents must, if possible, communicate to them a convincing argument in favour of 
innovation that accentuates the compatibility of the innovation with the system norms. 
 
There was a need from the outset of the NIM adoption to clearly communicate the 
potential benefits to investigation, decision making and the reduction of fraud.  The model 
required some translation for the opinion leaders and operational staff together with a clear 
indication of the potential benefits that intelligence-led decision making, investigation and 
joint working would deliver.  This required marketing the innovation and setting an 
ambitious target, together with the investment in appropriate resources, to facilitate a 
reasonably swift and painless adoption.  According to Rogers (2003: 221) the “rates and 
incidence of adoption appear to be influenced by five factors: relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, triability and observability”..  To focus upon just two of these 
factors – complexity and triability – the NIM was (and continues to be) perceived as 
complex and the language relatively incomprehensible, due to its police-partiality, 
providing a negatively relativity to its rate of adoption.  Delayed adoption tends to dilute 
the innovation and may even provide supporting evidence to a social group that resistance 
can defeat implementation, preserve traditional norms and confirm the oratory of 
‘opposition leaders’ (Rogers, 2003: 27).  Triability is the degree to which an innovation 
can be experimented with on a limited basis (ibid: 258) providing a positive relativity to 
the rate of adoption.  I would argue that the NIM cannot be partially ‘tried’ or 
incrementally adopted without significantly weakening its effect, impact and potential 
performance.  As previously mentioned “…conformity to the minimum standards and 






The NIM and non-police public services 
From previous research (Osborn, 2008) it would appear that the introduction of the NIM 
into public service was not well managed and a further contributing factor may be due to 
the potential complexity and police-partiality of model’s language and design.  The 
absence of a ‘common language’ will potentially generate inertia to change and this was 
comprehensively reported by Innes and Sheptyki (2004: 6) who argued that differences in 
intelligence nomenclature “…are symptomatic of different ways of doing business.  
Further because different terminology implies different expectations of intelligence 
analysis, these differences may also be symptomatic of interagency tension.”  The model 
appeared to herald a substantial change, whilst at the same time intimating that it was a 
transferable development of the ILP currently in vogue (Ratcliffe, 2008; Cope, 2004; 
Maguire & John, 2006).  This may have contributed to some ambiguity, at least in the 
minds of operational investigators: “if we were already doing this, why all the change and 
bureaucracy?” (RS34).  This may have added to the general resistance to change (Fisher, 
2003; Kotter, 1996, 2006, 2010) and senior managers failed to acknowledge that a key 
determinant of coping with the complexity of change is the high degree of ambiguity that 
is generated (Wallace, 2009: 15).  In itself, ambiguity implies confusion over what the new 
practices mean and, added to this, the suspicion of the NIM representing a performance 
and governance mechanism (RS16, RS17, RS18, RS25). Doherty and Horne (2001: 8) 
argue that new public service managerialism would be perceived as a way of challenging 
(and demolishing) the power of ‘professionalism’ – jealously guarded by investigators.  
The individual views of investigators, and the predominant culture, appears to have been 
largely ignored, this may have been naivety or deliberate policy by senior managers, either 
way, resistance to change is generated from a personal psychological perspective, that 
substantially differs from an organisational one (Agocs, 1997: 918).  Even without 
ambiguity or suspicion, transformation requires careful planning and marketing, variation 
is possible and there is an argument that the average employee does not resist change per 
se, rather they are wary of, or dislike, certain aspects of it (Dent & Galloway Goldberg, 
1999). 
 
Added to the social and psychological challenges presented by ‘imposed change’ within an 
organisation would have been the perceived complexity of the model, not helped by its 
police-style presentation and terminology.  This research identified no evidence to support 
a formulated change’ or implementation plan (as recommended by Kotter, 1999, Hiatt, 
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2006; Prosci Research, 2011), for the adoption of the NIM into the public services 
examined.  In this respect even the, relatively, primitive ‘ADKAR’ change model (Hiatt, 
2006) was not adopted by any of the public services under review.  The ‘ADKAR model’ 
requires systematic implementation: increasing investigative staff ‘awareness’; facilitating  
‘desire’ (for change); providing ‘knowledge’ (of the model); ensuring staff had the ‘ability’ 
to comply; and providing ‘reinforcement’.  Added to this, and from professional 
experience, the NIM did not appear to stimulate the level of adaptation required to ensure a 
‘comfortable fit’ between the external environment; and the internal structure – an essential 
demand when partnership was a supplementary aim (Burnes, 2009: 301).  It was apparent 
that some of the asset requirements were considered too costly and possibly unnecessary as 
in the case of a discrete intelligence database (DWP, 2005; IPS, 2005).  The prescribed 
tasking and co-ordinating processes were ‘revised’ for adoption; and, in the case of the 
DWP, operational (‘tactically deployable’) resources were actually decreased – effectively 
conflicting with an evolving organisational profile and other planned changes (Rainey, 
2003: 24).   
 
I would argue that it is simplistic to blame poor comprehension of the NIM as a model – or 
the associated minimum standards - on the failure to employ a change programme within 
the non-police public services.  A good level of compliance, through change, has been 
achieved within the police employing the same ‘instructions’ and standards, albeit with 
some ‘variations’ to implementation (James, 2011).  John and Maguire (2004) support the 
model and argued that, properly resourced and introduced the model: “represents an effort 
to promote effective intelligence-led-policing on a national basis and to standardise 
intelligence-related structures”.  However, public service investigative resources are 
generally very lean in comparison with the police and investigators are almost exclusively 
reactive; carrying high case loads of as many as 50 active investigation files.   
 
Politically, and from a reputational perspective, it would appear that public services avoid 
well-resourced investigation units (and the pro-active capacity this would facilitate) as this 
may imply unacceptably high fraud risks and losses (RS21). In addition, guidance and 
description of ‘performance delivery’ and ‘deployable capability’ for public services is 
rather unhelpfully stipulated by ACPO (2005: 4.13; 43): “performance delivery cannot be 
achieved if action approved by T&CG is not acted on in a timely manner” and similar to 
the ACPOS guidance: ”every BCU needs a tactically deployable capability ….”, they 
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provide a list, which is lacks relevance to any public service attempting to engage in a 
change programme as it includes: dogs, patrolling officers, traffic patrol and public order 
units.  This requirement, strongly partial to police business, may create both a hindrance 
and a tension for public services. Even if the main motive for adopting NIM was purely 
‘performance related’ then public services, as hierarchical bureaucracies, may lack the 
flexibility to adapt the standards from established processes and procedures; or the 
identified ‘assets’.  All public service organisations, lacking the guiding commercial 
principles offered by turnover and profit, will be easily frustrated by adaptive demands 
and, in attempting change and innovative processes, these may be particularly difficult and 
complex (Osborne and Brown, 2005: 229).  The police, not provided with ‘choice’ or 
discretion regarding ‘compliance’, still lack complete standardisation with NIM processes 
(James, 2011) and SOCA have adopted their own ‘version’ of the NIM.  Agencies are not 
bound by legislative requirement to comply or subject to any inspection regime.  I would 
argue that this latitude, enabling ‘cosmetic adoption’ and inconsistent implementation 
would potentially impoverished the model and will contribute to a continuing failure to 
deliver benefit to intelligence-led investigation and decision making. 
 
Summary 
The conversion of the Kent Police Model into the NIM as national policy was not a 
construct of the Home Office or central government, being commissioned by ACPO 
(Christopher, 2003: 178) and designed within NCIS.  The evidence for policy transfer – 
‘lesson drawing’ (James and Lodge, 2003; Hill, 2009) – is circumstantial and relies upon 
the adaptations made to the Kent model to provide a national product.  The time line 
(pages 56-58) covers the period 1975 - 2006 from the Baumber Report (ACPO, 1975) to 
the Scottish Police ‘Guidance’ on the NIM (ACPOS, 2006) and is included to provide an 
illustration of key events, initiatives and themes that, through policy transfer, may have 
impacted upon the design by NCIS or development within the Home Office.  The revisions 
to ILP and the Kent model included the addition of a ‘strategic element’; the broadening of 
application to general policing; and the construction of the NIM minimum standards 
enabling a test of compliance.  A number of potential policy transfer ‘contributors’ to the 
NIM were reviewed and it is proposed that strong candidates are COMPSTAT for the 
strategic element; community policing with regards to promoting partnership and 
advocating wider adoption of the model (beyond the police); and New Public Management 
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in describing the NIM as a business model and performance management tool (NPIA, 
2008).   
 
The ACPO/Home Office description of the NIM as a business model (ACPO, 2005), 
although not entirely convincing as an agreed definition is elusive, appears justified.  
Potentially, the term business model is still developing (Zott, 2010 and Treece, 2010) and 
the NIM does provide a system and process centred on activity.  Conformity or compliance 
with this process should facilitate intelligence-led investigation and, even in the absence of 
direct financial accounting, it is intended to deliver cost-effective policing through targeted 
priorities and more efficient allocation of resources.  However, it is argued that a less 
controversial title would be an intelligence process. 
 
The review of the origins of intelligence and ‘criminal intelligence’ illustrated that the 
acquisition and application of intelligence is not a new concept in investigation or resource 
allocation.  It provided a summarised progression of intelligence employment, focusing on 
its rudimentary intelligence employment within the police and its relatively slow evolution 
to ‘intelligence-led policing’.  It reviews this term and places it into context as a core 
ingredient of the NIM, although it recognises that there is still some controversy over its 
actual definition.  There is a paucity of evidence to support that the NIM reduces crime or 
improves investigation within the public service.  In isolation, even if the NIM did deliver 
improved intelligence-led investigations, Carson (2007: 408) suggests that the typical 
criminal investigation does not exist in the sense of a ‘most common example’ (ACPO, 
2005), because the norm in response to referrals for both the police and public service, 
continues to be ‘no enquiry’.  However, it has affected decision making and the processes 
of both tasking and co-ordinating within the police service.  This research has not revealed 
any evidence from testimony or activity data to support that the NIM has increased the 
number of investigations or prosecutions within the public service.  Focusing exclusively 
on fraud – the predominant criminal investigation within the public services - there is no 
apparent evidence to support that the NIM has reduced this risk or increased the number of 
investigations.  However, it should be acknowledged, this does not provide a fair test of 
efficacy where the model and minimum standards are not complied with – and previous 




The final part of this chapter reviewed organisational change and the introduction of the 
NIM both into the police and the public services.  From the police perspective the 
introduction was compulsory and more measured, being an extension of both ILP and 
community policing; the terminology was, broadly, familiar; and a number of the assets 
were already in place or available.  For public services the adoption of the model 
demanded some translation and interpretation, as the language is partial to police business, 
and potentially unfamiliar to outside agencies.  The ‘Guidance’ and standards appear to 
have been ‘cluttered’ with a lexicon of products and terms that, in themselves, may provide 
limited parallel in public service investigative processes.  As an example, the purpose of 
tasking and co-ordination is clear and sound: “to determine and communicate decisions 
based on the development of intelligence products” (ACPO, 2007: 13) – sadly, the 
‘Guidance’ and description thereafter is not.  For public services, adoption of the NIM 
required substantial variation to traditional investigative practices; and the resourcing and 
acquisition of a range of assets.  In the absence of any apparent ‘change process’ within the 
non-police agencies, the model’s adoption appears to have met with a number of barriers, 
both organisational and cultural.  I would argue that with operational engagement with, and 
systematic planning of, the NIM implementation, this resistance could have been reduced; 
assets and resources acquired; processes adopted; and conformity achieved.  The following 
chapter will review the results of the research, endeavouring to establish the level of 
operational conformity with the NIM minimum standards by non-police public services 
and to identify whether benefits either as a business model or an intelligence-led process 
have been identified by operational staff. 
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis; the results 
Introduction 
This chapter will open with a brief review of my earlier research findings (Osborn, 2008) 
within the non-police public sector regarding the operational practitioner’s views on the 
issues of the NIM ‘compliance’, application and perceived value of the model.  This earlier 
work provides a foundation to the current research.  The research results follows this 
summary, reflecting and corresponding to the format of the structured interview (see 
Appendix 4).  The main profile of this chapter employs the six themes relating to: 1. 
compliance and conformity with the NIM; 2. impact on fraud; 3. partnership; 4. the NIM 
as a business model; 5. investigative efficiency; and 6. the revised minimum standards.  It 
will conclude with an extended ‘Summary Discussion’ on each of these themes to evaluate 
and place the interview testimony into the context of the research. 
 
Earlier research findings 
The NIM had drawn support from senior managers in police agencies (RS01 and RS02) 
and a number of public services, e.g. DWP, IPS and DSA, that adopted the model to 
support their investigations in 2005.  By that time all police services had implemented the 
model as part of the National Policing Plan requirements, and the ACPO/Centrex 
‘Guidance on the National Intelligence Model’ (ACPO, 2005) had been published.  The 
NIM was reasonably well established, although not uniform in implementation, within the 
police by April 2004 (Police Reform Act, 2002), with the significant majority having 
introduced the NIM practices by 2002.  John & Maguire (2004: 2) reporting on their 
fieldwork in 2002 and in liaison with the National Intelligence Model Implementation 
Team in 2003 stated that: “It should be noted that, with an obligation on all forces to be 
‘NIM-compliant’ by April 2004, change has been rapid in this field of activity with much 
progress being made …”.   
 
However, this level of adoption should not suggest that the NIM was not without its critics, 
Dr Anne Davis (2007), formerly Head of Analysis in the MPS, in conversation, described 
the inception of the model as ‘empirically unsound’.  Objective reviewers have also 
expressed reservations: “that the use of community intelligence is marginal” (Kleiven, 
2007: 13) and that the exploitation of intelligence remain of ‘low status’ due to: ‘a 
combination of police culture, lack of knowledge within management and police officers, 
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the absence of a general definition of 'intelligence', a lack of guidance around community 
intelligence and the secrecy surrounding intelligence…’ (Kleiven, 2007: 21).  Even 
Ratcliffe (2008), a supporter and published exponent of ILP, acknowledges that the NIM 
has ‘limitations’ in progressing intelligence-led investigations, and this may be amplified 
for non-police agencies with limited resources and an extreme focus on crime.  Part of the 
difficulty for public service partners is the perceived ‘partiality’ of the NIM for police 
application (RS09, RS11, RS17, RS22, RS31 et al) and this may be explained by the 
processes continuing to be driven by ACPO, the NPIA and the Home Office (Newburn, et 
al, 2007: 220).  In addition, findings from two such ‘non-police organisations’ in 2007,  
(the Identity and Passport Service, and the Department for Work and Pensions), where 
exclusively investigative staff were surveyed, suggested that compliance was largely 
cosmetic (Osborn, 2008: 31).   
 
The 2008 research (Osborn, ibid) elicited the responses of a sample of investigative staff 
from within the DWP and the IPS, both of these agencies having ‘adopted’ the NIM and it 
had been a part of their investigative processes for 3 years.  The majority of respondents 
(60%) were aware of, and had received training in, the NIM,.  However a quarter of the 
respondents from the survey (26%) were unaware that their respective organisation used 
NIM to support intelligence gathering and investigation.  Only half the respondents (52%) 
agreed with the statement ‘Our investigations are intelligence-led’; which is a pre-requisite 
of NIM compliance.  The responses regarding tactical and co-ordination meetings revealed 
that there was variation between the two public services with only one respondent, from 
five investigation managers canvassed, being a member of a tactical tasking and co-
ordination group.   
 
There was a limited level of awareness of the NIM intelligence products, e.g. tactical 
assessments (52%); strategic assessment (39%); problem profiles (39%); and subject 
profiles (35%), predictably though, only from the respondents who were aware of, and had 
received training in the NIM.  A final point of note was the response to a question 
regarding whether the respondent’s Investigation Unit had a discrete intelligence gathering 
resource; nine of the investigators questioned (39%) recorded ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’.  Both 
public services engaged in the research had Operational Intelligence Units (albeit they are 
relatively new to the IPS); which would suggest poor communication and an extremely 
limited contribution from intelligence products in their investigative activities.   
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This earlier research employed mixed methods, with structured interviews for sixteen 
investigative staff, specifically related to the respondents understanding of the tasking and 
co-ordinating process (regarding the intelligence products and both tactical and strategic 
decision making in the investigation process).  It was evident from both the survey and 
interview that there was a limited understanding of the NIM and substantially less of the 
minimum standards that provide the criteria for conformity, regardless of whether the 
subjects had received training in investigation.  The majority (81%) of interviewees were 
unaware of the purpose of the Strategic Tasking & Co-ordinating (ST&C) and could not 
describe either the ‘control strategy’ or the ‘intelligence requirement’.  As both the IPS and 
DWP have ST&C groups, this suggests that these products are either not generated or that 
the communication process is flawed.  Furthermore, only one respondent was aware of 
their agency’s strategic priorities, but was uncertain what relevance these had to the 
Tasking & Co-ordination Group.  There was considerable vagueness from the respondents 
regarding the purpose of a Tactical Tasking & Co-ordination (TT&C), nearly all of the 
respondents (94%) believed the TT&C group’s sole purpose was to monitor ongoing 
investigation and ‘case loads’ (the volume of ‘live investigations’ carried by each 
investigator). 
 
The findings from this earlier research (Osborn, 2008) appeared to indicate that, 
potentially, it was not simply the complexity and language employed in describing the 
NIM and the minimum standards that was defying the investigative personnel’s 
understanding.  There appeared to be clear misunderstanding of a core element of the 
model viz. intelligence-led decision making facilitated through tasking and co-ordinating.  
There were some indications of cultural resistance, similar to the police and I wanted to 
explore this further.  However, to test that premise, I determined to expand the sample size 
and broaden the research.  The following current research findings are divided thematically 
reflecting the format of the semi-structured interview (see Appendix 4) in the six themes 





Theme 1: compliance and conformity with the NIM 
This research has identified a number of cultural parallels within the public service 
investigative community and the police including resistance to imposed change and a sense 
of elitism in comparison with ‘processing staff’.  From the structured interviews and 
through contact with public service training course delegates, it was evident that 
investigators and intelligence staff remain unfamiliar with some of the language and 
terminology employed in the NIM literature.  This research has not identified any lack of 
senior management support or approval for the NIM although it could not be confidently 
determined, through the documentary evidence or testimony available, whether the 
decision to adopt the NIM was fully informed.  However, a number of respondents 
indicated (RS24, RS 33, RS35 and RS45) that no ‘operational’ consultation or engagement 
took place within the DWP and IPS.  In addition, RS11 a DWP investigator suggested that 
the managers responsible for the introduction of the NIM to the Agency: “…. didn’t really 
understand what was involved – they still don’t” and content analysis reveals that this 
sentiment was replicated by four (11%) other respondents. 
 
There remained a common perception by interview respondents, supported by a minority 
of students attending investigation courses, that the public service adoption of the NIM was 
both ‘suspect’ and ‘autocratic’ - without consultation with the investigative community; 
and relatively naïve – lacking a proper understanding of the model’s requirements and 
standards (RS28 and RS43).  An intelligence manager within the IPS (RS18) explained: “I 
don’t think anyone fully understands NIM …. it is just too complex and the brochures, CDs 
and guidance will further confound rather than inform”.  Three interviewees (6%) stated 
that they believed that their respective agencies had adopted the NIM as a partnership tool 
without full consideration or regard to the policy, process and procedural changes that 
would be necessary to accommodate the NIM.   
 
This view was endorsed when interviewing a DWP Investigator (RS42) who stated 
“Rather than ‘complying with NIM’ through an alteration and adaptation of existing 
processes; they [senior managers] appeared to be operating the other way round.  That is 
modifying and redefining the processes and trusting that NIM supported these changes”.  I 
witnessed this apparent inertia as a lead consultant whilst working with the DWP Change 
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Team in 2006 when I was asked to ‘present and explain’ the purpose of tasking and co-
ordination (following the formal adoption of the NIM).  The audience proved polite and 
casually interested, but there was little evidence of energy or willingness to change the 
agency’s existing procedures and, invited to a follow up meeting four weeks later, it was 
determined that DWP would continue its extant practices ‘for the time being’.  A former 
senior manager within DWP (RS23) commented: 
 
The model was adopted without proper review and had to be introduced 
without additional resources or training.  I think, when the decision was made, 
there was not any representative from the FIU [Fraud Investigation Unit] – no, 
there would not have been anyone operational present.   
 
However, this view was not generally supported by the DSA respondents.  A DSA 
Investigator (RS36) suggested that there had been a level of discussion with operational 
staff and that the senior manager responsible for adopting the NIM into the DSA was an 
experienced investigator and aware of the conformity issues. 
 
The NIM may appear structurally complex to non-police eyes, and through the NCIS and 
police-partiality of the terminology, it may confound full interpretation and understanding, 
as James (2011: 257) suggests: “the ethos of the model was lost in translation”.  From the 
summary of responses outlined below, I would argue that from the public service 
investigators’ perspective: ‘the ethos, structure and potential products of the model were 
lost in translation’.  From the earliest review John & Maguire (2004: 8) identified that a 
substantial investment would be required by any organisation adopting the NIM stating 
the:  
 
complexity of all the developments pose a considerable challenge to police 
forces in terms of knowledge and professional competence (and hence training) 
as well as creating a need for organisational structures and systems properly 
suited to working in the new environment.   
 
Whether the absence of a meaningful change programme to introduce the NIM was due to 
lack of comprehension, organisational torpor or poor change management is difficult to 
judge from the interviews.  However, the level of understanding from the respondents was 
particularly low with more than half (57%) indicating that they were uncertain of the 
model’s purpose.  When questioned about the language and terminology used in the NIM 
94 
description and the minimum standards, a larger proportion (66%) criticised it for its 
complexity, partiality and confusion.  Typical of these responses was a SOCA BITSU 
Manager (RS07) who stated: “seems a bit complicated … too complex and ‘wordy”.  An 
IPS Investigator (RS15) said: “I don’t know too much about the National Intelligence 
Model other than what we covered on training”; following a supplementary question this 
trained operational investigator inaccurately described the NIM as being the same as the 
Intelligence Cycle (see Figure 1.2).  An Investigation Manager from the DSA (RS31) 
articulated a reasonably common theme: “the description, examples and instructions 
probably all have some meaning to the police, but we are not the police – it needs to be 
written in a way that we can understand and interpret it”.  These comments were 
supplemented by another public service investigator who declined to be interviewed, but 
stated: “we were expected to follow NIM, but really it was more about processing referrals 
and doing a few more checks [exploiting open and closed intelligence sources].  It didn’t 
really affect me or the way we investigated.”  In many respects these comments are not a 
critique of the core themes of the model, rather they indicate a genuine lack of 
understanding as to the model’s purpose and, from an operational perspective, how to 
apply and comply with its minimum standards, thus potentially denying the agencies 
potential benefit.   
 
I extended some sympathy to the Investigator (RS25) who apologetically, and loyally, 
responded to my opening question thus: “I don’t fully understand NIM, but I suppose we 
do follow the processes”.  This form of response was echoed by a number of other 
interviewees (16%) and investigative trainees who simultaneously admitted a lack of 
comprehension concerning the NIM and the standards, whilst expressing a belief that their 
organisation was compliant.  On further questioning regarding the respondent’s 
understanding of the model, RS25 answered: 
 
I remember looking at a CD, but it wasn’t very clear and it didn’t seem 
relevant to what we do; and I thought it had more to do with the police than us.  
The diagrams were weird and I don’t think anyone in the department really got 
it.   
 
Further questioned on whether there was any alternative information provided, it was 
intimated that the investigative team (department) remained nonplussed, RS25 admitted:  
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We were given a briefing, but all that did was to remind us of the importance of 
[intelligence] checks and that they were going to introduce a filtering system so 
that, as investigators, we did not, automatically, get all of the referrals.  The 
work did not really change and we are still following the same investigations 
as we always have.   
 
This response was enlightening in a number of ways, firstly it appears that the intended 
sole introduction to the model, provided for this investigative team, was the NCIS CD and 
that a supplementary briefing was only provided in response to the failure of this medium.  
Secondly, this investigator appears to be confusing the intelligence-led process, as a core 
theme of the NIM, with a newly introduced referral filtering system, which may have had 
more to do with reducing caseloads by diverting perceived criminality into a category of 
loss and error.  In hindsight, the CD was probably a very poor choice as an educational tool 
and has now become a notorious feature of the NIM-launch.  In my service as a police 
officer and since, I have never identified a single investigator who viewed it all the way 
through.  The final comment on this theme should be accorded to a seasoned DWP 
Investigator (RS30): “The model was not fully understood by anyone really, to start with 
… nothing much changed and we were doing the same investigations”.  From this 
investigators perspective, the introduction of the NIM, initially, signalled ‘no change’, and 
whatever asset investment, in terms of systems, processes and policy that may have 
accompanied the model’s introduction, evidently failed to impact on their operational 
investigative environment.   
 
To provide national consistency, implicit in its title, through intelligence-led investigation, 
decision making and tasking; and to facilitate and support partnership, adoptees of the NIM 
are required to comply with the Code of Practice and minimum standards (NPIA, 2010).  
The ‘Guidance’ (ACPO, 2005) provides the practical detail required for compliance and 
under the Police Reform Act, 2002, it is a mandatory requirement for the police.  Police 
compliance is subject to inspection by the HMIC: “it is against these standards that 
inspection is undertaken and the ‘level of compliance is determined” (NCPE, 2006 and 
HMIC, 2008: 7).  There is no apparent qualification to the standards or exception to the 
NIM Code of Practice for non-police users, and, as stated in Chapter 1, the Home Office 
affirms that the model “is not confined to, or restricted for specialist usage. It is relevant 
to all areas of law enforcement; crime and its investigation, disorder and community 
safety” (Home Office, 2002; para. 3.1.3).  I would argue therefore that conformity to the 
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NIM, by any adopting agency, requires the ‘assets’ outlined in the model and compliance 
with the processes and procedures outlined in the minimum standards (ACPO, 2005: 103).   
 
From the subject’s responses, e.g. RS25 and RS30, it appears that the terminology 
employed in the Code of Practice and minimum standards are an aggravating factor to 
compliance.  The response from the SOCA BITSU Manager (RS07), an organisation with 
similar core business to the police and familiar with police parlance, stated that the 
standards were complex and ‘wordy’.  The comment from the Investigation Manager from 
the DSA (RS31), an intelligent and experienced investigator, was almost an apologetic 
appeal, “the description, examples and instructions probably all have some meaning to the 
police, but we are not the police”.  This endorsed a common theme from public service 
investigators, that the NIM standards and instructions were unclear.  Furthermore, it was 
believed that the NIM did not accommodate a variety of ‘users’; the standards of 
compliance appear the same, regardless of agency and there are no caveats or evident 
alternatives tendered.  The additional ‘guidance’ that has been provided since 2005 (see 
page 144) appear to adopt the same style, language and terminology, perhaps further 
frustrating comprehension for the non-police agency.  This was endorsed by RS31 in the 
request that the model and standards “needs to be written in a way that we can understand 
and interpret it”.  However, from the response of RS42 it was apparent that non-
compliance may also be an unwillingness to conform to process and procedure “Rather 
than ‘complying with NIM’ through an alteration and adaptation of existing processes; 
they [senior managers] appeared to be operating the other way round”. 
 
It was evident from this research and exposure through consultancy that the public services 
do not conform to the NIM and that this was generally acknowledged by investigative staff 
and managers.  The ‘adoption’ of the NIM by the DWP and the IPS was apparently not 
accompanied by consultation with operational staff; the provision of appropriate resources 
and assets; appropriate training; or a formulated change plan (RS23).  This may have 
hardened cultural resistance and increased uncertainty surrounding the new processes.  
Five years after adoption, investigative personnel are still uncertain and unfamiliar with the 
model and the requirements for compliance, potentially due to the language and 
terminology employed in the ‘Guidance’ and supporting literature. However, it should be 
acknowledged that the implementation within the DSA was more measured and although, 
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initially, under-resourced and without a discrete intelligence unit, there was less apparent 
resistance by investigative staff. 
 
Theme 2: establishing the impact the NIM has on fraud within the public service 
Predominantly, the core business of public services is ‘service delivery’, e.g. benefit 
payments, the issuance of passports or the administration of driving tests; governance of 
policy; integrity of entitlement; and ‘duty of care’ for the public purse (Audit Commission, 
2010: 29; Smith, 2010).  Unlike the police, their business is not associated with community 
safety and the NIM is not designed to deliver benefits to public service core business; 
exclusively the NIM is employed by the agency’s investigative community (where one 
exists).  However, it should be acknowledged that agencies may profit from reduced risk or 
improved detection rates – provided that the model delivers benefit in crime reduction.  
However, this benefit is limited as they do not share the broader community safety 
demands of policing “the police maintain law and order: protect members of the public 
and their property; and prevent, detect and investigate crime” (Strathclyde Police, 2010).  
In this respect, the investigative activity of public services is dominated by a single crime – 
fraud; “we probably do deal with ‘volume crime’, but of only one type” (RS33); and the 
NIM, to deliver benefit, must impact upon that crime.  However, the fraud level continues 
to rise with Pricewaterhouse Cooper (PwC) reporting that now 60% of public services 
experienced some levels of fraud in 2010; an increase of over 15% from the previous year 
(PwC, 2011).  Disturbingly, according to PwC, the profile of the public service fraudster 
may be shifting from the ‘opportunist’ and external perpetrator to the internal fraudster 
(globally, public service organisations that suffered economic crime, reported that 57% of 
the fraudsters were internal).  For the NIM to add value to non-police agencies, the 
intelligence-led investigation and decision making processes need to reduce the levels of 
fraud perpetrated (and consequently the number of referrals); enhance financial recovery; 
or increase the efficiency and effectiveness detection and investigation which, for public 
service investigative teams, are subject to performance targets.   
 
With restricted access to alternative and reliable evidence, the methodology employed to 
establish the impact that the NIM has on fraud within the public service has relied upon the 
perception of investigative staff in interview testimony.  However, this line of questioning 
appeared to rapidly become redundant as a continued level of ‘uncertainty’, regarding the 
profile of NIM, became apparent.  Exclusively drawing on the comments from public 
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service investigators and intelligence officers (n=20) to canvass ‘coal face’ opinion, the 
majority (59%) asserted that the NIM had made no difference to the agency’s vulnerability 
to fraud and risk; over a quarter (27%) said they did not know; and a slim minority (17%) 
said they believed it had.  The managers tended to be more upbeat in their assessment with 
the majority believing that the NIM had registered a positive effect on investigation in 
general and specifically to the reduction of fraud, although no statistical support or 
empirical evidence were alluded to or tendered.   
 
The following selection of responses from interview provides an indication of the general 
tone from investigators.  A mature and experienced DWP investigator (RS25) said: “ … we 
are still following the same investigations as we always have.  The Intelligence Units are 
really in name only and don’t seem to have increased our results – if anything we are 
slowed down by their work”.  This was a reasonably common theme, repeated by delegates 
on a number of investigation courses, that the operational intelligence units added little and 
effectively slowed the work of the investigators.  This was supported by a DSA 
Investigator (RS46) who stated “I am not entirely sure that the OIU offers any real help to 
what we do yet”.  An investigation manager from the IPS (RS18) suggested that: “it [the 
NIM] does not reduce vulnerability or risk, although if analysis was properly applied to 
closing operations [Operational Analysis] it may show – you know, identify – weaknesses 
in processes and show areas of weakness in both application and issue”  However this 
view was contrasted by a DSA Investigation Manager (RS34) who stated that their Agency 
was not compliant, but contradicting his co-worker (RS46): “we do not do it [the NIM] 
properly at the moment”, but continued by saying that “the Intelligence Unit has improved 
the quality of our intelligence and I think that has made us better at our investigations”. 
 
On questioning investigators and intelligence officers as to whether the NIM impacted on 
fraud losses, the majority (55%) were unsure and a number of them (9%) stated they were 
unqualified to answer, being too new in the role to comment on a historic process.  A 
minority view (11%) was that it had little impact and this was supported in interview with 
an IPS investigator (RS19) stating “it [the NIM] makes no difference.”.  The context of 
this response was repeated by a co-worker (RS20) who suggested that the model was 
“useful for investigation, but that is ‘after the fact’ so I don’t think it was designed for 
reducing fraud.” There was less qualification forwarded by an IPS Investigation Manager 
(RS17) who replied “I don’t think it is designed to reduce fraud”.  This comment is 
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revealing and perhaps provides an illustration of a core weakness in the model – essentially 
that it is not exclusively or specifically designed to reduce fraud and is therefore perceived 
by agency investigators to offers relatively limited benefit.  Confusion over the purpose of 
the model was typified in the response by an Investigation Manager (RS18) who 
commented “I don’t believe that NIM increases or decreases much at all – other than 
bureaucracy”.  This was a reasonably common view held respondents and a range of 
public service course delegates – even those who support the model – that it has, 
administratively, increased their workload and ‘interfered’ with the process of 
investigation (by removing their ability to select referrals; determine what intelligence is 
necessary to progress the investigation; and then undertake their own collection and 
collation).  A seasoned IPS investigator (RS16) commented that the NIM: “hasn’t made us 
any better at investigating fraud or detecting it.  It was probably better before when we - as 
investigators, managed the whole lot – more referrals were investigated and we got better 
results I would say”.  This investigator identified the ‘before’ as emanating from the 
implementation of Intelligence Units – fundamental to the NIM – that, to him, typified the 
change and a dilution of effectiveness on the investigators role. 
 
From the investigators point of view, the perceived ‘culprits’ for the failure of the NIM to 
impact on their fraud investigations are the staff of the Operational Intelligence Units who 
generally attracted censure from the operational investigative community, particularly 
regarding their lack of experience and professionalism.  It is quite possible that this 
criticism is largely unwarranted, although the Intelligence Officers are generally drawn 
from process backgrounds and may, therefore, be unfamiliar with some aspects of the 
operational work of the investigators.  From interview, it appeared more likely that the 
denigration of the intelligence staff originates from investigators sensing a loss of prestige 
and control, clearly inferred by the comments of a DWP Investigator (RS25), who soberly 
delivered this explanation:  
 
Before, [the adoption of NIM] the investigator would deal with the referral 
from start to finish.  They still used intelligence and this was part of the checks, 
really they determined whether the referral would be investigated or not.  NIM 
has meant that the checks are done elsewhere – within the FIU [Fraud 
Intelligence Unit – the equivalent to an OIU] and the investigator receives the 
intel’ at the start of the investigation.   
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Comments similar to this and associated sentiments have been common to all of the public 
services with intelligence units that I have worked in, either as a trainer or consultant.  The 
substantial majority of investigators encountered during this research associated the NIM 
with the work of the Intelligence Units, the 5x5x5 system, and little else, consolidated by 
the comment of a recently retired IPS investigator who stated: “ … we don’t need the OIUs 
– we all know how the 5x5x5 system works”.  In this statement and supplementary 
comments from respondents (RS25, RS45 and RS47) on the ‘products’ generated by the 
intelligence units, the DWP and IPS investigators appeared to ascribe no ‘added value’ to 
their fraud investigations.  Rather, they viewed the intelligence staff activities as 
‘interference’ and bureaucratic (RS38 and RS42) and as an imposition on fraud referral 
and investigation management.  Interestingly, where analysts are employed, and these 
individuals are invariably members of the Intelligence Units, they were not collectively 
included in the negative comments – often being perceived as professionals and part of the 
‘investigative cadre’ who can make a contribution to fraud investigation.   
 
A potential, and fundamental, problem with public service Operational Intelligence Units 
(OIU), in contrast to the police, originates in their purpose and application.  In a number of 
cases this included a stated intention or inference that the OIU would, effectively, 
subordinate and regulate the activities of the agency investigators (see 1, 3, 5 and 6 below) 
and provide a monitoring and reporting function to senior managers with regards to fraud 
reduction objectives and targets (see 7 below).  This has fomented cultural resistance 
within the investigative community whom, until the OIU inauguration, had enjoyed high 
status within the agencies; a degree of autonomy that brought additional financial benefits 
in overtime; and accredited with specialist knowledge, expertise and experience.  To 
illustrate the changes introduced alongside the introduction of intelligence units, I will 
provide one example, although it has currency and relevance to a number of the agencies 
reviewed, the following edited extract (public service memorandum: D/2330/rest – GPMS, 
2005) provided the rationale and template for intelligence units setup within a major public 
service. 
 
1. Operational Intelligence Units (OIU) will be a resource both to investigators 
and to other staff in each Region. 
2. They will allocate work to investigators under the direction of a senior 
manager and the OIU will monitor progress in the work allocated. 
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3. They will obtain operational intelligence, managing the interface with other 
agencies and ensuring compliance with relevant legislation.  
4. They will quality assure applications under RIPA (Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act) managing external challenges to the process of 
approval.  
5. Where there are overlaps between investigation units, they will be the 
conduit for resolving boundary issues. 
6. The OIU will also be the first point of contact for staff that are seeking 
assistance and will task investigators with support as required by the 
Region.  
7. They will collate all referrals and manage the over-capacity of referrals, 
ensuring that quality data is not lost in the process of work allocation.  
8. Lastly, there will be a feedback loop to senior management to inform in year 
adjustments to targeting. 
 
The intention is to ensure that investigations are intelligence-led. This will 
deliver efficiency savings in the deployment of resource that should more than 
compensate for the cost of efficiently handling intelligence. At a greater level of 
detail, the current process, whereby many investigations are taken on at the 
level of individual investigators in the field can be wasteful. Quite apart from the 
problem of ensuring that delivery equals specification when investigations are 
selected by investigators; there are the questions over how those cases are 
chosen, and the resource that is consumed in making selections. The creation of 
an OIU will remove that task from operational investigators, leaving it with 
specialist intelligence analysts.  
 
The final paragraph of this ‘OIU implementation summary’ commences with a core 
doctrine and purpose of the NIM however, as it continues, it clearly introduces the 
concepts of performance management and has all of the hallmarks of adopting the NIM as 
a tool of NPM.  It therefore promotes a fundamental question and raises a suspicion that, 
for this agency, the adoption of NIM was more to do with NPM than investigation.  From 
professional association with this agency, I can confirm that they failed to predict the 
resistance encountered from their established investigators and the introduction of the 
intelligence units failed to deliver the aspired benefits to intelligence-led investigation or 
performance management.   
 
An investigator (RS19) provided this simplified and, somewhat jaundiced, view of the 
NIM and the introduction of intelligence units: “it’s about getting intelligence and having 
an intelligence unit that feeds the investigators I think … and making sure that the 
investigators only look at relevant cases and stay on track”.  A senior manager (RS21) 
held a different view and, in response to question regarding the core themes of the NIM, 
appeared to combine both NPM philosophy and intelligence-led process as a reason for 
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adoption: “Employing SOPs [standard operating procedures] with regards to referral 
management, investigation and disposal, whether that be suspension, cancellation, 
recovery – or in the case of applications – decline”.  This view was broadly supported by 
an Intelligence Officer (RS22) a member of an OIU, who claimed that the adoption of NIM 
required: “…. due consideration to intelligence when reviewing referrals and 
investigating”.  This response alludes to intelligence-led investigation, but then RS22 
qualified his comment with performance and integrity considerations: “we need to make 
sure we are compliant with DPA [Data Protection Act] and can show that we are focused 
in getting the intelligence and not just going on ‘fishing expeditions’.  It’s about audit 
trails and accountability really”.  The term ‘fishing’ or ‘fishing expeditions’ refers to a 
form of casual data mining of personal data on established storage systems, with the 
intention of identifying anomalies or irregularities that may indicate fraud.  Searches of this 
nature, without a clear and stated objective or referral-based target, are proscribed by 
organisational policy, and the Data Protection Act, 1998 (the exception under s.29 
effectively demands a ‘referral’ or investigation, before any search) and contrary to the 
ethos of the Intelligence Cycle (Figure 1.1). 
 
The apparent ‘confusion’, by senior managers, over the purpose and reason for adopting 
the NIM was neatly summarised by an experienced DWP investigator (RS37):  
 
There appears to be some confusion with the policy designers [the senior 
managers who adopted the NIM] that by using a relatively sophisticated 
referral filter, we are ‘evaluating intelligence’, whereas, in truth, this is really 
just a system of ‘selection’ and does not place a true emphasis on ‘intelligence-
led’ enquiry.  Using the FRISC system [Fraud Referral Information Scoring 
Card] it enables the organisation to: enable unbiased and legal selection of 
fraud referrals for investigation; facilitate the management of fraud 
investigators workload; and enable targeting of resources at most risky cases.  
As you know before processing the case through FRISC the RM [Referral 
Manager] has to decide whether fraud action is appropriate.  No action may be 
taken in the following circumstances: no trace of customer; no trace of a 
benefit claim; customer has already reported the change; and allegation does 
not affect benefit entitlement.   
 
This respondent effectively articulated a view, commonly held by investigative staff within 
the DWP and IPS, that adoption of the NIM was essentially ‘process driven’ and the model 
was conveniently exploited to support planned procedural changes relating to performance 
and governance, with little regard to intelligence-led investigation; improved tasking; or 
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productive partnership.  This was not a view shared by the DSA investigators, not 
employing a ‘scoring system’ for the selection of referrals for investigation. 
 
Theme 3: the impact on partnership and joint working 
The NIM is intended to be workable beyond the confines of ‘law enforcement agencies’ 
and that these complementary parties should to be capable of collaborative tasking and co-
ordination (Home Office, 2002; para. 3.1.3).  There was little evidence from either 
testimony or review to suggest that the adoption of the NIM by the public service had 
facilitated increased joint working and productive partnership.  Only two of the public 
service respondents (4%) interviewed, an IPS Investigation Manager (RS18) stated that the 
NIM “…helps in partnership”; whilst a senior manager (RS21) provided an ‘organisational 
perspective’ stating: “It is an essential attribute of partnership working and ensures 
consistency of both approach and case management”.  However, the substantial 
operational view (55%) was that the NIM made no difference to partnership, but a number 
of subjects were prepared to optimistically qualify these comments by stating that, if 
standardisation could be achieved, more collaboration and effective joint working would 
take place.  A DWP Investigation Manager (RS09) explained: “Most of our joint working 
is really led by the police, sometimes we are contacted by SOCA, but not ‘collaboratively’ 
or as ‘partners’”. In response to a supplementary question on what would increase and 
support meaningful partnership, the manager replied:  
 
We need a simplified and special version of NIM for us … for the public 
services I think, yes probably one for the public services so that we can at least 
be on the same ‘score card’ as prospective partners.  That’s the problem really 
we still do different things – you know like different referrals and even 
investigations so that there really isn’t any proper commonality – we don’t 
know their systems and they definitely don’t know ours.  Sometimes it doesn’t 
matter too much … particularly if it is just about swapping information – you 
know, like intelligence sharing.  Other times it does matter though and even the 
terms and language is all wrong, you need a translator, or a glossary, or 
thesaurus to know who does what, where and when. 
 
A DSA Investigation Manager (RS34) suggested that “At the moment, and in its current 
form, NIM does not encourage partnership and really, apart from 5x5x5 it has not 
facilitated consistency”. This was complemented by an investigator colleague (RS37) who 
stated “prospective partners all have their own versions of NIM” intimating that, without 
standardised processes, productive joint working was not possible and this indictment was 
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confirmed by an IPS Investigation Manager (RS17) who said: “it [the NIM] should help if 
we all followed the same procedures, but we don’t!”  From these comments, and those of 
investigative trainees, there appeared an acknowledgement that the NIM could contribute 
to joint working and improved partnership if a greater level of process consistency could 
be achieved.  There was some acknowledgement from subjects (9%) that the NIM 
contributed to partnership working with regards to local authorities and the police through 
shared responsibilities for community safety.  A DWP Investigator (RS30) stated: “NIM 
seems to work for the police and councils” and this sentiment was echoed by three other 
Investigators (RS26, RS42 and RS45).  This perception may lack empirical evidence, but 
appears to have contributed to a general belief within the public service investigative 
community that the NIM can deliver some benefits in collaborative working.  This was 
supported by a number of the respondents (11%) and a typical comment was: “it is 
intended to improve joint working” (DWP Investigator – RS24).  However, it was evident 
from a significant proportion of the respondents (34%) that NIM failed to deliver the 
necessary consistency to their agency and within the broader public service community to 
facilitate meaningful joint working.  Neither was it perceived as an accessible model for 
non-police agencies and organisations, with an investigative capability, with respondents 
(previously cited) suggesting that the language, describing the model’s processes and 
‘requirements’ was very selective, exclusive and more attuned to law enforcement as a 
core business.   
 
A fairly consistent complaint during this research, typified by responses from DWP (RS30) 
and IPS (RS47) investigators, is that when agencies have engaged in partnership, 
particularly with the police or SOCA, the benefit and identity fraud offences identified are 
considered minor, and often ‘dropped’ (not proceeded with) in favour of more serious 
offences.  However, this sentiment was not echoed by any member of the DSA and this 
may be an unfair criticism of their partners as this decision would generally be taken by the 
Crown Prosecution Service (England and Wales) or the Procurator Fiscal (Scotland).  
However, the prosecutor’s decision can, be influenced and the blame, rightly or wrongly, is 
often heaped upon the police or SOCA.  Gilling (2006: 736) argued that there needed to be 
transparency, honesty and trust in each partners’ motives and competence supported by a 
good understanding of member’s roles and processes.   
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The closing words on partnership should be credited to an experienced crime analyst 
(RS13) who responded to my question on the models impact on partnership and joint 
working thus:  
 
We should encourage collaborative working and it fits in with the broad 
principles of increased collaboration through information and intelligence 
sharing but other than the police, most of the other agencies don’t use NIM in 
a pure form and have a number of different types – if one of them is using the 
full model, that is if they are completely ‘NIM’ed’ - I haven’t seen it.  
 
Theme 4: NIM as a productive business model 
This line of enquiry attracted very few informed comments and was quickly frustrated by 
the declared naivety of the research population with regards to the actual processes of the 
NIM and the subject’s inability to differentiate between a model and process.  For the 
majority of investigators the NIM was a ‘model’, because that was its title.  This was not 
the dominant response in the structured interview trial, however this may have been due to 
a more ‘informed’ audience.  The managers from the research population, potentially with 
a greater understanding of the NIM core doctrine, were inclined to rebut the Home Office 
claim of the NIM being a business model.  A DWP Investigation Manager (RS09) stated 
quite categorically that the NIM was not a model “it’s really a set of instructions; rules and 
requirements that explain or describe a process” and an IPS Investigation Manager (RS17) 
suggested that it: “ …. just describes the investigation procedure, or processes”.  Another 
Investigation Manager (RS18) provided a reason for doubting its nomenclature stating:  
 
I think a business model should be easy to follow and you should be able to 
draw it on a single page.  This is a scheme or construct.  It is idealistic, that 
doesn’t matter, but it should be possible and we haven’t got the resources or 
the infrastructure to make it work. 
 
The structured interviews on the issue of the NIM as a business model delivered an 
inconclusive result and no real dividends.  Responses were broad and, perhaps predictable, 
equally split between the ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’ responses, with slightly more detail 
and rationale being tendered by the managers.  On reflection, and appropriately, I must 
take responsibility for this unproductive line of research; it quickly became evident that the 
subjects held no firm views, or particular interest in the typology of the NIM.  For the 
majority its description and title was relatively academic, more important to them, was that 
they did not particularly understand the NIM and they saw little value in it. 
Theme 5: the potential benefits to investigative efficiency or effectiveness? 
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This theme formed a critical part of the research and provided a test of the perception of 
operational investigators and managers as to the potential benefits of the NIM.  Although 
not congruent to the police, there is a discernible and similar culture within the public 
service investigative community, with slight variations depending upon the organisation or 
agency environment.  As such, and from the investigator’s perspective, for the NIM to be 
effectively adopted it needs to be acknowledged; understood (Skogan, 2008); and 
embraced as a practice and procedure (or process) that delivers benefit to the investigative 
process (Maguire, 2006).  This adoption by the investigative community should be 
reinforced by tangible results regarding detection and apprehension.  To the significant 
majority of respondents (75%) they were unable to determine any benefit to their 
investigations.  Indeed as indicated previously, the NIM was seen as an unhelpful and 
disruptive imposition.  This was summarised by an IPS Investigator (RS19) who stated: “it 
[the NIM] hasn’t really made any difference”, but was willing to qualify this critique by 
continuing, “ … having looked through the standards, I’m not sure we do it.  If we 
conformed to them we might be better off – I’m not sure though we don’t really have the 
resources or the commitment”.   
 
This view was countered by a senior manager (RS21) who appeared convinced of the 
benefits derived from adopting the NIM: “we all investigate in the same way.  Employing 
SOPs [standard operating procedures] with regards to referral management, investigation 
and disposal, whether that be suspension, cancellation, recovery – or in the case of 
applications – decline” although this response may lack ‘operational familiarity’ and 
appeared to focus more on performance and organisational consistency.  A DSA 
Investigation Manager (RS34) in a written response stated: “at the moment and in its 
current form NIM does not encourage partnership and really, apart from 5x5x5 it has not 
facilitated consistency”.  In interview RS34 provided a qualification to this, stating: “I am 
sure that investigations should be intelligence led, I am just not sure we need all of NIM to 
make that happen”.  An IPS Investigation Manager (RS17) provided a parallel that was 
descriptive, but ended dismissively: “it is the process that the police follow.  We do some 
of it and we do use intelligence, but most of the model is not really necessary or 
appropriate for the investigations we do”. I include the following response from a DWP 
Investigation Manager (RS33) in full, as it clearly and comprehensively articulates a 
common view within the DWP: 
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As we discussed, they [the NIM minimum standards] do not seem as if they are 
written for a non-police audience and, in that respect, probably do not fit the 
type of investigation we undertake in the DWP.  We probably do deal with 
‘volume crime’, but of only one type and our tasking processes are more 
concerned with ‘case conferences’ and making sure that we apply our limited 
resources to the referrals with the greatest chance of success, whether that be 
termination of benefit, recovery or prosecution.  The introduction of NIM was 
considered, by some of the investigators, as an imposition and there was 
complaint that proper consultation was not invited.  The view remains that the 
introduction was a political inspiration by senior managers and had little to do 
with [investigative] performance – we do not currently have any PIs 
[performance indicators] regarding NIM compliance and little evidence to 
demonstrate that we have improved investigations due to it.   
 
This response provides a number of insights into some of the resistance that the 
introduction of the NIM may have encountered within some public services; and a 
suggestion that this may be perpetuated.  It introduced the familiar theme that the language 
and terminology employed in the model and minimum standards has the effect of 
distancing non-police audiences, and this was a common and dominant factor encountered 
throughout the research.  The respondent is not entirely dismissive of the NIM 
acknowledging that the ‘volume crime’ element may have some relevance, whilst 
attempting to place and describe the model in the context of agency policy and practice.  
However, he identifies and voices a collective perception that the NIM was introduced as a 
politically inspired ‘device’ and not as a credible process to improve intelligence-led 
investigation or informed tasking (decision making). 
 
A qualified statement by a DWP Investigation Manager (RS09) provides further 
interpretation of the model from the perception of an operational supervisor; a comment on 
its complexity; and concludes that there is no perceived value: 
 
It should really be relatively simple - intelligence collation, based upon a 
collection plan, evaluation (you know like five by five for intelligence), analysis 
and then dissemination – the profile of the intelligence cycle effectively. It has 
been made far too complex and therefore, from our point of view it doesn’t add 
value to countering fraud either individually or acting collaboratively.  
 
In general, the comments from the managers appeared more thoughtful and qualified in 
their criticism of the model, particularly when compared to investigators and intelligence 
officers who had the necessary experience within the role to make a comparison of ‘before 
and after’ as in the case of the DWP Investigator (RS30) who simply stated: “For us – it 
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doesn’t work”.  This was marginally amplified by a DSA Investigator (RS31) who stated: 
“Our work only really focuses on regulation and fraud - not a variety of crime, so NIM 
doesn’t affect the way we work.”  This suggested a fundamental misunderstanding over the 
purpose of the model, as a tool to ensure intelligence-led investigation and to support 
improved tasking, and this was demonstrated with supplementary questioning when the 
respondent cautiously suggested that the NIM was: “about the Intelligent [Intelligence] 
Cycle and identifying the most common crime in an area” (RS31).  A recently retired IPS 
investigator (RS47) was equally vague about the purpose (or potential benefits) of the 
model, despite working for over a decade within the role and the last 5 years in an 
organisation that has adopted the model: “NIM helps the police I think, I’m not sure why 
we had it, but we don’t investigate crime like them”. 
 
Theme 6: review of the revised NIM minimum standards 
The NIM is supported by eleven different elements, in total 135 minimum standards 
(ACPO/Centrex, 2005) and legislation ensures that chief officers of police have regard for 
these (Police Reform Act 2002) and must ensure that their forces adopt the practices of 
NIM and implement the required minimum standards.  As an alternative, for review by the 
majority of the research population (85%), I revised the NIM minimum standards, 
removing the police terminology; reducing the volume to 20 pages; and simplifying the 
language; re-branding this compilation as ‘Revised National Intelligence Model for public 
services: Minimum Standards’.  As part of this research, I circulated the document (see 
Appendix 3) to 40 subjects and simply asked: “What is your view of the revised minimum 
standards?”.  The sanitising of the standards (removing police terminology) was 
acknowledged by three of the respondents and typical of their responses was that of an IPS 
Investigator who commented: “all the references about police have gone” (RS16).  This 
was supported by a DSA Investigator who stated “I can understand it better without all the 
police jargon …”. 
 
Predictably, the majority (31: 66%) indicated that the revised standards were an 
improvement, being substantially shorter and employing clearer language, although a 
proportion of the subjects qualified their responses, for example a DWP Crime Analyst 
(RS13) stated: “the standards seem better and are shorter than the originals – it might help 
make the NIM more popular, but it still seems very demanding …”.  An Investigation 
Manager from the DWP (RS09) echoed this sentiment stating that the revised standards: 
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“are shorter and clearer. If anything I would still like to see some of the requirements 
made easier maybe even removed”.  An IPS Investigation Manager (RS17) made a similar 
observation: “the ones you revised seem better, they are shorter and I thought easier to 
understand. These would be better to implement, but they are still demanding in terms of 
us needing to behave or act more like the police”.  These comments provided a prevailing 
theme in that my revision of the current NIM minimum standards, although more concise 
and providing increased clarity, still appeared too complex, as further endorsed by the 
following comments: “ … more straight forward and easier to understand”, but qualified 
the answer by stating that the guidance on tasking and coordinating was still too complex: 
“I still think that tasking is too complicated and doesn’t really fit our needs”.  (DWP 
Investigation Manager, RS21) 
 
A senior manager within DWP, referring to the revised standards, stated: “I think I have a 
better grip of what we are supposed to be doing under NIM” (RS24), which would support 
the contention that non-compliance may not be evident (even to senior management) and 
that a contributory factor is translating the requirements of the NIM.  However, a DSA 
Investigator, although complimenting the revised standards for its clarity, shared a 
supplementary common view in their written response: “much better and clearer, but we 
really need our own process to fit with the police” (RS36).   
 
Summary Discussion 
This chapter has reviewed the primary research findings and sought to place into context 
the views of operational investigators and intelligence staff within the three identified 
public services, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Identity and Passport Service 
and the Driving Standards Agency.  It provides a comprehensive summary of the six 
themes (related to the interview protocol in Appendix 4).  With regards to compliance, 
from subject commentary, previous research and my professional experience as a 
consultant, it is evident that the adoption of the NIM into the public sector has not resulted 
in common systems or conformity, and these variations were supported by the testimony of 
a number of operational staff outside of the target research group (CRB and DVLA: RS27, 
and RS32).  Neither has it apparently delivered benefits to investigative efficiency of these 
agencies  From the research, it was evident that there are different levels of engagement 
with the model by operational staff, in this respect the two larger agencies, the DWP and 
IPS, are very similar with investigative communities sharing a broadly negative 
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perspective.  The DSA investigative personnel are more positive and embracing of both the 
NIM philosophy and change, although the operational demands on them for fraud 
investigation are substantially smaller.  This variation in DSA responses may be due to a 
number of factors and deserves further research.  Speculatively, the reasons may be that the 
DSA investigative team and Intelligence Unit are comparatively compact and cohesive.  
The Intelligence Unit is perceived as professional and has been staffed with experienced 
personnel who work closely with the investigators.  In addition, the DSA management 
structure is flatter, providing easier access to senior managers and decision makers.  The 
introduction of the NIM into the DSA was negotiated and facilitated by a senior manager 
with investigative experience and through a consultation process with operational 
personnel. 
 
The broad consensus from this research regarding any positive impact that the NIM may 
have wrought upon public service, from the operational investigators perspective appears 
to be – ‘not much’ (RS45) and a reasonable proportion appear to both dislike and distrust 
the model.  There are a number of reasons and these should not all to be associated with 
cultural resistance, or even the perceived complexity of the model, although this is patently 
a factor.  A number of the subjects, the majority drawn from the managerial grades, 
provided qualified statements and insight into why benefit had not been derived and, 
compliance achieved, since the model’s adoption.  An experienced IPS Investigation 
Manager (RS18) provided a good summary: 
 
if NIM encourages or requires a faithful allegiance to intelligence leading 
the investigative process, then it will help.  I am just not convinced that NIM 
does that – it could be a question of more energy and resources being 
devoted to ‘compliance’, rather than actually improving investigation.  No it 
is not effective.  There is no consistency, NIM almost encourages variation 
because of the text and complication …. [qualifying] no, complexity.  It 
needs to be much simpler and the requirements must be attainable by even 
small investigative units not just NCS, police or SOCA”.   
 
It is worth considering this statement as the request for greater simplicity reflects the views 
of a good proportion of the research population (45%) and past training delegates.  It also 
suggests that the basic ethos of an intelligence process – to promote intelligence-led 
investigation and improve tasking - is not resisted, but apparently the NIM, as a model, is 
not a convincing vehicle for that purpose within non-police agencies, and in some cases (as 
above) it is clearly rejected.   
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For the majority of agency investigators within this study, the NIM has not delivered 
consistency of process and procedure; supported their investigations; or facilitated joint 
working and productive partnership. The compliance requirements, enshrined in the Code 
of Practice and minimum standards evidently appear complex and, in some cases 
incomprehensible to public service personnel potentially contributing to variations and 
‘versions’ of the model.  Added to this, the model is broadly viewed as discrete, specific 
and partial to the police and SOCA and potentially unsuitable for the more exclusive 
application of fraud investigation. 
 
Compliance and conformity 
It appears likely that the purpose of the model; the implications of adoption; and the asset 
and process requirements for compliance or conformity, were not fully understood by the 
agencies.  In addition, the senior managers and the decision-makers awareness of the 
minimum standards regarding asset requirements, resources and process was questionable, 
potentially due to a deficiency of any meaningful consultation with active partners or their 
own operational staff.  From testimony, there appeared to have been: no discernible change 
plan or investment in ‘marketing’ the potential benefits of the model to investigative staff.  
Added to this, was a very limited provision of meaningful briefing or training and there 
was a potential failure, by agency policy makers, to aggressively adhere to the minimum 
standards outlined in the ‘Guidance’ to ensure conformity.   
 
The identified difficulties experienced by non-police agencies in conforming to the NIM 
raises the question of the suitability of the model (in its current form) to public service 
employment.  The limited operational resources and tactical capabilities available to 
agencies, together with the unwillingness and/or inability by senior managers to invest in 
the full range of ‘assets’, may provide further aggravating factors to confound a common 
intelligence-led investigative and decision making structure.  This study, from the 
exclusive perspective of public services (discounting Local Authorities), did not support 
the aspirational claim by ACPO: “The NIM has significantly improved opportunities to 
share intelligence across forces and agencies and between local and national levels.  It has 
reduced significant barriers to effectiveness by producing common structures and 
language and has effectively created a joined-up working environment” (ACPO, 2004: 5, 
ix).  Within the agencies reviewed, a sizeable proportion of investigative personnel 
appeared confused by the language in the NIM literature and were either unaware or 
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misunderstood the processes, e.g. tasking and co-ordination, effectively frustrating the 
creation of common structures. 
 
No comprehensive reason was identified as to why the agency investigative personnel 
describe the language as complex, unclear or incomprehensible, other than reasonably 
consistent reference to its ‘police-partiality’. I would argue that such partiality was 
deliberate in design, and not necessarily misplaced by the architects - Messrs Flood and 
Gaspar - both from police backgrounds and ostensibly designing an intelligence-led model 
for the police and NCIS.  However, as mentioned in Chapter 1 and confirmed by subject 
testimony, in its current form, the perceived complexity of the NIM (Flood, 2004: 51), as 
presented within the “Guidance” (ACPO; Centrex, 2005) remains a potential weakness (as 
Newburn, et al, 2007: 210). 
 
Impact on fraud 
In the public service, with the sole exception of the local authorities’ ‘Community Safety 
Units’, criminal risks and vulnerabilities are dominated by fraud (National Fraud 
Authority, 2009; Serious Fraud Office, 2008).  The majority of subjects perceived little 
benefit on fraud investigation from the implementation of the NIM and a similar 
proportion were ‘unsure’ whether it had reduced fraud losses.  This negative outlook must 
be balanced by the clear evidence that the organisations do not conform to the minimum 
standards and therefore any perceived ‘failure’ to deliver dividends to their investigation 
and fraud vulnerability must be tempered with the absence of the appropriate assets, 
tactical resources and common processes and procedures required by the model.  The 
majority of the research population held a potentially jaundiced view that the NIM is 
closely associated with the introduction of process-driven Intelligence Units; 
disempowerment; and a perception that the NIM has been introduced as a ‘performance 
tool by stealth’ for which there is very limited evidence.  The subjects presented a 
relatively ‘blinkered view’ that the NIM is, almost exclusively, an intelligence-led 
operational investigation tool.  This perception is to impoverish both the purpose and 
potential dividends of the NIM, which as a model or process has the potential to deliver 
improved decision making; a significant impact on resource tasking and co-ordination; and 
the benefits of productive joint working. 
 
The interview results were not consistent and despite the majority of operational 
investigators asserting that the NIM had made no difference to the agency’s vulnerability 
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to fraud and risk, the majority of managers believed that the NIM had delivered some 
benefit to investigation and fraud reduction.  Corroboration for either statements was not 
tendered and statistical evidence on fraud levels is notoriously difficult to acquire (Tunley, 
2011), and even with limited access to restricted documents (subject to GPMS) within two 
of the agencies under review, there was limited conclusive evidence to suggest the NIM 
has impacted upon either the volume of referrals or detections.  A review of financial 
recovery under the asset recovery scheme was also frustrated through restriction on data 
and the shifting incentives offered to agencies that could potentially skew motives and 
recovery activity “under the asset recovery incentive scheme agencies will get back 50% of 
what they recover determined by the total value of receipts received in the Home Office in 
the financial year 2010-2011” (OFCU, 2010: Appendix A).  On an actuarial scale, there is 
no evidence to support that the NIM has reduced fraud levels within the public service and, 
as previously cited, the estimated fraud losses have substantially increased in the last 5 
years (Levi, et al, 2007 for 2005-6 figures and NFA, 2011b for 2010-11).   
 
Consistently in responses and comments, the operational investigators from the DWP and 
IPS closely associated (and in some cases interpreted) the NIM processes with the 
organisational referral management system, although this was not mirrored in the 
responses from personnel with the DSA.  This dominant view from the DWP and IPS staff 
included a belief that, as investigators, they had been disempowered; no longer authorised 
to make discretionary decisions regarding the selection of fraud referrals for investigation; 
and inhibited in determining sources and processes for intelligence gathering.  This 
common perception was repeated when the subjects were questioned on the impact the 
NIM had on investigative efficiency and, particularly in the DWP, it has contributed to 
relatively poor relations between the Intelligence Units and investigative teams.  This is 
particularly unhelpful (and potentially counter-productive) when considering the core ethos 
and purpose of the model – intelligence-led activity.  However, as an example, within the 
DWP, the Intelligence Units do appear to fulfil a dual role in that they provide a degree of 
governance and performance monitoring through embedded filtering processes and the 
evaluation of fraud referrals.  Traditionally, this process was undertaken by investigators, 
who enjoyed a high degree of freedom in selecting cases, acquiring intelligence and 
progressing investigations.  This level of authority was uncommon to (non-investigative) 
process staff existing in a bureaucratic civil service environment, and it evidently provided 
some kudos to the established fraud investigator.  The introduction of the NIM has 
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coincided with an erosion of this discretionary authority and a requirement to comply with 
legislative and procedural regulations regarding the handling of personal data, e.g. RIPA 
and DPA.  It is possible that the negativity ascribed to the NIM and its potential impact on 
fraud is, in part, due to this sense of disempowerment; increased governance; and the 
requirement to conform to both policy and established ‘good practice’. 
 
Partnership 
The Home Office aspiration for the NIM to facilitate joint working and productive 
partnership through standardisation of process appears sound, and intelligence sharing and 
collaborative operations can deliver substantial benefit (HMIC, 2009).  There are a number 
of positive examples as in the GMAC experiment (see page 27); and police operations such 
as: ‘Safer Streets’, ‘Eagle Eye’, ‘Regis’ (all related to reducing street crime); ‘Bumblebee’ 
(Burglary); ‘Strongbox’ (funded targeting police initiative); ‘Trident and Crackdown’ 
(reducing drug dealing and related gun crime); and the public service ‘Wisdom’ (‘Day of 
the Jackal’ identity fraud).  However, I would argue that the effectiveness of joint working 
does not exclusively rely upon common systems or shared process platforms.  The simple 
provision of ‘consistency of process’ (that is not currently apparent in the UK investigative 
community) or a legislative or regulatory requirement is unlikely to deliver meaningful 
collaboration.  The notion of partnership is complex particularly when parties have 
different perspectives, however, there appears to be certain key elements in partnership, 
namely: respect, transparency, accountability, shared values, honesty and communication 
that is understood by all interested parties.  Ideally, partnership is inclusive and perceived 
as a symbiotic relationship between equals (Morganton, 2003).  In addition, Miller (2010: 
2) argues that a dominant feature must be high levels of trust and ‘productive engagement’. 
 
From the subjects responses, the difficulties associated with joint working and partnership 
appear to be the absence of a common and consistent process; differing objectives; and a 
perception of seniority (or inferiority).  Without a common intelligence and investigative 
processes between partners, shared operational activities can be exacerbated and 
communication frustrated.  From the police perspective the referral management systems 
of public services can appear cumbersome, bureaucratic and unfocused (RS02) – providing 
a highly selective and scored decision making process to determine case for investigation.  
From the agency perspective, the police can appear cavalier in their operational activities 
and dismissive towards offences that they consider ‘minor’ (and this can include benefit 
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and identity fraud).  To supplement the subjects’ comments, my recent experience in a 
joint working operation demonstrated that the feature of mutual trust was not particularly 
evident and there was a limited consistency of language and investigative processes 
employed by the different members.  A further difficulty, identified by Gilling (2006: 736), 
was that working durability of partnerships demands continuity in representation.  From 
this research testimony and experience, such continuity of membership is an extreme 
rarity, unlike CDRP groups, reactive ‘working partnerships’ are often generated for 
individual operations, constantly providing a ‘churn’ of staff and agency representatives.  
On the one occasion that I witnessed a high degree of continuity over a number of years 
(Operation Wisdom: IPS, ‘Day of the Jackal’ series identity fraud) the partnership proved 
quite effective as individual trust, and understanding of differing investigative processes 
was provided time for nurturing and then cohesively developed.  This was supported by the 
Major Investigation Team Manager (IPS) who referring to Operation Wisdom, stated “we 
worked well together with the police and SOCA as we all gain”.  Potentially indicating that 
a number of the ‘challenges’ facing joint working and productive partnership can be 
overcome, provided ‘joint benefit’ through shared objectives can be established and the 
partnership team has sufficient time to develop critical cohesive features (Tuckman,1965; 
Tucker, 1973; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977). 
 
These features are not new to the Home Office, and a number of them were identified by 
the Morgan Committee (Home Office, 1991) which was described by Gilling (1997) in 
identifying reasons for the failure of local community safety partnerships.  Local 
Authorities have recognised and published the ‘challenges’ to partnership that need to be 
addressed if they are to be productive and, significantly, these include competing demands 
between members; and cultural differences (Communities Scotland, 2011).  However, their 
summary is drawn from a definitive central government source, the Improvement Network 
(2010) that has delivered a summary of ‘partnership killers’.  These are familiar features, 
both from the testimony of subjects in this research and from my own involvement over 
the last decade attempting operational joint working, the most familiar being ‘mission 
creep’, ‘pulling rank’ or more simply ‘inequality’.  As Gilling (2006: 735) identifies, it is 
of “crucial importance, first of all, that intended partnerships have a clear sense of 
common purpose, built around a recognition of interdependence”.  Equally important is 
that all members can benefit and meet their own objectives, as inequality can generate 
tensions when partners perceive that they are the ‘junior members’ or ‘also-rans’.   
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McPherson and Kirby (2004: 23) who, although acknowledging the potential diversity of 
partners, suggested: “the NIM was devised with law enforcement agencies in mind, all 
those engaged in community safety will require coordinated systems and processes”.  This 
appears to be uncontroversial in that ‘law enforcement agencies’ could be interpreted as 
those organisations with a core business of law enforcement, e.g. police, and includes local 
authorities with a statutory responsibility for community safety.  However, they continued: 
“The NIM offers a platform that enables partnership members to share information, 
identify problems, process information into intelligence and subject it to analysis” 
(McPherson & Kirby, 2004: 24).  This statement appears to broaden the potential users to 
any ‘partnership members’ and provides a focus on information sharing, problem 
identification and information processing’, potentially including other public services with 
an investigative capacity.  However, this study conflicts with that assertion and from 
research testimony and review, I would argue that the ‘adoption of the NIM’, in its current 
form, does not offer such an ‘enabling platform’ for joint working. 
 
Business model 
The results from this research into whether the NIM is a business model or intelligence 
process was not significant or conclusive, with only a minority of subjects (28%) tendering 
a view.  Critically, this line of enquiry proved irrelevant in the light of the general 
commentary drawn from interview and consultation that revealed a broad 
misunderstanding of the core doctrines and the model’s processes.  There was general 
agreement that the NIM provided an intelligence-led investigation process, although the 
level of awareness and understanding regarding decision making element with regards to 
resource management in tasking and co-ordination, was very low. 
 
Investigative efficiency and effectiveness 
In contrast, the thematic enquiry regarding the perceived impact of the NIM on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of investigations drew substantial response.  The significant 
majority of subjects reported that public service investigations had not improved with the 
adoption of the NIM; with the investigators from the DWP and IPS stating that 
investigations were now less effective due to imposed performance processes and the 
intervention, at referral level, of the Intelligence Units. This sentiment was not echoed by 
subjects from the DSA, although there was no intelligence unit within this agency until 
2009.  The majority of respondents (75%) were unable to determine any benefit to 
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investigations and considered the NIM unhelpful and a disruptive imposition on their 
work.  A number of reasons have been proposed for the apparent failure of the NIM to 
provide efficiencies in investigation, predictably some relating to its complexity. 
 
The sole claim (RS21) that the NIM delivered organisational consistency was countered by 
this study and, with minor exceptions as in the common use of the 5x5x5 (see Appendix 5) 
intelligence sharing system and a level of compliance with the Intelligence Cycle (see 
Figure 1.2), there appears very limited consistency.  There was no resistance tendered in 
interview to the concept of intelligence-led investigation or decision making, to account for 
the evident operational inconsistencies and the subsequent frustration to productive joint 
working.  Responses confirmed that there remains substantial confusion over the model’s 
process and, I would argue, that this misunderstanding, exacerbated by the language and 
terminology in guidance and the minimum standards, contributed to a cynical and 
pessimistic view of the NIM.   
 
Perhaps equally interesting, was an underlying scepticism, manifested by investigative 
staff, over whether the model could deliver any benefit to their agency; including the 
expressed view that this was a ‘police model’ and that the public services were not 
members (or even associates) of that ‘exclusive club’ (RS46).  These reservations were not 
qualified by a perceived need to conform to the model or the minimum standards.  Some of 
these reservations and failings may be difficult to externally address, particularly those 
relating to cultural resistance.  However, issues of perceived complexity, misunderstanding 
and accessibility relating to the NIM remain important issues, and potential hurdles, for the 
investigative and intelligence communities within the public service.  In Chapter 6, I will 
endeavour to address these potential shortcomings in the model by proposing generic and 
complementary process and guidance, preserving the core doctrines of the NIM, whilst 
endeavouring to provide a degree of clarity and simplicity. 
 
Revised NIM minimum standards 
Acknowledging research findings from earlier study (Osborn, 2008) and the review of 
literature (e.g. Newburn, et al, 2007: 210) indicating the difficulty that public service staff 
may experience in comprehending the NIM Code of Practice and minimum standards, a 
revised edition was generated (see Appendix 2).  The revised minimum standards 
attempted to edit, sanitise and simplify the original, and provide a simpler explanation and 
description of the model.  This was circulated to the majority (85%) of the research 
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population inviting their view to evaluate whether a simplified version of the current 
standards would improve their comprehension.  The document attracted positive comment 
from the majority of reviewers (66%) suggesting that it was appreciably more concise and 
delivered greater clarity.  However, it did not appear to deliver a substantial improvement 
or remedy to the original, still being perceived as too complex (RS21) and not addressing 
the perception that the NIM ‘did not fit’ the public services. 
 
In response to these comments; the research findings; and impromptu suggestions, I 
determined that further revision and editorial of the NIM minimum standards would be 
unlikely to succeed in delivering the necessary simplicity and clarity required by public 
service investigators.  This study has therefore prompted an alternative intelligence-led 
process for consideration and it is proposed that the provision of a complementary system, 
with simplified guidance for non-police public services, may provide a remedy to some of 
the difficulties and resistance identified by the subjects.  For the purpose of this thesis, I 
have included a Public Service Intelligence Process (PSIP) at Appendix 6 for 
consideration.  It is proposed that the PSIP provides no ‘minimum standards’ as these 
cannot be mandatory, nor should they be ‘imposed’ on an agency that, due to resource, 
budget constraints or policy restrictions, would be incapable of adopting them.   
 
The PSIP endeavours to deliver, in simple language a description of the intelligence-led 
decision-making and investigation process, authority levels, activity and purpose.  
Furthermore, it is intended that the PSIP could accommodate the discrete criminal 
investigation processes employed by different public service agencies and acknowledge 
extant policy and procedure.  The core tenets and some of the key language and 
terminology have been preserved including: the Intelligence Cycle; intelligence evaluation 
(5x5x5); tasking and co-ordinating; and, critically, intelligence-led investigation as these 
terms will be familiar to all trained investigators.  The retention of these terms should 
maintain sufficient parity between the two models to facilitate effective communication 
when engaged in productive joint working. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and ‘The Way Forward’ 
 
Introduction 
This research was not a critique of intelligence-led policing, nor of the National 
Intelligence Model, as used by the police and associated law enforcement agencies, e.g. 
SOCA.  The NIM now appears firmly embedded within the police service with mandatory 
observance of the minimum standards through legislation (Police Act 2002) and subject to 
an inspection regime.  I would argue that, in the short term, the model and its associated 
guidance, adopted as national policy for police, will be resistant to substantial change or 
revision.  This research has sought to test the adherence and conformity with the NIM by 
intelligence and investigative staff within a selection of non-police public services and 
whether, in its current ‘versions’ within those organisations, it delivers benefit.  It is stated 
in the model’s supporting documentation that “NIM derives much of its strength from 
standardisation and corporate approach, being particularly prescriptive when developing 
intelligence products” (ACPO, 2005: 60).  The research findings have identified 
organisational and operational nonconformity with the model and the ‘Guidance’ (ACPO, 
2005), potentially as a result of naivety and limited comprehension regarding the 
requirements.  This has contributed to incongruent inter-agency processes and non-
standard procedures, potentially conflicting with the ethos of the NIM and its minimum 
standards.  In addition to the perceived complexity of the application criteria (Flood, 2004: 
51; ACPO, ibid: 101), two significant causal reasons contributing to nonconformity were 
identified: insufficient investment in the required assets, in some cases resulting in 
inadequate resources; and cultural resistance manifested by the operational investigators.   
 
The current levels of adherence to the NIM within the DWP, IPS and, to a lesser extent the 
DSA, do not appear to be providing benefit to investigation or fraud reduction.  I would 
argue that, critically, where the model is not understood by the managers or operational 
staff within any adopting organisation, adherence will be frustrated and any ‘test’ of the 
orthodox model’s efficiency and effectiveness would be redundant.  Alternatively, if the 
NIM is adopted and the minimum standards, although understood, are only selectively 
applied, consistency and standardisation will be frustrated and the model is unlikely to 
provide the full dividends through intelligence-led investigation; improved decision 
making relating to tasking; and productive partnership.  I would further argue that some of 
the perpetuated difficulties in public service application and employment of the NIM 
120 
cannot be remedied.  In particular, the historical features related to the introduction of the 
model to agencies, apparently without operational consultation and in the absence of any 
definable change programme, communication plan or adequate training.  Perhaps as a 
consequence of this, cultural barriers to the change remain, and are fortified by the 
expressed belief of the operational investigators that the NIM is a thinly disguised 
performance mechanism.   
 
The reputation of the model has suffered, particularly within the DWP, by an inaccurate 
association with revised organisational processes of referral management and scoring 
mechanisms.  This appears to reinforce a pernicious perception by operational staff that the 
model reduces the investigators powers and discretion and is primarily intended to provide 
governance, rather than benefit through intelligence-led investigation.  Perversely, there is 
also a dominant view that the NIM is exclusively suited for the police and is not 
appropriate for alternative public service application; although there was no suggestion that 
the police investigator has been ‘disempowered’ through the model’s adoption.  However, 
a key factor of ‘resistance’ and non-compliance by operational personnel appears to go 
beyond this conviction of the model’s (police) partiality and features more on its 
complexity, due to the language used and its presentation. 
 
In these respects, to operational investigators within the public service, the NIM is viewed 
as a hindrance and failure; although I would argue that any process or model can be 
perceived to fail if it is misunderstood or considered irrelevant.  These factors present 
significant challenges to agencies seeking to improve the efficiency and performance of 
investigative teams, as the lack of conformity - enabling common and consistent processes 
- does subdue the potential value of the model.  This chapter will review and provide a 
summary of the key findings relating to nonconformity within the public service, and 
explore potential remedies to improve intelligence-led investigation, decision making and 
productive partnership.  It is presented in three parts: the first, reviews the suitability of the 
NIM to public services; the second, discusses the issue of conformity and compliance with 
the model; and finally, it reviews alternative intelligence-led processes accessible by non-





The issue of conformity 
It is apparent that some of the difficulties with conformity, and operational resistance, to 
the NIM identified in this research, could have been avoided, or reduced, on 
implementation.  However, the senior managers responsible for the adoption of the NIM 
apparently failed to recognise a number of key factors, including the investment 
requirements and the necessity to revise investigative processes and procedures to accord 
with the compliance criteria.  Before adoption (pre-2005), the public services operated on 
traditional models of investigation; both the progression of an enquiry and intelligence 
gathering function being undertaken by an individual fraud investigator.  The public 
services had not experienced the evolutionary intelligence-led experiences, initiatives, 
activities and processes associated with the intelligence-led policing over the last three 
decades.  Their investigative departments are comparatively small, localised and with very 
limited access to the growing technological infrastructure enjoyed by the police and its 
associated agencies, e.g. formerly NCIS, NCS and now SOCA.  In addition, there was a 
reasonably strong elitist culture within the public service investigative community similar 
to the police in its conservatism and cynicism (Christopher, 2004: 180), based upon 
specialised knowledge; discretionary powers; and the exclusive experience and exposure to 
the criminal justice system.  It was predictable that this culture would be resistant to 
change (Fisher, 2003 and Kotter, 2010); and it appears that public service investigators 
share with ‘rank and file police officers’ “…the capacity to undermine innovative strategic 
change by continuing to work, almost impervious at the workface, in a traditional, 
culturally defined ‘comfort zone’” (Holdaway, 1983 and 1998; Chan 1997 and Manning, 
1997).  The introduction of the NIM therefore faced a number of challenges: cultural; no 
legacy of widespread intelligence use; an ill-defined intelligence function; lack of 
awareness and expertise in the model’s functions; and a limited intelligence development 
capacity (Carter & Carter, 2005, cited in Ratcliffe, 2011).  Added to which, adoption 
appears to have been piecemeal, without attempting to market the potential benefits of the 
NIM; investing in the necessary assets; and, more critically, without attempting to seduce, 
induce or incentivise the investigative community to accept and engage in the change. 
 
To comply or conform to the NIM ‘Guidance’, the appropriate level of resources and the 
acquisition of ‘assets’ provide an essential foundation and these include: knowledge assets; 
system assets; source assets and; people assets (ACPO/Centrex, 2005).  In summary, these 
assets are knowledge asset: ‘knowing’ the business of criminal investigation; 
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understanding the law; associated policies; and statutory guidance, e.g. RIPA and PACE.  
System assets include acquiring the appropriate systems and structures, including secure 
environments and practices; source assets ensure that information and intelligence is 
effectively gathered and managed from as many sources as possible.  The people assets 
require the establishment of a professional personnel structure with trained and suitably 
skilled staff to carry out the required functions within the model (ACPO; Centrex, 2005; 
HMIC, 1998; HMIC 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; Maguire, 2000).  For policing agencies – with 
the core business of crime reduction - these ‘asset requirements’ are available, and even 
before the introduction of NIM, many services and forces had a number of them in place.  
However, this was not the case for public services with alternative core business, where the 
fraud investigation and security departments are viewed, proportionately, as a relatively 
minor resource to the overall agency.  In addition to the ‘assets’ providing a supporting 
framework, the NIM minimum standards provide a comprehensive, and relatively 
inflexible, inventory of process and procedural requirements (see Annex 1), that deliver the 
detail for compliance.  The aspiration of the NIM is to ensure common systems of 
intelligence-led investigation and decision making across law enforcement communities, as 
the Guidance states, the model is not: “confined to, or restricted for specialist usage. It is 
relevant to all areas of law enforcement; crime and its investigation …” (Home Office, 
2002; para. 3.1.3).  However, this aspiration appears to rely on standardisation through 
consistency of process and procedure and this demands conformity with the model, the 
Code of Practice and the minimum standards.  
 
It is possible that the introduction of the NIM into non-police agencies was politically 
inspired, although this is based upon the uncorroborated and partial testimony of 
investigative staff; the appeal to ‘adopt’ the NIM’ for senior managers could have been to 
overtly demonstrate agency concern regarding fraud and a willingness to undertake further 
investigative activity.  Equally, the adoption could have been motivated by a genuine and 
sincere attempt to improve investigative efficiency and reduce the level of fraud.  In either 
case, adoption of the model also demanded serious investment to safeguard consistency, 
compatibility (NCPE, 2005: 7) and to ensure conformity, if it was to secure the potential 
benefits through intelligence-led investigation and tasking.  Regardless of the motive, 
senior managers within the public services under review, determined to adopt the NIM 
and, in the DWP, even generated its own minimum standards (DWP, 2005).  This agency 
and other public services continue to assert, unequivocally, that their investigative teams 
123 
employ it.  This is not supported by the testimony of operational investigators, revealed in 
this study, who persist in manifesting a disruptive form of cultural resistance.  Intelligence 
does not appear to be routinely employed to support referral selection, investigation, or 
decision making.  As an example, there appears to be continuing poor relations between 
the intelligence unit’s staff and the investigators, with a significant proportion of the latter 
perceiving the NIM as an encumbrance and a mechanism to reduce their discretionary 
powers, e.g. referral selection, and as a thinly veiled performance and governance tool.   
 
I would argue that a contribution to nonconformity is the absence of any similar 
mechanism to the HMIC for public services, providing an inspection regime for agency 
investigation processes, although the Audit Commission could provide a substitute.  As 
such, adoption remains voluntary (the Police Reform Act, 2002 exclusively relating to the 
police) and compliance is broadly unregulated (and the individual vagaries of agency 
senior managers are unpublished).  It is controversial whether, without substantial 
investment and procedural revisions, the public services investigative capability could fully 
comply with the NIM minimum standards and, in the present financial climate, such 
investment appears unlikely.  To cite one example in the DWP, since the introduction of 
the NIM in 2005, investigative resources have been significantly reduced by nearly 50%.  
Structurally, public services continue to operate very differently to the police and, as 
described, their role does not directly contribute to core business.  Unlike the police, the 
top-tier of agency management and policy makers will generally be unfamiliar with 
investigation, intelligence gathering and the model.  This limits their credibility to 
demonstrate ‘informed’ operational (tactical) leadership, to provide investment and 
committed management, all of which are essential for compliance (John and Maguire, 
2004: 6).  Lack of comprehension is not the exclusive domain of public service senior 
managers as operational managers and staff appear to have genuine difficulties in 
understanding the NIM support literature, including the standards necessary for conformity 
and, even when translated, explained and placed more into the public service perspective, 
they may still confound genuine efforts at compliance.   
 
The misunderstanding of the model has predictably resulted in a number of ‘variations’ 
and may contribute towards serial non-compliance and lack of standardisation within 
public services.  This is manifested through a high level of inconsistency in investigative 
process; consequent failure to commit to productive partnership and joint working; and 
result in the failure to secure the potential efficiencies from intelligence-led investigations 
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and decision making.  However, these comments should not be construed as any 
interpretive shortcomings or inadequacies on the part of managers or investigators within 
the public services, rather an indictment on the style, terminology and sheer volume of 
‘descriptive’ literature and ‘guidance’ associated with the NIM.  The police-partiality of 
these documents has been covered in earlier chapters, and the research findings suggest 
that interpreting and adopting the guidance and instructions remain a significant challenge 
to public service personnel.   
 
I began this chapter by noting that the fact that any meaningful revision of the NIM, 
requires both emendation of the existing legislation and an overhaul of the current 
inspection regime.  That would appear to be a remote possibility and would potentially be 
divisive for the police.  I argue, that the difficulty with public service conformity or 
compliance is predominantly the terminology employed by the NIM ‘Guidance’, including 
the adoption of phrases such as ‘community safety’, ‘managed hotspots’ and ‘potentially 
dangerous offenders’ (John & Maguire, 2007: 211); and the perceived complexity of the 
model (Newburn, et al, 2007: 210).  My attempts within this study to deliver a more 
concise and simplified set of standards in the Revised National Intelligence Model: 
Minimum Standards (see Appendix 3), although attracting some approval, failed to provide 
substantially greater comprehension.  Arguably, that failure could be attributed to its 
retention of the spirit of the NIM and its continued association with the police and the 
exclusivity of the model’s application as: “a business model for law enforcement” (ACPO, 
2005: 8).   
 
This study has shown that the NIM is unpopular with operational investigators who view it 
as unhelpful, inappropriate and associated with performance management and governance.  
Compliance with the model is demanding of investment and operational resources, 
potentially unaccommodating of extant public service practices and the dominance of their 
single investigative pre-occupation - the reduction of fraud.  Provided the NIM continues 
to be perceived as providing a business process for policing, it will be viewed as an overly-
complex and unsuitable model for a minority investigative community operating within the 
confines of a larger service-driven bureaucracy.  I propose that an alternative simplified 
and more compatible process should be identified as a matter of urgency.  The relevant 
public sector agencies need intelligence systems and processes that maintain the central 
tenets of NIM but which are more closely tailored to the needs and expectations of those 
agencies. 
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Suitability of the NIM to public services 
The NIM, its Code of Practice and the minimum standards were designed for the police 
and similar law enforcement agencies, which have community safety as their core 
business.  As previously mentioned in Chapter 5 “the NIM was devised with law 
enforcement agencies in mind, all those engaged in community safety will require 
coordinated systems and processes” (McPherson and Kirby (2004: 23).  The fundamental 
difference between the police and the public services is significantly more than just the 
variety of crimes that they engage with.  The purpose of the police (to quote just one 
‘Statement of Common Purpose’) is to uphold the law; to prevent crime; to pursue and 
bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queens Peace and to help and 
reassure people (Metropolitan Police Service, 2011).  Predominantly, the concern of public 
agencies is ‘service delivery’, and ‘duty of care’ for the public purse (Audit Commission, 
2010: 29; Smith, 2010).  
 
Potential beneficial outcomes for the NIM 
The anticipated public policy outcomes from the NIM were neatly summarise by Harfield 
& Harfield (2008: 105) “…a desired outcome – enhanced community safety and reduction 
in crime and disorder through the effective use of intelligence within police forces and 
partner agencies.”  From the exclusive police perspective, Flood and Gaspar (2009: 54) 
argued that the NIM was “… an ideal model for the whole business of policing” adding 
that it would enable the police to “…understand and anticipate risks and threats across the 
public safety domain”.  Critically, the NIM introduces a strategic element to both decision 
making and investigation, attempting to counter earlier political and media concerns and 
accusations of dominantly reactive features of traditional policing.  Ratcliffe (2008: 1) 
supports this by suggesting that a primary role of intelligence-led activity and therefore the 
core purpose of the NIM is to anticipate future risks to public safety and influence decision 
makers. 
 
Essentially, the NIM describes a process, its affinity to intelligence-led policing is 
evidenced through its origins with earlier initiatives including Compstat, community 
policing and problem oriented policing, culminating in the SID Project and the Kent Police 
Model.  As a potential business model, and perhaps more realistically a managerial 
philosophy, data analysis and its intelligence products are “pivotal to an objective, decision 
making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention 
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through the strategic management and effective enforcement strategies …” (Ratcliffe, 
2008: 89).  This is endorsed by Sherman et al (1998), with a recognition of the demand for 
collaborative strategic management to impact upon crime and disorder, potentially 
providing further stimulus for its inclusion within the NIM. 
 
Although process driven, implicit to the Home Office policy expectations for the NIM was 
that, through unified processes and conformity with the NIM minimum standards, it would 
deliver access and the employment of a broader range of data sources (see page 28).  Thus 
enabling agencies to mine and harvest a variety of repositories and enabling the review of 
trends, problem areas and through collation and analysis, to effectively identify causation 
factors and profiles prior to committing resources (Clarke, 2004; Eck, 2006).  This 
proactivity should contribute to ‘long term gains’, and Ratcliffe (2008) argues that the NIM 
will support long term strategic management.  He summarises the potential gains as: crime 
reduction; top-down management; the generation of (quality) crime intelligence; resource 
management; and providing focus on prolific offenders and serious offences.  This is 
broadly supported by Peterson (2005), but qualified arguing that the NIM (and 
intelligence-led investigation) can only become a reality if intelligence analysis is 
incorporated into the essential tactical and strategic planning undertaken by all 
collaborative agencies – thereby demanding a common protocol, standard and system. 
 
The potential benefits of the NIM is to facilitate ‘joined up thinking’ and complementary 
strategic planning (regarding crime reduction and community safety) across the range of 
public services with a criminal investigation capacity.  Phillips (2008: 29) identifies the 
strategy related to the NIM as “…making the best use of resources, time and space 
…recognising the contingencies on the ‘wider canvas’ and identifying a winning formula 
in the prevailing context.” He continues by providing a cautionary observation and 
warning “…strategic aims are all too easily set aside for short term advantages.” and that 
has become a more symptomatic and frequent feature of a performance culture and new 
public management. 
 
The Home Secretary’s desired outcome from a uniform intelligence-led model, arguably 
sought to encourage and facilitate intelligence sharing and unimpaired collaboration, 
providing a unified effort to reduce crime.  Harfield & Harfield (2008: 96) comment that 
“Although NIM is usually presented as the starting point for intelligence, it should perhaps 
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be regarded as the end point of a process leading to informed decision making …”.  
Simply, this process model supports the conversion of data and information into 
intelligence.  It is also intended to encourage and facilitate intelligence application and 
decision making to inform interventions between organisations on a collaborative basis.  In 
theory, the NIM seeks to impose a policy based framework on varied circumstances and 
organisations, the outcome of which is “…increased agency capability and capacity for 
direct application in accordance with community need and in response to the criminal 
environment” (ibid: 113).  The NIM continues to offer some opportunity for a common 
and shared comprehensive strategy based upon as full an understanding as possible of the 
crime and disorder environment.  However, this commonality depends upon consensus and 
concurrence and these supposed strengths of collaborative working, co-operation and team 
work “…are in fact the inherent weaknesses of the NIM implementation” (ibid: 98). 
 
Fraud 
The investigative activity of the agencies under review is dominated by a single crime that 
of fraud and, as an example within the DWP, the Fraud Investigation Service represents a 
very small proportion (1.5%) of the 117,000 staff employed (DWP, 2008: 4); and within 
the IPS only 2% of the 4000 staff.  Their activities, although important to the 
organisation’s ‘duty of care’ obligations regarding public money, make a very limited 
contribution to the agency’s primary purpose regarding benefit administration and issuing 
passports.   
 
However, fraud remains a problem disproportionately attracting public and ministerial 
attention to the work of public services, which in turn demands attention, and some 
response, from their senior management.  In my professional association with agencies, it 
is apparent that there is a heightened sensitivity towards the actual cost of fraud and in 
some fatalistic senior managers the level is viewed as inevitable.  Perhaps they are being 
realistic as the fraud level continues to rise with Pricewaterhouse Cooper (PwC) reporting 
that now 60% of public services experienced some levels of fraud in 2010; an increase of 
over 15% from the previous year (PwC, 2011).  According to HM Treasury figures, the 
annual cost of welfare fraud and error is £5.2 billion (DWP, 2010b; 3).  Again, to use the 
DWP as an example, 9,000 cases of benefit fraud are prosecuted annually, making DWP’s 
legal services the largest public service prosecuting authority (DWP, 2010b: 22) and 
benefit fraud investigations account for 95% of an investigators caseload (Collins, 2006).  
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From my consultancy with the IPS Major Investigation Team in 2008 this level of fraud 
referrals was proportionately mirrored in the operational investigators’ caseloads.  I would 
argue that the NIM, as a business model or process for public service investigative teams, 
has a highly focused and exclusive appeal – that of crime reduction, which is not the case 
for their partners within the police, harnessed with broader social demands (Reiner, 2011). 
 
From the police perspective the NIM, as an evolved model of ILP, can potentially provide 
benefit for the whole organisation as a business model: delivering “the core business model 
for policing…” (ACPO, 2005: 9); and the “management of volume crime” (Flood, 2004: 
46).  Although supportive of intelligence-led investigation, this is not the case for public 
services, with a significantly narrower organisational application for the model exclusively 
within the fraud investigation department, and dealing with a single ‘high volume crime’. 
In addition, from the perspective of a senior manager within an agency, the NIM may be 
viewed as politically attractive but, in terms of impact on staff numbers and limited 
contribution to the service delivery, only as a subsidiary ‘integrity benefit’ to core service 
delivery, e.g. issuing passports.  For the NIM to improve the fraud investigators 
performance, the intelligence process must be embedded in the procedures and policies 
related to investigation.  As an exclusive measure of success, or ‘value added’ for the NIM 
- fraud reduction - in isolation, would perhaps be an unfair appraisal as it discounts the 
model’s potential capacity to facilitate and encourage productive partnership and 
collaborative working through standardisation.  However, the broader introduction of 
performance management regimes (targets and counting) in recent years do not appear to 
have increased partnership within public services, possibly because individual core 
businesses, risks and performance targets are dissimilar.   
 
Maguire & John (2006: 67) argued that the NIM, operating as an ideal, offered a 
‘framework of business processes’ to manage policing priorities and ‘incorporate the 
perspective of partner agencies’.  However, there remains some disagreement as to 
whether performance management, actually encourages partnership or collaborative 
working.  McLaughlin, Muncie and Hughes (2001: 37) are supportive, suggesting that 
performance management will encourage joint working - provided there is an opportunity 
for mutual gain.  However, Jackson (2005: 33) and Wilson, Ashton and Sharp (2001: 85) 
argued that it encourages insularity and parochialism as the individual agencies compete to 
attain their own objectives.  Gerwitz (2002) goes further with a critique of performance 
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management and New Public Management, stating that the dominant drive to meet 
imposed objectives as the exclusive measure of achievement, potentially reduces 
innovation, creativity effectively ‘devaluing professional skills’.  The Police Federations 
line is predictable and, probably, accurate, critically arguing that “‘intelligence-flow’ 
cannot be subject to a performance culture” (Orr Munro, 2006: 22).   
 
Conformity with the NIM ‘Guidance’ and standardisation may facilitate and increase the 
benefits of partnership, e.g. Operations ‘Bumblebee’ and ‘Gemini’ illustrating that it can 
have a positive impact on targeted volume crime (in this case, Burglary).  However, both 
of these operations carried substantial on-costs and opportunity costs (distracting and 
diverting police resources from other demands).  They also heralded the widespread 
introduction (and institutional acceptance) of ‘crime desk reporting’ - non-attendance by 
police officer and effectively, ‘no active investigation’ (Stockdale and Gresham, 1995; 
Wright 2002).  Nevertheless, I would argue that productive partnership should be pursued 
as it could deliver benefits to public services and support the ‘intelligence sharing’ agenda 
across government in a united effort to reduce serious criminality – including, at least from 
the public service perspective – organised fraud. 
 
With specific regard to tasking and co-ordination, for non-police public services, the terms 
employed together with the processes and procedures outlined in the NIM literature may, 
appear to have limited relevance to the broader organisation outside of their investigation 
teams.  In addition, whereas improved intelligence-led decision making and problem 
solving impact upon the core business of police, for public services, criminal investigation 
or community safety is not the ‘core business’.  Supporting compliance with the NIM 
presents difficulties due to the proportionately smaller investigative structure and 
establishments and with regards to operational intelligence-led tasking and co-ordination; 
they are generally not as hierarchical, nor disciplined as their ‘law enforcement 
counterparts’.  The effectiveness of tasking and co-ordination within the NIM depends 
upon the quality of information feeding decision making (Herdale and Stelfox, 2008) and 
the manager’s ability to directly influence resources and investigative activity.  A restricted 
view of the intelligence requirement (for example, exclusively based on performance 
targets) or a limited understanding of their purpose by the Strategic Tasking and Co-
ordination Group will result in inadequate direction and control of the both tactical group, 
and the intelligence and investigative activity.  Conformity with the NIM should enable an 
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agency to assess real or potential problems and identify an effective tactical and 
operational response.  However, the absence of clear directions may result in the collation 
of either too much information or too little – the former resulting in an agency being 
‘wealthy with data, but impoverished for intelligence’; the latter with the inability to 
employ meaningful intelligence-led investigation.   
 
The perceived limited value to the whole organisation of the NIM, focusing exclusively on 
the investigation team, may explain the difficulties that public services have experienced in 
introducing the model and embedding a compliant and productive investigative process 
(Osborne & Brown, 2005: 217).  There was evidently very limited consultation prior to 
adoption, which appeared to have excluded the operational investigators.  The introduction 
was not accompanied by any discernible change programme and, for the DWP and IPS, the 
process and structural changes did not ensure compliance, and were perceived as 
‘performance mechanisms’.  The research has not identified any positive impact exerted by 
the NIM on the level of fraud investigated by the public services; although it acknowledges 
that an exclusive reliance on testimony from a partial source is unreliable.  However, 
attempting to use a simple actuarial comparison on published fraud figures is notoriously 
unreliable (Tunley, 2011).  Exclusively from the operational investigators perspective, no 
benefit has been derived from the NIM-inspired creation of Operational Intelligence Units 
(OIU), the majority of intelligence unit staff (excluding the analysts) being viewed as 
‘amateurs’ and the OIU processes perceived as intrusive, ineffective and retardant to 
effective investigation.  It appears probable that a significant proportion of this expressed 
irritation and vexation may be due to a sense of disempowerment by the investigative 
community and there remains a suspicion that they have been ‘regulated’ and subjected to 
a ‘performance regime’. 
 
This study has identified systemic failure to achieve key attributes of the model’s 
minimum standards, including tasking, co-ordination and briefing capability; the absence 
of standardised and integrated intelligence system; and failure to generate and exploit 
intelligence products (NCPE, 2005: 6-10).  These deficiencies account for a significant 
degree of non-compliance and result in limited parity of process with potential partners, 
including the police.  Therefore, with limited conformity the benefits of the model are 
difficult to test, and without standardised investigative process, the NIM is unlikely to 
deliver performance improvement, nor act as a facilitator for productive partnership.  It 
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raises an issue whether ‘partial compliance or conformity’; ‘observance in principle’; or 
‘selective employment’ of the model can deliver any dividends in investigative efficiency 
and fraud reduction.  Arguably it may, the public service investigators now appear 
marginally more ‘intelligence-led’, and the Intelligence Units, although unpopular, provide 
governance and routinely provide supplementary information and intelligence that, in the 
IPS and DWP, accompany pre-selected referrals to be investigated.  The widespread use of 
the ‘5x5x5’ intelligence sharing system (see Appendix 4) and general compliance with the 
Intelligence Cycle (see Figure 1.1) is a significant improvement on traditional methods.  
The employment of trained analysts in both the IPS and DWP has increased the quality of 
intelligence refinement and product and their services continue to be exploited by both 
managers and investigators.  However, it should be qualified that these improvements 
remain marginal and the full potential and advantages of consistency of process and 
productive partnership are not being progressed by partial and selective conformity to the 
NIM Guidance. 
 
Alternative intelligence-led investigation processes 
It is proposed that any complementary alternative to the NIM must employ and act in 
accord with the latest version of the Intelligence Cycle (see Figure 1.1) the components of 
the cycle being direction, collection, collation, evaluation, analysis and dissemination 
(ACPO, 2008: 11) as it provides established, although controversial; good practice.  The 
cycle is broadly compatible with established public service practice regarding probity and 
integrity - accounting for organisational sensitivities surrounding the collection and 
‘mining’ of personal data.  It therefore regulates and provides a cyclical process to a 
critical element of intelligence-led investigation and, from the research findings, would be 
familiar to public service investigators and intelligence officers. Any alternative process 
should also continue to use the intelligence sharing system of ‘5x5x5’ (see Appendix 4), 
again familiar to, and systematically employed across, the investigative network.  A 
simplified investigation process for public services should acknowledge a highly focused 
investigative methodology, essentially focused on fraud reduction, whilst endeavouring to 
augment that same process with an intelligence-led foundation.  The ‘asset requirements’ 
for an alternative intelligence process should accord with public service ‘assets’ already in 
place.  For a lawful and referral-driven intelligence-led investigation team, they should 
include: trained investigators, intelligence officers and a crime analysts (people); secure 
intelligence and storage (system); knowing the business, the law and regulation relating to 
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investigation (knowledge); and having an operational intelligence unit (source).  Finally, to 
preserve complementary parlance when engaged in productive joint working, ‘intelligence-
led decision making’ should preserve the ‘tasking and co-ordinating’ process – although in 
a substantially simplified format and a process that acknowledges the factional position of 
public service investigation teams. 
 
Fundamentally, the public services would benefit from improved decision making through 
the collection, analysis and application of intelligence and, within this basic premise, it 
demands a simplified intelligence process accessible to the public services.  However, a 
degree of flexibility would be necessary as any alternative process would need to 
accommodate the reality that established public service Operational Intelligence Units 
(OIU) work quite differently from the police, neighbouring (and sometimes even 
associated) agencies.  The public service OIUs are subject to different policy and 
procedure that provide mandatory organisational restrictions and regulations upon their 
activities and capacities.  In addition, agency investigative communities have limited 
operational resources, and although the investigators are generally trained and accredited, 
almost without exception, they generally carry a very high reactive workload (occasionally 
over 50 live cases) – providing limited capacity for proactive work.  As previously 
mentioned, most agencies have an extreme focus of criminal investigations in comparison 
to the police (predominantly identity or financial-based fraud) and, as such, the concept of 
‘selecting’ from a broad range of volume criminality, having no relevance, has been 
omitted.  I would argue that any public service intelligence process should condense and 
simplify the intelligence process, complementing the NIM as used by the police, whilst 
avoiding operational tension by agency staff through direct association with that model.  It 
needs to deliver a substantial degree of compatibility with the NIM if commonality, and an 
acceptable level of standardisation, is to be achieved between a public service investigator 
and a police or SOCA investigator using the NIM.  Any alternative intelligence-led 
investigation process would not be compulsory or mandatory, its attraction to non-police 
managers and operational personnel would have to rely on providing clear and impartial 
direction to facilitate intelligence-led investigation, decision making and productive 
partnership. 
 
A proposed process, incorporating the aforementioned considerations - the Public Service 
Intelligence Process (PSIP): see Appendix 6 - has been included as a discussion document.  
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It is deliberately simplistic, to accommodate the variations of process within each of the 
public services, although it acknowledges some commonality between agencies.  The PSIP 
and ‘guidance’ have only received limited circulation to 14 investigative staff within the 
DWP, IPS and DSA who had been previously interviewed and expressed a willingness to 
‘help further’.  It was circulated with a simple request for the subjects to undertake a 
preliminary review to determine its compatibility with their extant processes and whether 
they believed it was an improvement on the ‘revised NIM minimum standards’ they had 
previously read.  The PSIP has not been subject to any operational trial or pilot within the 
public services under review.  Without exception, all of the comments were positive, 
although two Investigation Managers stated they were uncertain whether their respective 
agencies would be willing to ‘change again’ and deviate from ‘cosmetically pursuing the 
NIM’ (RS18).  No revisions were tendered by the reviewers, other than a minor editorial 
error, which has now been amended, and the general response indicated that the language 
employed and the description of process were clear and unambiguous.  One IPS 
investigator stated: ‘it is about time we had a model that we could follow’ (RS42) and 
again, this was a common theme.  Without a formal operational trial, this proposed process 
remains untested and, potentially, just an academic response to this research, however it 
may provide stimulus for further study and the identification of a suitable alternative to the 
NIM for public services. 
 
Summary 
The findings from this research illustrate that the NIM is not a ‘comfortable fit’ for non-
police public services.  The provenance and foundation of the model – intelligence-led 
policing – has a relatively broad appeal to investigative communities, but the NIM exceeds 
this core philosophy and represents an effective business model for law enforcement 
agencies.  With a few notable exceptions, e.g. SOCA, public services do not have ‘law 
enforcement’ as their core business and this has generated conflict and a tension in a 
minority and factionalised intelligence community within non-police agencies.  The 
potential impact and value of the NIM is intended to contribute to the broad spectrum of 
police business relating to community safety; in contrast, the limited public service 
demand, in a minority department, is dominated by fraud investigation and reduction.  
 
The minimum standards of the model, which provide the criteria for (police) compliance 
and (public service) conformity, are substantial and appear relatively inflexible (ACPO, 
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2005: 101).  In addition, and as result of this research, I would argue that for public service 
managers and investigators, unfamiliar with police terms, the description of the NIM and 
the supplementary minimum standards are potentially complex and confusing.  The 
language adopted outlining the model’s requirements appear sophisticated and specialised, 
potentially defying common comprehension and thereby contributing to ‘adaptation’ and 
alternative ‘versions’ of processes, potentially unrelated to the NIM.  It is further argued 
that, should the description of any process lack clarity, particularly regarding the core 
components and compliance criteria, it cannot deliver consistency.  In this respect, the 
description of the NIM together with its perceived complexity, breeds different 
interpretations and promotes inconsistency.  The NIM may provide a cosmetic appearance 
of intelligence process uniformity, but this is an illusion, for in reality there it is not a 
national model, nor does it provide a common system of intelligence-led investigation or 
decision making within non-police public services.  Whilst this situation prevails, the 
model will not fully contribute to improved intelligence-led investigation, decision making, 
productive partnership; or joint working and the potential beneficial outcomes of the model 
will not be achieved.   
 
It is therefore proposed that the primary demand for standardisation (ACPO, 2005: 60) and 
consistency with the NIM (or any intelligence process), is absolute clarity of requirement 
and process.  Within the final part of this chapter I have included considerations for an 
alternative process to deliver a simplified intelligence-led process.  I would argue that any 
alternative process must potentially provide a degree of parity with the NIM, and facilitate 
standardisation of the core intelligence-led investigative processes.  Furthermore any 
‘alternative’ should take account of operational ‘user commentary’ and ‘cultural 
sensitivity’ – the investigative personnel within public service and the key stakeholders of 
organisational change. To promote further debate, I have included an example - the Public 
Service Intelligence Process - that offers an abridged and basic process that should be 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis provides a review of the NIM, when adopted within non-police public services 
and this final chapter will summarise the general findings and arguments.  This will 
include the identified difficulties that the public services continue to experience in 
conforming to the NIM minimum standards; the potential reasons for continued 
nonconformity; and recommendations to remedy this position. 
 
Origins, foundation and development of the NIM 
The provenance of the NIM is sound, primarily based upon a range of evolving 
intelligence-led initiatives, including the Intelligence Cycle (Figure 1.1), initially 
recommended in the Baumber Report (ACPO, 1975).  Following the introduction and 
apparent success of the Kent Police Model in 1993, its progeny, the NIM, was designed 
within NCIS, before being strongly sponsored by ACPO, as national policy, to the Home 
Office.  The Kent model was subject to substantial revision including the appendage of a 
strategic element.  It was re-engineered and re-branded to provide significantly broader 
focus and impact on police business.  The NIM was first published in 1999 (NCIS, 2000) 
and with continued support from ACPO, gradually adopted by police services.  With the 
advent of the Police Reform Act 2002 and inclusion in the National Policing Plan 2003-
2006, adoption of the model was made compulsory to all 43 police forces in England and 
Wales by April 2004.  The NIM was widely perceived as the effective synthesis and 
embodiment of intelligence-led investigation, fundamentally employing intelligence to 
influence strategic and tactical decision making and resource allocation.  As an 
intelligence-led business model or process, compliance with the NIM is intended to 
provide a range of benefits for the user including: community safety, reduced crime and 
the control of criminality and disorder (NCPE, 2010).  Critically, there was no proposal 
that employment of the NIM should be restricted to the police (Home Office, 2002) and in 
consequence a number of public services adopted it from 2004-5.  The model can appear 
complex (Flood, 2004: 51; ACPO, 2005: 11) and the compliance criteria contained within 
the associated Code of Practice and minimum standards are reasonably demanding on the 
adoptee, to achieve a standardised intelligence-led investigation and decision making 
process.  Police compliance is subject to an inspection regime from the HMIC, although no 
similar mechanism is in place for non-police users. 
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Research method and further research 
Chapter 3 outlined the research methodology that exploited professional exposure, 
investigative experience and interviews with public service staff.  The initial 
disappointment regarding the poor return on the survey provided compensation through an 
increased understanding of the subject group’s awareness of the NIM and an expansion of 
the interview sample.  The choice of public services provided a good ‘spread’ engaging 
with a large organisation in the DWP, a moderate one in IPS and a more modest agency in 
the DSA.  Despite some minor inconsistency in the findings, with the DSA investigators 
tending to have a more positive outlook, the results proved highly informative and 
significant.  The sample was sufficient to provide theoretical saturation and to deliver 
evidence in identifying the key difficulties experienced by public service investigators in 
achieving conformity with the NIM and the minimum standards.   
 
Background and related work 
Chapter 4 reviewed the creation of the NIM as national policy and the potential influences 
exerted through policy transfer (Hill, 2009) on the model’s architects Messrs Flood and 
Gaspar within NCIS, and on the Home Office designers during its final development.  The 
evidence is reasonably compelling, but circumstantial, that attributes of the COMPSTAT 
initiative, Community Policing and New Public Management featuring in the model, were 
as a result of ‘lessons learned’ or policy transfer.  A comprehensive time line is included 
on pages 55-58 to illustrate potentially relevant initiatives, events or themes that may have 
influenced or impacted upon the fabricators of the NIM and its associated minimum 
standards.  A review was undertaken on the origin of intelligence, and of criminal 
intelligence, as core ingredients of the model and this illustrated that the paradigm of ILP is 
based upon a long and distinguished heritage.  A conclusive definitive description of 
criminal intelligence remains elusive, but a general view is that it is the product of 
processed, refined and analysed data and information.   
 
An examination of the impact and potential benefits of the NIM and intelligence-led 
investigation on crime reduction suggests that direct evidence is reasonably obscure 
(Reiner, 2000: 123 and Tilley, 2008: 147).  There is a paucity of evidence to support that 
the NIM has made a direct contribution to reducing crime, and this study has not identified 
any convincing data to suggest that it has improved agency investigators’ effectiveness in 
reducing fraud.  From the non-police-public services investigators’ perspective, there was 
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heightened expectation that an effective intelligence-led process would directly contribute 
to fraud reduction.  This may be unrealistic as Flood, (2004) proposed that the ‘core of core 
business’ supported by the NIM is ‘volume crime’ including the management of “volume 
crime – burglary, theft, vehicle crime, street robbery and the like” (Flood, ibid: 46).  He 
further suggests that volume crime is so extensive and of such importance that it needs to 
be made “susceptible to a knowledge-based attack if there is any hope of bringing under 
control” (Flood, ibid: 46).  This may have limited appeal in addressing the refined and 
marginal demands of a minority investigative community dominated by fraud referrals – 
for them an exclusive ‘volume crime’.  These investigators operate in a less tolerant and 
more thinly resourced environment than the police and agency senior managers may view 
the NIM as offering limited advantage to the majority of the agency’s business.  From the 
public service investigators’ viewpoint, in the absence of clear advantage to referral 
management processes and investigation, potentially due to a shortage of ‘assets’ 
(resources); perceived disempowerment; and a clear decision making process, the NIM 
may be viewed sceptically and even with some suspicion.  This apprehension was 
potentially fuelled by a poorly contrived implementation process that was common to both 
the DWP and IPS, although it was evidently better managed for the DSA with consultation 
and good operational awareness manifested by senior managers of the compliance criteria.   
 
From testimony and review it was evident that the DWP and IPS did not engage in a 
comprehensive change programme, or provide significant investment to support the 
adoption of the NIM.  Both of these agencies apparently synchronised the NIM adoption 
with a number of process and procedural changes to ‘referral selection’, scoring and 
governance – not directly related to the model.  The resultant collision with the 
investigators culture generated a level of mistrust regarding the motives and purpose of the 
NIM, this legacy has perpetuated a degree of division and non-cooperation with the 
intelligence units, resulting in serial non-engagement with the core doctrines of the model. 
 
The research 
This research illustrated that the public service investigative staff significantly 
misunderstood the compliance requirements of the NIM and the ‘Guidance’, whilst 
harbouring some suspicion regarding its purpose.  The findings indicated that the model is 
perceived, by a substantial proportion of the operational staff, as a governance and 
performance tool; a negative change agent designed to restrict investigators power and 
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discretion; and the inappropriate and unproductive imposition of a police model.  These 
perceptions are not true reflection of the NIM, although they appear a reality to the subjects 
and, regardless of real or perceived shortcomings, it would be worth considering the adage 
‘all models are wrong, some models are useful’ (Box, 2006).  It was also evident that the 
introduction of the NIM was not subject to a methodical change programme in the three 
agencies reviewed and that this may have contributed to the negative reception and further 
frustrated compliance.  The NIM minimum standards are complex in both their format and 
terminology, perhaps unnecessarily so from the viewpoint of public services, but the 
model’s central themes are sound: exploiting intelligence to direct investigation, decision 
making and tasking (taking the guess work out of it)!  It was not poorly contrived and the 
architects appeared to have designed an adequate intelligence model for police use – the 
additions to the Kent model attempting to provide a ‘general application’, appears to have 
been a later appendage either within NCIS or the Home Office.  
 
The research revealed that there continues to be a very limited understanding within the 
public services of the core purpose of the NIM beyond relatively rudimentary concepts 
such as the Intelligence Cycle and the 5x5x5 (Appendix 5).  There appears to be little 
comprehension of the ‘Guidance’ or the minimum standard criteria, contributing to 
nonconformity.  The majority of subjects reported that the NIM appeared to have only 
marginal impact on counter-fraud activity.  When questioned regarding the impact that the 
NIM had on investigation, the significant majority (74%) of respondents stated they were 
unable to determine any increase in efficiency or effectiveness.  There was a close, and 
potentially inaccurate, perception that the intelligence units – imposing a variation to 
traditional referral selection and intelligence gathering – were initiated for the purpose of 
regulation, disempowerment and governance of the investigators.  A further common 
perception appeared to align the NIM with procedural changes relating to scoring (the de-
selection of referrals for investigation) and restrictive practices on intelligence gathering.  
This demonstrated broad unfamiliarity with the model’s purpose, standards and 
compliance criteria, despite its five years legacy and complementary training.  This review 
identified little evidence to suggest that the NIM had supported or increased joint working 
through partnership, although there was a perception that it should, drawing from media-
based knowledge of CDRP.  There is only partial consistency or parity of investigative 
process between the different agencies and a limited appetite for collaborative working, 
particularly with the police or SOCA.  A critical and relatively consistent complaint from 
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the investigative staff was that the NIM was too complex; incomprehensible and partial to 
the police and was not considered suitable or appropriate for the public service.  However, 
this perception should be countered with the significant naivety of the model and standards 
manifested through interview responses and process review (see pps. 88-91 and responses 
by subjects RS07, RS11, RS15, RS25, RS28, RS31 and RS43) 
 
Addressing public service nonconformity 
This research has established that the current level of compliance with the NIM or 
conformity to the minimum standards within the DWP, IPS and, to a lesser extent, the 
DSA, is unlikely to deliver substantial benefit to investigation or fraud reduction.  Chapter 
6 reviewed the research findings and identified significant contributory factors to the non-
compliance by these investigative teams and, primarily, this relates to a limited familiarity 
and understanding of the model and compliance criteria, possibly as a consequence of the 
complexity and language employed in the model’s supporting literature.  In addition, and 
possibly as a consequence, there are incongruent inter-agency processes and procedures, 
potentially conflicting with the NIM minimum standards; insufficient investment in the 
required assets in some teams and units, resulting in inadequate resources; and cultural 
resistance from the operational investigators.  An attempt was made to address the issue of 
complexity and police-terminology by modifying the NIM minimum standards (Appendix 
3) and, through editorial revision, sanitising and simplifying the requirements for 
conformity, endeavouring to provide a simpler explanation and description of the model.  
These were circulated to the majority (85%) of the research population to evaluate whether 
this abridged version of the compliance criteria would improve their comprehension. The 
revision attracted positive comment from the majority of reviewers (66%) suggesting that 
it was appreciably more concise and delivered greater clarity.  However, it was still 
perceived as too complex and failed to address the perception that the NIM was not suited 
to the public services. 
 
The research indicated that for an investigation model to work and deliver a convincing 
‘national model’ of intelligence-led investigation it must be comprehensible and accessible 
to, and potentially compatible with, all agencies employing investigators.  It should deliver 
clear business benefits to the subscribers, regardless of their core business.  Adoption of 
the NIM ‘in name only’ or partial compliance with a, perceived, ‘police model’, due to its 
relative unsuitability to public service and investigation systems, cannot facilitate 
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consistency and is therefore, unlikely to fuel and expand productive collaborative working 
and intelligence sharing.  It is argued that whilst the complexities of the model and its 
‘Guidance’ are misunderstood, conformity and the desired consistency and commonality 
will not be achieved.  The consequence of this will be the current state; a variety of 
intelligence-led processes purporting to follow the NIM, but in reality representing a 
number of quite different versions.  The continuing lack of investment in the NIM by 
public services appears to be a product of this misunderstanding, combined with genuine 
organisational deficiencies in the resources necessary to provision the model’s asset 
requirements.  Similarly, the identified cultural opposition may also correlate to lack of 
resources and the continuing naivety of operational staff regarding the purpose, processes 
and compliance obligations of the NIM.  However, this resistance may have been 
compounded by unrelated changes in organisational structures and mechanisms. 
 
In response to the research findings I would argue that further revision and editorial of the 
NIM minimum standards would be unlikely to succeed in delivering the necessary 
simplicity and clarity required by public service managers and operational personnel.  It is 
possible that a complete and thorough translation of the NIM, Code of Practice and 
minimum standards, going substantially beyond the limit of my own revision (Appendix 
3), could deliver a simpler guidance for the public service.  However, remaining faithful to 
the current NIM configuration, it would not reduce the necessary asset demands to 
resource intelligence-led investigation and decision making, nor the procedural 
requirements associated with tasking and co-ordination.  Critically, even with extremely 
basic and abridged descriptions and standards, it would remain the ‘National Intelligence 
Model’ and, I would argue, not overcome the resistance that it is perceived as a model 
‘designed by the police, for the police’.  Similarly, comprehensive briefing and education 
for investigative staff, managers and senior policy makers within agencies to interpret, 
explain and provide public service comparisons (where possible) to the compliance 
requirements, may address some of the misconceptions and cultural resistance, but this 
training would be costly and need to be highly standardised to ensure consistency of 
delivery and objective. 
 
I would further argue that cultural resistance is sustained by the notoriety of the model, 
within public services, associated with a potentially mismanaged introduction and an 
inaccurate associated with unrelated organisational change; and that this would not be 
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remedied by simplified guidance or further training.  It is therefore proposed that a 
complementary alternative to the NIM should be identified for non-police public services 
and the general factors were outlined in Chapter 6.  This alternative should be a simple 
intelligence-led investigation process, retaining its adherence to the Intelligence Cycle (see 
Figure 1.1) and continuing to employ the 5x5x5 intelligence sharing system (Appendix 4) 
– both of which are familiar to the agency investigative community.  It is argued that this 
alternative process should accommodate some flexibility, acknowledging the different 
organisations, businesses and investigative resources available throughout the public 
service. It is further proposed that any alternative would need to condense and simplify the 
intelligence-led processes, complementing the NIM as used by the police, whilst avoiding 
operational tension by agency staff through direct association with that model.  A proposed 
process, incorporating the aforementioned considerations - the Public Service Intelligence 
Process (PSIP): see Appendix 6 - has been included as a discussion document.   
 
Summary 
On the basis of this research, I would argue that the police-partiality of the NIM 
substantially restricts its broader productive employment into the public service and that 
the perceived complexity of the minimum standards may defy conformity with the model’s 
‘Guidance’.  It is further argued that the concept of intelligence-led investigation is sound 
and improved decision making, through tasking and co-ordinating, would deliver benefit in 
reducing fraud and facilitating improved partnership.  Sadly, even within the police 
service, the NIM does not appear to have delivered a radical change to investigative 
practice and resource distribution (James, 2011: 256).  Whilst in the police, emphasis on 
compliance may have diluted potential benefit, within the public service conformity to the 
NIM ‘Guidance’ is irregular and inconsistent frustrated by inadequate assets; cultural 
resistance; and incomprehension.  To promulgate what was, essentially, a police model to 
other organisations was fraught from the outset and the conflict and difficulties in 
assimilation were potentially predictable.  Acknowledging this and demonstrating a 
willingness and activity to remedy the current inconsistencies could still deliver the desired 
improvements to investigative practice and productive partnership. 
 
As a result of this research, I have proposed a limited number of recommendations in 
Appendix 7.  For future study, I intend to expand this review to include additional public 
services with an investigative capability, particularly Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
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and National Health Service, broadening the research sample to test the current findings 
against a wider investigative population.  The concept of a discrete ‘intelligence-led 
process’ for non-police public services, potentially providing a complementary alternative 
to the NIM, requires further review, debate and greater operational exposure to assess its 





Relationship between research aims and objectives 
Aims Description Objectives Chapters Contributing Respondents  
1 Assess the relevance and 
accessibility of the NIM, as a 
business model to non-police 
public services 
1. Undertake research of official documents and literature. 
2. Interview operational investigation staff within public services, police and 
SOCA personnel. 
3. Undertake secondary research in published research, literature and 
biographies.  
1, 2, 4,  
5 and 6 
RS01, RS04, RS08,  
RS09, RS11, RS14,  
RS17, RS22, RS31, 
RS36, RS41 and RS46 
2 Establish the level of 
compliance with the NIM, Code 
of Practice and minimum 
standards by public service 
investigative teams. 
1. Review public service documents and published literature. 
2. Interview operational investigators within public service, the police and 
SOCA. 
3. Analyse that data to identify the level of compliance with the NIM 
‘Guidance’. 
5 and 6 RS03, RS06, RS09, 
RS15, RS19, RS21,  
RS22, RS25, RS47,  
RS31, RS42, RS45  
and RS46 
3 Identify the specific areas of 
non-compliance and assess its 
impact on intelligence-led 
investigation, decision making 
and partnership. 
1. Interview public service operational personnel to identify specific areas of 
non-compliance to include ‘assets’ ad procedures. 
2. Comparatively evaluate the current NIM processes within the police and 
SOCA with public services to identify differences  
3. Interview public service managers and investigator and review agency 
literature to establish the impact of the NIM on investigative processes, 
decision making relating to tasking and co-ordination and partnership. 
4, 5 and 6 RS01, RS02, RS07,  
RS09, RS16, RS18,  
RS19 RS20, RS21,  
RS25, RS31, RS34,  
RS45 and RS47  
4 Identify and evaluate the causes 
for non-compliance with 
regards to the model’s asset 
requirements, process and 
procedural change and cultural 
resistance. 
1. Undertake research of official documents including archived data 
regarding the introduction of the NIM to agencies. 
2. Interview public service operational personnel to establish cultural barriers 
to compliance with the NIM. 
3. Through interview and review of literature assess comprehension and 
understanding of the key compliance requirements for the model. 
2, 4, 5 and 
6 
RS09, RS13, RS17,  
RS18, RS23, RS24,  
RS25, RS28 RS30  
RS33, RS34, RS35,  
RS37, RS38, RS42 and RS45 
5 Assess whether a revised 
edition of the NIM minimum 
standards will improve the 
comprehension and 
understanding of the public 
service investigation teams. 
1. Generate a revised version of the NIM minimum standards: sanitised and 
summarised to evaluate whether this supports improved understanding of 
the compliance criteria. 
2. Comparatively evaluate the revised standards with the current ACPO 
version to ensure it retains faithful to ethos and model. 
3. Circulate the revised standards and invite feedback; evaluate and report. 
5, 6 and 
Appendix 3 
RS02, RS07, RS09,  
RS10, RS13, RS16,  
RS18 RS21, RS24,  
RS37, RS41 and RS46  
6 Propose any potential remedies 
to non-compliance with the 
NIM. 
1. Review the findings and critically analyse the data and evaluate possible 
remedies. 
2. Propose appropriate remedies, if identified. 








Consultancy and Training activity within Public Service since 1996 
 
1996 – 1999  Experience – Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 
Nick Osborn was a training and quality manager within Specialist Operations for 3 years.  In 
addition, he managed the delivery of criminal intelligence and analysis training for the MPS 
Criminal Intelligence Directorate and Covert Policing (SO11 and SO10).  Working with the 
Head of Profession, he was the project lead for the Professional Development Programme for 
analysts, within the MPS.   
 
1999-2001 (retired)  Experience 
Nick Osborn continued with the Metropolitan Police Service and engaged in a number of 
special projects, working in partnership mainstream policing, and with the security services. 
 
Public Service Consultancy has included (since 2001) to date: 
 Child Support Agency; investigation training and management development – 
accredited training; process review and security consultancy 
 City of London Police: sundry courses, currently the Counter Fraud programme in 
liaison with the NFA and TROY. 
 CRB: process review; ACFS design and delivery 
 DEFRA: management development including security, probity and integrity of systems 
 DSA: ACFS and PinS 17 equivalent (criminal Analyst Foundation Programme) 
 DWP (PinS 6, PinS 6M, PinS 17, PinS 17A, PinS 24 design, accreditation and 
delivery); Change programme as Lead External Consultant; NIM integration; 
consultancy reviews of policy and process; Lead Consultant to Security Committee, etc. 
 Forensic Science Service: designed and delivered the accredited ‘Aspiring Leaders 
Programme’ for middle and executive managers; portfolio delivery for operational staff 
regarding integrity of evidence and system.. 
 Home Office: CSAS, DDO and PCSO.  
 Home Office: Professional Needs Analysis (and TNA) for Designated Detention 
Officers; leadership and the management development programme for Police Services 
(PRDLDP). 
 Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC): pre-employment assessment for 
Investigative Managers (supplement to Investigative Managers Development 
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Programme; Investigators, DSI and SI accredited development programme through 
EdExcel) 
 IPS (formerly the United Kingdom Passport Service): Organisational Development 
(FIU restructure); Operations Management, and Joint and Collaborative Management; 
Policy and Procedural review; MIT and OIU External Project Lead; ACFS design and 
delivery to operational investigators. 
 Jobcentre Plus (DWP): Risk Management Unit, London Region (Criminal Analysis, 
SIO and OIU); NW Region (Model OIU and Inspection); Change Team ( introduction 
of NIM, Risk Management and control mechanisms and Analyst Development 
Programme (Risk Identification and Intelligence Application). 
 Local Authorities (most of them): PinS Programme for Housing Benefit investigators 
and managers; sundry security and investigation programmes, including the accredited 
Street Wardens Programme; Licensing Officers and Street Enforcement Officers 
training (WCC) 
 MPS: Executive Leadership Programme and Partnership Programme 
 NAFN: consultancy on policy and process relating to LA interface and joint working; 
all PinS, analyst, intelligence officers and managers training. 
 Pension Service (DWP): PinS Programme and Business Analysis 
 SOCA: Systems, policy, process and management development 
 
Academic Qualifications 
 MSc – Decision Making (in Management)  London Guildhall University 
 Post Graduate Diploma: Decision Making  City of London Polytechnic 
 Post Graduate Certificate of Education (FE II)  University of Greenwich 
 Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist (ACFS)   University of Portsmouth 
 
Other Professional Qualifications and Memberships 
 Associated Institute of Bankers Examination (Bromley College of Further Education) 
 A1 NVQ Assessor (City & Guilds) 
 Fellow of the Chartered Management Institute: Registration: 000445147 (FCMI) 
 Fellow of the Institute of Leadership & Management: Registration. 110027 (FInstLM) 
 Member of the International Association of Chartered Analysts (MIACA) 
 Member of the Institute of Counter Fraud Specialists (MICFS) 
 Member of the Institute of Management Services (MIMS): Registration. 43085 






National Intelligence Model:  
revised Minimum Standards for public services   
 
ELEMENT 1: KNOWLEDGE ASSETS 
 
1. CURRENT LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW 
A public service with an investigative capacity will ensure that its designated intelligence staff 
and investigators remain informed of legislation and case law developments – having ready 
access to current information sources.  A professional public service will ensure that its 
investigative staff remain fully informed of legislation, case law developments and guidance, 
and that they have ready access to up-to-date information sources on a round the clock basis.  
Where available, ‘Practice Advice’ documents should be provided for intelligence and 
investigative staff, these provide details of good practice; suggest operational methods and 
structures to provide a further basis for the delivery of training. 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be continual access to a knowledge repository (locally, centrally, or electronically) 
and it must cover all areas of investigative activity, for example: 
 Crime 
 Community 
 Various private legal databases, details of which can be found in Appendix 3 or 
through the Office of Public Sector information http://www.opsi.gov.uk 
Ensure access to, and an understanding of, Practice Advice documentation where available and 
relevant. For example, practice advice on NIM, and anti- corruption. Access can be locally or 
centrally available, or made available electronically through thru use of systems such as the 
intranet. 
2. CODES OF PRACTICE AND SECONDARY LEGISLATION 
A code of practice under the Police Act 1996 is a statutory document which provides a high 
level strategic framework and principles enabling the development of detailed guidance and 
practice advice. Some codes of practice are in the form of secondary legislation, providing 
mandatory compliance, e.g., the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). 
Meeting the Criteria 
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There should be ready access to a knowledge source (locally, centrally or nationally) that cover 
all areas of investigative activity, to include:  
 






 Criminal Records Bureau (CRB); 
 PNC; 
 Any future or proposed associated codes of practice and secondary legislation. 
 ACPO Practice Advice On Resources And The People Assets Of NIM 
 ACPO Anti-Corruption Advisory Group (Vetting Protocol Of Intelligence Staff) 
 ACPO Guidance On The National Briefing Model 
 ACPO Codes Of Practice On The Management Of Police Information 
 ACPO Guidance On The Management Of Police Information 
 ACPO HMR Memorandum Of Understanding Disclosure Of Information 
 ACPO Practice Advice On Tasking And Co-Ordination 
 Home Office Codes Of Practice For The Use Of The Serious Crime Analysis Section 
 ACPO And HMRC Manual Of Standards For Covert Human Intelligence Sources 
ACPO Practice Advice On Prison Intelligence And Related Matters 
 ACPO and HMRC Manual Of Standards For The Deployment Of Test Purchases And Decoy 
Officers 
 ACPO and HMRC Manual Of Standards For The Deployment Of Undercover Officers 
 ACPO/ACPOS/HMC Manual Of Standards For Accessing Communication Data 
 ACPO/HMC National Standards In Covert Investigations Manual Of Standards And 
Surveillance 
 ACPO Deployment Standards For Technical Support In Tackling Volume Crime 
 ACPO Guidance On The National Briefing Model 
 ACPO Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures Manual 
 ACPO PNC Compliance Strategy 
 ACPO Code Of Practice For Data Protection 
143 
 
3. MANUALS OF GUIDANCE 
 
A manual of guidance describing the standards and subsequent compliance required by forces or 
law enforcement agencies in respect of various policing activities, for example the collection 
storage and application of Intel. This enables effective compliance within a legal framework, 
and provides a basis for an established minimum competence requirement. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Ensure access to, and an understanding of, standards in respect of relevant subjects, for 
example: NIM, data communications SPOC, dangerous offenders, priority and prolific 
offenders, prison intelligence, covert operations and the ANPR system. 
 
4. PUBLIC SERVICE POLICY RELEVANT TO INTELLIGENCE 
 
Individual service policies on intelligence must complement minimum standards and practice 
advice, while further establishing NIM into everyday policing. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
The following should be in place and adhered to: 
 Intelligence Strategy; 
 Forensic Policy; 
 Tasking & Co-ordinating Group Policy. 
 
5. PUBLIC SERVICE NIM COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY 
 
The development and implementation of a marketing and communications strategy designed to 
promulgate the benefits of intelligence-led investigation, both internally and externally to the 
service, is fundamental to the successful implementation and further development of NIM. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be a method in place, such as the intranet, for communicating a standard message to 
all investigative and intelligence staff. 
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6. PUBLIC SERVICE IT STRATEGY (FORCE INFORMATION STRATEGY) 
 
All service IT strategies relating to investigations and potential crime ‘referrals’ should include 
issues relating to the support and maintenance of intelligence IT structures. This will ensure the 
continual employment of intelligence–led investigating. 
Meeting the Criteria 
The investigation and security departments must maintain an IT strategy and infrastructure 
capable of sustaining intelligence-led investigating. 
 
7. I.T. DISSEMINATION OF T&CG ACTIONS 
 
Effective management of the T&CG process includes providing an appropriate means of 
ensuring tasks are carried out and monitored. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
An agreed dissemination system should be in place to disseminate strategic and tactical T&CG 
decisions to investigative staff and to confirm that all the necessary actions have been carried 
out and recorded. Dissemination must take security into account and the content may be 
reduced, particularly at Level 2.  Access must be restricted to nominated staff only, and good 
practice identified. 
 
8. PUBLIC SERVICE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF TRAINING STRATEGY 
 
Investigative and intelligence staff should receive appropriate training to support their 
knowledge and competence to program intelligence-led investigations through the NIM. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A service training strategy should be in place covering explanations of NIM and the processes 
involved in gathering and submitting intelligence. It should emphasise the importance of 
intelligence submissions, and the fact that such submissions are especially important from staff 
in roles outside of the intelligence function. 
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ELEMENT 2- SYSTEM ASSETS 
 
9. SECURITY 
Access to and from vulnerable areas must be monitored and controlled. Intelligence and 
investigation material, documentation and products must be managed in a secure manner. All 
investigative staff should be aware of, and comply with, the requirements under the CPIA to 
maintain the integrity of the intelligence gathering and investigation. In addition, investigative 
staff should exercise duty of care and the protection of intelligence gathering and investigative 
products; observing the principles and established good practice that must be adhered to in the 
investigation of criminals and criminality. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Within investigation and security departments a ‘clear desk policy’ and secure file storage 
systems must be in place, located within a secure accommodation or with limited access. Public 
services should ensure that access policies are in place that enable qualified staff to gain entry to 
secure environments. Services must ensure source protection and confidentiality both internally 
and externally in information sharing and the dissemination of intelligence. 
 
10. SECURITY POLICIES RE: INTEGRITY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND VETTING 
STANDARDS WITHIN INTELLIGENCE WORK 
 
Those individuals working within secure environments must be subject to clearance themselves. 
The manner in which material is recorded, disseminated and retained should also be the subject 
of security policy. 
 
11.  EFFECTIVE BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS 
 
All investigating and intelligence staff should be fully briefed and continually informed of all 
tasking and intelligence requirements. Debriefing is also vitally important in maintaining the 
cycle of information. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Intelligence must be fed back to the intelligence unit and dedicated briefing facilities, structures 
and processes must be established in all areas of activity. For further information see ACPO 




12. INTER-AGENCY INFORMATION SHARING PROTOCOLS 
 
Information management and the provision of protocols, standard operating procedures and 
MOU’s between agencies are essential to the efficient investigation and complement the NIM. 
The ACPO (2005) Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information and ACPO 
Guidance on the Management of Police Information provides information and good practice on 
such protocols at a national and international level.  The integrity of any intelligence system 
relies on ethical processes and legislative compliance. 
 
The DPA, ACPO (2000) PNC Compliance Strategy, ACPO (2002) Code of Practice For Data 
Protection and the ACPO Guidance On The Management Of Police Information provide 
minimum requirements for access to, and the retention and deletion of, information.  All storage 
of information must be subject to the appropriate security measures. There must be an 
organisational information access, retention, review and security policy in place. Nominated 
Data (Protection) Officers will proactively and intrusively supervise compliance through 
thematic testing. All data systems should be subject to intrusive and proactive management 
supervision and quality assurance protocols. 
Senior security managers and the designated intelligence managers should fully understand 
intelligence products and the analytical process.  In addition to data access agreements, 
protocols between law enforcement agencies and partners must be established with respect to 
the dissemination of information and intelligence material. 
 
Published control strategies should be used as a basis for prioritising data input and research. 
Other issues may take precedence, providing their tasking is subject to control mechanisms. 
 
USE OF 5X5X5 AS STANDARD EVALUATION 
The National Information/Intelligence Report Form 5x5x5 is the only system recognised 
nationwide for the recording, evaluation and dissemination of information into the intelligence 
system. The ability of staff to have ready access to data input systems, in order to record 
information, will enhance intelligence collection. 
Meeting of the Criteria 
Examples of inter-agency information sharing protocols include: 
 ACPO (2002) HM Customs and Excise Memorandum of Understanding 
Disclosure of Information; 
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 CDRP; 
 Wider crime reduction partnership community protocols at both local (level 1 and 
2) and regional (level 2 and 3) levels; 
 Section 115 of the CDA, which provides a statutory gateway for information 
sharing for crime and disorder purposes. 
 
There must be a policy and resources in place to enable hot intelligence assignments, human 
rights compliance, risk assessment and duty of care considerations.  The Agency’s control 
strategies should be evident to all investigative, security and process staff and be seen to drive 
prioritised input and research into reducing, loss, error and risk, e.g. fraud.  The Agency should 
have data quality assurance protocols in place to ensure high data standards. These protocols 
should include defined review processes with respect to the maintenance of up-to-date 
intelligence records, file tracking and audit trails’. Due consideration must be given to other 
related NIM standards and practice advice, for example the designation of Data (Protection) 
Officers. 
 Evidence of the 5x5x5 system being used in line with the ACPO Guidance on the Management 
of Police Information. There should also be evidence of training for investigators in respect of 
the 5x5x5 process, including evaluation and risk assessment (by the intelligence function) of 
submitted information. 
13. STANDARDISED AND INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE DATABASE 
Public Services should seek to ensure the integration of process information and intelligence 
systems to provide a reliable framework for quality data management and analysis. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Partner agency information/data may be included in accordance with agreed protocols, thereby 
assisting risk reduction and security planning. Being a member of a data warehousing consortia 




14. AUTHORITIES PROCESSES AND DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN 
PLACE 
Public services would benefit from an auditable and secure authority and management system to 
support compliance with legislation such as HRA, CPIA and RIPA. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Public Services should have a case and/or document management and file tracking systems that 
facilitate the auditing of paper systems and authorities (electronic or paper system to show 
history of input and access, dates, owners, authority).  
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to the system assets 
element of NIM are outlined below. 
Public Service Policy and Procedure for System Assets 
The establishment of policies and procedures in line with minimum standards will facilitate 
public services to undertake internal checks against agreed national and local standards, and to 
give better value for money including reducing cost and bureaucracy. 
Security and Integrity 
Implementing the minimum standards regarding security and integrity will provide improved 
protection of intelligence assets. Personnel vetting and the establishment of sterile corridors and 
clear desk policies will embed a ‘need to know’ culture. 
Research Analysis 
An efficient and timely research capability giving immediate and direct access to information 
enables informed operational risk assessments and appropriate action to be taken. It also 
provides reassurance to front line staff. 
Improved access to data through the use of standard products for intelligence and analytical 





Adherence to both NIM and information management standards (in terms of intelligence 
databases and authorities processes) creates a more competent platform when accessing and 
sharing data with partners. This, in turn, improves the flow of information and data sharing. It 
also improves cross-border search ability and enables remote access to systems.  Compliance 
with the NIM will assist in providing an efficient, intelligence-led, response service. 
Information Technology Policy 
An information systems strategy to underpin police force and local core business processes is at 
the heart of NIM. Essential data must be safeguarded. In the event of a system failure, this 
strategy will clearly demonstrate the measures to be taken to ensure the continuity of 
information management during any recovery period. 
 
ELEMENT 3-SOURCE ASSETS 
15.   VICTIMS AND WITNESSES 
Victims of crime and witnesses to crime are vital sources of intelligence. The ability to identify 
repeat victims; vulnerable persons, areas of criminal activity and categories of crime provide 
important sources of information for the NIM process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Where possible, intelligence should be secured from victims/witnesses who have been the 
subject of offences that fall within the control strategy or who have witnessed such offences. 
The details obtained from them must be reported to the investigation and security departments.  
A public service policy should be implemented locally to engage intelligence interviews with 
victims, particularly with regard to impersonation, loss or fraud. These interviews must be 
subject to risk assessment and conducted with the knowledge and sanction of a senior 
investigator or manager. 
 
 
16. UNDERCOVER/TEST PURCHASE OPERATIVES 
All ‘covert activity and test purchases should be subject to risk assessment and  require 
management authority. Established good practice should be adhered to, for further information 
see ACPO and HMCE (2003) Manual of Standards for the Deployment of Test Purchase and 
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Decoy Officers and ACPO and HMCE  (2003) Manual of Standards for the Deployment of 
Undercover Officers.  
Access to, and employment of interception activity and products, and the use of covert 
deployments should be subject to public service policy; for further information see 
ACPO/ACPOS/HMCE (2003) Manual of Standards for Accessing Communication Data. and 
ACPO and HMCE (2004) National Standards in Covert Investigators Manual of Standards for 
Surveillance. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Information or intelligence obtained from covert deployments should be subject to public 
service policy and management authorisation.  Limited access to such products is necessary and 
they should exclusively be recorded onto the intelligence or investigation recording systems.  It 
is recommended that a sterile corridor processes be considered at the time of exchange of 
material between covert units and the investigation or security department, including the 
sanitisation of information reports. Access to covert units and their products must be through 
defined gateways. Covert deployments will be in line with agreed control strategy priorities.  
Policy logs must be maintained and full risk assessments evident for all stages of the 
deployment, acquisition and exchange of information.  
 
17. FORENSIC DATA AND FORENSIC INTELLIGENCE POLICY 
The incorporation of forensic sources of information or intelligence enhances the investigative 
(and NIM) processes and may provide a fuller picture of criminal behaviour and patterns.  
Public services should consider having clear policies in place with regards to the handling of 
exhibits and access to specialist forensic examination.  Investigators should be aware of 
established good practice to ensure the continuity of evidence and to avoid contamination of 
samples and evidential materials. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Established public service policies and procedures relating to forensic examination access; the 
maintenance of evidential integrity; appropriate training and evidence of auditable ‘good 
practice’ by investigative staff. 
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18. OTHER SERVICE/AGENCY TASKING 
Sources of information are available from a wide variety of other agencies and law enforcement 
bodies and should be accessed and used where appropriate 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Measures must be in place to identify and use external source opportunities, collaborative 
working and partnership to enable tasking and access of investigative products through agreed 
gateways.  
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of complementing and where appropriate meeting the minimum 
standards related to the source assets element of NIM are outlined below. 
Multiple Sources of Information 
Adopting the stated minimum standards will ensure that information is obtained from multiple 
sources. Engagement with partner agencies can provide a vast source of information and data 
relating to community issues which have previously been under-used. 
Assets outside the scope of the individual Public Services can be realised and used to assist 
organisational targets and risk/loss reduction objectives. 
 
Ownership of Intelligence 
The minimum standards will create a culture of understanding that intelligence is everywhere 
and it is every police person’s job to find it and report it.  Creating a minimum standard for 
gathering intelligence from other sources will encourage the flow of information and assist the 
efficiency of investigations and the NIM processes. 
Profiling 
An increased access to victims and witnesses for the purpose of intelligence interviewing will 
lead to enhanced profiling and the development of victimology. This will provide opportunities 
to realise the contributory factors of organisational vulnerability such as error, loss, fraud and 
related crime. 
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ELEMENT 4-PEOPLE ASSETS 
19 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SINGLE POINT OF CONTRACT (SPOC) 
Good practice (and NIM minimum standards) should encourage each public service to have a 
Single Point of Contact (SPOC) to manage all authorities and issues around accessing evidence 
or intelligence through defined communication systems. Accredited and highly trained staff 
should be nominated to provide a point of contact for all enquiries for established partners and 
external agencies. 
20. INTELLIGENCE MANAGER 
An intelligence manager must be of an appropriate status to be appointed. This is to ensure that 
experience is added to the analytical techniques and products before they are presented to the 
T&CG. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Intelligence Managers should be experienced supervisors and it would be an advantage if they 
had experience of the investigation or security domain. An Intelligence Manager is responsible 
for the intelligence function and intelligence product deliver locally. 
 
21. ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY 
The NIM requires analysis of information and data from numerous sources, thereby providing 
an intelligent picture of crime issues. The delivery of proven analytical products and key 
assessments is fundamental to the success of this model. The development of qualified and 
accredited analysts within the investigation or security department is a vital component of NIM 
can support investigations employing standardised, high quality, intelligence products. 
For further information contact the National Analyst Working Group and see ACPO practice 
advice on tasking and co-ordination. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Sufficient accredited intelligence analysts must be in place to support tasking processes at both 
strategic and tactical levels, and in order to support the investigation of major crime. In addition 
to local analysts, it is highly beneficial to have centrally based analysts so that they can profile 
force control strategy priorities.  
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There must also be an analytical capability to identify series offences both locally and centrally. 
A process of series identification should be established to enable reporting to the TT&CG and to 
aid crime series forums. Minimum staff numbers should take into account force crime/incident 
profiles and not be prescribed. 
 
22. INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT 
The timely recording, dissemination and subsequent management of information and data 
sources are crucial to competent investigation.  Compliance with legal provisions such as the 
DPA, PNC Codes and the ACPO (2005) Code of Practice on the Management of Police 
Information must be stringently adhered to in order to maintain the integrity and security of the 
intelligence process. This must not, however, prevent the exchange of information with partners 
in support of policing purposes. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be sufficient capability to evaluate, input and manage information from a wide 
range of sources. Data quality, consistency, timeliness of input and compliance with relevant 
legislation and organisational policy must be ensured. The ACPO (2005) Code of Practice on 
the Management of Police Information and ACPO Guidance on the Management of Police 
Information must be adhered to. Compliance inspections should be undertaken by the 
Investigations Manager that includes the security of IT and information and intelligence assets. 
Data protection must be seen as part of the process of information management, rather than as a 
separate process to NIM. 
 
23 DEDICATED I.T SUPPORT 
All organisational IT systems employed for investigation must be sufficiently robust, efficient 
and subject to future proofing to ensure that the necessary capacity and quality of product is 
achieved. 
24. TT&CG ACTIONS MANAGER 
This standard should be used in conjunction with ACPO Guidance on the National Briefing 
Model and ACPO Practice Advice on Tasking and Co-Ordination. The TT&CG actions 
manager role is that of an enactor. It carries responsibility for arranging the completion of 
TT&CG actions, including follow-up actions allocated to other managers. It may also include 
responsibility for managing the briefing process.  
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Meeting the Criteria 
Public services must ensure that there is a capability, responsible for co-ordinating actions 
emanating from the T&CG meetings, a stated individual must be responsible for the delivery of 
those actions, monitoring progress and feeding back results to the T&CG and organisational 
memory. 
 
ELEMENT 5 -INFORMATION SOURCES 
25. OPEN AND CLOSED SOURCE DATA 
Staff should be sufficiently trained, and IT must be in place, to fully exploit all available sources 
of data.  The investigation should not be restricted to data, information or intelligence that is 
maintained on a single agency’s files and/or systems.  The ability to research and exchange 
information with established partners enhances intelligence collection and will support robust 
investigation and risk reduction strategies.  Links, associations and working partnerships should 
be actively sought and engaged in through established, MOU, SLA, gateways and protocols. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Evidence of active collaboration and working partnerships with law enforcement agencies, 
allied public services and appropriate partners; supported by established intelligence exchange 
gateways.  Service Level Agreements should provide expected standards of service deliver 
between departments and organisations or for individual operations.  Similarly a Memorandum 
of Understanding should set out the protocols between departments, agencies and organisations 
enabling effective joint working and partnership arrangements. 
 
ELEMENT 6  INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION RECORDING 
26. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
Setting performance targets against specified control strategies and intelligence collection 
requirements will assist in maintaining the business focus complement risk reduction and 
encourage the need for good quality intelligence recording. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be evidence of the development of performance measures around the collection of 
actionable intelligence. This should be in accordance with organisational and/or local priorities 
as set in the control strategy and intelligence requirement and sanctioned by the T&CG process. 
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ELEMENT 7 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
27. ACCESS TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT/SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT 
The means with which to support the intelligence-led investigation process through technical 
support and surveillance must be available at all levels of investigating.  
National standards for the procurement, deployment, training and authority processes for 
technical support are defined in a CD published by the former PSDB known as The Yellow 
Book and in ACPO (2004) Deployment Standards for Technical Support in Tackling Volume 
Crime.  Access to technical resources and expertise held by other agencies will provide a 
valuable additional capability to gather intelligence and evidence. 
28. SYSTEM FOR DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE 
COLLECTION PLANS 
Processes should be developed which allow for the development and review of intelligence 
collection plans in line with the requirements of the T&CG and a method of reporting such 
actions. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Reviewing the progress of intelligence collection plans against tactical T&CG actions, 
refinement and recommendations are to be reported in the tactical assessment. Local systems 
enabling this standard to be achieved will be evident and reported in T&CG policy. 
 
28. DATA COLLECTION DIRECTED AND FOCUSED ON CONTROL STRATEGY 
The control strategy provides a focus for investigative activity.  All available resources, both 
internally and externally, should be encouraged to gather intelligence and be subject to the 
tasking process. Any authorised intelligence collection and tasking will need to be assessed for 
its impact and benefits against the overall tactical and strategic direction of the agency. 
Intelligence products such as target and problem profiles must be subject to continual 
enhancement and development. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Agencies should be able to demonstrate that the tasking for information and data collection is 
focused on their respective control strategies. Exceptions to this standard can be considered 
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where directed by the T&CG during a major reactive enquiry. The tasking processes should be 
developed for contribution by all staff and partners. A directory of assets should be recorded and 
available to staff during intelligence research. Organisations should evidence the use and 
development of corporate target and problem profile templates. 
 
ELEMENT 8-INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS 
29. STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS 
Strategic assessments complement the functioning of NIM and are useful mechanisms for 
identifying vulnerability and in framing risk reduction measures. Strategic assessments must be 
used by the strategic T&CG to agree control strategies and intelligence requirements. 
30. TACTICAL/PROBLEM PROFILES ONLY COMMISSIONED BY T&CG, 
INTELLIGENCE MANAGER OR SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS IN A  
MAJOR ENQUIRY 
Target and problem profiles create greater clarity and definition around the respective issues of 
priority, prolific and recidivist offenders or those suspected of more serious crime and priority 
locations or crime types. These profiles are as relevant to serious and organised crime groups. 
Target and problem profiles should, in the main, relate to the control strategy and stated 
intelligence requirement. In some circumstances the commission of a serious crime or major 
serial or series crime investigation fall outside of the control strategy remit. In these cases a 
corporate line of authority for commissioning should be adopted.  
Meeting the Criteria 
These profiles should reflect NIM templates. They will be commissioned by Tactical T&CGs to 
determine tactical resolutions; Strategic T&CGs to assist with greater definition prior to setting 
the control strategy; or by an Intelligence/Investigation Manager, in exceptional circumstances, 
for limited profiling to aid research in accordance with the control strategy.  The profiles should 
be self-explanatory and evidenced by debate with the T&CG chair.  
 
31. ANALYST AS A STANDING MEMBER AT T&CG 
The role of the analyst and analytical products are a fundamental part of NIM. It is 
recommended that an analyst is a key member of the T&CG process. Analysts will provide 
interpretation of the analysis within the intelligence products that drive the T&CG process. 
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ELEMENT 9: STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL TASKING AND CO-ORDINATION 
32. T&CG POLICY 
Tasking and co-ordination is essential to the NIM process and should be guided by Agency 
policy. Stakeholders and partner agencies play a key role in informing the strategic assessment 
and influencing strategic tasking and co-ordination process. The NIM tasking and co-ordination 
processes require monitoring and supervision in order to maintain standards and to ensure 
direction and control is meaningful. Daily management meetings, briefings and case reviews are 
not T&CG meeting as they are not driven by the intelligence products review.  
Meeting the criteria 
T&CG policy should detail the key attendees, products and timescales in line with national 
standards and good practice, reinforcing use of national minimum standards for strategic and 
tactical assessments and use as a core decision making document by command reams.  Where 
possible and appropriate, Agencies should evidence the involvement of stakeholders in the 
strategic process 
 
33. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT 
Operational intelligence assessments are key to remaining focused during agreed T&CG 
tasking. For further information see ACPO Practice advice on tasking and co-ordination. 
Meeting the Criteria 
Operational intelligence assessment must take place to ensure that investigations remain focused 
in order to: 
 Prevent mission creep; 
 Identify priorities for the operation’s intelligence effort; 
 Focus intelligence gathering; 
 Inform resource decisions; 
 Guide investigative activities; 
 Verify that protocols, such as the correct authorisation, are present; 
 Highlight diversification from agreed objectives; 
 Aid compliance with HRA, RIPA, and other legislation. 
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34. JOINT AGENCY AND SPECIALIST OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE 
CELLS 
The formation of joint agency intelligence cells or cells set up specifically for major operations 
requires careful management and adherence to strict protocols. The following are common 
examples of joint agency and specialist intelligence cells: 
 CDRP; 
 Prisons, through adequate investment in prison intelligence officers; 
 Immigration investigations; 
 Serious crime investigations; 
 National security investigations and operations. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A policy must be in place in police forces to enable the use of multi-agency staff in a joint 
intelligence cell and should include agreed data sharing protocols, governance issues and 
security policies. Joint agency intelligence cells usually operate from a single site, with one 
common purpose dictated by a control strategy. 
 
35 SANCTION OF THE CONTROL STRATEGY 
ST&CGs must sanction the control strategy and the intelligence requirement. The setting of 
strategic direction requires review to ensure that the appropriate of risk reduction focus is 
maintained. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Priority issues for prevention, intelligence and enforcement must be identified in the control 
strategy. The professional heads of the respective disciplines should be consulted and play an 
active role in ensuring accurate and informed strategies are set. 
ST&CG provides the principle sanction of a requirement on all staff to secure intelligence to fill 
intelligence and knowledge gaps in line with the control strategy. This requirement must be 
reviewed and amended according to need, by the TT&CG. 
The ST&CG must sit every 6 months with the minimum of a paper review at 3 monthly 
intervals. The meetings must review the control strategy and amend this as necessary, taking 




ELEMENT 10-TACTICAL RESOLUTION 
36. INVESTIGATE CAPABILITY 
A dedicated intelligence-led investigations team is necessary to ensure effective resolution of 
core priorities. 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be evidence of a tactical investigative capability able to meet the tasking 
requirements of TT&CG. Establishment numbers of such teams is not prescribed but staff must 
be trained to a high level on investigative skills. T&CGs must be aware of available 
investigative/intelligence capability to ensure there is a balance of work and tasking in 
accordance with the tactical menu. 
 
ELEMENT 11-INTELLIGANCE/OPERATIONAL REVIEW 
37. RESULTS ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 
Results analysis is an analytical technique which can be used to inform the NIM process. It 
should be used to assess the success of actions endorsed by the T&CG. 
Meeting the Criteria 
T&CG commissioning of results analysis and operational review must be evidenced. 
Recommendations must be reflected in tactical assessments and operational plans and the 
organisational memory updated. This is particularly necessary when using technology or after a 
failed operation. 
 
38. MONITOR AND REVIEW OF RIPA AUTHORITIES 
The usefulness of information gained as a result of RIPA authorities will also require review, 
and policies will need to be in place to guide this process. 
Meeting the Criteria 
Agencies should undertake a proactive review of RIPA authorities and ensure that the retention 
policy is adhered to. This is usually a function of the person or team with responsibility for the 




39. NATIONAL BRIEFING MODEL 
In order to maximise the usefulness of harvested intelligence, effective briefings and debriefings 
are essential to intelligence and investigative staff. See also ACPO Guidance on the National 
Briefing Model. 
Meeting the Criteria 
A standardised and structured briefing/debriefing process, using the National Briefing Model, 
must be implemented. This will ensure the effective tasking and briefing of the patrol function 
and enable assessment of intelligence product accuracy and timeliness and also allows gap 
analysis to improve the product. 
 
40. ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY & AUDIT  
The evaluation of the outcomes and processes of investigating should be fed into corporate 
knowledge. This will improve the expertise of staff involved and lead to the reduced risk 
operations. In addition, a system for monitoring and reviewing tactical decisions, operational 
plans and results ensures that operational and intelligence tasking is compliant with the HRA. It 
also provides an audit trail for subsequent scrutiny. 
Meeting the Criteria 
Operation logs, operational reviews and case histories should all be examined. The results and 
analysis of this examination must be added to the organisational memory through the NIM 
process and in line with control strategy objectives or emerging high risk issues. 
 
Agencies should have in place systems for recording, monitoring and reviewing tactical 
decisions, operational plans and results to ensure that operational and intelligence tasking is 





Semi-structured Interview Protocol 
 
Theme 1 
 Does the (name of the public service) comply with the NIM? 
 Do you as a (role, e.g. investigator) comply with the NIM?  
 (If so,)  In what way? (supplementary question to a closed response) 
 (If not,)  Why not? (supplementary) 
 
Theme 2 
 Do you believe the model impacts upon the risk of vulnerability to fraud within (name 
of public service)? 
 (If so,)   In what way? (supplementary) 
 (If not,)  Why not? (supplementary) 
 
Theme 3 
 Do you believe that the NIM impacts upon partnership and/or joint working for (name 
of public service)? 
 (If so,)   In what way? (supplementary) 
 (If not,)  Why do you think this is? (supplementary) 
 
Theme 4 
 Do you consider the NIM to be a productive business model for (name of public 
service)? 
 (If so,)   In what way? (supplementary) 
 (If not,)  Why not? (supplementary) 
 
Theme 5 
 Does the NIM impact upon your investigation efficiency and effectiveness within 
(name of public service)? 
 (If so,)   In what way? (supplementary) 
 (If not,)  Why not? (supplementary) 
 
Theme 6 






Police National Intelligence Model 5x5x5 Grading System  
 
A number of law enforcement agencies and the police service use the National Intelligence 
Model. It allows intelligence to be correctly evaluated where the original source is not made 
known to the recipient. It is sometimes known informally as the 5x5x5 system.  The model 
grades the source of the intelligence by 5 letters, A to E, it evaluates the information as a score 
of 1 to 5 and on the same basis indicates who has access to the information (HMRC, 2009)  
 
The 5x5x5 scheme is similar to the Admiralty (or NATO) system, but with the addition of a 
handling code to indicate conditions for the dissemination of the information. The Admiralty 
system is a 6x6 scheme. (Ratcliffe, 2008: 36) 
 
 
SOURCE EVALUATION (ACPO, 2011) 
 
A: ALWAYS RELIABLE 
 
There is no doubt of the authenticity, trustworthiness and competence of the source, or the 
information is supplied by an individual who, in the past, has proved to be reliable in all 
instances. Examples might include technical deployments and information known directly to 
law enforcement officers. Information in the past has always been 100% accurate. 
 
B: MOSTLY RELIABLE 
 
Sources where information in the past has, in the majority of instances, proved to be reliable. 
Examples might include contacts and informants whose information has proved correct the vast 
majority of times but not enough to be graded as ‘A’ 
 
C: SOMETIMES RELIABLE 
 
Sources where information in the past has in the majority of instances, proved unreliable. 
Information has in the past proved correct but the majority of times has been incorrect. 
Information should not be acted on without corroboration. It might also include the product of 





Examples might include persons who have routinely proved unreliable in the past, or where 
there is some doubt about the authenticity, trustworthiness or competency, for example is 
known second or third hand. 
 
E: UNTESTED SOURCE 
 
This does not necessarily mean the information is unreliable but should nonetheless be treated 




EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
 
1: KNOWN TO BE TRUE WITHOUT RESERVATION 
Examples might include the product of technical deployments or events witnessed by a law 
enforcement officer. However, special care should be taken in assuming that everything heard 
through the use of technical equipment is ‘A1’. Whilst it will be an accurate record of what the 
officer heard, the intelligence itself may still not be accurate, for example the source may be 
repeating hearsay or may be lying. 
 
2: THE INFORMATION IS KNOWN PERSONALLY TO THE SOURCE BUT IS NOT 
KNOWN PERSONALLY TO THE REPORTING OFFICER 
 
3: THE INFORMATION IS NOT KNOWN PERSONALLY TO THE SOURCE BUT IS 
CORROBORATED BY INFORMATION ALREADY RECORDED.  
 
4:  THE INFORMATION IS NOT KNOWN PERSONALLY TO THE SOURCE AND 
CANNOT BE CORROBORATED IN ANY WAY. 
 
5: SUSPECTED TO BE FALSE 
Action should be taken with extreme care and reliable corroboration sought. Whilst it may be 
desirable to record such intelligence onto the intelligence system it must be assessed for the 







Permits dissemination to other law enforcement and prosecuting agencies within EEA and EU 
compatible (no special conditions), for example the Serious Organised Crime Agency. 
 
CODE 2: 
Permits dissemination to UK non-prosecuting parties, e.g. credit card companies and 
commercial organisations. Subject to authority levels and records being maintained. Special 
conditions for dissemination can be endorsed. 
 
CODE 3: 
Permits dissemination to Non-EEA law enforcement agencies, where no adequate safeguards 
for the rights of individuals exist, only on the grounds of substantial public interest and only 
after additional risk assessment. Special conditions for dissemination can be endorsed. 
 
CODE 4: 
Permits dissemination but only within the originating organisation. 
 
CODE 5: 
Dissemination can only be made in compliance with the special conditions imposed. These 
conditions should be detailed. Any further dissemination of the content will only take place 





The intelligence is generally evaluated and graded using a single letter and two numbers as in 
the following example: E,5,1 (untested source, suspected to be false and may be circulated to 
other law enforcement and prosecuting agencies)  the abbreviation EEA means European 
Economic Area, e.g. part of the European Union. 
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Appendix 6 
The Proposed Public Service Intelligence Process (PSIP)  
Introduction 
The PSIP process (Figure A5.1) attempts to remove the complexity of the NIM in response to 
the declared requirements of a significant proportion of research subjects: “we need a simplified 
version …”  (RS09).  It only focuses on four entities: the referral, the Intelligence Unit (IU), the 
Investigation Manager (IM) and the Investigator.  This provides a cycle of activity that requires 
all referrals to initially go to the IU; thus preserving the integrity of intelligence-led 
investigation; and organisational probity in accessing personal data.  The processes and 
mechanisms within the IU must conform to the Intelligence Cycle, but will depend upon the 
resources available and the embedded agency procedures - these are unlikely to be changed 
because of external ‘intelligence process demands’.  However, an essential element, and one 
that is generally acknowledged, is that IU staff should be properly trained to ensure that they are 
aware and compliant with the regulatory demands of the criminal justice system (including 
evidential integrity, RIPA and the DPA); and familiar with the work of the investigator (to 
ensure that the service and products they provide are ‘fit for purpose’). In addition, each IU 
complement must include one qualified member of staff capable of undertaking analysis and 
delivering the products outlined in the Intelligence Cycle, i.e. developing inferences, identifying 
information gaps and making recommendations relevant to the task.  Following information 
gathering, process and analysis, the intelligence products of the IU (ideally in a referral and 
intelligence file or docket), are directed to the Investigation Manager (IM).  It upon this 
individual that, on the basis of the intelligence products, the tactical decision making relies and 
who determines the initial allocation of work; the monitoring and quality supervision; and 
ultimately the ‘disposal’ e.g. termination of the investigation, administrative sanction, or 
prosecution.  Ideally, the IM should be supported by a representative of the IU, such as an 
Intelligence Officer or Analyst – this will be unlikely on a daily basis, but may be possible on a 
monthly cycle.  It should be acknowledged that the IU and the IM may be (and generally are) 
geographically separated unlike the more convenient divisional communities enjoyed by the 
police.  
 
The IM is required to allocate the referral, ideally selecting an investigator with the appropriate 
experience, and capacity to undertake the investigation, based upon the accompanying 
intelligence.  Once the referral has been allocated, the investigator can communicate directly 
with the IU (hence the dotted and arrowed line) requesting intelligence support as the case 
progresses.  With the employment of an appropriate Case Management System, the IM has the 
facility and opportunity to provide effective monitoring and supervision of the investigation.  
Should the case develop and it transpire that it is serious, organised, complex, serial or series, 
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the Investigator can raise a ‘follow up’ referral and forward it to the IU for further development 
– thus completing the PSIP Investigation Process cycle. 
 
Intelligence-led investigation and decision making through tasking and coordination provides 
the core doctrine of the NIM.  For any revised model to remain compatible with the NIM and 
support partnership it must acknowledge, and include, a similar tasking process – decision 
making based upon intelligence products.  The NIM tasking and coordination process has been 
previously described in Chapter 2.  Even a cursory review of the NIM literature on the subject 
should clearly demonstrate that it will appear complex, employing unfamiliar terms and this was 
revealed during the research, this complexity is not reduced by the ACPO (2005: 74-84) 
guidance or subsequent advice.  The NIM version of tasking and coordination does not fit most 
public services and the descriptive products tend to confound the managers and investigators – 
many of the products simply do not exist within many of the public services.  The use of terms 
such as ‘control strategy’, ‘intelligence requirement’ and ‘tactical menu’ are of minimal 
relevance to public service agencies and it is therefore proposed that the PSIP excludes them.  
Essentially, the public service require a much simplified and revised version of tasking, catering 
for their discrete need and this precludes much of what the NIM requirements.  I am proposing, 
in order to support a degree of common parlance and joint working, that agencies should retain 
the same titles, as described in the NIM guidance, for the two different types of groups 
necessary for intelligence based decision making.  For smaller agencies this requires the 
maintenance of a sole strategic tasking and coordination group (ST&CG), with a select senior 
management membership, supported by an analyst and, on the basis of the intelligence 
products, to deliver the organisational direction regarding intelligence focus and investigation 
activity to reduce loss through crime.  The ST&CG should, usefully, sit twice a year, but the 
frequency of assembly should be determined by the chair.  Critical to the process is that all 
strategic direction regarding the reduction of loss are clearly communicate in plain language to 
their Intelligence Unit staff and investigators.  To provide three illustrative examples, the DWP 
ST&CG may direct intelligence and investigative for the first-half of 2012 on fraud relating to 
‘Working and Claiming’.  The ST&CG for the IPS may direct focus on ‘The Day of the Jackal’ 
fraud (as in ‘Operation Wisdom’ and the series offences of hi-jacking deceased infant identity); 
or alternatively the ST&CG for the DSA may direct focus on ‘driving instructor fraud’ 
(falsifying ADI certification).   
 
In public services each investigation team, would be represented by a tactical tasking and co-
ordination groups (TT&CG).  The TT&CG would be chaired by the IM, comprise of selected 
investigative staff and be supported by an Analyst or Intelligence Officer – this meeting would 
not be the same as a case conference (reviewing an individual or collection of investigations), 
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but would endeavour to put any strategic directions into practice; and make resource decisions, 
and allocations, on the basis of intelligence products to reduce loss.  The ideal frequency would 
be once a fortnight, but this should be determined by the chair and the availability of a suitable 
IU representative to source and deliver the appropriate intelligence products to support tactical 
and operational decision making.  All public services are hierarchical and the TT&CG meetings 
provide a mechanism of accountability upon the IM, it also provides an opportunity for that 
individual’s line managers to, occasionally, attend the TT&CG, review the proceedings; ensure 
compliance with ST&CG direction and guidance; and to provide support and feedback. 
 
Guidance 
This Public Service Intelligence Process (PSIP) guidance is for public services with an 
investigative capability and is designed to support intelligence-led investigation and facilitate 
effective joint working, acting as a supplement to the National intelligence Model (NIM) 
employed by the UK police services.  This document can be read in association with the NIM, 
when specific direction is required regarding specialist activities, e.g. test purchases; ACPO 
(Centrex and NPIA) and Home Office guidance and best practice is also available from the 
following publications:  
 
 RIPA; CPIA; PACE; DPA; Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) 
 ACPO: Anti-Corruption Advisory Group (Vetting Protocol Of Intelligence Staff) 
 ACPO: Codes Of Practice on the Management of Police Information 
 ACPO: Code of Practice for Data Protection 
 ACPO: Deployment Standards for Technical Support In Tackling Volume Crime 
 ACPO: Guidance on the Management of Police Information 
 ACPO: Guidance on the National Briefing Model 
 ACPO: HMR Memorandum of Understanding Disclosure of Information 
 ACPO: Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures Manual 
 ACPO: PNC Compliance Strategy 
 ACPO: Practice Advice on Prison Intelligence and Related Matters 
 ACPO: Practice Advice on Resources and the People Assets of NIM 
 ACPO: Practice Advice on Tasking and Co-Ordination 
 ACPO/ACPOS/HMC: Manual of Standards for Accessing Communication Data 
 ACPO/Centrex: Guidance on the National Intelligence Model 
 ACPO & HMRC: Standards for the Deployment of Undercover Officers 
 ACPO & HMRC: Standards for Deployment of Test Purchases and Decoy Officers 
 ACPO & HMRC: Standards for Covert Human Intelligence Sources 
 ACPO & HMRC: Standards In Covert Investigations; Manual of Surveillance 
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The Public Service Intelligence Process 
A ‘referral’, in terms of the public service investigations, relates to any information relating to a 
‘customer’, potential customer or staff member that provides evidence or suspicion of 
irregularity – this may not result in a criminal investigation as it may be categorised as a system 
error or loss. 
 
 
Figure A6.1: The Public Service Intelligence Process 
 
Intelligence-led Investigation 
The PSIP will utilise the Intelligence Cycle (see Figure 1.2), ensuring that intelligence-led 
investigation is employed in all criminal investigations.  This will also ensure that there will 
always be a recorded (collection plan) purpose and auditable trail for data mining; system 


























The constituents of a collection plan should include: 
 
 Define your objective employing the ‘SMART’ acronym: specific, measurable, 
achievable, realistic and timed. 
 Identify and record key intelligence sources 
 Define method and mechanisms of collection, e.g. system checks, PNC, etc. 
 Define format of collection, e.g. electronic, case management system, intelligence 
folio/docket, etc. 
 Identify contact points, this may include identified individuals as specific points of 
contact (SPOC) in other organisations and subject to conditions within an agreed 
Memorandum of Understanding 
 Identify and record powers/authority to collect information 
 Obtain and record consents/authority where necessary 
 Specify deadlines and contact point 
 
Intelligence sharing 
All external intelligence sharing with, and requests from, other agencies, organisations or the 
police service, must be dealt with by the Intelligence Unit in accordance with established policy, 
procedures including any prevailing Memoranda of Understanding / Service Level Agreements 
– observing agreed authority levels. The 5x5x5 format must be employed (see Appendix 4). 
 
The ‘asset’ requirements 
The PSIP requires agencies and organisation to have dedicated ‘assets’ to support intelligence-
led investigation and to facilitate joint working, these can be described as ‘people’, ‘system’, 
‘knowledge’ and ‘source’ assets.  These should include: 
 
 trained investigators, intelligence officers and a crime analysts (people);  
 secure intelligence and data storage (system); 
 appropriate training, policy and procedure regarding ‘knowing the business’, the law 
and regulation relating to investigation (knowledge); and 
 an intelligence unit (source). 
 
The PSIP: Referrals 
A referral will form the foundation of an enquiry and investigation, as such it is a critical feature 
and must be accorded sensitive handling and subject to close supervision.  All referrals, from 
whatever source, must be directed to the Intelligence Unit.  The only alternative will be if the 
referral is considered to be sensitive or relate to a member of staff or associate, in which case it 
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will be referred to the Internal Security Unit Manager.  All referrals must be recorded on a 
secure system, reviewed and processed in accordance with established organisational policy and 
procedure to ensure that consequent action is lawful and that evidential integrity is maintained.  
Following review and preliminary intelligence gathering, the Intelligence Unit Manager or 
Referral Manager must decide whether to allocate a referral for operational investigation, 
together with all intelligence products.  Referrals, intelligence searches and analytical products 
are disclosable for the purpose of the CPIA and must, therefore, be properly recorded, 
maintained and capable of audit.  When referrals are delivered from a confidential source, or are 
of a sensitive nature, the referral should be graded (using the 5x5x5 system) with an appropriate 
restrictive handling code. 
 
The PSIP: The Intelligence Unit 
The Intelligence Unit must have a dedicated Intelligence Manager or Referral Manager who is 
responsible for all intelligence collection, collation and evaluation in response to referrals; 
progressing investigations; and legitimate information requests.  The Intelligence Unit must 
maintain a secure recording system and is responsible for probity with regards to all intelligence 
issues.  The Intelligence Unit must have a trained criminal analyst as a member of its 
complement who will be tasked by the Intelligence Manager to provide support for senior 
managers and all investigative staff.  Trained Intelligence Officers are responsible for 
progressing all intelligence gathering, collation and evaluation; preserving evidential integrity; 
and providing support for analysts and all investigative staff.   
 
The PSIP: The Investigation Manager 
The Investigation Unit must have a dedicated Investigation Manager who is responsible for the 
allocation of all referrals from the Intelligence Unit, and the supervision of all criminal 
investigations undertaken by operational investigators.  Monitoring and supervision must be 
supported by an established case management system capable of documenting and verifying all 
investigative activity, providing evidential integrity, and an auditable record of compliance to 
organisational policy and processes.  The Investigation Manager will chair a regular tactical 
tasking and co-ordination group (TT&CG) meeting to improve resource-based decision making 
in accordance with direction and guidance from the strategic tasking and co-ordination group 
and the intelligence (analytical) products, and to monitor and provide direction on ‘live’ cases.   
 
The frequency of TT&CG meeting should be at least once a month and it should be supported 
by the Intelligence Unit criminal analyst, who will provide a review on the profile and volume 
of the agency referrals; current trends relating to criminal risk; and a summary of good practice 
resulting from operational analysis.  The Investigation Manager will be responsible for any 
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decision regarding the termination of an investigation as in ‘no further action’; engagement in 
joint working; administrative sanction e.g. cancellation or recovery; and the referral to a legal 
department or seeking police prosecution. 
 
The PSIP: The Investigator 
Trained operational investigators must be under the direct supervision of an Investigation 
Manager.  On allocation of a referral, they are responsible for expeditiously and lawfully 
progressing investigations and recording all investigative activity on an established case 
management system.  They must direct all intelligence requests, analytical requirements and 
‘information requests’, e.g. from outside agencies, to the Intelligence Manager in accordance 
with agreed organisational procedures.  The investigator must identify and inform the 
Investigation Manager as soon as it becomes evident that a decision is necessary regarding the 
consequence of an investigation including: the termination of an investigations e.g. ‘no further 
action’; engagement in joint working; administrative sanction, e.g. cancellation or recovery; or 
the referral to a legal department or seeking police prosecution. 
 
Strategic Tasking & Co-ordinating Group  
There must be at least one strategic tasking and coordination group (ST&CG), chaired by a 
senior manager and supported by an Intelligence Unit criminal analyst.  It is recommended that 
the group includes at least one Investigation Manager and one Intelligence Manager (these posts 
can be rotated) to support operational decision making.  The purpose of the ST&CG is, on the 
basis of the intelligence products, to deliver the organisational direction regarding intelligence 
focus and investigation activity to reduce loss through crime.  The ST&CG should, ideally, sit 
twice a year, but the frequency of assembly should be determined by the chair.  Critical to the 
process is that all strategic direction regarding the reduction of loss are clearly communicated in 
plain language to the Intelligence Unit staff and Investigators.   
 
The PSIP: Summary of Process  
The PSIP ensures intelligence-led investigation.  Through tasking and co-ordination it provides 
a transparent and recorded mechanism for strategic considerations of crime and risk reduction to 
influence and provide direction for all tactical and operational criminal investigative activity.  
No perceived guidance from, or interpretation of, this model or the National Intelligence Model 
can override the paramount demand for complete integrity and probity in criminal investigation.  
Investigation Managers and Intelligence Managers must ensure strict compliance with 
established guidance, codes of practice; legislative and regulatory requirements relating to 
investigation and the criminal justice system.  The transition of a referral through to an 
investigation should be regulated by published policy and procedure.  Investigative activity and 
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decision making must properly documented and employ a dedicated and secure recording 
system, capable of interrogation by authorised staff and audit.  The tasking and co-ordination 
process should be moderated to ensure that investigative staff have the capacity to expedite 
enquiries, maintaining appropriate ‘duty of care’, with regards to individual rights, and capable 






1. Non-police public services that have ‘adopted’ the NIM should undertake a comprehensive 
review, including the attitudes and activities of operational staff, to establish their level of 
conformity with the ‘Guidance’ and minimum standards.  This will inform them as to 
whether ‘adoption’ of the NIM has genuinely contributed towards standardisation of process 
and procedure with the police.  Although only a partial solution to the problems associated 
with ‘data anxieties’, isolationism, diverse objectives and perceived imparity, in the absence 
of such commonality, productive intelligence sharing and partnership may prove elusive.   
 
2. Having assessed the level of conformity (or compliance) with the NIM ‘Guidance’, establish 
the actual level of intelligence-led decision making and investigation.  ‘Adoption’ of the NIM 
may not necessarily have resulted in increased efficiency and effectiveness decision making 
or investigations, but may have improved supplementary issues, e.g. governance in 
intelligence acquisition, storage and application.   
 
3. For public services that have not yet ‘adopted’ the NIM, but are considering it - careful 
deliberation is necessary together with a comprehensive understanding of the requirements 
for conformity outlined in the ‘Guidance’ and minimum standards.  Non police agencies are 
not subject to legislative compliance or an inspection regime, providing latitude with 
regards to ‘asset requirements’ and the recommended processes.  However, selective 
application may frustrate both commonality of investigative practice (with police) and 
standardisation, potentially frustrating the objective for adoption and not delivering the 
potential benefits of the model. 
 
4. Public services intending to adopt the NIM (engage with Recommendation 3 above), should 
consult and clearly communicate with their investigation staff before adoption; 
comprehensively establish the necessary ‘investment’ and process ‘requirements’ to achieve 
the level of conformity with the model that meet the agency objectives; and employ a 
formulated change plan and qualified change manager for implementation.   
 
5. Consider an alternative intelligence-led investigation process.  The NIM may appear complex 
to agency staff and the terminology employed may appear partial (to police) and confusing.  
Conformity to the model requires substantial investment and modification to traditional 
public service investigation processes.  Without proper investment; support and contribution 
from senior managers; the awareness, understanding and support of investigation and 





ACPO (1975). Report of the Subcommittee on Criminal Intelligence (The Baumber Report). 
London: Association of Chief Police Officers. 
 
ACPO (1978). Third Report of the Working Party on a Structure of Criminal Intelligence above 
Force Level (the Pearce Report). London: Association of Chief Police Officers. 
 
ACPO (1986). Report on the Working Party on Operational Intelligence (the Ratcliffe Report).  
London: Association of Chief Police Officers. 
 
ACPO (1996). Report on International, National and Inter-force Crime. London: Association of 
Chief Police Officers. 
 
ACPO (2004). ACPO National Intelligence Model: Manual of Guidance. Wyboston: 
Association of Chief Police Officers: NIM Team 
 
ACPO (2005). Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine. Cambourne: National Centre for 
Policing. 
 
ACPO (2006). Guidance on the National Briefing Model. Wyboston: Association of Chief 
Police Officers /Centrex  
 
ACPO (2008). Practice Advice on Analysis,. Wyboston: SOC NPIA 
 
ACPO (2008). Submission of the Police Reform Green Paper: ‘The Future of Policing’ London: 
ACPO Retrieved March 21, 2011 from: 
http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/Data/ACPO_submission_re_Green_Paper_20March_20
08%PUBLIC%29.pdf    
 
ACPO (2011). Information Sharing Agreement Association of Chief Police Officers  




ACPO Centrex (2005). Guidance on the National Intelligence Model.  Retrieved November 30, 
2008, from the UK Home Office website: www.acpo.police.uk/asp/police/Data/nim2005.pdf. 
ACPO Centrex. (2007). Practice Advice: Introduction to Intelligence–led Policing.  Wyboston: 
Centrex/NCPE Centrex 2005 (p. 8). 
 
Agocs, C. (1997). Institutionalized resistance to organizational change: denial, inaction and 
repression. Journal of Business Ethics, 16(9): 913-917 
175 
 
Amey, P., Hale, C. & Uglow, S. (1996). Development and Evaluation of a Crime Management 
Model: Police Research Series Paper 18.  London: Home Office. 
 
Ascoli, D. (1979). The Queen’s Police: The Origins and Development of the Metropolitan 
Police, 1829-1979. London: Hamish Hamilton. 
 
Ashby, D. I., Irving, B. L., Longley, P. A. (2007). Police reform and the new public 
management paradigm, matching technology to the rhetoric. Environment and Planning C 
Government and Policy 25(2), 159-175 
 
Asthana, A. (2010, October 17). Benefit and tax cheats face new clampdown. The Observer p. 
17 
 
Atkinson, P.A ., Coffey, A.J., Delamont, S., Lofland, J. and Lofland, L.H. (2001). Handbook of 
ethnography. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
 





Auerbach, C.F. & Silverstein, L.B. (2003). Qualitative Data: An Introduction to Coding and 
Analysis. New York: New York University Press. 
 
Banton, M. (1986). Investigating Robbery.  Aldershot: Gower. 
 
Bayley, D. H. (1994). Police for the Future.  Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Bell J (1999). Doing your Research Project in Education and Social Science Buckingham: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Berelson, B (1971). Content Analysis in Communication Research (2
nd
 ed.). Glencoe, Ill: Free 
Press  
 
Bernhardt, P. (1994). “I want it fast, factual and accurate – tailoring competitive intelligence to 
executive needs”. Long Range Planning, vol 27, no 1: 12-24, cited by J.Grieve (2004). 
“Developments in UK criminal intelligence”, in J.H. Ratcliffe (2004) Strategic Thinking in 
Criminal Intelligence. Annandale, NSW: The Federation Press (25-36) 
 
Bichard, Sir M. (2004). The Bichard Inquiry Report (June 2004). London: HMSO. 
 
176 
Blair, I., (2003) Report in Committee to the Metropolitan Police Authority retrieved January 19, 
2010 from http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2003/030227/15/ 
 
Boswell, G. (2000). Violent children and adolescents: asking the questions why. London: Wiley 
Blackwell 
 
Bowling, B. and Foster, J. (2002). Policing and the Police.  In M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. 
Reiner (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (3
rd
 ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1011-14 
 
Box, G. (2006). Improving almost anything. London: Wiley-Blackwell 
 
Boyzatzis, R.E. (1998). Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code 
Development. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Bratingham, P.J. (1976). A conceptual model of crime prevention, Crime and Delinquency, 22: 
284-98 
 
Bratton, W. (1998). Turnaround: How America’s Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic, New 
York: Random House 
 
Brogan, M & Nijhar, P. (2005). Community Policing: International Concepts. Cullompton: 
Willan 
 
Brooks, S. (2010). What gets measured gets done. Retrieved on March, 29, 2011 from 
http://www.guardianpublic.co.uk/police-targets-crime-brooks-comment 
 
Brown, S. (2007). The meaning of criminal intelligence. International Journal of Police Science 
and Management, 9(4) 336-340. 
 
Burnes, B. (2009). Managing Change. Harlow: Pearson Educational 
 
Burrows, J. & Lewis, H. (1998). Directing Patrolling: a study of uniformed policing. London: 
Home Office Research & Planning Unit 
 
Businessdictionary. (2009). Business Models. Retrieved on January 10, 2009 from 
www.businessdictionary.com/definitions/business-model.html.  
 
Businessdictionary. (2011). ‘Policy’: definitions (3). Retrieved on July, 2 2011 from 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/policy.html 
 
Butterfield, R., Edwards, C. and Woodall, J. (2004). The new public management and the UK 
Police Service, Public Management Review, 6(3), pp. 395-415. 
177 
 
Cabinet Office. (2002). Identity Fraud. Retrieved on April 2, 2010 from 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/may/id-fraud-report.pdf  
 
Cabinet Office, (2011a): The cost of cyber crime.  Retrieved on March 1, 2011 from 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/cost-of-cyber-crime  
 
Cabinet Office. (2011b). Eliminating Public Sector Fraud: The Counter Fraud Taskforce Interim 




Carney, T.F. (1973). Content Analysis. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press. 
 
Carson, D. (2007), Models of Investigation. In T. Newburn, T. Williamson & A. Wright (Eds.), 
Handbook of Criminal Investigation. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 407-425 
 
Carter, D.L. and Carter, J.G. (2009). Intelligence-Led Policing: Conceptual and functional 
considerations for public policy. Criminal Justice Policy Review. 20(3), 310 
 
Carter, D.L., and Carter, J.G. (2009) Intelligence-Led Policing: Conceptual and functional 
considerations for public policy: Criminal Justice Review, cited in J.R. Ratcliffe (2011) 
Intelligence-led policing; Anticipating risk and influencing action. In Press, IALEIA 
 
Chan J. (1997). Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
Chatterton, M., Humphrey, C., and Watson, A.J. (1996). On the Budgetary Beat. London: 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
 
Christopher, S. (2003). A practitioner’s perspective of UK strategic intelligence. In J.H. 
Ratcliffe (Ed.) Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. Annandale, NSW: The Federation 
Press 177-193 
 
CIFAS. (2010). Identity fraud levels.  Retrieved on November 9, 2010 from 
http://www.cifas.org.uk/default.asp?edit_id=1031-57 
 
Clarke, R.V. (2004). “Technology, criminology and crime science”. European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1), 55-63 
 
Cohen, N. (1995, June 4). What causes crime? The Independent. Retrieved on August 11, 2009 
from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/what-causes-crime-1584969.html  
178 
 
Coleman, R. (1999). Recovery: An Alien Concept. Gloucester: Handsell Publishing. 
 
Collier, P. (2005). Competing Modes of Control in Policing. PMA, 4: ISS. 1-12. 
 
Collins, G. (2006). Fraud Investigation. DWP Internal memorandum (GPMS) 
 




Colorado State University (2009). Writing at CSU’: Methods of Conceptual Analysis.  
Retrieved May 4, 2009 from http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/content/pop3a.cfm,  
 
Communities Scotland (2011). Partnership Working: What are the challenges?  Retrieved on 




Cope, N. (2003). Crime analysis: principles and practice. In T. Newburn (Ed.) Handbook of 
Policing.  Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 340-362 
 
Cope, N. (2004). Intelligence-led policing or policing led intelligence? British Journal of 
Criminology, 44, 188-203. 
 
Crotty, M. (1998). The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the 
Research Process. London: Sage. 
 
Currie, E., Hogg. R. and Carrington, K. (2002). Critical Criminology: Issues, Debates, 
Challenges. London, Willan Publishing 
 
Critchley, T. (1978). A History of Police in England & Wales. London: Constable. 
 
Davies, M. B. (2007). Doing a successful research project using qualitative or quantitative 
methods. New York: Palgrave MacMillian 
 
DCA. (2006). Department for Constitutional Affairs: Information Sharing Vision Statement. 





DCFS. (2009). Department for Children, Schools and Families: Information Sharing: Further 
guidance on legal issues. Retrieved on July 4, 2011 from 
https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/Info-Sharing_legal-issues.pdf 
 
De Lint, W. (2006). Reflections on Scholarship, Policing & Society. Intelligence in Policing 
and Security, 16(1), 1-6 
 
Dent, E. B. and Galloway Goldberg, S. (1999). Challenging resistance to change. Journal of 
Applied Behavioural Science 35(1), 25-41 
 
Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln Y.S. (Eds.). (2000a). Handbook of Qualitative Research (2
nd
 ed.). 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Derrida, J. (1972-1982). Margins of Philosophy. trans. A. Bass. Brighton and Chicago: 
Harvester Press and University of Chicago Press 
 
de Quiros, A. C, Aranda-Mena, G., Edward, P. and Calder, J. (2007). Research Model for 




Doherty, T. L. & Horne, T. (2001). Managing Public Services: Implementing Changes – A 
Thoughtful Approach. London: Routledge 
 
Douglas, D. (2003). Grounded Theories of Management: Methodological Review. Management 
Research News, 26, 5, 44-60 
 
De Dreu, C. K. W. and West, M. A. (2001). Minority dissent and team innovation: the 
importance of participation in decision making. Journal of Applied Psychology. 86, 1191-1201 
 
DSA. (2010). Driving Standards Agency Annual Reports and Accounts. London: HMSO 
 
DSA. (2011). Driving Standards Agency Annual Reports and Accounts. Retrieved on May 29, 
2011 from http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/dsa-annual-report-accounts/dsa-ara-2010-11.pdf 
 
Durham Police. (2011). Durham Constabulary: Force Strategies; Intelligence Strategy. 
Retrieved on May 29, 2011 from http://www.durham.police.uk/reports/force_strategies.php 
 
Dussault, R. (1999). Jack Maple: Betting on Intelligence. Government Technology, March 31, 




DWP. (2005). The National Intelligence Model: Minimum Standards. Unpublished and internal 
document: Crown Copyright (GPMS) 
 
DWP. (2006). Internal memorandum and draft guidance (GC/SEO). GPMS protected 
document. 
 
DWP. (2008). A Guide to The Department for Work and Pensions. Retrieved on December 9, 
2009 from http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/dwp-ohs-tender-guide.pdf 
 
DWP. (2009). Investigative Policy and Procedure, GPMS protected documents 
 
DWP. (2010a). Department for Work and Pensions: Annual Report 2009/10. London: The 
Stationery Office. Subsequently retrieved on February 2, 2011 from 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/2010-annual-report-social-fund.pdf 
 
DWP. (2010b). Tackling fraud and error in the benefit and tax credits systems. Retrieved on 
March28, 2011 from http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/tackling-fraud-and-error.pdf 
 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Lowe, A. (2002). Management Research: An Introduction, 
(2nd ed.). London: Sage Publications 
 
Eck, J. E. (1982). Solving Crimes: Investigation of Burglary and Robbery.  Washington DC: 
Police Executive Research Forum. 
 
Eck, J.E. (2006). “Science values, and problem oriented policing: Why problem oriented 
policing?” in D. Weisburd and A.A. Braga, (eds.), Police innovation: Contrasting Perspectives, 
New York: Cambridge University press, 117-132 
 
Eck, J.E. and Rosenbaum, D.R. (1994). The New Police Order: Effectiveness, Equity and 
Efficiency in Community Policing. In D.R. Rosenbaum (ed.), The Challenge of Community 
Policing: Testing the Promises. London: Sage. 
 
Ekblom, P. and Heal, K. (1982). The Police Response to Calls from the Public: Research and 
Planning Unit Number 9.  London: Home Office. 
 
Emsley, C. (2002). The history of crime and crime control institutions.  In M. Maguire, R. 
Morgan and R. Reiner (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 57-76 
 
Emsley, C. (2007). Community Policing/Policing and Communities: Some Historical 
Perspectives. Policing (2007) 1 (2): 235-243 
 
181 




FAS. (2010). Intelligence. Retrieved on June 11, 2010 from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-0.pdf 
 
Fernet, J. & Spenlehauer, V. (2009). Does policing the risk society hold the road risk? British 
Journal of Criminology, 49, 150-164. 
 
Fisher, J. (2003). Process of Change: introduction to personal construct psychology.  Retrieved 
on April 4, 2009 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/19368940/Process-of-Personal-Change 
 
Flanagan, R. (2008). The Review of Policing: Final Report. London: HMSO. 
 
Flick, U. (2002). An introduction to qualitative research (2
nd
 ed.). London: Sage. 
 
Flood, B., (2004). Strategic aspects of the UK National Intelligence Model.  In J.H Ratcliffe 
(Ed.) Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. Sydney, Federation Press, 37-52 
 
Flood, B., Felton, A. and McCann, D. (1998). Kent Policing Model. cited in A. James The 
Influence of Intelligence-led policing Models on investigative Policy and Practice in 
Mainstream Policing 1993-2007: Division, Resistance and Investigative Orthodoxy.  
Unpublished PhD thesis: London School of Economics 
 
Flood, B. and Gaspar, R. (2009). Strategic aspects of the UK National Intelligence Model. In J. 
Ratcliffe, (ed.) Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. Sydney: Federation Press, 54 
 
Fraud Review Team. (2006). Fraud Review: Final Report. London: Fraud Review Team. 
Retrieved on August 1, 2009 from http://www.lslo.gov.uk/pdf/fraudreview.pdf.  
 
Friedmann, R.R. (1996). Community Policing: Some Conceptual and Practical Considerations. 
Home Affairs Review, vol. XXXIV (No. 6): 114-23  
 
Gambling Commission. (2010). Intelligence. Retrieved on April 11, 2010 from  
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensing_compliance__enfo/intelligence.aspx 
 
Gerwitz, S. (2002, May). Achieving Success? Critical Reflections on New Labour’s Third Way 
agenda for education. Keynote Lecture to international meeting on Curriculum Politics, Oporto 
 
Ghauri, P. and Gronhaug, K. (2002). Research Methods in Business Studies: A Practical Guide. 
(2
nd
 ed.). Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
 
182 
Gilbert, N. (2001). Researching Social Life London: Sage 
 
Gill, P. (2000), Rounding up the Usual Suspects? Developments in Contemporary Law 
Enforcement Intelligence. Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Gilling, D. (1997). Crime Prevention, Theory, Policy and Practice. London: Routledge 
 
Gilling, D. (2006). Partnership and Crime Prevention.  In N.Tilley (Ed.). Handbook of Crime 
Prevention and Community Safety. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 734-756 
 
Glaser, B. (1992). Basics of grounded theory analysis. Mill Valley, CA, Sociology Press 
 
Glaser, B. and Strauss, A. (1967). A Discovery of Grounded Theory for Qualitative Research. 
Millvalley, CA, Sociology Press 
 
GMAC. (2010). Greater Manchester Against Crime. Retrieved on June 2, 2011 from 
http://www.gmac.org.uk/history.php 
 
GMPA. (2010). Partnership Working. Retrieved on April 9, 2011 from 
http://www.gmpa.gov.uk/about-5.htm  
 
Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem-Oriented Policing. New York: McGraw Hill. Retrieved on 
February 7, 2011 from http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/goldstein_book.pdf 
 
Goulding, C. (2002). Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
 
Government Office of the North East. (2010). Retrieved on February 19, 2011 from 
http://www.safeinteesvalley.org/dsc/index.html 
 
Grady, M.P. (1998). Qualitative and Action Research: A Practitioner Handbook. Bloomington: 
Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation. 
 
Grampian Police. (2010). National Intelligence Model.  Retrieved on April 4, 2010 from 
http://www.grampian.police.uk?About.aspx?id=204&pid=30;31;227  
 
Gregory, E, (1967). Unit Beat Policing – implications on the experiments and implications of a 
widespread adoption of the system. London: Home Office Police Research and Planning Unit 
 
Grieve, J. (2004). Developments in UK Criminal Intelligence. In J. Ratcliffe (Ed.) Strategic 
Thinking in Criminal Intelligence (2
nd




Grieve, J. (2009). “Developments in UK criminal intelligence” in J.H. Ratcliffe, (ed.), Strategic 
Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. Sydney: Federation Press 
 
Griffiths, W. (1997). Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society (Choice in Welfare). London: 
IEA Health & Welfare Unit 
 
Gurbich, C. (2004). New Approaches in Social Research. London: Sage 
 
Gwent Police. (2010). National Intelligence Model: Tasking and Co-ordination Policy. 
Retrieved on March, 2 2010 from 
http://www.gwent.police.uk/documents/f_o_i/policies/National_Intelligence_Model_Policy.pdf 
 
Hamlyn, D. W. (1995) Epistemology, history of. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Harfield, C. & Harfield, K. (2008). Intelligence: Investigation, Community and Partnership. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press 
 
Harfield, C. (2009) Paradigm not procedure: current challenges to police cultural incorporation 
of human rights in England and Wales. Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice 
Vol 4, pps 91-112 
 
Hart, J.M. (1996). The Management of Change in Police Organisations.  Retrieved on July 30, 
2011 from https://www.ncjrs.gov/policing/man199.htm 
 
Hayes, B. (1998). Applying Bratton to Britain: the need for a sensible compromise.  In M. 
Weatheritt (Ed.) Zero Tolerance Policing: What does it mean and is it right for policing in 
Britain? London: Police Foundation, 13-24 
 
Hedman, J. & Kalling, T. (2003). The business model concept: theoretical underpinnings and 
empirical illustrations.  European Journal of Information Systems. 12, 49-59. Retrieved 
February 20, 2009 from.http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/ejis/journal/v12/n1/full/3000446a.html  
 
Heisenberg, W. (1949), The Physical Principle of Quantum Theory. (Trans. C. Eckart & F. 
Hoyt), New York: Dover 
 
Herdale, G. & Stelfox, P. (2008). National Intelligence Model. In T. Newburn and P.Neyroud 
(ed.) Dictionary of Policing. Cullompton: Willan, 173-5 
 
Heulillet, H. (2001). Basse Politgue Haute Police. Paris: Fayard. 
 
Hiatt, J. M. (2006), ADKAR: A Model for Change in Business, Government and the Community. 
Loveland, Connecticut: Prosci Research 
184 
 
Hill, M. (2009). The Public Policy Process (5
th
 ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education 
 
HMIC. (1995) Kent County Constabulary Performance review Inspection – September 1995. 
London: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies 
 
HMIC. (1997). Policing with Intelligence: Criminal Intelligence. Retrieved on April 7, 2009 
from http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/HO/421/2/hmic/pintell.htm 
 
HMIC. (1998). Beating Crime: HMIC Thematic Inspection Report 1998.  London: Home 
Office. 
 
HMIC. (2001). Going Local: the BCU Inspection Handbook.  Retrieved on November 30, 2008, 
from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/bcuhandbook.pdf. 
 
HMIC. (2001). HMIC Primary Inspection: Grampian Police. Retrieved on April 3, 2009 from  
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2002/04/14566/3348 
 
HMIC. (2004). West Midlands Police E3 BCU Inspection. London: Home Office 
 
HMIC. (2006). Raising the Standard. London: Home Office. 
 
HMIC. (2008). Inspection and Reporting.  Unpublished Internal Document; not GPMS 
protected 
 
HMIC. (2009) Getting Together: A better deal for the public through joint working. Retrieved 
on October 11, 2011 from http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/getting-together-a-better-deal-for-the-
public-through-joint-working-20090608.pdf 
 
HMRC. (2009). Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. Retrieved on March 23, 2010 from 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/mlr3cmanual/mlr3c14000.htm  
 
Holdaway, S. (1983). Inside the British Police. London: Basil Blackwell Publishing 
 
Holdaway, S. (1989). Discovering Structure: Studies of the Police Occupational Culture. In M. 
Weatheritt (Ed.) Police Research: Some Future Prospects. London: Avebury 
 
Home Office. (1983). Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service: Circular 
114 London: Home Office 
 
Home Office. (1984). Circular 8/84: Crime Prevention. London HMSO 
 
185 
Home Office. (1998). Directing Patrol Work: A Study of Uniformed Policing; Home Office 
Research Study 99. Reviewed on August 3, 2011 from 
http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/hors/hors99.pdf   
 
Home Office. (1991). Morgan Report: Getting to Grips with Crime: a new Framework for 
Local Action. London: HMSO 
 
Home Office. (2001). Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead. London: HMSO. 
 
Home Office. (2002), The National Policing Plan 2003/2006.  London: HMSO. 
 
Home Office. (2006). Crime and Disorder Act.  Reviewed on June 28, 2010 from 
http:www.crimereduction.gov.uk/partnership60 
 
Home Office. (2006). Counting Rules. Retrieved on January 3, 2011. from 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/countrules  
 
Home Office. (2008) Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Crime in England and Wales 2007/08. C. 
London: HMSO. 
 
Home Office. (2008). Statistical Bulletin: Police Strength: England and Wales. S. Bullock and 
R. Mulchandani (Eds.). London: HMSO. 
 
Home Office. (2009). Crime Reduction: Legislation Crime and Disorder Act 1999, Section 17. 
Retrieved January 12, 2009, from 
http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/legislation26.htm. 
 
Home Office. (2009). Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000: Consolidating Orders and 
Codes of Practice. A Public Consultation Paper. London: HMSO 
 
Horvath, F., Meesig, R. T. and Lee, Y. H. (2001). National Survey of Police Policies and 
Practices Regarding the Criminal Investigations Process: Twenty-Five Years After Rand (Final 
Report [NCJRS 202902]). Washington DC: National Institute of Justice 
 
Hough, M. (1987). Thinking about Effectiveness.  British Journal of Criminology, 27, 70-79. 
 
Hough, M. (2006). Policing, and Legitimacy in Britain. In T.R Tyler, A. Braga, J. Fagan, T. 
Meares, R. Sampson, and C. Winship, (2007). Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International 
perspectives. N.Y.: Russell-Sage Foundation. 
 
Hough, M. (2008). Crime Statistics. In T. Newburn and P.Neyroud (Eds.), Dictionary of 
Policing. Cullompton: Willan, 65-7 
 
186 
Hough, M. and Maxfield, M. (2007). Surveying crime in the Twenty-first Century. Cullompton: 
Willan 
 
Hughes, G. (2006). The Politics of Crime and Community. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
 
Hughes, G. (2008). Crime and Disorder Act 1998.  In T. Newburn and P.Neyroud (Eds.) 
Dictionary of Policing. Cullompton: Willan, 56-7 
 
Hyunseok, J., Hoover, L.T. and Hee-Jong, J. (2010), An Evaluation of Compstat’s Effect on 
Crime: The Fort Worth Experience. Police Quarterly December 2010, vol. 13, no. 4, 387-412 
 
IACP. (2003). Criminal Intelligence, IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center.  
Retrieved on October 28, 2009 from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/CI_Paper_0703.pdf  
 
IACP. (2003). Criminal Intelligence. IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, 
Alexandria Viginia 
 
Improvement network. (2010). Ten top partner killers.  Retrieved on March 11, 2011 from 
http://www.improvementnetwork.gov.uk/imp/aio/11465 
 
Innes, M., Fielding, N. & Cope N. (2005). The appliance of science? The theory and practice of 
crime intelligence analysis”. British Journal of Criminology, 45, 39-57. 
 
Innes, M. & Sheptycki, J. (2004). From detection to disruption: intelligence and changing logic 
of police crime control in the United Kingdom. International Criminal Justice Review, 24, 1-24 
 
IntelligenceAnalysis.net. (2009). NIM and Intelligence. Retrieved on December 16, 2008 from  
http://www.intelligenceanalysis.net/index.htm. 
 
IntelligenceAnalysis.net. (2010). Dysfunction of NIM. Retrieved on November 16, 2010 from 
http://www.intelligenceanalysis.net/Dysfunction%20of%20NIM.htm 
 
Innes, M., Abbott, L., Lowe, T. and Roberts, C. (2009) ‘Seeing Like a Citizen: Field 
Experiments in Community Intelligence-Led Policing’. Police Practice and Research, 10(2) 99-
114. 
 
Investopedia. (2010). Business Model. Retrieved on July 24, 2010 from 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/businessmodel.asp#axzz1W1jdep5f 
 




IPS. (2005). Policy and Procedure. Explanatory document regarding Special Files WA/132: 
10/05, unpublished GMPS protected document 
 
IPS. (2007). Identity and Passport Service. Internal Memorandum KJ/7: 03/07, unpublished 
GMPS protected document 
 
IPS. (2008). Identity and Passport Service: Investigative Policy and Procedure. GPMS 
protected documents 
 
IPS. (2008). Identity and Passport Service: Common Sampling. Internal Document: GPMS 
Protected 
 
IPS. (2010). Identity and Passport Service: Annual Report 2009-2010, (HC 48). Retrieved on 
August 19, 2010 from www.official-document.gov.uk/document.hc1011/hc00/0048.pdf 
 
IPS. (2010). Identity and Passport Service: Home Office Identity and Passport Service Annual 




James, A. (2011). The Influence of Intelligence-led policing Models on investigative Policy and 
Practice in Mainstream Policing 1993-2007: Division, Resistance and Investigative Orthodoxy.  
Unpublished PhD thesis: London School of Economics 
 
Jimenez, G., Galeano, N., Najera, T., Aguirre, J.M., Rodriguez, C. & Molina, A. (2005). 
Methodology for Business Model Definition of Collaboratively Networked Organizations. IFIP 
International Federation for Information Processing. Volume 186/2005, pps 347-354. Boston: 
Springer. 
 
John Grieve Centre. (2010). Professor Emeritus John Grieve. Retrieved on March 4, 2010 from 
http://www.johngrievecentre.co.uk/johngrieve.htm 
 
John, T. & Maguire, M. (2002). The National Intelligence Model: key lessons from early 
research, Home Office Online Report 30/04, (London: HMSO). Retrieved on February 6, 2009, 
from http;//www.homeoffice.gov.uk/pdfs04/rdsolr30004.pdf. 
 
John, T. and Maguire, M. (2004). ‘The National Intelligence Model: Early Implementation 




John, T. and Maguire, M. (2004). The National Intelligence Model: key lessons from early 
research; Home Office Online Report 30/04. Retrieved on April 7, 2009 from 
http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/hordsolr/rdsolr3004.pdf 
 
John, T. & Maguire, M. (2007). Criminal Intelligence and the National Intelligence Model. In T. 
Newburn, T. Williamson & A. Wright (Eds.), Handbook of Criminal Investigation. Cullompton: 
Willan Publishing, 199-225 
 
John, T., Morgan, C. and Rogers, C. (2006). The Greater Manchester Against Crime 
Partnership Business Model: an Independent Evaluation. Glamorgan Centre for Criminology: 
University of Glamorgan 
 
Johnston, I. (2009, August 3). Unsustainable social security spending equal to a quarter of 
governmental budget. The Daily Telegraph (p. 7) 
 
Johnston, L. (1996). “What is vigilantism? British Journal of Criminology. 36, 2, Spring 220-
236 
 
Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (1997). Policing after the Act: Police and Magistrates Court Act 
1994. London : Policy Studies Institute 
 
Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2002). The transformation of policing: Understanding current trends 
in policing systems. British Journal of Criminology, 42, 129-146 
 
Jones, T. and Newburn, J. (2004) The transformation in policing? Understanding current trends 
in policing systems. In T. Newburn (Ed.). (2005). Policing Key Readings. Cullompton: Willan, 
773-750. 
 
Kant, I. (1781/1901). Critique of Pure Reason. London: George Bell & Sons 
 
Keane, M. & Kleiven, M.E. (2009). Risky Intelligence. International Journal of Police Science 
and Management, v. 11, 3, 324-333 
 
Kelling, G. L. (1988). Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution. Perspectives on 
Policing, No. 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 
 
Kelling, G. and Coles, C. (1998). Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing 
Crime in Our Communities. London: Simon & Schuster 
 
Kelling, G., Pate, T., Dieckman, D. and Brown, C. (1974). The Kansas City Preventive Patrol 




Kelling, G.L. and Wilson, J.Q. (1982). Broken Windows: the police and neighborhood safety 
The Atlantic Monthly, 29-38. Retrieved on January, 23, 2010 from 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/ 
 
Kelly, G., Mulga, G. and Muers, S. (2000). Creating Public Value. London: Strategy Unit. 
Retrieved on March 9, 2009 from http://www.wm-ireland.com/polfed/issues/change.pdf 
 
Kirby, J. (2009). Centre for Policy Studies ‘The Benefits of Simplification’. Retrieved on March, 
9 2009 from http://www.cps.org.uk/index.php?option.com_content&review=article 
&id=218:the_benefit_of_simplification&itemid=42 
 
Kirby, S. and McPherson, I. (2004). Integrating the National Intelligence Model with a 
‘problem solving’ approach. Retrieved on April, 9 2010 from 
http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/31778/1/nim.pdf 
 
Kitchen, R. (2005).  Intelligence across National Structure.  Speech delivered to the Public 
Service Strategies Intelligence Handling in Public Sector Investigations Conference on 18
th
 
March 2005. Retrieved (programme summary) on June 4, 2009 from 
http://www.psstrategies.co.uk/Intelligence%20Programme.pdf 
 
Kleiven, M. (2005). Where’s the intelligence in the National Intelligence Model?. International 
Journal of Police Science & Management 9(3), 257-273 
 
Kong, L. (2011). Diffusion of Innovations. Retrieved on May 2, 2012 from 
www.stanford.edu/class/symbsys205/Kong_Diffusion.html 
 
Kotter J.P. (1996). Leading Change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press 
 
Kotter, J. P. (2006). Our Iceberg is Melting: changing and succeeding under any condition. 
London: Macmillan 
 
Kotter, J. P. (2010). Buy-In: Saving Your Good Idea from getting Shot Down. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press 
Krippendorf, K. (1980). Content Analysis: an introduction to its methodology, Beverley Hills 
CA: Sage 
 
Kumar, M. (2005). Research: Methodology: a step-by-step guide for beginners. London: Sage.  
 
Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
 
Lane, J. E. (2000). New Public Management: An Introduction. London: Routledge 
190 
 
Laycock, G. (2008). Crime Prevention (Situational and Social).  In T. Newburn & P Neyroud 
Dictionary of Policing. Cullompton: Willan, 59-61 
 
Lee, R. (2002). The self, Lucid Dreaming and Post-modern Identity. Electric dreams 9(3) 
Retrieved on December 13, 2009 from http://dreamgate.com.pomo/lucid_lee.htm 
 
Levy, R. (2010, May). New Public Management: End of an Era. Public Policy and 
Administration, vol 25, No. 2, 234-240 
 
Levi, M., Burrows, J., Fleming, M.H., and Hopkins, M. with the assistance of Matthews, K. 
(2007). The Nature, Extent and Economic Impact of Fraud in the UK: Report for the 
Association of Chief Police Officers. London: Home Office/ACPO 
 
Lingamneni, J. R. (1979). Resistance to Change in Police Organizations: The Diffusion 
Paradigm. Criminal Justice Review Fall 1979 vol. 4 no. 2 17-26 
 
Locke, T. (2001). Grounded Theory in Management Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
James, O & Lodge, M. (2003). The Limitations of ‘Policy Transfer’ and ‘Lesson Drawing’ for 
Public Policy Research. Political Studies Review, vol. 1, 179-193 
 
Loveday, B. (2005). The challenge of police reform. Public Money and Management, 25, 275-
280.  
 
Loveday, B. (2005). Performance management: threat or opportunity? The Police Journal, 78, 
188-201.  
 
Loveday, B. (2005). Police reform: problems of governance and accountability. The Police 
Journal, 78, 339-350  
 
Loveday, B. (2005). The Police Modernization Programme in England and Wales: A Reform 
too Far? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Royal 
York, Toronto.  Retrieved on December 11, 2010 from 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p32843_index.html 
 
Mackenzie, S. and Henry, A. (2009). Community Policing: a Review of the Evidence. Scottish 
Government Social Research Paper. Retrieved on March 11, 2010 from 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/292465/0090209.pdf 
 
Macpherson, W. (1999). Report on the Inquiry into the Investigation of the Murder of Stephen 
Lawrence. London: HMSO. 
 
191 
Magretta, J. (2002). Why Business Models Matter. Harvard Business Review, May 2002. 
R0205F, pps 1-8. Retrieved on January 28, 2009 from 
http://teaching.ust.hk/~ismt302/busmod.pdf. 
 
Maguire, M. (2000). Policing by risks and targets: some dimensions and implications of 
intelligence-led crime control.  Policing and Society, 9(4), 315-336. 
 
Maguire, M. (2004). The Crime Reduction Programme in England and Wales: reflections on the 
vision and the reality; Criminology and Criminal Justice, August 2004 vol. 4 no. 3 213-237 
 
Maguire, M. (2006). Intelligence Led Policing, Managerialism and Community Engagement: 
Competing Priorities and the Role of the National Intelligence Model in the UK. Policing and 
Society  
Volume 16, Issue 1, Special Issue: Intelligence in Policing and Security: Reflections on 
Scholarship 
 
Maguire, M. (2008). Criminal investigation and crime control.  In T.Newburn (ed.) Handbook 
of Policing.  Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 430-464 
 
Maguire, M. and John, T. (1995). Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: Integrated 
Approaches. Crime Detection and Prevention Series Research Paper Number 64. London: 
Home Office 
 
Maguire M., & John T., (2006). Intelligence-led Policing, Managerialism and Community 
Engagement: Competing Priorities and the Role of the National Intelligence Model in the UK. 
Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 67-85 
 
Maguire, M. & Norris, N. (1992). The Conduct and Supervision of Criminal Investigations. 
Research Study No. 5, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. London: HMSO 
Malloch-Brown, J. (2009, February 24). written response to House of Lords Question (HL1051) 
Retrieved on January 23, 2010 from 
http://services.parliamentary.uk/hansard/lords/bydate/20090224/written answers/part051.html 
 
Manning, P.K. (1984). Community Policing. American Journal of Police, 3(2), 205-27. 
 
Manning, P.K. (1992). Information Technologies and the Police cited in. S. Christopher (2003). 
‘A practitioner’s perspective of UK strategic intelligence’. In J.H. Ratcliffe (Ed.) Strategic 
Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. Annandale, NSW: The Federation Press, 177-193 
 
192 
Manning, P.K. (1997). ‘Police Work’ (2nd ed.) cited in S. Christopher (2003). ‘A practitioner’s 
perspective of UK strategic intelligence’. In J.H. Ratcliffe (Ed.) Strategic Thinking in Criminal 
Intelligence. Annandale, NSW: The Federation Press, 177-193 
 
Maple, J. (1999). The Crime Fighter: Putting the Bad Guys Out of Business. New York: 
Doubleday 
 
Mark, Sir R. (1978). In the Office of Constable Glasgow: William Collins & Sons 
 
Marshall, J. (1999). Zero Tolerance Policing: Information Bulletin No. 9 (March 1999). 
Retrieved on January 7, 2009 from 
http://www.ocsar.sa.gov.au/docs/information_bulletins/IB9.pdf 
 
Marx, G.T. (1988) Undercover: Police Surveillance in America. Berkley: University of 
California Press 
 
Mason, G. (2004). The Official History of the Metropolitan Police. London: Carlton Publishing 
 
Mason, M. (2009) Findings from the second year of the national Neighbourhood Policing 
Programme evaluation. Home Office Research Report 14. London: Home Office. 
 
Mayhew, P. (1994). Comment on Victimisation Surveys.  European Journal of Criminal Policy 
and Research, 2, 36-47. 
 
Maynard, M (1994). Methods, practice and epistemology: the debate about feminism and 
research. London: Taylor and Francis 
 
Mayring, P. (2004). Qualitative Content Analysis. In U. Flick, E. Kardoff and I. Steinke, A 
companion to qualitative research”; London: Sage. 
 
McLaughlin E., Muncie, J., and Hughes, G. (2001). The Permanent Revolution: New Labour, 
New Public Management and the Modernisation of Criminal Justice. Criminal Justice, vol 1 no. 
3, 301-318 
 
McManus, J. (2010). Churches Accuse Osborne Of Benefit Fraud ‘Exaggeration’. British 
Broadcasting Company News. October 26, 2010 Retrieved on December 20, 2010, from: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11628643?print=true 
 
McPherson, I. and Kirby, S. (2004). Integrating the National Intelligence Model with problem 
solving policing. London: Home Office 
 
McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (2001). Controlling Crime. London: Sage 
 
193 
Metropolitan Police Authority. (2005). National Intelligence Model: Application and Guidance.  
Internal guidance. Home Office ‘AWARE’ MPS Intranet 
 
Metropolitan Police Service, (2011). The Statement of Our Common Purpose and Values. 
Retrieved on April 1, 2011 from http://www.met.police.uk/history/purpose.htm  
 
Mills, H., Silvestri, A. and Grimshaw, R. (2010). Police expenditure: 1999-2009, Centre for 
Crime and Justice Studies: The Hadley Trust. Retrieved on February 16, 2010 from 
http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/publication_download_page_1779.html 
 
McPherson, I. and Kirby, S. (2004). Integrating the NIM with problem solving policing. 
Retrieved on March 3, 2009, from www.crimereductions.homeoffice.gov.uk/nim1.pdf. 
 
Miller, A. (2010). Effective Partnership Working. Retrieved on November 11, 2010 from 
www.labccymru.co.uk/ContentFiles//LABC%20AGM%20Andrew%20Miller%20PPT.pdf 
 
Ministry of Justice – New Zealand (2005). Research on the Effectiveness of Police Practice in 
Reducing Residential Burglary; 6: Police Organisation. Retrieved on March 24, 2011 from 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/r/research-on-the-effectiveness-of-
police-practice-in-reducing-residential-burglary-november-2005-report-3literature-review.   
 
Monjardet, D. (1994). La Culture Professionnelle des Policiers. Revue Francaise de Sociologie, 
3:393-411. 
 
Morgan, R. and Newburn, T. (1997). The Feature of Policing.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Morgan, T. (2011, February 11). Cyber Crooks are raking in £1,000 a second The Daily 
Express. 
 
Morgan-Jones, L. (2009). A Lite Touch to Intelligence Police Professional, 180, 12-15 
 
Morganton, N. C. (2003). Six Principles of Partnership 
Retrieved on October 6, 2009 from http://www.trainingmatters-
nc.org/tm_vol4_no3/six_principles.pdf 
Morris, R. (2007). History of criminal investigation in T. Newburn, T. Williamson and A 
Wright (Eds.), Handbook of Criminal Investigation. Cullompton:Willam, 15-40 
 
Morris, M., Scindehutte, M. and Jeffrey, A. (2005). The business model: towards a unified 
perspective. Journal of Business Research. Volume 48/6, June 2005, pps. 726-735. 
 
Morse, J.M. (1994). Critical issues in qualitative research methods. London: Sage.  
 
194 
Morton, J. (2005). The First Detective: The Life and Revolutionary Times of Eugene-Francois 
Vidocg, Criminal, Spy and Private Eye.  London: Trafalgar Square. 
 
MPA. (2010). Metropolitan Police Service: The Safer Sutton Partnership. Retrieved on  
February 19, 2011 from www.mpa.goc.uk/downloads/partnerships/cdrp/sutton-safety.pdf  
 
MPS. (2009). Metropolitan Police Service: Management of MPS Intelligence Policy.  
Retrieved on March 11, 2010 from 
http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/policies/management_of_mps_intelligence_policy.pdf 
 
National Audit Commission. (1993). Helping with Enquiries – Tackling Crime Effectively. 
London: HMSO 
 
National Audit Office. (2006). International Benchmark of Fraud and Error in Social Security 
Systems’ Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General HC 1387, Session 2005-6. London: 
Stationery Office 
 
National Centre for Policing Excellence. (2005). Code of Practice: National Intelligence Model. 
London: HMSO. 
 
National Criminal Intelligence Service. (2000). The National Intelligence Model. London: NCIS 
Corporate Communications 
 
National Police Improvement Agency NPIA, (2007). Practice Advice on Resources and the 
People Assets of the National Intelligence Model. Retrieved on June 9, 2010 from 
http://www.npia.police.uk/en/9015.html  
 
NCPE. (2005). National Centre for Policing Excellence: Code of Practice: Police National 
Computer. Retrieved on April 2, 2011 from 
http://www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/Police_nat_comp_C_of_P.pdf 
 
NCPE. (2010). National Centre for Policing Excellence: Code of Practice: National Intelligence 
Model. Retrieved on February 3, 2009 from 
http//www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/National_Intelligence_Model_c_o_p.pdf 
 
NPIA. (2008). Improving Performance: A Practical Guide to Performance Management. 
London: Home Office. Retrieved on January 9, 2009 from 
http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/Practical_Guide_to_Police_P5.pdf 
 
NPIA, (2009). National Police Improvement Agency: National Intelligence Model. Retrieved on 
June 9, 2010 from http://www.npia.police.uk/en/9015.html  
 
195 
Newburn, T. and Neyroud, P. (Eds.). (2008). Dictionary of Policing. Cullompton: Willan 
Publishing  
 
Newburn, T., Williamson, T and Wright, A. (Eds.) (2003). Handbook of Policing. Cullompton: 
Willan Publishing. 
 
Newburn, T., Williamson, T. and Wright, A. (Eds.) (2007). Handbook of Criminal 
Investigation.  Cullompton: Willan Publishing. 
 
NFA. (2010a). National Fraud Authority: A fresh approach to combating fraud in the public 









NFA. (2011a). National Fraud Authority: Pickles: Ten ways to tackle council fraud and recover 









NPIA. (2009). National Intelligence Model (NIM). Retrieved on June 29, 2009 from 
http://www.npia.police.uk.en/9015.htm  
 
NYPA: North Yorkshire Police Authority (2007), Intelligence Strategy 2007-2012. Retrieved 
on July 3, 2010 from http://www.nypa.gov.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=508&p=0 
Oakensen, D., Mockford, R. and Pascoe, C. (2002). Closing the Gap – a review of the current 
‘fitness for purpose’ of the current structures of policing in England and Wales. London: HMIC 
196 
 
OFCU. (2010) Asset Recovery Incentive Scheme 2010-11: Arrangements for Implementation  






Oliver, D. Jerovich, J. and Mason, T. (2005). Constraints and Opportunities with Interview 
Transcription: Towards Reflection in Qualitative Research Social Forces 84(2) 1273-1289 
 
Orr, G. (2003). Diffusion of Innovation. Retrieved on May 1, 2012 from www. 
Stanford.edu/class/symbsys205/Diffusion%20of%20Innovations.htm 
 
Orr Munro, T. (2006, January). Sink or Swim. Police, 1:21-22. 
 
Osborn, N. (2008). In Search of NIM. Unpublished dissertation for the Professional Doctorate in 
Criminal Justice at the University of Portsmouth 
 
Osborn, S.P. and Brown, K. (2005). Managing Change and Innovation in Public Service 
Organisations. Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge 
 
Osterwalder, A. (2004). The business model ontology – a proposition in a design science 
approach. Dissertation 174, University of Lausanne, cited in C. Zott, R. Amit and L. Massa 
(2010: 13) The Business model: Theoretical Roots, Recent Research and Future Research. 
Working Paper WP-862. University of Navarra. Retrieved on June 17, 2011 from 
http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0862-E.pdf 
 
Palmquist, M. (2004). Content Analysis. Retrieved on September 14, 2009 from 
http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~palmquis/courses/content.html 
 
Parliament.uk. (2005). Select Committee on Welsh Affairs: The National policing Plan. 
Retrieved on January 4, 2009 from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmwelaf/46/4606.htm 
 
Parliament.uk. (2010). Intelligence–led policing. Select Committee on European Union Twenty-
Ninth Report. Retrieved on July,3 2010 from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/183/18307.htm 
 
Patrick, R. (2004). Community Empowerment A Challenge for the Professional. Local 
Governance, v30. 3, 125-143 
 
197 
Peak K.W. and Glensor, R.W. (2011). Community Policing and Problem Solving: Strategies 
and Practices. London: Prentice Hall 
 
Perry, C. (1998). Processes of a Case Study Methodology for Postgraduate Research. European 
Journal of Marketing, 32(9/10) 785-802 
 
Peterson M. B. (1994). Applications in Criminal Analysis: A Sourcebook. Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publisher 
 
Peterson, M. B. (2005). Intelligence-led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture. 
Washington DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance 
 
Phillips, D. (2008). Police Intelligence Systems as a strategic response. In C. Harfield, J. Grieve,  
A MacVean and David Phillips (Eds.), Handbook of Intelligent Policing: Consilience, Crime 
Control and Community Safety. Cullompton: Willan, 25-36 
 
Phillips, S.& Cochrane, R. (1988). Crime and Nuisance in the Shopping Centre: a case study in 
crime prevention . Crime Prevention Unit Paper 16. London: Home Office. 
 
Pidd, M., (2008). A critical assessment of performance measurement for policy making.  In J. 
Hartley, C. Donaldson, C. Skelcher and H. Wallace (Eds.); Managing to improve public 
services. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 65-87 
 
Porter, M.E. (2001). Strategy and the Internet. Harvard Business Review, 79(2), 63-78. 
 
PRO MEPO 2/4967. Metropolitan Police record of the work of the Home Office Committee on 
Detective Work 1933-1936. Held at the National Archives (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) 
MEPO 2/4967 cited in A. James, (2010). The Influence of Intelligence-led policing Models on 
investigative Policy and Practice in Mainstream Policing 1993-2007: Division, Resistance and 
Investigative Orthodoxy.  Unpublished PhD thesis: London School of Economics 
 
Prosci Research (2011), Prosci’s Change Management Toolkit. Retrieved on May 6, 2011 from 
http://www.change-management.com/change-management-toolkit.htm 
 
Public Service. (2011). Public sector fraud “goes up as cuts bite; Public Service Co UK, 
13.4.2011”; Retrieved on May 1, 2011 from 
http//www.publicservice.co.uk/news_story.asp?id=16053.  
 




Ratcliffe, J.H. (2003). Intelligence-led Policing: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal 




Ratcliffe, J.H. (2004). Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. Annandale, NSW: The 
Federation Press 
 
Ratcliffe, J. H. (2008). Intelligence-led Policing. Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing 
 
Ratcliffe, J. H. (2008). Intelligence-led policing.  In Wortley, R., Mazerolle, L. and Rombouts, 
S. (Eds.) Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis. Cullompton, Devon: Willan 
Publishing, 263-282 
 
Reiner, R. (1992), The Politics of the Police (2
nd
 ed.). Sussex: Saint Martins Press. 
 
Reiner, R., (1994), Policing and the Police.  In M. Maguire, R., Morgam and R. Reiner, The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminology Oxford: Clarendon Press, 704-772 
 
Reiner, R. (2000). The Politics of the Police, (3
rd
 ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Reiner, R. (2011). Let's admit it: most police work does not involve catching criminals. The 
Guardian, 28
th
 October 2011. Retrieved on November 3, 2011 from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/oct/28/admit-police-work-catching-criminals 
 
Rix, A., Joshua, F., Maguire, M and Morton, S. (2009) Improving public confidence in the 




Rocco, T. S., Bliss L. A., Gallagher, S. and Perez-Prado, A. (2003). Taking the Next Step: 
Mixed Methods Research in Organizational Systems. Information Technology, Learning, and 
Performance Journal. 21(1): 19–26. 
 
Rogers, C. (2004). From Dixon to Z Cars- the Introduction of Unit Beat Policing in England and 
Wales, Police History Journal, No. 19, 10-14 
 
Rogers, E.M. (2003). Diffusion of Innovation, (5
th
 ed.). New York: Free Press 
 
Rowe, M. (2008). Introduction to Policing. London: Sage 
 
199 
Rowlands, B. (2005). Grounded in Practice: Using Interpretive Research to Build Theory. The 
Electronic Journal of Business Research Methodology 3(1), 81-92. Retrieved on March 3, 2009 
from http://www.ejbrm.com/issue/download.html?idArticle=152  
 
Rutter, S. and Smith, D. J. (1995). Psychosocial Disorders in young people: time trends and 
their causes. London, Wiley-Blackwell 
 
Ryan, J. (2007, March 19). Home Office Minister, reply to Parliamentary Question, London: 
Hansard 
 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2003). Research Methods for Business Students. (3
rd
 
ed.). Harlow: Pearson Educational Ltd. 
 
Savage, S. (2007). Police Reform: Forces for Change. Oxford: Open University Press 
 
Scarman, Lord. (1981). The Brixton Disorders. London: HMSO 
 
Schon, D.A. (1963) “Champions for Radical New Inventions” Harvard Business Review 41: 77-
86 
 
Scott, J. (1998). Performance culture: the return of reactive policing. Policing and Society, vol. 
8, 269–288. 
 
Scottish Police College; SPSA. (2010). The National Intelligence Model.  Retrieved on June 1, 
2010 from http://tulliallan.police.uk/workingparties/nim/index.html  
 
Select Committee on Welsh Affairs. (2005). Fourth Report.  Retrieved December 20, 2010 from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmwelaf/46/4606.htm  
 
Sewell, M. (2009) The Use of Qualitative Interviews in Evaluation. Cyfernet-Evaluation. 
Retrieved on January 12, 2010 from http://ag.arizona.edu/fcs/cyfernet/cyfar/Intervu5.htms 
 
Shafer, S.M., Smith, H.J. and Linder, J.C. (2004), The Power of Business Models. Business 
Horizons, vol. 48, Issue 3, pps. 199-207. 
 
Sheptycki, J. (2004). Review of the Influence of Strategic Intelligence or Organised Crime 
Policy Practice: Special Interest Paper 14.  London: Home Office Research, Development and 
Statistics Directorate. 
 
Sherman, L.W., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. and Bushway, S. (1998). 




SIA. (2010). Security Industry Authority: Risky Intelligence. Retrieved on May 6, 2010 from 
http//www.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/about-good-practice-regulations.aspx 
 
Silberman, C. E. (1978). Criminal Violence; Criminal Justice.  Westminster US: Random 
House. 
 
Sims, L. and Mynhill, A. (2001). Policing and the Public: Findings from the 2000 British Crime 
Survey (Research Finding): Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate. 
London: Stationery Office 
 
Smith, J.A. (2003). Qualitative psychology: a practical guide to research methods. London: 
Sage 
 




Sobh, R. (2006). From in-depth interviews to structural equation modelling: the realism 
paradigm in consumer research, (The Qualitative Research Group, School of Business of the 
University of Auckland). Retrieved June, 23, 2008 from: 
http://www.qu.edu.qa/qu/colleges/bus/doc/RanaCV.pdf 
 
Stake, R. (1995). The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
 
Stelfox, P. (2007). Professionalising Investigative Processes.  In T. Newburn, T. Williamson 
and A Wright (Eds.), Handbook of Criminal Investigation. Cullompton: Willan, 628-651 
 
Stephenson, M. (2006). Young people and offending: education, Youth Justice and social 
inclusion, London, Willan 
 
Stockdale, J.E. and Gresham, P.J. (1995), Combating Burglary: An Evaluation of Three 
Strategies. Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 59. London: HMSO 
 








Straw, J. (1997, April 8). Speech by the Home Secretary on the opening of the second reading of 
the Crime and Disorder Bill. Retrieved on February 2, 2009 from 
http://yourdemocracy.newstatesman.com/parliament/orders-of-the-day/HAN14654273 
 
Strebel, P. (1997). Mastering Change.  In T. Dickson and G. Bickerstaff (Eds.), Financial Times 
Mastering Management. London: Pitman Publishing 
 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Tavares, C. and Thomas, G, (2010) Eurostat: Statistics in Focus 58/2010. Retrieved on 
December 21, 2010 from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-10-
058/EN/KS-SF-10-058-EN.PDF  
 
Taylor, M. and Tidy, J. (2000). ‘Policing objectives obtained through targeted information’. 
MPS Technology Futures Group (unpublished) cited by J.Grieve (2004). “Developments in UK 
criminal intelligence”, in J.H. Ratcliffe (2004) Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. 
Annandale, NSW: The Federation Press (25-36) 
 
The Crime and Reduction Act. (1998). Retrieved on April 2, 2010 from 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980037.htm  
 
The Scottish Government. (2010).Community Policing: a Review of the Evidence.  Retrieved on 
March 4, 2010 from http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/11/19091609/3 
 
The Times Newspaper. (2001). Obituary of David Powis. London: 5
th
 January 2001 
 
Thompson, S.B. (2004). Research is an electronic published report. Retrieved August, 3, 2008 
from: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/research/studentsdoes/mgtpdf 
 
Thurrock. (2011). Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) Corporate Policy:  Use 
of Covert Surveillance Covert Human Intelligence Sources and communications data 
acquisition For the prevention and detection of crime or the prevention of disorder. Retrieved 
on May 4, 2012 from http://www.thurrock.gov.uk/legal/pdf/ripa_201106.pdf 
 
Tilley, N. (2003). Community Policing, Problem Oriented Policing and Intelligence-Led 
Policing. In T. Newburn (Ed.) Handbook of Policing, Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 311-339. 
 
Tilley, N. (2008). Intelligence-led Policing. In T. Newburn & P. Neyroud (Eds.), Dictionary of 
Policing. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 146-8 
 
Tonry, M., and Farrington, D. (Eds.). (1995). Building a Safer Society. Crime and Justice. 
Volume 19 1-20. 
202 
 
Tonry, M., and Farrington, D. (Eds.). (1995). Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. 
Retrieved on April 4, 2008 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147594 and Retrieved on 
February 11, 2010 from http://jthomasniu.org/class/Stuff/Temp/tonry111.pdf 
 
Treece, D.J. (2010). Business models, business strategy and innovations. Long Range Planning, 
43, 172-194 
 
Trojanowicz, R. and Bucqueroux, B. (1990). Community Policing: A Contemporary 
Perspective. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishers 
 
Tucker, D.M. (1973). Some Relationships Between Individuals and Group Development. 
Human Development, 16,249-272 
 
Tuckman, B. W. (1965). Developmental Sequence in Small Groups. Psychological Bulletin, 
63(6), 384-399 
 
Tuckman B.W. & Jensen, M.A. (1977, December). Stages of Small Group Development 
Revisited. Group & Organisational Studies, 2,4: 419 
 
Tunley, M. (2011). Another Case of Old Wine in New Bottles? The Coalition’s Misguided 
Strategy to Reduce Benefit Fraud. The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, v50(3), 314-317 
 
University Francais. (2010). La Reynie, Gabriel Nicolas De (1625-1709). Retrieved on 
January 12, 2010 from http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/gabriel-nicolas-de-la-
reynie/ 
 
University of Portsmouth. (2010). Ethics Approval Guidance. Retrieved 6
th
 January 6, 2009 
from 
http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/faculties/portsmouthbusinessschool/research/pbsethics/fileto
download,46482,en.pdf.   
 
Van Dijk, J. & de Waard, J, (1991). A two-dimensional typology of crime prevention projects: 
with a bibliography. Criminal Justice Abstracts, 4, 483 – 503. 
 
Waddington, P.A.J. (1999). Police Sub-culture.  British Journal of Criminology, 39(2), 287-309. 
 
Walklate, S., (2002). So who are the victims now? British Journal of Community Justice, vol 1, 
issue 1 47-64 
 
Wallace, M. (2009). Why Focus on Coping with Complexity?.  In M. Wallace, M. Fertig and E. 
Schneller (Eds.) Managing Change in the Public Service. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 13-35 
 
203 
Walliman, N. (2001). Your Research Project: A Step by Step Guide for the First Time 
Researcher. London: Sage. 
 
Walsh, K. (1995). Public Services and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and the 
New Public Management. London: Macmillan 
 
Weille, P. and Vitale, M.R. (2001). Place to Space. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S., McNally, A. M. and Greenspan, R. (2001). COMPSTAT and 
Organizational Change. Washington DC: Police Foundation 
 
Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S., McNally, A. M. and Greenspan, R. (2004). Changing everything 
so that everything can remain the same. In J. Willis, J. Braga and A. Braga (Eds.) Policing 
Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 248-304 
 
Whitaker R (1999), The End of Privacy. New York: The New York Press 
 
Williamson, T. (2005). Editorial - Community Policing. Journal of Community and Applied 
Social Psychology, 15, 153-5. 
 
Wilson, D., Ashton, J. and Sharp, D. (2001). What Everyone in Britain Should Know About the 
Police. London: Blackstone 
 
Wilson, J. (1968). Varieties of Police Behaviour. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Wilson, D. (2007). Sir Francis Walsingham: A Courtier in an Age of Terror. New York, Basic 
Books. 
 
Wood, J. & Shearer, C. (2007). Imagining Security. Cullompton, Willan Publishing 
 
Wright, A. (2002). Policing: an introduction to concepts and practice. Cullompton: Willan 
Publishing. 
 
Yates, S. (2004). Doing Social Science Research. London: Sage 
 
Yeo, T. and Budd, T. (2000). Policing and the Public: Findings from the 1998 British Crime 
Survey (Research Findings).  Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate: 
HMSO. 
 
Zott, C., Amit, R. and Massa, L. (2010) The Business Model: Theoretical Roots, Recent 
Research and Future Research. Working Paper WP-862, IESE University of Navarra. Retrieved 




National intelligence Model: Minimum Standards 
 
The following excerpt is from Appendix 2 of the ‘Guidance on the National Intelligence Model’ 
(ACPO/Centrex, 2005: 111-159).  The ‘Guidance’ is 207 pages in length and provides a 
summary of the background to the NIM, the ‘Code of Practice’ and the minimum standards.  It 
provides this explanation: NIM consists of eleven individual elements. Each section of this 
document focuses on a single element of the NIM business process. Each element has a set of 
minimum standards associated with it, and a checklist of them is provided at the end of each 
section. Forces must take appropriate action to ensure that they comply with all 135 standards 
within the time frame given. The minimum standards are discussed in Appendix 2. 
 
Appendix 2 
The features that enable the intelligence unit and other staff to operate effectively and to the 
minimum standard prescribed by ACPO are covered here. Police forces must take appropriate 
action to ensure that they comply with all 135 standards listed by November 2005. HMIC will 
inspect the application of NIM in forces against the national minimum standards. 
 
1. CURRENT LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW 
 
A professional Police Service will ensure that its staff remain fully informed of legislation and 
case law developments, and that they have ready access to up-to-date information sources on a 
round the clock basis. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be continual access to a knowledge repository (locally, centrally, or electronically) 





 Special Branch; 
 Firearms; 
 Domestic violence; 
 Child protection; 
 Genesis; 
 National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies (NCALT); 
 Various private legal databases, details of which can be found in Appendix 3 or 
through the Office of Public Sector Information: http://www.opsi.gov.uk 
 
Global Force access is considered highly beneficial. 
 
2. CODES OF PRACTICE AND SECONDARY LEGISLATION 
 
A code of practice under the Police Act 1996 is a statutory document which provides a high 
level strategic framework and principles enabling the development of detailed guidance and 
practice advice. Some codes of practice are in the form of secondary legislation, providing 
mandatory compliance, e.g. the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). 
 
Meeting the Criteria 








 Criminal Records Bureau (CRB); 
 Serious Crime Analysis Section (SCAS); 
 PNC; 
 Police use of firearms and less lethal weapons; 
 Any future or proposed associated codes of practice and secondary legislation. 
 
3. MANUALS OF GUIDANCE 
 
Manuals of guidance describe the minimum level of standards and subsequent compliance 
required by forces or law enforcement agencies in respect of various policing activities, for 
example the investigation of missing persons or the police use of information. This enables 
effective deployment within a legal framework, and provides a basis for a national learning 
requirement. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Ensure access to, and an understanding of, standards in respect of relevant subjects, for 
example: NIM, data communications SPOC, dangerous offenders, priority and prolific 
offenders, prison intelligence, covert operations and the ANPR system. 
 
4. PRACTICE ADVICE 
 
Practice advice documents provide details of good practice, suggest operational methods and 
structures and provide a further basis for the delivery of training. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Ensure access to, and an understanding of, practice advice where relevant. For example, practice 
advice on NIM, murder investigation and anti-corruption. Access can be locally or centrally 
available, or made available electronically through the use of systems such as the ACPO 
Intranet or Genesis. 
 
5. FORCE POLICY RELEVANT TO INTELLIGENCE 
 
Individual force policies on intelligence must complement minimum standards and practice 
advice, while further establishing NIM into everyday policing. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
The following must be in place and adhered to: 
 
 Intelligence strategy; 
 CHIS policy; 
 Forensic policy; 
 T&CG policy. 
 
6. ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE ASSETS 
 
Providing ready access to knowledge assets is vital to the success and universal understanding 
of NIM and the intelligence-led policing process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Ensure access to NIM guidance and practice advice documents through NCALT, Genesis, force 
intranet sites and hard copy documents. Ensure access to the periodic NCPE Covert Intelligence 
Journal (see Appendix 6 for contact details) and the Genesis NIM website, both of which 
provide a forum for frequently asked questions (FAQ) and promote good practice, data sharing 
protocols, marketing materials and briefing products. 
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6. FORCE NIM COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY 
 
The development of a marketing and communications strategy designed to promulgate the 
benefits of NIM both internally and externally to the Police Service, is fundamental to the 
successful implementation and further development of NIM. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be a method in place such as Genesis, for communicating a standard message to all 
staff and partner agencies, including the capture and dissemination of case study examples of 
local and/or national good practice. 
 
8. FORCE IT STRATEGY (FORCE INFORMATION STRATEGY) 
 
All police forces’ IT strategies must include issues relating to the support and maintenance of 
intelligence IT structures. This will ensure the continual employment of intelligence-led 
policing. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be a force IT strategy in place that is consistent with intelligence-led policing. This 
includes a priority service for the maintenance of technology used by intelligence analysts, and 
the regular review and upgrading of analytical tools in line with individual force needs. Police 
forces must ensure the security vetting of a limited number of IT staff, and make certain that 
those staff have access to secure information for maintenance purposes. 
 
9. IT DISSEMINATION OF FORCE/LOCAL CONTROL STRATEGY AND 
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
In order to maintain the Police Service’s focus of direction, all staff members must be aware of 
BCU, force and/or national priorities for law enforcement, together with the information 
required to support those priorities, including the National Policing Plan, Force Policing Plan, 
Community Safety Strategy and local Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPI). 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A force intranet should be used to communicate force/local priorities and intelligence needs to 
all staff. This may include IT access to force/local control strategic assessments, although 
security, i.e., GPMS, must be taken into account. See 2.10 Determine Asset Values for more 
information on protectively marked material using the GPMS. 
 
10. IT DISSEMINATION OF T&CG ACTIONS 
 
Effective management of the T&CG process includes providing an appropriate means of 
ensuring tasks are carried out and monitored. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
An IT system should be in place to disseminate force/local strategic and tactical T&CG actions 
to staff and to confirm that all the necessary actions have been carried out and recorded.  
Dissemination must take security into account and the content may be reduced, particularly at 
level 2. Access must be restricted to nominated staff only, and good practice identified. 
 
11. FORCE TRAINING STRATEGY 
 
A project is currently underway designed to identify the National Learning Requirement for the 
intelligence discipline. Many forces provide specialist intelligence training, for example, in 
research and development and source handling. Only intelligence manager and analyst training 
courses are, however, delivered as nationally accredited products. It is, therefore, incumbent on 
forces to provide a training strategy which ensures that all staff members are fully aware of their 
roles and responsibilities under NIM, until such time as national training products are fully 
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developed. For further information see ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice on Resources and 
the People Assets of NIM. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A force training strategy must be in place covering explanations of NIM and the processes 
involved in gathering and submitting intelligence. It should emphasise the importance of 
intelligence submissions, and the fact that such submissions are especially important from staff 
in specialist roles outside of the intelligence function. 
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to the knowledge 
assets element of NIM are outlined below. 
 
Increasing Professional Knowledge and Understanding 
Having readily accessible products that allow staff to increase their professional knowledge and 
understanding, benefits the individual and the organisation.  Central repositories of knowledge 
reduce the duplication of research to locate good practice and legal advice. This repository 
should be available to operational officers at all times. 
 
Effective IT Strategies and Structures to Deliver Corporate Standards 
Providing an effective IT strategy which encompasses the intelligence processes and sets a 
direction for standard IT systems, will improve accessibility to local force and BCU published 
priorities.  Using a standard format for delivering knowledge assets allows for a corporate 




A communications strategy aimed at marketing the benefits of NIM, both internally and 




A published NIM and intelligence training strategy ensures that focus is maintained on 
improving the knowledge and skills profile of staff. 
 
12. PHYSICAL SECURITY 
 
Access to and from vulnerable areas must be monitored and controlled, and intelligence material 
must be managed in a secure manner. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Clear desk policies and secure file storage systems must be in place, located within secure 
intelligence accommodation. Local police forces must ensure that access policies are in place 
that enable staff to gain entry to secure environments. 
 
13. SECURITY POLICIES RE: INTEGRITY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND VETTING 
STANDARDS WITHIN INTELLIGENCE WORK 
 
Those individuals working within secure environments must be subject to clearance themselves.  
The manner in which material is recorded, disseminated and retained must also be the subject of 
security policy. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
The use of the GPMS must be apparent. Documents and products must be appropriately GPMS 
coded. IT access and access to data must be restricted and auditable. Vetting protocols for 






Compliance with the rules relating to disclosure under the CPIA is vital to maintaining the 
integrity of intelligence-led policing. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A system must be in place to provide an assessment of intelligence products which enables the 
release of intelligence material to the disclosure officer. 
 
15. STERILE CORRIDOR 
 
Duty of care and the protection of covert assets are principles that must be adhered to in the 
targeting of criminals and criminality. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must ensure source protection and confidentiality both internally and externally in 
information sharing and the dissemination of intelligence. A firewall must be installed between 
the employment of covert resources and all other elements of business outside the authorisation 
process. 
 
16. REAL-TIME SEARCH CAPABILITY 
 
Being able to make an early risk assessment on the nature of any incident being attended, 
through the use of sound intelligence, is vital to ensuring effective police response.  
 
Meeting the Criteria 
This capability particularly applies to the patrol function. Police forces should consider 
providing a service for staff attending incidents (usually located within command and control) 
which enables informed decisions and risk assessments to be made by relaying pertinent 
intelligence. This service should be located within command and control. Data integrity and 
quality is essential for it. 
 
17. STANDARD ANALYTICAL TOOLS 
 
Nationally recognised analytical tools are essential to effective analysis. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Local force standards must be set and implemented. They will include a wide search capability 
for all intelligence analysts and also the provision of IT and training. For further information 
contact the National Analyst Working Group (details in Appendix 6) and see ACPO 
(forthcoming) Practice Advice on Tasking and Co-ordination. 
 
18. EFFECTIVE BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS 
 
All staff should be fully briefed and continually informed of all tasking and intelligence 
requirements. Debriefing is also vitally important in maintaining the cycle of information. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Intelligence must be fed back to the Intelligence Unit and dedicated briefing facilities, structures 
and processes must be established in all areas of activity. The patrol function briefing must 
correlate with the tactical menu and drive tasking. The NBM must also be adhered to. For 
further information see ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the National Briefing Model. 
 
19. INTER-AGENCY INFORMATION SHARING PROTOCOLS 
 
Information management and the provision of protocols, standard operating procedures and 
MOUs between agencies, are essential to the efficiency of NIM. The ACPO (2005) Code of 
Practice on the Management of Police Information and ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the 
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Management of Police Information provides information on such protocols at a national and 
international level. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Examples of inter-agency information sharing protocols include: 
 
 ACPO (2002) HM Customs and Excise Memorandum of Understanding Disclosure of 
Information; 
 CDRP; 
 Wider crime reduction partnership community protocols at both local (level 1 and 2) 
and regional (level 2 and 3) levels; 
 Section 115 of the CDA, which provides a statutory gateway for information sharing 
for crime and disorder purposes. 
 
Prison intelligence protocols must be established to enable profiling of dangerous/sex or priority 
and prolific offender releases.  
 
20. STANDARDISED AND INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE DATABASE 
 
Integrated information and intelligence systems provide a reliable framework for quality data 
management and analysis and such systems are the forerunners of a nationally integrated 
network. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Forces will have an integrated custody/case/nominal, forensic, crime and incident reporting 
database in place to aid in the search and retrieval of data to assist analysis. Partner agency 
information/data will be included in accordance with agreed protocols, thereby assisting local 
prevention and enforcement planning. Being a member of a data warehousing consortia together 
with other regional forces enables the search and retrieval of information across organisational 
boundaries. 
 
21. HIGH-SPEED SEARCH CAPABILITY 
 
Rapid information searching and retrieval is vital. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be direct single key access/input and search capability across integrated databases.  
 
22. AUTHORITIES PROCESSES AND DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN 
PLACE 
 
Compliance with legislation such as HRA, CPIA and RIPA requires an auditable and secure 
authority and management system. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must have document management and file tracking systems that facilitate the 
auditing of paper systems and authorities (electronic or paper system to show history of input 
and access, dates, owners, authority). Police Informant Management Systems (PIMS) is an 
example of such a system. 
 
23. HUMAN RESOURCES SYSTEM 
 
Personnel management is a key factor in delivering NIM successfully. See standards 41 
Minimum Establishment Policy and 42 Succession Planning. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must have a human resources system in place to monitor the skills profile and 
availability of key personnel. 
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24. SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
 
Ensuring the availability of up to date IT solutions and systems development for the purposes of 
information and intelligence management will provide credible NIM products. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
An Intelligence Steering Group must be established which has responsibility for continual 
systems development, including IT. This group should identify the requirements and report on 
or investigate solutions. Connectivity of information systems and analytical tools is a priority to 
ensure the quality and timeliness of intelligence product delivery. 
 
25. IT CRITICAL INCIDENT RECOVERY PROCEDURES/PROCESS (FORCE 
DISASTER RECOVERY STRATEGY) 
 
The ability to provide access to, and the use of, information sources must be maintained in the 
intelligence process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Protocols must be established to facilitate priority IT service, maintenance and recovery to allow 
the continuity of business in the event of a crash to the intelligence function and, in particular, 
the analytical capability. 
 
26. USE OF PNN2 AND CJX (STANDARD LEVELS OF ACCESS) 
 
National IT standards must be maintained including the security standards essential for the use 
of the second generation Police National Network (PNN) telecommunications infrastructure, 
PNN2, which supplies forces with telephony, internet access and secure extranet. The use of the 
Criminal Justice Extranet (CJX) allows secure information sharing with other agencies 
connected to the network, including the CPS, CRB and Forensic Science Service. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Forces must comply with the national standards set by PITO and install inspection measures to 
confirm adherence to these. 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to the system assets 
element of NIM are outlined below. 
 
Local Force Policy and Procedure for System Assets 
The establishment of policies and procedures in line with minimum standards allows police 
forces to undertake internal checks against agreed national and local standards, and to give 
better value for money including reducing cost and bureaucracy. 
 
Security and Integrity 
Implementing the minimum standards regarding security and integrity will provide improved 
protection of intelligence assets. Personnel vetting and the establishment of sterile corridors and 
clear desk policies will embed a ‘need to know’ culture. 
 
Research and Analysis 
An efficient and timely research capability giving immediate and direct access to information 
enables informed operational risk assessments and appropriate action to be taken. It also 
provides reassurance to front line staff.  Improved access to data through the use of standard 




Adherence to both NIM and information management standards (in terms of intelligence 
databases and authorities processes) creates a more competent platform when accessing and 
sharing data with partners. This, in turn, improves the flow of information and data sharing. It 
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also improves cross-border search ability and enables remote access to systems. Compliance 
with the NBM will assist in providing an efficient, intelligence-led, response service. 
 
Information Technology Policy 
An information systems strategy to underpin police force and local core business processes is at 
the heart of NIM. Essential data must be safeguarded. In the event of a system failure, this 
strategy will clearly demonstrate the measures to be taken to ensure the continuity of 
information management during any recovery period. 
 
27. VICTIMS AND WITNESSES 
Victims of crime and witnesses to crime are vital sources of intelligence. The ability to identify 
repeat victims; vulnerable persons, areas of criminal activity and categories of crime provide 
important sources of information for the NIM process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Intelligence should be secured from victims/witnesses who have been the subject of offences 
that fall within the control strategy or who have witnessed such offences. The details obtained 
from them must be reported to the intelligence function. This will include data input in to the 
SCAS from such sources. For further information see Home Office (forthcoming) Codes of 
Practice for the Use of the Serious Crime Analysis Section.  A force policy must be 
implemented locally to engage in intelligence interviews with repeat victims. These interviews 
must be subject to risk assessment and conducted with the knowledge and sanction of the senior 
investigator. 
 
28. REPEAT VICTIMS 
 
See standard 27 Victims and Witnesses 
 
29. PRIORITY AND PROLIFIC OFFENDERS 
 
Collecting as much information as possible about the activities of priority and prolific offenders 
enables offender profiling, improves tasking and enhances the effectiveness of analytical 
products. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A force policy must be in place, and implemented locally to engage in intelligence interviews 
with priority and prolific offenders. These interviews will be subject to risk assessment and 
conducted with the knowledge and sanction of the senior investigator. 
 
30. ACCESS TO COMMUNITY INTELLIGENCE 
 
Access to community intelligence is an important aspect of integrating NIM with 
neighbourhood policing. Information gained from local communities should be used to inform 
the strategic and tactical assessments at level 1 and 2 which will assist in the deployment of 
resources in response to problems of crime and disorder. See ACPO (2005) Practice Advice on 
Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing (Draft). 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be force/local management of knowledge around community information such as 





The Crimestoppers process provides vital sources of information which, in response, require 






Meeting the Criteria 
There must be access to corroborative evidence or the capability to receive, evaluate and seek 
corroboration, to enable assessment and tactical resolution to be conducted where appropriate.  
 
32. PRISONERS/PRISON VISITS 
 
Intelligence approaches to persons in police custody, conducted within guidelines, and early 
visits to convicted prisoners have been shown to provide high quality information and 
intelligence which can be used effectively in the NIM processes. See ACPO and HMCE (2004) 
Manual of Standards for Covert Human Intelligence Sources and ACPO (forthcoming) Practice 
Advice on Prison Intelligence and Related Matters. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
An intelligence approach policy must be established in accordance with identified priorities. 
Active use should be made of prison visits to assist the capture of intelligence. Risk assessments 
must be carried out. 
 
33. PRISON INTELLIGENCE 
 
Intelligence approaches to persons detained in police custody, conducted within guidelines, and 
early visits to convicted prisoners can provide high quality information and intelligence which 
can be highly beneficial in the NIM processes. See ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice on 
Prison Intelligence and Related Matters. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
At a force level, there must be the capability to develop meaningful profiles of criminals who 
are to be released from Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) or future equivalent or a National Offender 
Management process. This is likely to include certain recidivists and defined priority and 
prolific offenders who fall within control strategy priorities, together with dangerous offenders 
and sex offenders that pose a high risk. Target profiles should be developed to national 
standards using police, probation and prison intelligence to enable a threat assessment to be 
conducted and tactical plans to be developed, thereby reducing risk to the public.  Protocols and 
authority levels for data exchange must also be in place (see 2 System Assets). 
 
34. COVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES (CHIS) 
 
The lawful, ethical and efficient use, conduct and tasking of CHIS in accordance with identified 
priorities, is seen as one of the most powerful and cost effective intelligence tools available to 
law enforcement. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There should be active use of CHIS in line with legislation, ACPO minimum standards and 
control strategy priorities. 
 
35. USE OF ENHANCED CHIS PROFILING 
 
The use of enhanced CHIS profiling can be particularly beneficial when used as part of an 
intelligence collection plan on an organised criminal group or a location difficult to infiltrate. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police force and/or local enhanced profiling of all CHIS assets and searches of the National 




36. UNDERCOVER/TEST PURCHASE OPERATIVES 
 
For further information see ACPO and HMCE (2003) Manual of Standards for the Deployment 
of Test Purchase and Decoy Officers and ACPO and HMCE (2003) Manual of Standards for the 
Deployment of Undercover Officers. 
 
37.ACCESS TO INTERCEPTION PRODUCT 
 
For further information see ACPO/ACPOS/HMCE (2003) Manual of Standards for Accessing 
Communications Data. 
 
38. SURVEILLANCE PRODUCT 
 
Covert deployments, while often evidential in nature, provide a large volume of intelligence 
concerning the subject of an operation as well as their associates and other related issues.  
Further information can be found in ACPO and HMCE (2004) National Standards in Covert 
Investigations Manual of Standards for Surveillance. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Information or intelligence obtained from covert deployments (identified in 3 Source Assets) 
should be recorded onto the intelligence function and organisational memory. Sterile corridor 
processes should be considered at the time of the exchange of material between covert units and 
the intelligence function, including the sanitisation of information reports. Access to covert 
units will be through defined gateways. Covert deployments will be in line with control strategy 
priorities, but may also be used on other high profile crime issues.  Policy logs must be 
maintained and full risk assessments evident for all stages of the information exchange. Policies 
must be in place to allow direct submission of intelligence to operational command where 
immediate personal and/or operational risk is identified.  
 
39. FORENSIC DATA AND FORENSIC INTELLIGENCE POLICY 
 
The incorporation of forensic sources of information or intelligence enhances the NIM 
processes by giving a fuller picture of criminal behaviour and patterns. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Forensic data, in particular from linked crime scenes, should be used as source material and 
introduced into the intelligence function in line with control strategy objectives. Force level 
management of forensic hits will be in place to ensure inclusion within the T&CG process and 
ensure that information is acted on in a timely fashion. Forensic intelligence and data should be 
included in the crime series and target management forums along with access to SCAS data. 
Forensic and intelligence strategies and policies will enforce these standards. 
 
40. OTHER SERVICE/AGENCY TASKING 
 
Sources of information are available from a wide variety of other agencies and law enforcement 
bodies and must be used where appropriate. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Measures must be in place to identify and use external source opportunities to enable tasking 
and access to products through agreed gateways. Tasking another law enforcement agency’s 
CHIS via the National Source Management Unit at NCIS, which is in line with control strategy 
priorities or an approved major enquiry, will be subject to an auditable and justifiable request 
and authority process. 
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to the source assets 
element of NIM are outlined below. 
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Multiple Sources of Information 
Adopting the stated minimum standards will ensure that information is obtained from multiple 
sources. Engagement with partner agencies can provide a vast source of information and data 
relating to community issues which have previously been under-used.  Assets outside the scope 
of the Police Service can be realised and used to assist both force and local objectives. This will 
lead to an improved information base with regard to community priorities including crime and 
disorder issues. 
 
Ownership of Intelligence 
The minimum standards will create a culture of understanding that intelligence is everywhere 
and it is every police person’s job to find it and report it. Creating a minimum standard for 
gathering intelligence from other internal sources (for example, crime records, child protection 
records and incident records), and issues such as a focused CHIS strategy communicated to all 




An increased access to victims, witnesses and prisoners for the purpose of intelligence 
interviewing will lead to enhanced profiling and the development of a victimology. This will 
provide opportunities to realise the causes of crime and who might have committed them.  
Community sourced information will assist in the ability to identify local tension hot spots and 
disorder and behaviour effecting the quality of life in a community. 
 
Targeting and Tasking 
These standards will also lead to visible targeting of particularly disruptive elements in a 
community. Where the standards reflecting source assets are focused on control strategy 
priorities and intelligence requirements, a more structured and consistent intelligence-led 
approach at BCU (level 1) and service level (level 2) can be achieved. This will lead to 
precision tactical deployments, a more cost effective use of resources and better informed 
decision making – from constable to chief officer. 
 
41. MINIMUM ESTABLISHMENT POLICY 
 
The successful implementation of NIM and its subsequent operation as a model is dependent on 
ensuring that minimum levels of resources are in place in key roles. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A local force policy relating to intelligence functions must be in place and adopted at all levels.  
Key roles and the number of staff required to meet the expectation of a T&CG must be outlined, 
in accordance with the minimum standards established for those roles.  This includes: 
 
 Analysts; 
 Data input; 
 Evaluation and management; 
 Research and development; 
 Briefing and source management. 
 
Skills for Justice competency levels must also be met. 
 
42. SUCCESSION PLANNING 
 
The success of an intelligence structure is reliant on building a professional body of knowledge.  
Succession planning for the key roles identified in NIM is vital. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A succession planning policy must be in place and adhered to. It is likely to include initiatives 




43. ACPO LEAD FOR NIM IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
The appointment of an ACPO lead to ensure that respective forces remain focused on their 
requirements to meet the national minimum standards is an important factor in determining 
force performance. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
An officer of ACPO rank must be appointed as a lead in each police force to ensure the 
implementation and development of NIM and the maintenance of minimum standards. 
 
44. T&CG CHAIRS 
 
The minimum standards allow local determination of the chairing of local force T&CG 
meetings. Significant benefits can be obtained from the chief officer chairing the force strategic 
T&CG.  The roles are: 
 
 ACPO Chair of force strategic T&CG; 
 ACPO/Designated Deputy Chair of force tactical T&CG; 
 ACPO Chair of regional strategic and tactical T&CG; 
 BCU Commander Chair of BCU strategic T&CG; 
 BCU Commander/Designated Deputy Chair of BCU tactical T&CG. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
All police forces must ensure that the relevant T&CG chairs are appointed and have executive 
authority empowering them to make resource decisions. T&CG chairs should develop the 
necessary skills and knowledge of their role in line with ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice 
on Tasking and Co-ordination. 
 
45. DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE/HEAD OF PROFESSION (INTELLIGENCE) 
 
A senior member of the force with appropriate experience in the field of intelligence and/or 
proactive investigation can provide a focus for the efficient management of the intelligence 
process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
The staff member in the role must have ownership of the intelligence function, its development 
and strategic direction. The head of profession also has responsibility for the production and 
submission of the four intelligence products, the force control strategy and the intelligence 
requirement to the force T&CG. 
 
46. AUTHORITIES MANAGEMENT 
 
The establishment of a centrally located police authority’s bureau enables forces to manage the 
processes and administration concerned with covert operations and CHIS competently.  
Dedicated police staff can build a body of knowledge relating to NIM and intelligence processes 
through this. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must have all of the following in place: 
 
 RIPA authorising officer(s) in compliance with the Act, i.e., an ACPO and Detective 
 Superintendent at force level and a BCU commander locally; 
o Infrastructure and systems to ensure appropriate tasking of CHIS, surveillance, 
undercover and intrusion; 
 Records management for compliance with relevant legislation, manuals of standards 
and codes of practice; 
 Evidence of security and sterile corridors. 
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47. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT (SPOC) 
 
The code of practice and manual of standards for accessing communications data dictates that 
each force will have a SPOC department to manage all authorities and issues around accessing 
evidence or intelligence through defined communication systems. Accredited, highly trained 
personnel provide a point of contact for all police staff and other external agencies. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A telecommunications SPOC must be in place. SPOC departments are usually located centrally 
as a resource to individual forces through agreed gateways.  All staff operating in a 
telecommunications SPOC department must have completed the required accredited course. 
Post-holders must operate according to force policy (see ACPO/ACPOS/HMCE (2003) Manual 
of Standards for Accessing Communications Data) with regard to accepting requests and 
disseminating intelligence. 
 
48. INTELLIGENCE MANAGER 
 
An intelligence manager must be of appropriate status to be appointed. This is to ensure that 
experience is added to the analytical techniques and products before they are presented to the 
T&CG. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Intelligence managers are usually of inspector rank at the BCU level of operation. They must 
have successfully attended an intelligence management training course. As with the role of 
director of intelligence as described above, an intelligence manager is responsible for the 
intelligence function and intelligence product delivery locally. 
 
49. CHIS CONTROLLER AND DESIGNATED DEPUTY CHIS CONTROLLER 
 
These roles maintain the integrity of systems and processes and manage the risk involved in the 
day-to-day engagement with members of the criminal fraternity. These roles are mandated by 
the ACPO and HMCE (2004) Manual of Standards for Covert Human Intelligence Sources, Part 
3 – Roles and Responsibilities. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
The CHIS controller and designated deputy CHIS controller must have successfully completed 
suitable, accredited, CHIS training. They are responsible for: 
 
 Team supervision of field capability; 
 Supervising meetings with sources; 
 Ensuring day-to-day alignment with the T&CG control strategy and tactical priorities. 
 
They must also ensure staff compliance with: 
 
 RIPA; 
 Dissemination of intelligence policy; 
 DPA; 
 Internal auditing. 
 
The CHIS controller should be of inspector rank. For further information see ACPO and HMCE 
(2004) Manual of Standards for Covert Human Intelligence Sources. 
 
50. SOURCE HANDLER 
 
Forces must establish DSUs staffed by highly trained and accredited source handlers. For 
further information see the ACPO and HMCE (2004) Manual of Standards for Covert Human 
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Intelligence Sources. NIM supports this principle and recognises source handling as a core 
function in intelligence-led policing. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Source handlers must be a dedicated resource and appropriately trained to a minimum of 
Training Level 2 on a nationally accredited course. They are responsible for the effective, 
ethical and lawful recruitment, handling and co-handling of covert human intelligence sources 
in accordance with the requirements of the T&CG. 
 
51. ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY 
 
NIM analyses information and data from numerous sources, thereby providing an intelligent 
picture of policing issues. The delivery of proven analytical products and key assessments is 
fundamental to the success of this model. For further information contact the National Analyst 
Working Group (details in Appendix 6) and see ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice on 
Tasking and Co-ordination. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Sufficient accredited intelligence analysts must be in place to support tasking processes at both 
strategic and tactical levels, and in order to support the investigation of major crime. In addition 
to local analysts, it is highly beneficial to have centrally based analysts so that they can profile 
force control strategy priorities. There must also be an analytical capability to identify series 
offences both locally and centrally. A process of series identification should be established to 
enable reporting to the TT&CG and to aid crime series forums. Minimum staff numbers should 
take into account force crime/incident profiles and not be prescribed. 
 
52. HEAD OF PROFESSION – INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
 
This position is usually filled by a principal analyst with the post-holder being head of 
profession for all the intelligence analysts. This role carries responsibility for the strategic 
development and quality assurance of intelligence products, technical skill levels and training 
the workforce and will include joint training with partner agencies. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must ensure that a fully qualified and trained force principal analyst is appointed 
and authorised to provide a professional management focus for the analytical discipline. 
 
53. ANALYSTS ACCREDITATION 
 
The deployment of analysts across all levels of policing is a vital component of NIM. Resource 
strategies for analysts should be linked to the national training strategy for the discipline.  
Analysts must gain accreditation through training and workplace assessment in order to support 
prosecutions on the basis of standardised, high quality, intelligence products. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must ensure that they appoint sufficient analysts who are trained to appropriate 
national standards, to meet the needs of the entire scope of policing from the community and 
partnership level to serious and organised crime, working at all three levels of law enforcement. 
 
54. FIELD AND RESEARCH CAPABILITY 
 
Field and/or research intelligence officers (see 7 Research, Development and Analysis) are 
responsible for the provision of field and research support in accordance with the intelligence 
collection strategy. They provide the vital link between covert intelligence collection and 





Meeting the Criteria 
The deployment of field and/or research officers is aligned to control strategy priorities, unless 
otherwise sanctioned. Their role consists of the research and development of packages for action 
(usually to assist the investigative process), a sterile access to source handlers and proactive 
intelligence collection. They must successfully complete accredited Research and Development 
training at the earliest opportunity and prior to appointment to level 2/3 resources.  A specialist 
intelligence research capability should be provided where necessary. Such resources are usually 
based centrally and may consist of: 
 
 Prison liaison; 
 Sex offender and dangerous offender resources; 
 Financial investigators; 
 Crimestopper capability. 
 
All of these resources should be available to police forces through agreed gateways. 
 
55. TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT CAPABILITY 
 
Intelligence units will usually have their own technical field capability which will be able to 
deploy technical equipment against level 1 criminality, based on criteria set by the T&CG and 
in line with the area control strategy. Although line-managed at BCU level, professional 
development and procurement of technical equipment should be governed by the head of police 
force dedicated TSUs. For further information see 4 People Assets and also ACPO 
(forthcoming) Practice Advice on Resources and the People Assets of NIM. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be access to the TSU, which is usually located centrally. In smaller forces there 
must be access to a regional unit. TSU officers must be trained to relevant technical standards. 
See ACPO (2004) Deployment Standards for Technical Support in Tackling Volume Crime and 
CD published by the former PSDB known as The Yellow Book. 
 
56. INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT 
The timely recording, dissemination and subsequent management of information and data 
sources are crucial to the provision of a competent intelligence structure. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be sufficient capability to evaluate, input and manage information from a wide 
range of sources. Data quality, consistency, timeliness of input and compliance with relevant 
legislation and inputting standards must be ensured. The ACPO (2005) Code of Practice on the 
Management of Police Information and ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the Management of 
Police Information must be adhered to.  
 
57. DATA PROTECTION 
  
Compliance with legal provisions such as the DPA, PNC Codes and the ACPO (2005) Code of 
Practice on the Management of Police Information must be stringently adhered to in order to 
maintain the integrity and security of the intelligence process. This must not, however, prevent 
the exchange of information with partners in support of policing purposes. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Intrusive inspections must take place to ensure compliance. This must include the security of IT 
and information and intelligence assets. Data protection must be seen as part of the process of 
information management, rather than as a separate process to NIM. 
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58. DEDICATED IT SUPPORT 
 
In the continually changing world of information technology, intelligence IT systems must be 
sufficiently robust, efficient and subject to future proofing to ensure that the necessary capacity 
and quality of product is achieved. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A post holder must be in place centrally and accessible locally, in order to meet the critical 
incident recovery policy and to develop IT in accordance with needs. They must also ensure 
linkage between local systems and national information systems developments, for example, 
Impact.  Service level agreements (SLA) are signed off by the intelligence director and the head 
of IT. 
 
59. BRIEFING CAPABILITY 
 
See ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the National Briefing Model. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A briefing capability is the responsibility of the intelligence unit. This can be a dedicated role 
although it does not have to be. Briefing packages, particularly for the patrol function, must be 
prepared in accordance with T&CG tactical menu actions. The results emanating from briefings 
must be fed back into the organisational memory. 
 
60. TT&CG ACTIONS MANAGER 
  
This standard should be read in conjunction with ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the 
National Briefing Model and ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice on Tasking and Co-
ordination. The TT&CG actions manager role is that of an enforcer. It carries responsibility for 
arranging the execution of TT&CG actions, including follow-up actions allocated to other 
managers. It may also include responsibility for managing the briefing process. This role may 
be found on BCU and centrally at level 2. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must ensure that there is a capability responsible for co-ordinating actions 
emanating from the T&CG meetings, enforcing the delivery of those actions, monitoring 
progress and feeding back results to the T&CG and organisational memory. 
 
61. HIGH VISIBILITY/STRIKE TEAMS 
  
This standard should be read in conjunction with ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice on 
Tasking and Co-ordination. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 




 Public order units; 
 Tactical Support Groups; 
 The patrol function; 
 Cycle patrol; 
 Traffic, air and river support. 
 
If no dedicated capability is in place, a logistics capability to use neighbouring BCU or police 
force resources, necessary to meet T&CG requirements, should be evident. 
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62. JOINT AGENCY AND SPECIALIST OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE CELLS 
 
The formation of joint agency intelligence cells or cells set up specifically for major operations 
requires careful management and adherence to strict protocols. The following are common 
examples of joint agency and specialist intelligence cells: 
 
 CDRP; 
 Prisons, through adequate investment in prison intelligence officers; 
 Immigration investigations; 
 Serious crime investigations; 
 National security investigations and operations. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A policy must be in place in police forces to enable the use of multi-agency staff in a joint 
intelligence cell and should include agreed data sharing protocols, governance issues and 
security policies. Joint agency intelligence cells usually operate from a single site, with one 
common purpose dictated by a control strategy. 
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to NIM people assets 
are outlined below. 
 
Professionalising the Workforce 
Compliance with the minimum standards in respect of establishment policy and succession 
planning will create resilience within intelligence structures and enable business continuity. In 
addition, a standardisation of roles throughout the service will promote and enable cross-border 
cooperation and rationalisation of investigative activities.  The minimum standards give rise to a 
focused training strategy by training personnel to specific skill requirements. Training costs will 
be reduced through training key staff on the basis of need, while specialising has the effect of 
increasing professionalism in a particular area and thereby reducing personal and organisational 
risk. 
 
Corporate Standards and Ownership 
The appointment of an ACPO lead will ensure that NIM implementation and the development 
of NIM as a business model remains at the centre of the strategic processes of each police force.  
ACPO driving forward implementation provides a level of responsibility commensurate with 
the mandatory requirement to firmly establish NIM in day-to-day policing concepts.  
Appointing a head of profession (director of intelligence) along with maintaining the continual 
professional development of intelligence roles defined in NIM, and ensure maintenance of 
standards.  The appointment of T&CG chairs (with the appropriate level of responsibility and 
authority) will provide sustainable resource and deployment decisions and specific ownership of 
each level of the T&CG process. 
 
Legislative Compliance 
The provision of specialist SPOC advice and authority units is necessary in ensuring common 
standards of compliance with legislation and the police authorities processes applicable to NIM 
and associated policing disciplines. Central Authorities Bureaux and communications SPOC 
offices provide a protected knowledge base and streamlined compliance capability, which 
enables the intelligence and covert business community to more readily use and obtain 




Senior management specialists (with an in-depth understanding of the management of 
intelligence operations, NIM and related issues such as covert policing tactics) are essential to a 
professional intelligence structure and the development of NIM. Compliance with the minimum 
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standards in respect of directors of intelligence, intelligence managers, CHIS controllers and 
heads of analysis will give forces a strong leadership focus in respect of NIM. 
 
Analysis 
A highly trained analytical capability with career structures, appropriate grading and 
professional accreditation, is a core element in the implementation and continual development 
of NIM.  Implementation of the standards relating to analysis will result in the acquisition of a 
corporate analysis knowledge base, and improve the assessment of policing activity, thereby 
allowing informed decision making and promoting better quality data for higher quality 
intelligence products. 
 
Field and Research Capability 
An ability to build efficient intelligence packages on a foundation of comprehensive research 
and field operations will lead to improved investigations into targets, crime problems and 
identified hot spots.  Professionally managed and trained technical human resources will 
provide a tactical capability necessary for the development of intelligence tasking and tactical 




The importance and value of providing an efficient information and data management resource 
with systems maintained by dedicated IT support cannot be overemphasised.  Implementation of 
standards in respect of information management resources will reduce the risk of compromised 
sources, data and information. It also has the effect of increasing information flows.  High 
quality information management leads to improved intelligence communication and creates an 
audit trail to indicate why (justification) issues were, or were not, acted on. It also enables police 
forces to maintain a consistent flow of information and ensures that police staff have an up-to-
date knowledge and understanding of business problems. 
 
Effective Briefing and Debriefing 
Ensuring that the minimum standards are met will result in improved tasking and direction of 
patrol officers and that intelligence collection opportunities are optimised.  T&CG action 
managers driving forward the BCU or force business will ensure that the necessary resources 
are available and actions and tasks are acted on and completed. 
 
Tactical Response 
Implementation of this standard will deliver an increased focus on proactive policing in 
accordance with control strategy priorities and enable evaluated information to be quickly acted 
on, thereby encouraging police staff to support NIM. It will also promote public reassurance, 
help to resolve problems and disrupt targets, resulting in reduced crime. 
 
63. OPEN AND CLOSED SOURCE DATA 
 
Staff should be sufficiently trained and IT must be in place to fully exploit all available sources 
of data. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Both training and IT should be available to enable local or central access to open/closed source 
data such as: 
 
Forensic information 
 Shoe Mark Index; 
 Forensic medical training; 
 DNA database; 
 Weapons and injuries database; 
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Behavioural/offender profiling information 
 Catchem; 
 Murder Method Index; 
 Badman; 
 Fire investigation unit; 
 Rape and sexual offences; 






 National prisoner tracing; 
 






 National Voters; 
 CDA. 
 
For more information on these sources and others available to the Police Service, see the 
Directory of Information Sources in Appendix 3 of this guidance. 
 
64. INTELLIGENCE, CRIME, CUSTODY AND COMMAND AND CONTROL RECORDS 
AVAILABLE IN SEARCHABLE FORM 
 
All internal data sources must be developed to allow ready access, ease of search and analysis. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
The intelligence function should have IT access to data in a form that is capable of search and 
analysis through data IT applications. 
 
65. ACCESS TO HOLMES2/SCAS/NCF PROFILING DATA 
 
All major crime enquiries require the ability to interrogate national profiling data. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Following a risk assessment, there must be a capability for authorised access to national 
profiling intelligence databases through agreed policy gateways. A policy log should be in place 
of decisions made. This type of access usually assists a major enquiry SIO. See ACPO (2000) 
MIRSAP Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures Manual (forthcoming 
November 2005). 
 
66. ACCESS TO LIVE DATA EXCHANGE 
 
The ability to research and exchange information on national intelligence data enhances 
intelligence collection. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Links must be in place to enable access to national intelligence assets, i.e., ANPR, Livescan, 
Alert database, Antiques database, NCIS Desks and DNA. MOU, data sharing protocols and 
nominated staff to aid collection are highly recommended at both force and local levels in 
accordance with force data protection policies. 
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67. FULL DATA INTEGRATION MODEL 
 
The compilation of efficient strategic assessments requires access to, and research of, many 
diverse sources of data in order to form a comprehensive picture of issues affecting policing. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
IT access to the following types of data, possibly achieved through central data warehousing 
with local links to BCUs must be in place:  
 
 Stop and search; 
 Forensic data; 
 Human resources (HR) data; 
 Crime statistics; 
 Custody; 
 Domestic violence; 
 Firearms; 
 Budget and finance; 
 Business information; 
 Public/victim survey data. 
See also 2 System Assets. 
 
68. ACCESS TO HUMAN RESOURCES DATA 
 
While access to human resources data will inform strategic assessments, it is also necessary for 
day-to-day decision making. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must ensure that human resources data provides skills profiles, staffing levels and 
abstraction and sickness levels to assist operational decision making. Human resources data 
must enable fast time deployment in accordance with assessed risk and enhanced 
command/control. See also 2 System Assets. 
 
69. ACCESS TO EXTERNAL INFORMATION SOURCES 
 
The many sources of data now available through partnership approaches to policing provide 
sources of information that have previously remained unused. Intelligence requirements should 
be set to examine external information sources. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Local forces and BCUs must ensure access to other law enforcement agencies, government 
regulated organisations, business and company data. This should be achieved centrally through 
agreed gateways and authority protocols. Locally, access to external data can be achieved 
through CDRP agreements, particularly in planning preventative measures. 
 
Examples of external information sources include: 
 
 Public safety/road safety data – local authority; 
 Community intelligence – police/CDRP; 
 Quality of life data – census/survey; 
 Taxi/hackney carriage data – licensing departments; 
 Health and education data – local relevant authorities; 
 Local authority housing data. 
 
70. CROSS-BORDER INFORMATION SHARING 
 
Sharing information between neighbouring police forces and within police regions will enable a 
fuller picture of strategic policing issues to be developed. Similar structures at BCU level will 
give clearer insight into local issues. 
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Meeting the Criteria 
There must be access to neighbouring force and BCU strategic and tactical assessments to 
provide a comprehensive picture of strategic and local policing issues. 
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to the information 
sources element of NIM are outlined below. 
 
Improved Access to Information 
Establishing protocols which ensure access to all available information sources will enable 
greater research capability for analysts and others to enhance decision-making and justification 
processes. This will improve knowledge and awareness of external factors effecting policy and 
lead to high quality strategic assessments and well qualified intelligence products. 
 
Integrated IT Processes 
Application of the stated standards will lead to more robust and applicable IT policies with 
better security in place. IT functions will develop in line with need and this will assist in 
creating a national integration of force intelligence systems. Improved connectivity of data 
across all systems will provide more accurate, timely and efficient research and use of data. 
 
Improved Operational Effectiveness 
The establishment of minimum standards with respect to information sources will increase staff 
knowledge of the intelligence and investigative tools available for qualitative research. There 
will be better informed command and control of operational matters with officer profiling to 
specific requirement and an improved intelligence assessment.  This will also enable more 
effective management, risk assessments and improved officer safety. Intelligence products 
enhanced by a wider access to information sources and national intelligence databases will 
greatly improve local, force, regional and national intelligence-led processes. 
 
71. SANITISATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROTOCOLS IN PLACE 
 
The integrity of any intelligence system relies on ethical processes and legislative compliance. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be a policy and resources in place to enable hot intelligence assessments, human 
rights compliance, officer safety and duty of care considerations. 
 
72. COMPLIANCE WITH DATA PROTECTION ACT 
The DPA, ACPO (2000) PNC Compliance Strategy, ACPO (2002) Code of Practice for Data 
 
Protection and the ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the Management of Police Information 
provide minimum requirements for access to, and the retention and deletion of, information. All 
storage of information must be subject to the appropriate security measures. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be an information access, retention, review and security policy in place. Data 
Protection Officers will proactively and intrusively supervise compliance through thematic 
testing. 
 
73. AGREED DISSEMINATION POLICY 
 
In addition to data access agreements covered in Element 5 – Information Sources, protocols 
between law enforcement agencies and partners must be established with respect to the 
dissemination of information and intelligence material. 
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Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces should ensure that protocols are in place, both at a force and local level, governing 
the transfer of information and its subsequent dissemination. Agreements with CDRP and 
Criminal Justice Boards are examples of this process. 
 
74. PRIORITISATION OF DATA INPUT AND RESEARCH 
 
Published control strategies (see 9 Tasking and Co-ordination) should be used as a basis for 
prioritising data input and research. Other issues may take precedence, providing their tasking is 
subject to control mechanisms. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
BCU and force publication of control strategies should be evident and be seen to drive 
prioritised input and research. 
 
75. USE OF 5X5X5 AS STANDARD EVALUATION 
 
The National Information/Intelligence Report Form 5x5x5 is the only system recognised 
nationwide for the recording, evaluation and dissemination of information into the intelligence 
system.  
 
The ability of staff to have ready access to data input systems, in order to record information, 
will enhance intelligence collection.  The Impact Programme proposes the design of a national 
data warehouse system allowing all forces to exchange information and intelligence. This 
system is reliant on forces having common processes for information data inputting and 5x5x5 
information/intelligence reports. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
All forces must show evidence of the 5x5x5 system being used in line with the ACPO 
(forthcoming) Guidance on the Management of Police Information. There must also be evidence 
of staff training in respect of the 5x5x5 process, including evaluation and risk assessment (by 
the intelligence function) of submitted information. All forces must be compliant with the 
guidance mentioned above in respect of the data input of 5x5x5 information/intelligence reports. 
Direct input of information on to the intelligence process by electronic means must be available 
to staff. 
 
76. ELECTRONIC INPUT OF INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE REPORTS (5X5X5) 
See standard 75 Use of 5x5x5 as Standard Evaluation.  
Meeting the Criteria 
See standard 75 Use of 5x5x5 as Standard Evaluation.  
 
77. COMMON STANDARDS FOR DATA INPUT ON TO FORCE IT SYSTEMS 
See standard 75 Use of 5x5x5 as Standard Evaluation. 
Meeting the Criteria 
See standard 75 Use of 5x5x5 as Standard Evaluation. 
 
78. STANDARDISED SYSTEMS FOR AUTHORISING TARGET SELECTION 
 
Standard systems for target selection, managed through the relevant intelligence manager, 
provide auditable processes which allow decisions to be recorded in compliance with the 
principles of proportionality, justification and risk assessment. These processes are particularly 
important when target research and target profiles are authorised prior to T&CG sanction. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces and BCUs must implement standard target selection systems. Processes are 
authorised by intelligence managers and will evidence due account of such issues as community 
impact assessments and human rights principles. 
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79. PROTOCOLS CONCERNING THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE CODES/FLAGS TO 
SPEED COLLATION AND RETRIEVAL 
 
The ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the Management of Police Information and NCIS policy 
govern the use of codes and target flagging. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must demonstrate compliance with the relevant guidance and policy and have 
internal standard operating procedures in place. Practical application of such protocols must be 
evident. 
 
80. DATA MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION PROTOCOLS 
 
All data systems should be subject to intrusive and proactive management supervision and 
quality assurance protocols. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces should have data quality assurance protocols in place to ensure high data 
standards. These protocols should include defined review processes with respect to the 
maintenance of up-to-date intelligence records, file tracking and audit trails. Due consideration 
must be given to other related NIM standards and practice advice, for example, Data Protection 
Officers (see 4 People Assets) and OPSY (see 2 System Assets). 
 
81. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
Setting performance targets against specified control strategies and intelligence collection 
requirements will assist in maintaining the business focus of a force or BCU and encourage the 
need for good quality intelligence recording. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be evidence of the development of performance measures around the collection of 
actionable intelligence. This should be in accordance with force and/or local priorities as set in 
the control strategy and intelligence requirement and sanctioned by the T&CG process. CHIS 
recruitment in hard to reach groups/locations is an example for DSU staff. 
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to the information 
and intelligence recording element of NIM are outlined below. 
 
Recording, Dissemination and Retention Standards 
Compliance with the stated standards will provide consistent and timely inputting of 
information. Consistency of data standards brings effective communication, increases 
professionalism and reduces the likelihood of misunderstanding. This, in turn, will lead to 
increased confidence in the quality of intelligence. 
 
Accessible IT Systems 
Provision of intelligence forms (5x5x5) in electronic format enables easier access to information 
sources. Users of intelligence databases will also have faster access to information. Intelligence 
managers, operational heads and T&CG chairs will be given the ability to assess risks and 
threats more accurately. IT data standards through reduced bureaucracy will result in time and 
cost savings and create an increased security of information and intelligence. 
 
Performance Measures 
Establishing a performance regime synchronised with identified priorities will drive the 
corporate alignment of NIM across forces and BCU.  Performance measures can be tailored to 
fit with priorities when proactive resources are deployed.  Data quality assurance will help to 
remove the possibility of substandard intelligence products being developed on the basis of poor 
information collection and recording.  
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82. ACCESS TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT/SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT 
 
The means with which to support the intelligence-led policing process through technical support 
and surveillance must be available at all levels of policing. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There must be access to technical support and surveillance equipment at all levels of policing.  
BCUs may hold and deploy equipment through their own dedicated technical field capability or 
force TSU. Level 2 and 3 deployments will invariably be through dedicated covert resources or 
TSU departments. Access to specialist resources and equipment for all levels will be through 
agreed authorisation and tasking processes. 
 
83. NATIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT GUIDANCE USED AS A MINIMUM 
STANDARD (YELLOW BOOK) 
 
National standards for the procurement, deployment, training and authority processes for 
technical support are defined in a CD published by the former PSDB known as The Yellow Book 
and in ACPO (2004) Deployment Standards for Technical Support in Tackling Volume Crime. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Evidence of compliance with the above standards in the purchase of HOSDB approved 
equipment, training of operatives and adherence to deployment protocols must be evident. Force 
TSU managers should ensure that there is access to the appropriate standards manual and that 
procurement rules are in place to prevent the local purchasing of inappropriate equipment. 
 
84. OTHER STANDARD PRODUCTS 
 
In addition to the defined standard intelligence products, a corporate approach should be taken 
in the development of processes and documentation for all other intelligence functions. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Standard processes and documentation for the intelligence function should be corporately 
agreed and recorded with regard to such issues as the intelligence unit, terms of reference, 
source tasking, data search, surveillance, prison intelligence, other covert operations, multi/other 
agency product, CCTV/ANPR and risk assessments, together with the four intelligence 
products. 
 
85. STANDARDS FOR DELIVERY OF PRODUCT/SERVICES 
 
SLA provide expected standards of service delivery between departments, organisations or for 
individual operations, for example, between an intelligence manager and an SIO when the 
intelligence function is in operation during a major crime investigation. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A policy must be established to convey force minimum SLA requirements. 
 
86. MOU/INFORMATION EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS 
 
Similarly, an MOU should be developed to set out protocols between departments, agencies and 
organisations enabling effective joint working or partnership arrangements. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Protocols should be established to determine parameters within which research may be 
conducted or data secured to enable competent research to be undertaken for recommendations 
for resolutions to be made. Adherence to such protocols must be evidenced.  
 
See ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the Management of Police Information. 
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87. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST, RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY 
TRAINED TO NATIONAL STANDARDS 
 
Sufficient numbers of well-trained intelligence specialists are necessary to carry forward the 
business of a BCU or force.  
 
Meeting the Criteria 
BCU and forces, however limited their establishment of staff, must have access to sufficient 
numbers of trained intelligence specialists capable of meeting T&CG demands. National 
Specialist Law Enforcement Centre (NSLEC) training products or any products identified 
through National Learning Requirement research should be used. Staff must meet the levels of 
competency required by the Skills for Justice National Occupational Standards, see 4 People 
Assets. 
 
88. SYSTEM FOR DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE 
COLLECTION PLANS 
 
Processes should be in place which allow for the development and review of intelligence 
collection plans in line with the requirements of the T&CG and a method of reporting such 
actions. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Reviewing the progress of intelligence collection plans against tactical T&CG actions, 
refinement and recommendations are to be reported in the tactical assessment. Local systems 
enabling this standard to be achieved will be evident and reported in T&CG policy. 
 
89. DATA COLLECTION DIRECTED AND FOCUSED ON CONTROL STRATEGY 
 
The control strategy provides a focus for policing activity. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces and BCUs should be able to demonstrate that the tasking for information and data 
collection is focused on their respective control strategies. Exceptions to this standard can be 
considered where directed by the T&CG or SIO with authority during a major reactive enquiry. 
A policy determining the intelligence research and development capability for a murder enquiry 
is highly recommended. 
 
See also 6 Intelligence/Information Recording and ACPO (2000) MIRSAP Major Incident Room 
Standardised Administrative Procedures Manual (forthcoming November 2005). 
 
90. DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE TRIGGER PLANS 
 
The production of trigger plans used to alert tactical resources to notifiable incidents and to 
specify response actions, is recognised as good practice. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A system must be in place to alert tactical resources to respond to a specified set of 
circumstances using tried and tested methods. Methods adopted should be available from good 
practice which has been committed to an organisational memory process. 
 
91. ACCESS TO OTHER AGENCIES’ TECHNICAL RESOURCES AND EXPERTISE 
 
Access to technical resources and expertise held by other agencies will provide a valuable 
additional capability to gather intelligence and evidence. 
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Meeting the Criteria 
This may include databases, CCTV systems and specialist highways, environmental health and 
licensing officers (see also 2 System Assets). 
 
92. ALIGN JOINT INTELLIGENCE CELLS TO FORCE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS 
 
Joint Intelligence Cells, as described in 4 People Assets, must follow all of the same principles 
and practices as defined for the force intelligence process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Policies and protocols must be in place which define common and corporate processes for Joint 
Intelligence Cells aligned to the force intelligence model. 
 
93. TASKING CAPABILITY OF WIDER INTELLIGENCE ASSETS 
 
All available resources, both internally and externally, should be used to gather intelligence and 
be subject to the tasking process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Tasking processes should be in place for the wider policing community including PCSOs, 
Special Constabulary, local authority park rangers, street wardens, NHW, shop watch and river 
watch. A directory of assets should be recorded and available to staff during intelligence 
research. 
 
94. IMPACT AND BENEFIT ASSESSMENT 
 
Any authorised intelligence collection and tasking will need to be assessed for its impact and 
benefits against the overall tactical and strategic direction of the BCU and/or force. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Local forces and BCUs should consider the use of community impact assessments within the 
risk assessment process. Operational costs and effective communication and briefing and 
similar processes need to be subject to analysis and not just identified through a tactical review. 
 
95. DEVELOPMENT OF ENHANCED TARGET AND PROBLEM PROFILES 
 
Intelligence products, such as target and problem profiles must be subject to continual 
enhancement and development. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces and BCUs must evidence the use and development of corporate target and problem 
profile templates. Systems capable of being scanned for crime and incident problems should be 
in place. Analysis is to include hypothesis on causation and recommendations for resolution. 
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards for research and development 
are outlined below. 
 
Effective Research and Development 
An efficient intelligence unit will be able to provide detailed research into authorised targets and 
problems using the suggested intelligence collection model.  
This will lead to the development of high quality intelligence products.  Access to all available 
intelligence collection techniques, including surveillance, technical observation, 
telecommunications analysis and forensic computer expertise will aid this research and may 
reduce time spent on target file development.  First class intelligence products will inform 
decision making and reduce both risk and investigation costs.  The creation of systems and 
processes which allow for the review of collection plans and which ensure data collection 
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remains focused on control strategy priorities, will permit a more comprehensive and detailed 
level of analysis and product delivery according to need. 
 
Corporate Standards 
Ensuring that intelligence unit functions and documentation are conducted to a corporate 
standard will enable effective communication between command and analysis and with 
neighbouring BCUs and forces. This process can be supported by the existence of SLAs and 
MOUs, particularly when exchanging information between agencies.  A corporate response to 
specific circumstances through the development of intelligence trigger plans will assist the 
T&CG function. When linked to an organisational memory process, there will be improvements 
in harnessing and promulgating best practice. This, in turn, will inform policy review.  Co-
ordination of the procurement of technical equipment and technology through Force TSU 
Managers, with adherence to national standards, will prevent unnecessary cost, duplication of 
purchases and potential health and safety issues. Equipment can also be more effectively 
assessed and evaluated. 
 
Skills and Training 
The benefits of having skilled and trained staff within the intelligence unit structure will be 
borne out by the delivery of high quality, well researched products, in which command teams 
can have confidence.  National training products, while still under development, are available 
through Centrex, NSLEC and various forces and should be adopted by all intelligence units.  A 
resource formula ensuring establishment levels are maintained will enable more effective 
planning to meet priority research needs.  For further information see 4 People Assets and 
ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice on Resources and the People Assets of NIM. 
 
The Wider Intelligence Community 
Closer links between the Police Service and external partners will provide a wider variety of 
information and intelligence sources.  Many external agencies have access to technical 
resources, data and expertise which are of value in intelligence collection.  The extended police 
family of PCSOs, wardens, rangers, traffic wardens, parish special constables, together with 
volunteer organisations, such as neighbourhood and farm watch are an invaluable source of 
information. When included in tasking and collection planning the intelligence capability is 
greatly enhanced.  Permanent Joint Intelligence Units, combining police, customs, immigration 
and other agencies are established in many forces. Experience has shown that where processes 
which are common to NIM standards are developed, such units function without difficulty. 
 
96. FORCE POLICY DICTATING CORPORATE STANDARDS OF PRODUCTS 
 
The defined intelligence products must follow nationally recognised templates. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
The standards adopted must reflect NIM operational standard templates for the four intelligence 
products. For further information see ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice on Tasking and Co-
ordination. 
 
97. FORCE POLICY DICTATING TIMING AND CIRCULATION OF PRODUCTS 
 
The content and timing of the delivery of strategic and tactical assessments must be 
synchronised at local, force, regional and national level. A corporate circulation policy is 
necessary to ensure the appropriate audience for the respective product is reached. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police force and BCU policies setting out the corporate standards for content reflecting national 
guidance, timescales and circulation of the intelligence products must be developed in line with 
ACPO NIM minimum standards. Timing must reflect local, force and regional needs. Business 
planning cycles will be a significant driver of delivery timings. Confidentiality must be 
considered and compliance with GPMS must be evident. 
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98. FORCE POLICING/BUSINESS PLAN INFORMED BY INTELLIGENCE 
PRODUCTS 
 
Strategic assessments at all levels must inform the policing and business planning processes of a 
force and BCU. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Strategic assessments must be used in the business planning process and should be available for 
chief officer consultation with police authorities to enable issues of resource applications to be 
addressed, and for BCU commanders during CDRP consultation phases. 
 
99. STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS 
 
Strategic assessments are vital to the functioning of NIM. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Strategic assessments must reflect NIM templates and be reported as a minimum at BCU, force 
and regional levels. Strategic assessments must be used by the strategic T&CG to agree control 
strategies and intelligence requirements. 
 
100. TACTICAL ASSESSMENTS 
 
Tactical assessments enable effective targeting, tasking and co-ordination based on information 
that has been provenanced through an analytical process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Tactical assessments should reflect NIM templates and be reported as a minimum at BCU, force 
and regional levels. They should identify priority locations, subjects, crime and incident series 
and high risk issues in accordance with the control strategy and, in turn, recommend tactical 
options for prevention, intelligence and enforcement, and suggest potential communications 
strategies. 
 
101.  TARGET/PROBLEM PROFILES ONLY COMMISSIONED BY T&CG, 
INTELLIGENCEMANAGER OR SIO IN MAJOR ENQUIRY 
 
Target and problem profiles create greater clarity and definition around the respective issues of 
priority, prolific and recidivist offenders or those suspected of more serious crime and priority 
locations or crime types. These profiles are as relevant to neighbourhood policing issues, such 
as problem families or locations, as they are to serious and organised crime groups.  Target and 
problem profiles should, in the main, relate to the control strategy and stated intelligence 
requirement. In some circumstances the commission of a serious crime, major crime 
investigation, issues of community concern or identified signal crimes, fall outside of the 
control strategy remit. In these cases a corporate line of authority for commissioning must be 
adopted.  See ACPO (2005) Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of 
Neighbourhood Policing (Draft). 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
These profiles must reflect NIM templates. They will be commissioned by tactical T&CGs to 
determine tactical resolutions; strategic T&CGs to assist with greater definition prior to setting 
the control strategy; an intelligence manager, in exceptional circumstances, for limited profiling 
to aid research in accordance with the control strategy, and a SIO in a major or serious crime 
enquiry to aid the investigation.  In all cases a common approach to commissioning must be 
undertaken. Profiles should be self-explanatory and evidenced by debate with the T&CG chair 
or SIO and analyst.  Detailed documents are only necessary in order to delve in depth to a 




102. APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS AND TECHNIQUES 
 
All intelligence products must be subject to a wide range of analytical products and techniques.  
For further information contact the National Analyst Working Group (details in Appendix 6) 
and see ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice on Tasking and Co-ordination. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Analytical techniques and products (listed in 7 Research, Development and Analysis) must be 
used effectively to develop the intelligence products. An appropriate gateway must be 
established for tasking analysts via the T&CG and/or the intelligence manager. This will ensure 
the analyst’s product is focused on the intelligence requirement and control strategy and is not 
used solely for administrative purposes such as performance management. A hypothesis on 
causation and recommendations for resolution will be included in the intelligence products.  
 
103. MANAGEMENT OWNERSHIP 
 
Chief officers, BCU commanders and senior intelligence managers are responsible for the 
ownership of intelligence products. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Directors of intelligence and BCU intelligence managers are responsible for the delivery of 
intelligence products and corporate publications. Final approval of the relevant strategic 
assessments must be given by chief officers and BCU commanders.  It must not be left to the 
analyst to compile intelligence products. Senior managers must be given responsibility for 
different aspects of the products and must ensure the delivery of the necessary information and 
data to the analyst as determined in policy standards. Available NIM Assets must be used to 
determine qualified recommendations. 
 
104. PRE-CIRCULATION AND READING OF PRODUCTS PRE-T&CG 
 
The speed and efficiency of the T&CG process is assisted by pre-reading of assessments by 
attendees. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces and BCUs must make assessments available in a timely manner, allowing pre-
meeting reading time for attendees. 
 
105. ANALYST AS A STANDING MEMBER AT T&CG 
 
The role of the analyst and analytical products are a fundamental part of NIM. An analyst is a 
key member of the T&CG process. Analysts will provide interpretation of the analysis within 
the intelligence products that drive the T&CG process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces and BCUs must ensure that an analyst is present at all T&CG meetings in order 
that a qualified interpretation of the analysis can be given and is used in the development of 
intelligence products. 
 
106. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT FLOWS 
 
The two-way flow of an intelligence assessment between community level and national level 
via BCUs, force, regions and national organisations is critical to the success of intelligence-led 
policing. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
BCU assessments must inform the force assessments which, in turn, will inform the regional 
assessments and United Kingdom Threat Analysis (UKTA) via NCIS. The process must also be 
reciprocal and operate at both strategic and tactical levels. This will not be simple aggregation 
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but will be used, in association with other intelligence, to inform the process, in order to 
determine priorities. Timelines for reporting must be set in policy and met. 
 
107. INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE 
 
The exchange of intelligence across all boundaries is particularly relevant to target profiles 
relating to the travelling criminal or in identifying noteworthy trends or themes. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
IT systems must be in place for sharing intelligence products and T&CG outcomes with 
neighbouring BCUs, forces and regions. This should also include processes for receiving 
feedback. 
 
108. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT 
 
Operational intelligence assessments are key to remaining focused during agreed T&CG 
tasking. For further information see ACPO (forthcoming) Practice Advice on Tasking and Co-
ordination. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
An operational intelligence assessment must take place to ensure that investigations remain 
focused in order to: 
 
 Prevent mission creep; 
 Identify priorities for the operation’s intelligence effort; 
 Focus intelligence gathering; 
 Inform resource decisions; 
 Guide investigative activities; 
 Verify that protocols, such as the correct authorisations, are present; 
 Highlight diversification from agreed objectives; 
 Aid compliance with HRA, RIPA and other legislation. 
 
109.  COMMAND TRAINING/APPRECIATION PROGRAMME RELATIVE TO  
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS AND ANALYSTS 
 
Commanders and intelligence managers must fully understand intelligence products and the 
analytical process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A full understanding within command of the analytical role and intelligence products is 
essential. National, regional or local appreciation programmes relating to intelligence products 
and analysis are necessary and must be in place. Training packages must reflect the minimum 
standards listed in this manual. 
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to the intelligence 
products element of NIM are outlined below. 
 
Intelligence Products – Standard Format and Delivery 
The compilation of standard intelligence products and the appropriate use of archiving will 
allow the inclusion of standard formats to improve compliance with legislative requirements 
such as HRA, DPA, RIPA and Freedom of Information Act 2000. The inclusion of human 
rights obligations in respect of proportionality and justification. Corporate civil liability will be 
reduced by having justification in place for operational targeting. 
 
Strategic and Tactical Assessments 
Strategic assessment products create the ability to engage with policy makers regarding business 
priorities from a scientific, knowledge-based position. Resource and performance issues, when 
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aligned with regional and national processes, can be tied to control strategy priorities.  New and 
emerging trends or threats outside the control strategy can be identified by the tactical 
assessment and then fed back into the strategic assessment.  Applying standard analytical 
products can provide more timely and accurate identification of priority locations and the ability 
to respond more effectively to emerging issues and series crime and incidents. 
 
Target and Problem Profiles 
High quality profiling can reduce the criminal justice attrition rate and reduce priority and 
prolific offending through targeting the correctly identified offenders and problems.  Sharing 
profiles with neighbouring BCUs and forces will lead to better targeting of travelling criminals 
that do not respect artificial BCU and force boundaries. 
 
Operational Intelligence Review 
Continual operational review and results analysis can be used by command to aid performance 
measurement and to develop an organisational memory capability. 
 
Training 
As with all areas of NIM, the provision of training products to ensure a full understanding of the 
available analytical techniques and intelligence product development, will enhance the force and 
BCU capability. 
 
110. T&CG POLICY 
 
Tasking and co-ordination is essential to the NIM process and requires policy to be developed 
by forces. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
T&CG policy should detail the key attendees, products and timescales in line with national 
standards and good practice, reinforcing use of national minimum standards for strategic and 
tactical assessments and use as a core decision making document by command teams.  NIM is 
not purely focused on crime. Strategic and tactical assessments which have been created using 
community intelligence as an information source are likely to indicate issues of disorder and 
social decay as being important areas for local police to take action. This will clearly change the 
likely direction of decision making at the T&CG meeting. 
 
111. CONSISTENCY IN T&CG MEETINGS THROUGHOUT THE FORCE 
 
Co-ordination of T&CG processes to ensure consistent activity will improve intelligence flows 
and assessments. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Local tasking and co-ordination groups must be arranged consistently to time with the rest of 
the force and take account of the regional and national picture. Compliance will enable a greater 
use of intelligence products to inform others and to assist in the collaboration with, and tasking 




Meeting the Criteria 
See standard 44 T&CG Chairs 
 
113. ENGAGEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS IN THE STRATEGIC T&CG PROCESS 
 
Stakeholders and partner agencies play a key role in informing the strategic assessment and  
influencing strategic tasking and co-ordination processes. 
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Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces and BCUs should evidence the involvement of stakeholders in the strategic 
process.  This may include Police Service or Police Authority representatives at force level, and 
the chief executive and other key CDRP, Local Safety Partnership Team and/or Drugs Action 




NIM tasking and co-ordination processes require regulation and inspection, in order to maintain 
standards. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must develop a thematic inspection template to assess the effectiveness of T&CG 
action setting. This must centre on the use of the control strategy and outputs linked to 
operational performance and reporting at performance reviews. 
 
115. STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 
 
Strategic assessments must be compiled in accordance with minimum standards. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces and BCUs must evidence commission and use of strategic assessments as a core 
decision making document. The assessments will adhere to the national template. The 
assessment is to be used in business planning processes to enable the setting of force and local 
priorities as reported in the control strategy. This will also enable resource, funding and 
communication strategies to be set. 
 
116. TACTICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Tactical assessments must be compiled in accordance with minimum standards. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces and BCUs must evidence the commission and use of tactical assessments as a core 
decision making document. The assessments must adhere to the national template and 
recommend actions from the menu of tactical options. These options must be adopted in 
accordance with the control strategy. Target and problem profiles may also be commissioned to 
aid definition of a problem raised, see 8 Intelligence Products. The tactical assessment will 
review and amend intelligence requirements according to force needs. It must, however, take 
account of force control strategy priorities and report on them as necessary. 
 
117. REGIONAL ST&CG AND TT&CG 
 
Tasking and co-ordination must continue into the regional arena to ensure the effective targeting 
of criminality at levels 2 and 3. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces must demonstrate active participation in regional ST&CG and TT&CG, in 
adherence to the ACPO approved protocols. 
 
118. ATTENDEES AT ST&CG AND TT&CG 
 
Key personnel and role functions must attend ST&CG and TT&CG. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
ST&CG should include relevant representation from operations, traffic, crime management, 
community safety, intelligence analysts and partners. Attendance criteria must be set down in 
local T&CG policy.  TT&CG may include representation from all departments. Attendance 
need not be rank specific, however, and attendees should have the authority over task-able 
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resources. Attendees may include partner agencies, CDRP representation and the Probation 
Service. Security of information and assets, however, must be taken into consideration. 
 
119. SANCTION OF THE CONTROL STRATEGY 
 
ST&CGs must sanction the control strategy. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Priority issues for prevention, intelligence and enforcement must be identified in the control 
strategy. The professional heads of the respective disciplines should be consulted and play an 
active role in ensuring accurate and informed strategies are set. 
 
120. SANCTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT 
 
ST&CGs must sanction the intelligence requirement.  
 
Meeting the Criteria 
ST&CG provides the principle sanction of a requirement on all staff to secure intelligence to fill 
intelligence and knowledge gaps in line with the control strategy. This requirement must be 
reviewed and amended according to need, by the TT&CG. 
 
121. MINIMUM 6-MONTHLY REVIEW OF ST&CG 
 
The setting of strategic direction requires review to ensure that the appropriate policing focus is 
maintained. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
The ST&CG must sit every 6 months with the minimum of a paper review at 3 monthly 
intervals.  The meetings must review the control strategy and amend this as necessary, taking 
into account performance, effectiveness of the strategies set, emerging threats, and trends and 
resource capability. 
 
122. BRIEFING POLICY 
 
The actions set in accordance with the tactical menu must be delivered to the patrol and 
investigative function through effective briefing. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Minimum standards for briefing must be adopted, including strategies and effective delivery 
mechanisms, see ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the National Briefing Model.  Daily 
management meetings, briefings and LAG meetings are not a T&CG meeting as they are not 
driven by the intelligence products review. These informal tasking meetings may use remote 
conferencing facilities due to the geography of a BCU.  Daily meetings should be chaired by a 
local commander or their deputy and reinforce and maintain the focus of TT&CG decisions. 
Briefings should be conducted by the appropriate operational lead and inform designated teams 
of their tasking requirement while LAGs should be chaired in accordance with partnership 
arrangements and inform the T&CG process. 
 
124. LEVEL 2 RESOURCE ALLOCATION CRITERIA 
 
The allocation of finite level 2 resources should be governed by set protocols. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There should be a transparent policy and decision-making process in place for the application 
and allocation of level 2 resources primarily in support of priority issues reported in the force 
control strategy or in support of major investigations. BCU command representation at either 
level 2 T&CG or resource forum is highly recommended. 
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IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to both the strategic 
and tactical tasking and co-ordination elements of NIM are outlined below. 
 
Strategic Direction 
Effective ST&CG processes which use well-defined intelligence products will create a better 
informed Police Service with a greater understanding of the risks to performance and efficient 
service delivery. Informed strategic direction will lead to improved planning processes.  The 
adoption of minimum standards for ST&CG will focus operational strategies on key priorities, 
CHIS recruitment according to need, forensic resources to locations, and people and patrols to 
hot spots and priority locations.  The ST&CG maintains the currency of control strategies and 
allows flexibility to include emerging trends or issues. Well-informed strategic direction will 
enable and drive data sharing requirements for common and justifiable aims. 
 
Tactical Delivery 
Compliance with TT&CG minimum standards and disciplines will lead to more officers being 
focused on targeting the most active criminals, patrolling locations of the highest priority and 
collecting intelligence on key needs.  Maintaining focus through strong co-ordination will 
ensure operations are only commissioned where necessary.  The consequential improvement in 
planning will lead to greater officer safety and more effective deployment of resources.  Tasking 




Tasking processes, particularly at the strategic level, should include full integration with 
partnership arrangements. Involvement of local politicians in ST&CG will ensure overview and 
understanding of operational and resource conflicts.  Improved integration in the tasking and co-
ordination process with partner agencies, i.e., DATs/drug reference groups, youth crime 
offender teams and other local authority bodies will enhance action setting linked to partnership 
development and joint ownership.  Partnership involvement will assist with the development of 
reassurance programmes by engaging partners through the application of the tactical menu.  The 
adoption of these minimum standards reinforces the principles of the CDA. 
 
Performance 
Effective tasking regimes, creating high quality targeting processes will lead to improved 
quality of prosecution case files and the reduction in, and increased conviction rates for, 
recidivist offenders.  Results analysis used by command to aid performance review and develop 
organisational memory will create greater understanding of resource capabilities. This will 
enable forces and BCUs to link T&CG decisions and outputs to performance.  Robust tasking 
and targeting sanction will provide auditable processes leading to improved legislative 




Ensuring the full integration of tasking and co-ordination and delivery of strategic assessments 
at local, force, regional and national level, will enable government to produce informed 
priorities through the National Threat Assessment. The implementation of level 2 tasking 
policies will also lead to greater effectiveness in managing cross-border criminality between 
BCUs and forces. 
 
125. INVESTIGATIVE CAPABILITY 
 




Meeting the Criteria 
There must be evidence of a tactical investigative capability able to meet the tasking 
requirements of TT&CG, both at force and BCU level. Establishment numbers of such teams is 
not prescribed but staff must be trained to a high level of investigative skills. 
126. RED CIRCLE POLICY 
 
Intelligence staff members need to be dedicated to fulfilling T&CG actions and to retaining the 
profile of control strategy priorities. In addition specialist intelligence roles must retain a 
position of covertness. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Policy must be implemented which prevents the use of intelligence staff for other functions 
unless very exceptional circumstances dictate. This policy will include analysts, intelligence 
management, briefing and co-ordination and those in covert roles, i.e., CHIS handling, 
surveillance and TSU. 
 
127. TACTICAL CAPABILITY 
 
T&CGs must be aware of available tactical capability to ensure there is a balance of work and 
tasking in accordance with the tactical menu. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Police forces and BCUs must evidence the following capabilities as being present: 
 
 Sufficient tactical and operational capability to respond to fast time intelligence and 
tactical resolution through a fast track process; 
 A high visibility patrol capability and general policing or sector options; 
 Access to covert resources, i.e., surveillance, test purchase and undercover; 
 Tactical traffic management options; 
 Mutual aid agreements with neighbouring BCUs and forces on a regional or national 
level through force and regional T&CG structures; 
 Capability to provide operational response to ANPR operations; 
 Crime reduction/prevention resources to assess and review reduction and prevention 
opportunities. 
 
128. TACTICAL PLANS 
 
Tactical plans must be developed by owners appointed and tasked by the TT&CG. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Tactical plans must accord with the tactical menu and control strategy priorities. Inspection will 
evidence compliance as recorded in TT&CG minutes and action setting. Copies of plans 
developed in a corporate style must be retained in force organisational memory systems. 
 
129. TRIGGER PLANS 
 
Trigger plans allow for instant, controlled and co-ordinated response to particular events, 
incidents or crime types. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Trigger plans must be in place to direct response capability to undertake certain tasks on the 
occasion of a particular event or circumstance occurring. 
 
IMPACTS AND BENEFITS 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to the tactical 





The use of T&CG will create a co-ordinated response inclusive of all resources available within 
the organisation, as well as providing access to the resources of other agencies.  The ability to 
make faster and more accurate decisions, guided by the control strategy and intelligence 
requirement, will mean that forces can make a more timely response to operational problems or 
targets at all levels of operation. This will also lead to the earlier arrest of offenders. 
 
Professional Investigation 
Implementation of the minimum standards for tactical resolution will lead to dedicated tactical 
investigation teams. These dedicated teams will lead to better performance in terms of improved 
evidential standards, reduced attrition rates and increases in the detection rate. The direction 
offered through T&CG will enable forces to focus on gaining the best evidence of worst 
offences to help secure more convictions. This should, in turn, have a qualitative impact 
throughout the criminal justice system. 
 
130. RESULTS ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 
 
Results analysis is an analytical technique which can be used to inform the NIM process. It 
should be used to assess the success of actions endorsed by the T&CG. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
T&CG commissioning of results analysis and operational review must be evidenced. 
Recommendations must be reflected in tactical assessments and operational plans and the 
organisational memory updated. This is particularly necessary when using technology or after a 
failed operation. 
131. MONITOR AND REVIEW OF RIPA AUTHORITIES 
 
The usefulness of information gained as a result of RIPA authorities will also require review, 
and policies will need to be in place to guide this process. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
Forces must undertake a proactive review of RIPA authorities and ensure that the retention 
policy is adhered to. This is usually a function of the person or team with responsibility for the 
management of authorities, see standard 46 Authorities Management. Intelligence gained under 
an authority is usually located elsewhere (see standard 38 Surveillance Product) but will be 
subject to assessment and input on to the intelligence function as required. 
 
132. NATIONAL BRIEFING MODEL 
 
The ability to brief and debrief effectively is critical to the success of intelligence-led policing. 
The essence of NIM is to tailor the response to the problem in hand. This is inherently difficult 
to achieve if officers are not briefed as to what and where the problem is. Conversely, it is 
difficult to identify and address problems with any degree of success if debriefing systems are 
ineffective. In order to maximise the usefulness of harvested intelligence, effective briefings and 
debriefings are essential. See also ACPO (forthcoming) Guidance on the National Briefing 
Model. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
A standardised and structured briefing/debriefing process, using the National Briefing Model, 
must be implemented. This will ensure the effective tasking and briefing of the patrol function 
and enable assessment of intelligence product accuracy and timeliness and also allows gap 
analysis to improve the product. 
 
133. ORGANISATIONAL MEMORY 
 
The evaluation of the outcomes and processes of operations should be fed into corporate 
knowledge. This will improve the expertise of staff involved and lead to the improved 
effectiveness of future operations. 
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Meeting the Criteria 
Operation logs, operational reviews and case histories should all be examined. The results and 
analysis of this examination must be added to the organisational memory through the NIM 
process and in line with control strategy objectives or emerging high risk issues.  A system for 
monitoring and reviewing tactical decisions, operational plans and results ensures that 
operational and intelligence tasking is compliant with the HRA. It also provides an audit trail 
for subsequent scrutiny. Police forces must have in place systems for recording, monitoring and 
reviewing tactical decisions, operational plans and results to ensure that operational and 
intelligence tasking is compliant with the HRA. The subsequent audit trail will then be suitable 
for later scrutiny by third parties. 
 
135. COMMUNITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REVIEW 
 
In order to fully assess the impact and success of operations it is necessary to consult with 
partner agencies and the wider community. This is especially important where operations are in 
response to locally identified problems. 
 
Meeting the Criteria 
There should be evidence of the use of community impact assessments as part of the results 
analysis. This will include such questions as: 
 
 Was activity implemented as planned? 
 Did the problem change after activity? 
 Why was this? 
 Did activity cause displacement? 
 Did new offenders move in?  
 
This will evidence that forces have worked with partners to establish the impact on the 
community of actions implemented. 
 
Impacts and Benefits 
The impacts and benefits of meeting all of the minimum standards related to the 
intelligence/operational review element of NIM are outlined below. 
 
Better Learning and Development Opportunities 
The evaluation aspects of operational review within NIM will mean that the relevant skills 
needed by police staff will be identified at an early stage. This knowledge will then inform the 
decision-making process for the distribution of human resources within NIM. Such evaluation 
will also allow for the identification of knowledge gaps for individual staff or groups of staff, 
allowing focused and relevant training programmes to be developed. The conduct of an 
operational review gives the opportunity to recognise good work. Positive feedback within the 
organisation will improve motivation and engender more thought and attention being given to 
the production of intelligence reports, and errors being corrected quickly and easily. Effective 
review also avoids the situation where the same mistakes are repeatedly made, improving the 
organisational memory, processes and performance. 
 
Increased Availability of Good Practice 
The implementation of an operational review process will lead to improved arrangements for 
harnessing, assisting and promulgating good practice. Appropriate and timely recording and 
dissemination of good practice will mean officers have ready access to corporate memory and a 
knowledge base. In this way the identification of good practice can be used to create better 
operational solutions and improve the formulation of operational policing policy. The increased 
availability of good practice increases learning ability, avoids duplication, reduces costs and 





Improved Operational Effectiveness 
The use of operational review creates an in-built audit trail of operational decision making and 
its results. It also leads to a more informed response to incidents. The learning that comes from 
the review process will lead to improved arrangements for exploiting scientific and 




*              *               *               *               * 
 
 
This excerpt from Appendix 2 of the ‘Guidance on the National Intelligence Model’ 
(ACPO/Centrex, 2005: 111-159) is a faithful reproduction with the minor exceptions of 
editorial amendments to correct grammatical errors. 
 
